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Abstract 
 
Despite universal access entitlements to the public healthcare system in Ireland, over 
half the population is covered by voluntary private health insurance.  The market 
operates on the basis of community rating, open enrolment and lifetime cover.  A set 
of minimum benefits also exists, and two risk equalisation schemes have been put in 
place but neither was implemented. 
 
These schemes have proved highly controversial.  To date, the debate has primarily 
consisted of qualitative arguments.  This study adds a quantitative element by 
analysing a number of pertinent issues. 
 
A model of a community rated insurance market is developed, which shows that 
community rating can only be maintained in a competitive market if all insurers in 
the market have the same risk profile as the market overall.  This has relevance to 
the Irish market in the aftermath of a Supreme Court decision to set aside risk 
equalisation. 
 
Two reasons why insurers’ risk profiles might differ are adverse selection and risk 
selection.  Evidence is found of the existence of both forms of selection in the Irish 
market. 
 
A move from single rate community rating to lifetime community rating in Australia 
had significant consequences for take-up rates and the age profile of the insured 
population.  A similar move has been proposed in Ireland.  It is found that, although 
this might improve the stability of community rating in the short term, it would not 
negate the need for risk equalisation. 
 
If community rating were to collapse then risk rating might result.  A comparison of 
the Irish, Australian and UK health insurance markets suggests that community 
rating encourages higher take-up among older consumers than risk rating.  Analysis 
of Irish hospital discharge figures suggests that this yields significant savings for the 
Irish public healthcare system. 
 
This thesis has implications for government policy towards private health insurance 
in Ireland. 
 
 xiii 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Private health insurance is a widely used method of healthcare financing in Ireland.  
Despite universal access entitlements to the public healthcare system, over 50% of 
the Irish population is covered by private health insurance, the purchase of which is 
voluntary.  The Irish private health insurance market is heavily regulated, with 
legislation specifying community rating (everyone must be charged the same 
premium for the same plan), open enrolment (insurers may not refuse to cover an 
applicant) and lifetime cover (insurers may not refuse to renew cover), with some 
minor exceptions.  A set of prescribed minimum benefits, which must be covered by 
any eligible plan, is also set out in regulations. 
 
Having consisted of a State-owned monopoly provider for 40 years, the market first 
experienced competition in 1997.  When the market was opened up to competition 
as a result of a European directive, the legislation that was put in place also allowed 
for a risk adjustment mechanism – risk equalisation as it is known in Ireland – to be 
implemented in order to support community rating. 
 
Risk equalisation proved highly controversial however, and despite schemes being 
on the statute books from 1996 to 1999 and again from 2003 to 2008 (when it was 
set aside by the Irish Supreme Court), no payments were ever made under either 
 2 
scheme in Ireland.  The debate surrounding the implementation of risk equalisation 
in Ireland has largely centred on qualitative arguments, with relatively little 
quantitative research carried out in the area.  This study adds a quantitative element 
to that debate. 
 
A number of questions are addressed in this study.  Firstly, the extent to which 
community rating can operate in the presence of multiple insurers without a risk 
adjustment mechanism is examined.  One of the reasons it might not do so is if 
selection effects lead to differing risk profiles on the part of insurers.  The Irish 
market is therefore tested for indications of adverse selection on the part of 
consumers and risk selection on the part of insurers. 
 
A change in the form of community rating in operation in the Irish private health 
insurance market has been proposed.  The effect of a similar change in Australia in 
2000 is examined and implications drawn for the Irish case.  Finally, the community 
rated Irish and Australian private health insurance markets are compared with the 
risk rated UK market to assess the impact of community rating on overall take-up 
and the age profile of the insured population, and Irish hospital discharge data are 
examined to assess the impact that a breakdown of community rating might have on 
the Irish public hospital system. 
 
This study comes at a time when Government policy towards the private health 
insurance market in Ireland is under review.  In particular, a change to the form of 
 3 
community rating is anticipated in the near future, while work is currently being 
carried out on the design of a future risk equalisation scheme. 
 
1.2 Private Health Insurance as a Method of Financing Healthcare 
 
Healthcare systems around the world are funded in a variety of ways.  This can be 
done through taxation, social health insurance, user charges, medical savings 
accounts, private health insurance or some combination thereof.  Each method of 
healthcare financing has advantages and disadvantages and different countries have 
had diverse experiences of the various funding methods.  This is partly due to 
different combinations of methods and partly due to structural issues across 
healthcare systems. 
 
Private health insurance plays a role in healthcare funding in most countries in the 
European Union.  However, the role it plays and the degree to which it is used vary 
considerably.  Private health insurance can be substitutive (acting as an alternative to 
the statutory healthcare system), complementary (providing cover for services not 
covered, or not fully covered, by the statutory system) or supplementary (providing 
enhanced choice, benefits not covered by the statutory system and/or faster access to 
healthcare services).  Private health insurance usually plays a relatively minor role in 
healthcare system funding, although the Dutch system (since reforms in 2006) is a 
notable exception in the European context, as is the United States, where private 
health insurance is a major source of funding for healthcare services. 
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Private health insurance as a funding method for healthcare brings with it a number 
of issues that are not necessarily features of other funding methods.  One of these is 
the basis on which premiums are set.  Insurance premiums normally take account of 
the risk that a consumer represents to an insurer – this is referred to as risk rating.  
However, some health insurance markets around the world operate on the basis of 
what is known as community rating, whereby everyone is charged the same 
premium for the same cover, with the premium based on the overall risk of the 
insured community.  The other main type of rating is group rating, which is the most 
common rating type in the US private health insurance industry, whereby premiums 
are based on the overall risk of an insured group – members of that group all pay the 
same premium, but premiums may vary between groups. 
 
Another issue that private health insurance raises is selection.  Selection is a feature 
of many insurance markets, not just for private health insurance, and results from 
information asymmetry.  Selection is defined by Newhouse (1996) as “actions of 
economic agents on either side of the market to exploit unpriced risk heterogeneity 
and break pooling arrangements, with the result that some consumers may not obtain 
the insurance they desire.”  (Newhouse, 1996: 1236).1 
 
Selection can occur in different forms.  One such form is adverse selection, whereby 
consumers have more information about their risk status than insurers.  This can lead 
                                                 
1
 In this thesis, selection is used to describe the outcome of such actions.  This differs from 
Newhouse’s (1996) definition, but is a common use of the term selection, and is brought to the 
reader’s attention to avoid confusion. 
 5 
to low-risk consumers under-insuring or not purchasing insurance at all, while high-
risk consumers over-insure.  A second form of selection is risk selection (also known 
as cream skimming or cherry picking), whereby insurers can classify consumers into 
low- and high-risk categories and try to attract low-risk consumers while 
discouraging or refusing to cover high-risk consumers. 
 
Community rating is often accompanied by two other regulatory provisions.  The 
first is open enrolment, which prohibits insurers from refusing cover to an applicant, 
while the second is lifetime cover, which prohibits insurers from refusing to renew 
cover to an existing insured life, irrespective of his/her claims history.  Although 
community rating, open enrolment and lifetime cover reduce the opportunity for 
insurers to engage in risk selection, they increase the incentive for insurers to engage 
in this activity.  Community rating might also increase incentives for consumers to 
engage in adverse selection. 
 
If adverse selection and/or risk selection result in insurers having different risk 
profiles, this can lead to insurers with higher risk profiles having to charge higher 
premiums than insurers with lower risk profiles.  This might encourage lower-risk 
insured lives to switch to a lower-cost provider, leaving a higher concentration of 
higher-risk lives with the higher-cost insurer, thus accentuating the differential 
between risk profiles.  If this continues, it can – in the extreme – lead to what is 
known as a ‘death spiral’, whereby one or more insurers with relatively high risk 
profiles are forced to withdraw from the market. 
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Risk adjustment mechanisms have been proposed in order to counteract the effects 
of differing risk profiles – due to adverse selection, risk selection or a combination 
of the two.  These mechanisms are designed to spread the cost of high-risk insured 
lives between insurers in proportion to their market shares and have been 
implemented in a number of community rated private health insurance markets 
worldwide. 
 
1.3 The Role of Private Health Insurance in the Irish Health System 
 
Although it is not uncommon for health systems in various countries to be described 
as unique, the Irish health system certainly differs significantly from other health 
systems in Europe and elsewhere. 
 
The Irish health system is primarily financed through general taxation, which 
accounts for approximately 80% of funding.  Although government spending on 
health has increased significantly in nominal terms in recent years, and has also 
trended upwards as a proportion of GDP, it still lags behind in international 
comparisons.  However, health spending measured as a proportion of GNP, which 
many feel is a more accurate indicator of economic activity in Ireland, would be 
higher than health spending as a proportion of GDP.  Nevertheless, it would appear 
that the Irish health system is still recovering from severe cutbacks in the 1980s.   
 
 7 
Nearly one third of the population in Ireland benefits from medical cards.  These 
cards are primarily given to those who are below specified income thresholds.  
Between 2001 and 2008, those aged 70 and over were also entitled to medical cards 
irrespective of income, although this universal entitlement for the over-70s was 
reversed from January 2009.  Medical cards entitle holders to free access to primary 
care General Practitioners, while the remainder of the population largely pay out-of-
pocket payments for primary care, although private health insurance covers partial 
reimbursements for primary care and the degree to which this feature has been 
offered on private health insurance plans has increased in recent years. 
 
Access to hospital care is based on universal entitlement to the public hospital 
system.  Those with medical cards are entitled to free access to this system, while 
those without medical cards pay only nominal charges.  In the context of the current 
economic recession and a sharp deterioration in public finances however, the 
possibility of co-payments for those with medical cards has been discussed. 
 
Despite the universal access entitlements to the public hospital system, over half the 
population is covered by private health insurance, the purchase of which is 
voluntary, paying over €1.65bn in premiums in 2008.  Private health insurance gives 
holders a greater choice of hospitals (public and private), superior accommodation in 
public hospitals and, in some cases, a choice of consultant, although most 
consultants operate in both the public and private sectors.  It is also perceived as 
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giving holders faster access to hospital treatment, and there is some evidence to 
support this perception. 
 
1.4 Overview of the Irish Private Health Insurance Market 
 
The Irish private health insurance market in its current form dates back to 1957, 
when the Voluntary Health Insurance Board (now trading as Vhi Healthcare) was 
established as a statutory body, with the aim of providing voluntary insurance cover 
for the 15% of the population who at that time did not qualify for free access to the 
public hospital system on the basis of high earnings.  However, over time the 
proportion of the population purchasing private health insurance far exceeded 15%, 
despite access entitlements to the public hospital system being extended to the entire 
population. 
 
Vhi Healthcare operated as a statutory monopoly for 40 years until the mid-1990s 
when the market was opened up to competition as a result of the European Third 
Non-Life Insurance Directive.  When this Directive was transposed into Irish 
legislation in the form of the Health Insurance Act, 1994, the legislature formalised a 
number of the practices that Vhi Healthcare was already operating on a de facto 
basis. 
 
These practices included community rating, whereby consumers pay the same 
premium for the same insurance plan irrespective of the risk they represent to the 
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insurer; open enrolment, whereby insurers may not refuse cover to applicants, except 
in very limited circumstances; and lifetime cover, whereby insurers may not refuse 
to renew cover, except in very limited circumstances.  A set of minimum benefits 
was also specified, which must be covered by any eligible plan offered by insurers. 
 
In order to safeguard community rating in the face of competition, a risk equalisation 
scheme was also brought forward in 1996.  Risk equalisation aims to equitably 
neutralise differences in insurers’ costs due to differing risk profiles.  It does so by 
requiring insurers with lower than average risk profiles to contribute to a fund, from 
which payments are made to insurers with above average risk profiles.  The risk 
equalisation scheme in Ireland proved controversial, particularly to the first new 
entrant into the market after deregulation, BUPA Ireland, which was a branch of the 
British United Provident Association and began selling private health insurance in 
Ireland in 1997.  BUPA Ireland continued to oppose the scheme until the scheme 
was withdrawn in 1999. 
 
After a consultation process in the late 1990s, the then government published a 
White Paper on private health insurance in 1999 (Department of Health and 
Children, 1999).  This set the tone for public policy towards the private health 
insurance market from then on, and was reflected in the Health Insurance 
(Amendment) Act, 2001.  One of the main policies was the introduction of a new 
risk equalisation scheme.  Another was the establishment of an independent statutory 
regulatory body for the industry.  The Health Insurance Authority was established in 
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2001, and a new risk equalisation scheme was promulgated in 2003, with The Health 
Insurance Authority having a significant role to play in the operation of this scheme. 
 
However, as with the first scheme, the 2003 scheme also proved controversial and 
was strongly opposed by BUPA Ireland, which mounted a number of legal 
challenges against the scheme.  After the Irish High Court dismissed BUPA 
Ireland’s challenge in late 2006, BUPA Ireland announced its withdrawal from the 
Irish private health insurance market.  In early 2007 it sold its book of business to 
Quinn Insurance, which already operated in other non-life insurance markets in 
Ireland.  BUPA Ireland also appealed the case to the Irish Supreme Court. 
 
In the interim, a third insurer, VIVAS Health, entered the market in late 2004.  
Although it too was opposed to the risk equalisation scheme, it was more vociferous 
in its opposition to Vhi Healthcare’s differential prudential regulation relative to the 
other health insurers operating in Ireland.  Specifically, VIVAS Health argued that 
Vhi Healthcare’s statutory position gave it a competitive advantage against other 
competing health insurers, particularly as Vhi Healthcare was not required to keep 
the same level of solvency reserves as its competitors and had begun diversifying its 
business without the need to establish subsidiary companies.  In mid-2008, 
Hibernian Insurance, which already operated in other non-life insurance markets in 
Ireland, bought a majority stake in VIVAS Health and it now trades as Hibernian 
AVIVA Health. 
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In July 2008, the Supreme Court set aside the Risk Equalisation Scheme, 2003, 
ruling that the establishment of the scheme was ultra vires (beyond the powers of) 
the Minister for Health and Children.  The judgment revolved around the definition 
of community rating contained in the Health Insurance Act, 1994, as amended.  
Therefore, despite being on the statute books from 1996 to 1999 and again from 
2003 to 2008, payments were never made under risk equalisation in Ireland. 
 
The setting aside of the Risk Equalisation Scheme, 2003 left a hiatus in the market 
and interim measures were put in place by the Minister in late 2008 in an attempt to 
bolster community rating in the absence of risk equalisation.  Specifically, these 
consist of a community rating levy that insurers must pay for each member they 
insure, and increased tax relief at source for older consumers, designed to ensure that 
the net premium payable by consumers remains consistent, so as to adhere to 
community rating. 
 
Various risk adjustment schemes are currently operated in the health insurance 
systems of a number of other countries, including Australia, which is probably the 
most similar system to that of Ireland.  Australia also has a voluntary private health 
insurance system, with a relatively high take-up rate, operating alongside a public 
system with universal entitlement.  It also operates community rating (although it 
modified its system of community rating in 2000), open enrolment and lifetime 
cover.  Risk adjustment is also practiced in public health systems in a number of 
countries, including the UK. 
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1.5 Specific Research Questions 
 
The nature of the Irish private health insurance market raises a number of questions 
in relation to risk equalisation.  The Irish market is heavily regulated, one of the 
regulations being mandated community rating, supported by open enrolment and 
lifetime cover.  Another specific feature of the Irish market is the accentuated nature 
of the staggered entry of insurers.  This stems from the fact that a State-backed 
monopoly was in operation for 40 years before the market first experienced 
competition from another provider.  Thus, the Irish private health insurance market 
provides an interesting case study in the broader debate over the necessity and 
appropriateness of risk equalisation. 
 
The overarching question is whether risk equalisation is necessary and this has been 
vigorously debated in Ireland.  The debate about risk equalisation in Ireland has been 
largely based around qualitative arguments – the support of community rating on 
one side versus the effect on competition and the attractiveness of the market to new 
entrants on the other side.  There has however, been a dearth of empirical analysis to 
support these arguments.  The question of whether risk equalisation is necessary in 
turn leads on to a number of further questions, which are examined in this study. 
 
The first of these is whether community rating could operate in the absence of risk 
equalisation.  Those who argue for the introduction of risk equalisation claim that it 
is necessary to support community rating.  A formulaic model is therefore presented 
 13 
in Chapter 3 to examine whether community rating can operate in a market with 
multiple insurers in the absence of a risk adjustment mechanism.  Specific issues 
relating to the operation of community rating in the Irish market are then discussed 
and the model is applied to the Irish market in the wake of the 2008 Supreme Court 
ruling on risk equalisation, which centred on the definition of community rating in 
Irish legislation. 
 
The proponents of risk equalisation in Ireland point to the difference in risk profiles 
between Vhi Healthcare and its competitors – with the former having a higher 
proportion of older, high-risk members than the latter – as evidence of the need for a 
risk equalisation scheme.  Community rating can be undermined if insurers have 
different risk profiles.  Two possible causes of different risk profiles are adverse 
selection and risk selection.  Adverse selection describes a situation in which high-
risk consumers choose more comprehensive cover and low-risk consumers choose 
less generous, cheaper cover.  Risk selection entails insurers trying to attract low-
risk lives and discourage high-risk lives.  Chapter 4 therefore examines whether 
there is any evidence of either form of selection in the Irish private health insurance 
market, which could give rise to differences in risk profiles between insurers. 
 
It has been suggested that community rating brings with it an inherent instability, as 
low-risk (often younger) consumers are charged more than they actuarially would be 
for insurance, thus cross-subsidising high-risk (often older) consumers.  In order for 
insurance to remain affordable to the entire community, this requires a sufficient 
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flow of younger consumers into the market.  It has been proposed that lifetime 
community rating (whereby those who enter the market later in life must pay late 
entry loadings, thereby encouraging people to join at a younger age) be introduced in 
Ireland in an attempt to reduce the instability arising from community rating.  In 
Chapter 5, this measure is examined, supported by analysis of the introduction of a 
similar measure in the Australian private health insurance market in 2000.  In 
particular, this analysis aims to examine whether the introduction of lifetime 
community rating would reduce the need for risk equalisation in Ireland. 
 
If community rating were to break down, possibly as a result of a lack of risk 
equalisation, then it is possible that the market could revert to risk rating, whereby 
the risk that a consumer represents to an insurer is taken into account when setting 
premiums.  A similar effect would be seen if risk segmentation on the part of 
insurers were to become widespread.  In practice, this would lead to lower premiums 
for younger consumers and higher premiums for older consumers, compared with a 
system of community rating.  In Chapter 6, the Irish market is compared with two 
other markets – Australia, which operates on the basis of community rating, and the 
UK, which operates on the basis of risk rating – to ascertain what impact a change to 
risk rating would mean for the age profile in the privately insured market.  Analysis 
is then undertaken, using data relating to hospital discharges in Ireland, to examine 
the effect this might have on the Irish public health system. 
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1.6 Rationale for the Current Study 
 
Much of the debate surrounding risk equalisation in Ireland has centred on 
qualitative arguments.  Proponents of the scheme argue that a measure such as risk 
equalisation is necessary to support community rating, while opponents argue that 
risk equalisation is anti-competitive and a barrier to entry.  Community rating in the 
private health insurance market in Ireland has broad cross-party support in the 
Oireachtas (parliament), as do the principles of open enrolment and lifetime cover, 
while risk equalisation was also broadly supported, though perhaps not as widely as 
the other principles. 
 
The competition argument used against risk equalisation focuses on the low number 
of insurers operating in the Irish health insurance market.  The dominant position of 
Vhi Healthcare has also been used by opponents of risk equalisation in Ireland to 
argue against the scheme.  In particular, BUPA Ireland argued that risk equalisation 
would force smaller players in the market to subsidise the dominant player, a former 
State-backed monopoly. 
 
Most of these arguments have been qualitative in nature, however (see, for example, 
DKM Economic Consultants, 2005; Goodbody Economic Consultants, 2007).  There 
has been a relative shortage of quantitative research presented to support either side 
of the debate.  That was the primary reasoning for the current study, which will add 
an empirical element to the debate surrounding risk equalisation in Ireland. 
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Most observers accept at least the possibility that some form of risk adjustment 
mechanism might be required in certain circumstances to support community rating, 
although the degree to which such a mechanism is required is the subject of some 
debate.  The starting point of this study therefore is to examine the extent to which 
community rating could operate in the absence of some form or risk adjustment 
mechanism.  The model presented in Chapter 3 offers a formulaic representation of 
the answer to this question. 
 
Selection issues are often discussed in the context of insurance markets in general, 
and health insurance is no different.  Selection can take the form of adverse 
selection, where consumers choose to insure or not insure, or choose the level of 
insurance, based on their own state of health; or risk selection, where insurers try to 
attract low-risk lives and avoid high-risk lives if possible.  The combination of 
community rating and open enrolment accentuates the likelihood that consumers 
might engage in adverse selection.  The presence of community rating, which means 
that insurers are not permitted to charge different rates to different consumers based 
on the level of risk those consumers represent to the insurers, also increases insurers’ 
incentives to engage in risk selection.  Risk adjustment has been suggested as a 
means of combating either or both types of selection.  However, despite the 
appearance of arguments in relation to risk selection in particular in the debate 
surrounding risk equalisation in Ireland, no empirical evidence has thus-far been 
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presented to confirm or refute the suggestion that it is present in the market.  This 
study empirically tests for both adverse selection and risk selection. 
 
The structure of the Irish market lends itself to an examination of whether either 
form of selection exists.  Most plans available in the market are broadly similar in 
terms of the cover they provide for hospital treatment, with the main differences 
being on the basis of the level of hospital accommodation covered.  This allows an 
examination of whether adverse selection is evident, as plans can be differentiated 
on the basis of the generosity of cover for hospital accommodation.  There are also 
significant similarities between plans on offer between insurers covering similar 
levels of hospital accommodation, which facilitates an examination of whether risk 
selection is evident.  If neither form of selection were evident then it would suggest 
that risk equalisation would be less likely to be triggered, while if one or both forms 
are present then it would suggest that risk equalisation would be more likely to be 
triggered.  It should be noted however, that even if evidence of selection is not 
found, this would not suggest that risk equalisation is not needed.  Rather, the 
possibility of selection, and its associated adverse effects, means that it might still be 
worthwhile to have a risk equalisation scheme in place in order to combat any 
selection that may occur in the future.  Whether or not selection is found would be 
indicative of the likelihood of such a scheme being triggered. 
 
One criticism that has been levelled against community rating is that it may perhaps 
entail an inherent instability, as it relies on intergenerational solidarity.  This means 
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that a constant stream of younger, healthier, low-risk consumers is needed in order 
to keep insurance affordable for older, sicker, high-risk consumers.  It has been 
suggested that the current form of community rating in operation in Ireland – single-
rate community rating – is particularly vulnerable to this type of instability.  A move 
to lifetime community rating, where age at entry has an impact on premiums, has 
been proposed and is anticipated in the near future.  Such a change was implemented 
in Australia in 2000.  If such a change were to improve the stability of community 
rating, then this could mitigate the need for a risk adjustment mechanism.  The effect 
that the move to lifetime community rating had in Australia is therefore examined, 
and implications drawn for the Irish case. 
 
If community rating were to fail altogether, due to the instability that it creates, or be 
abandoned (although this is unlikely given the widespread political support for it), 
then an alternative would be risk rating.  Risk rating is applied in many other 
insurance markets in Ireland, such as the motor and home insurance markets, and it 
is also applied in health insurance markets in other countries, such as the UK.  The 
differences between a community rated health insurance market and a risk rated one 
are therefore examined, using the examples of Ireland and Australia (community 
rated) versus the UK (risk rated). 
 
Although it is unlikely that risk rating will be applied in the Irish private health 
insurance market, if risk segmentation by insurers were to become widespread then 
the net result would be similar.  It is therefore instructive to examine what difference 
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community rating makes in the Irish context.  An argument that has been used to 
justify the subsidisation of private health insurance in the Irish market is that it takes 
some of the pressure off the public healthcare system, by encouraging some patients 
to be treated privately.  If community rating were to break down or be undermined 
then significant numbers of older consumers, facing substantially higher premiums, 
would likely discontinue cover and rely on the public healthcare system.  Analysis is 
therefore carried out of the effect this might have on the public hospital system in 
Ireland.  This is particularly relevant given the current deterioration of the public 
finances in Ireland. 
 
1.7 Research Contributions 
 
As previously mentioned, much of the debate in relation to risk equalisation in the 
Irish private health insurance market has been based on qualitative arguments.  This 
study will therefore bring a new dimension to the debate, by using empirical 
evidence. 
 
The Irish private health insurance market is an example of a regulated health 
insurance market, in which community rating is mandated.  The staggered nature of 
entry of insurers into the market is accentuated by the presence of a statutory 
monopoly for 40 years before the second entrant, with the third entrant following 
seven years later. 
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Although there is widespread acceptance that differential risk profiles between 
insurers will lead to different premiums being charged, the model presented in 
Chapter 3 puts this into a formulaic representation.  Its application to the Irish 
market following the Supreme Court ruling is also topical. 
 
Although adverse selection and risk selection are often discussed in literature on 
insurance markets, it can be difficult to empirically test for them.  In this regard, the 
features of the Irish private health insurance market are conducive to testing for 
evidence of either type of selection. 
 
Shifting from single rate community rating to lifetime community rating is not 
widespread in private health insurance markets, Australia being a notable exception.  
In this context, the proposed shift in Ireland follows that of Australia in its form.  
While there has been some analysis of this shift in Australia, this thesis takes such 
analysis a step further by trying to simulate the effect such a move would have in 
this country. 
 
The comparison of community rating with risk rating is based on a number of 
similarities between the health systems in the three countries examined in Chapter 6 
– Ireland, Australia and the UK.  The analysis of the utilisation of public hospital 
resources by patients of different ages in different categories (public and private) is 
also novel. 
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As well as adding empirical evidence to underpin elements of the debate 
surrounding risk equalisation in Ireland, the findings of this study will help to inform 
public policy in the area of private health insurance in Ireland, at a time when 
aspects of the current policy are under review with a view to reform. 
 
1.8 Structure 
 
The rest of this thesis is structured as follows.  Chapter 2 details the background to 
the private health insurance market in Ireland.  This includes a discussion of the role 
that private health insurance plays in the Irish health system, and an examination of 
the development of the market, from a legislative standpoint and from the point of 
view of competition.  The controversy surrounding risk equalisation in Ireland, as 
well as other controversial aspects of the market, are also discussed. 
 
A model of a community rated insurance market is presented in Chapter 3, and this 
model is used to examine whether, or to what extent, community rating can be 
successfully maintained in first a monopoly situation and then a multi-insurer 
market.  This mirrors the Irish situation in the 1990s, when the market moved from a 
monopoly provider (Vhi Healthcare) to a competitive market, with community 
rating mandated by legislation.  The model is then used to examine the implications 
of the 2008 Supreme Court ruling on the Risk Equalisation Scheme, 2003 for 
community rating in the Irish private health insurance market. 
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Selection issues are examined in Chapter 4.  Data from surveys of consumers 
commissioned by The Health Insurance Authority are used to test for evidence of 
adverse selection and risk selection.  The former is tested for by comparing the 
characteristics of those purchasing plans with different levels of cover, as 
differentiated by the level of hospital accommodation covered, while the latter is 
tested for by comparing the characteristics of those purchasing plans with the same 
level of hospital accommodation on offer from different insurers. 
 
Chapter 5 reviews issues relating to different forms of community rating, and their 
effects on adverse selection.  The effect that the changeover from single-rate 
community rating to lifetime community rating had in Australia is then examined.  
The take-up rates of private health insurance and the age profile of the insured 
population changed quite dramatically in Australia as a result of the move.  These 
changes are modelled and the results are applied to the Irish data to simulate what 
might happen in Ireland if and when a similar change is effected here.  The potential 
effect of a move to lifetime community rating on risk equalisation is also examined, 
with reference to the Australian experience. 
 
In Chapter 6, two community rated health insurance markets (Ireland and Australia) 
are compared with a risk rated market (the UK) in an effort to determine the effect 
that community rating has on the age profile of the market.  All three countries share 
a number of similarities in terms of the presence of voluntary private health 
insurance markets alongside universal entitlements to use the public healthcare 
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systems in those countries.  However, differences are also evident, and these are 
noted in the discussion.  Analysis of data on discharges from public hospitals in 
Ireland is then undertaken to discern the effect that an increase in older consumers 
relying on the public hospital system – which would result from a collapse of 
community rating – would have on that system. 
 
Chapter 7 summarises the results of this research, draws conclusions thereon and 
identifies possible areas for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUNDTO THE PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE MARKET IN 
IRELAND 
 
 
2.1 Contextual Overview 
 
Private health insurance in Ireland plays a significant role in the healthcare system.  
Just over half of the population is covered by private health insurance, despite 
universal access entitlements to the public hospital system.  After 40 years of a 
State-owned monopoly provider, competition was introduced to the market in the 
1990s.  Since then, market regulation has led to much controversy.  There is a 
significant overlap between the provision of public and private healthcare in Ireland, 
and this has led to much debate about the role and impact of private health 
insurance. 
 
2.1.1 Private Health Insurance in the Irish Insurance System 
 
Private health insurance, although only in existence for just over half a century, has 
become ingrained in the Irish societal landscape.  At the end of 2008, 2.299 million 
people in Ireland were covered by private health insurance, representing an 
estimated 51.6% of the population.  Total premium income from private health 
insurance in 2008 was €1,652.2m, up from €1,477.8m in 2007 (Source: HIA, 2009).2 
 
                                                 
2
 Data from the most recent Household Budget Survey, relating to 2004/05 (CSO, 2007b) show that 
households in Ireland spent an average of €12.43 on private health insurance out of an average 
weekly expenditure of €787.12.  Thus, private health insurance accounted for an average of 1.58% of 
weekly household expenditure. 
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By comparison, gross premium income for Irish Insurance Federation members 
operating in the non-life insurance market in Ireland in 2008 was €3,333.5m, while 
gross premium for the life sector in 2008 was €10,097.0m (Source: Irish Insurance 
Federation, 2009b).
3
  It should be noted that the non-life figures do not include 
private health insurance.
4
  It can be seen from these figures that the private health 
insurance market is quite substantial relative to other forms of non-life insurance in 
Ireland.  It can be seen from Table 2.1 that premiums in the private health insurance 
market have grown strongly in recent years, while they have fallen in each year 
since 2004 in the non-life insurance market, and although strong growth was 
witnessed in the life market until 2007, there was a sharp fall in this category of 
insurance in 2008. 
 
Table 2.1 Insurance Premium Income in Ireland (€m), 2002-2008 
 
Year Private Health 
Insurance 
Non-Life Life 
2002 821.9 3,954.9 7,253.3 
2003 978.2 4,239.1 7,644.4 
2004 1,061.1 3,999.8 7,929.7 
2005 1,152.7 3,841.1 9,738.6 
2006 1,236.2 3,822.9 12,327.2 
2007 1,477.8 3,610.7 14,594.4 
2008 1,652.2 3,333.5 10,097.0 
 
Source: HIA (2009), Irish Insurance Federation (2007, 2008, 2009b) 
 
 
                                                 
3
 The Irish Insurance Federation is the representative body for insurance companies in Ireland.  
According to its 2009 Annual Report (Irish Insurance Federation, 2009a), its members collectively 
write over 95% of all life and non-life insurance business in Ireland.  The 2009 Annual Report also 
lists Quinn Insurance, Vhi Healthcare and Hibernian AVIVA Health as members. 
4
 The non-life insurance categories that are included in these figures are motor, property, liability, 
personal accident/travel insurance and other non-life business.  The other non-life business category 
includes marine, aviation and transit (MAT), credit and suretyship, other financial loss covers and 
legal expenses insurance (see Irish Insurance Federation, 2009b: 24). 
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2.1.2 Private Health Insurance in the Irish Health System 
 
One of the main factors affecting the cost of access to medical services in Ireland is 
possession of a medical card.  Entitlement to a medical card is primarily based on 
financial circumstances (i.e. it involves a means test), although in 2001 eligibility to 
a medical card was extended to all those aged 70 or over, irrespective of income.  In 
the Budget delivered in October 2008 (Department of Finance, 2008), the 
Government removed this universal eligibility entitlement, although after much 
public opposition, the proposed income threshold for the over-70s medical card was 
raised so that those aged 70 or over with earnings of €700 per week or less (or 
€1,400 per week or less for a married couple) would still qualify for a medical card, 
and the means test would only apply to those applying for the over-70s medical card 
from 1 January 2009 (see Department of Health and Children, 2008b).  The 
proportion of the population with a medical card currently stands at 30% (Source: 
HSE, 2009). 
 
Those with medical cards are entitled to
5
: 
 
 Free GP (family doctor) services 
 Prescribed drugs and medicines (with some exceptions) 
 In-patient public hospital services, out-patient services and medical appliances 
 Dental, optical and aural services 
                                                 
5
 See http://www.citizensinformation.ie/categories/health/entitlement-to-health-
services/medical_card.  Accessed on 15 December 2008. 
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 Maternity and infant care services 
 Some personal and social care services, for example, public health nursing, 
social work services and other community care services 
 A maternity cash grant of €10.16 on the birth of each child. 
 
For those not entitled to a medical card (or a GP visit card
6
), primary care is usually 
paid for out-of-pocket on a fee-for-service basis, although the Drugs Payment 
Scheme reimburses expenditure on prescription medicines above a set threshold 
(€100 per month since 1 January 2009), while the Treatment Benefit Scheme 
operated by the Department of Social and Family Affairs provides assistance in 
meeting the cost of some dental and optical services.  Currently, all Irish residents 
are entitled to access to public hospitals and public hospital consultant treatment.  
For those who qualify for a medical card, such access is free of charge, while those 
without a medical card must pay nominal fees.  From 1 January 2009 these fees are 
set at €100 per out-patient or Accident & Emergency visit without a GP referral 
(unless admitted to hospital as a result of attending A&E), and €75 per night as an 
in-patient up to a maximum of €750 in a continuous 12-month period. 
 
Tables 2.2 and 2.3 contain a number of indicators of private and public health 
spending in Ireland since the mid-1990s, just before the introduction of competition 
into the market for private health insurance in Ireland (see Section 2.3). 
 
                                                 
6
 GP visit cards were introduced in 2005 and entitle the holder to free GP services only.  The means 
tested income threshold for a GP visit card is higher than that for a medical card 
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As can be seen from the figures, Ireland’s healthcare system is primarily funded 
through public expenditure, the vast majority of which is raised via taxation.  The 
figures from the World Health Organization (WHO, 2009a) show that, in 2007, total 
expenditure on health represented 7.9% of GDP
7
, and that this has been on an 
upward trend since the turn of the century (see Table 2.2).  However, this is still 
below the figures for many other EU countries (see OECD, 2009).  The figures also 
show that general government expenditure on health accounted for almost 80% of 
total expenditure on health in Ireland, with the remaining 20% accounted for by 
private sector expenditure on health. 
 
The figures show that out-of-pocket payments by private households accounted for 
the majority of private sector expenditure on health (57.3% in 2007), and that this 
proportion has risen significantly since the turn of the century.  This largely reflects 
out-of-pocket payments for primary care services by those who do not qualify for a 
medical card.  Meanwhile, prepaid and risk-pooling plans (private health insurance) 
accounted for 40.9% of private sector expenditure on health – or 8.3% of total 
expenditure on health – in 2007.  The proportion of private expenditure on health 
accounted for by prepaid and risk-pooling plans has also increased sharply since 
                                                 
7
 It should be noted however, that many believe that GNP is a better measure of Ireland’s economic 
activity (see, for example, Kennedy, 2001).  As the level of GNP is lower than GDP in Ireland, the 
proportion of this accounted for by health expenditure would be higher than the ratio presented in 
Table 2.2, which uses GDP.  However, GDP is the measure used by the World Health Organization, 
so its figures are presented in the table.  Calculations based on the figure for THE from WHO (2009a) 
and national accounts figures from the Central Statistics Office (CSO, 2009) show that total 
expenditure on health in 2007 was 7.7% of GDP (compared with the 7.9% calculated by the WHO 
based on national accounts figures from Eurostat) compared with 9.1% of GNP.  This results from the 
fact that GNP was approximately 15% lower than GDP at current market prices in 2007 (see CSO, 
2009).  McDaid, Wiley, Maresso & Mossialos (2009) suggest that, if health spending as a proportion 
of GNP were used for comparison then Ireland would consistently have a higher expenditure as a 
proportion of GNP than the EU average.  
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2000.
8
  The same source shows that general government expenditure on health in 
2007 represented 17.2% of general government expenditure. 
 
Table 2.2 Health Expenditure Ratios in Ireland (%), 1995-2007 
 
Year THE/GDP GGHE/THE PvtHE/THE PRP/PvtHE OOP/PvtHE 
1995 6.7 71.9 28.1 32.4 47.9 
1996 6.5 71.3 28.7 31.9 45.4 
1997 6.4 73.9 26.1 32.8 48.3 
1998 6.2 73.8 26.2 33.5 43.6 
1999 6.2 73.1 26.9 29.3 42.4 
2000 6.3 73.5 26.5 28.5 41.0 
2001 7.0 74.1 25.9 23.9 46.2 
2002 7.1 76.0 24.0 26.1 52.0 
2003 7.3 77.2 22.8 29.2 58.8 
2004 7.5 78.6 21.4 32.3 63.4 
2005 8.2 79.5 20.5 33.3 59.3 
2006 7.5 78.3 21.7 38.6 57.2 
2007 7.9 79.7 20.3 40.9 57.3 
 
Source: WHO (2009a) 
Key: THE = Total expenditure on health; GDP = Gross domestic product; GGHE = 
General government expenditure on health; PvtHE = Private sector expenditure on 
health; PRP = Prepaid and risk-pooling plans; OOP = Private households’ out-of-
pocket payments 
 
 
However, these ratios do not fully demonstrate the increase in health expenditure in 
absolute levels, as it must be borne in mind that this period coincided with a period 
of economic boom in Ireland – the so-called ‘Celtic Tiger’ years.  The fact that the 
Irish economy is officially in recession at the time of writing could mean that the 
landscape for health expenditure is considerably different in the near-term future.
9
 
 
                                                 
8
 The remaining element of private expenditure on health is non-profit institutions serving households 
(NGOs).  According to the WHO figures, this accounted for 27% of private expenditure on health in 
2000 but by 2007 this proportion had dropped to under 2%. 
9
 Indeed, speaking in September 2009, the Minister for Health and Children stated that there would be 
significant cutbacks in health spending in 2010.  See 
http://www.irishhealth.com/article.html?id=16155.  
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Table 2.3 puts this increase in health expenditure in the context of absolute monetary 
levels.  Total expenditure on health increased by just over 310% between 1995 and 
2007, while private sector expenditure on health increased by approximately 195% 
over the same period.  The amount spent on prepaid and risk-pooling plans increased 
by over 270% over the period, while the amount of out-of-pocket payments 
increased by over 250% over the period.  However, it should be noted that these 
increases coincided with relatively strong population growth in Ireland, which 
experienced a shift from net outward migration to net inward migration during the 
period.  On a per capita basis, total expenditure on health increased by just under 
270% between 1995 and 2007. 
 
Table 2.3 Health Expenditure in Ireland (€m), 1995-2007 
 
Year THE GGHE PvtHE PRP OOP 
1995 3,561 2,560 1,001 324 479 
1996 3,836 2,734 1,102 351 500 
1997 4,361 3,222 1,139 374 550 
1998 4,894 3,610 1,284 430 560 
1999 5,656 4,133 1,523 446 645 
2000 6,574 4,833 1,741 496 714 
2001 8,128 6,019 2,109 504 975 
2002 9,280 7,057 2,223 580 1,157 
2003 10,143 7,826 2,317 676 1,362 
2004 11,066 8,694 2,372 767 1,504 
2005 13,205 10,494 2,711 903 1,607 
2006 13,168 10,307 2,861 1,104 1,637 
2007 14,610 11,650 2,960 1,210 1,695 
 
Source: WHO (2009a) 
Key: THE = Total expenditure on health; GGHE = General government expenditure 
on health; PvtHE = Private sector expenditure on health; PRP = Prepaid and risk-
pooling plans; OOP = Private households’ out-of-pocket payments 
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As Nolan (2006) notes however, the level of resources generated by private health 
insurance in Ireland is not commensurate with the leverage within the health system 
enjoyed by those with private cover.
10
  One major element contributing to the degree 
of leverage referred to here is the fact that much of the treatment of privately insured 
persons takes place in public hospitals.  Figures from 2002 (Department of Health 
and Children, 2002) suggest that there were approximately 12,000 acute beds in 
public hospitals in Ireland at that time.  Approximately 20% of beds in public 
hospitals are designated private, in other words for use by privately insured 
patients.
11
  It was also estimated that the number of beds in private hospitals at the 
time was approximately similar to the number of private beds in public hospitals.  
More recent figures from a report commissioned by the Health Service Executive
12
 
(HSE, 2007) show that private beds accounted for just over 17% of beds in public 
hospitals and that the number of private beds in public hospitals exceeded the 
number of beds in private hospitals (although the report excluded some beds in 
private hospitals from its totals).
13
 
 
According to the country’s largest private health insurer, Vhi Healthcare (VHI, 
2003), approximately half of the bed capacity used by its members in that financial 
year was in public hospitals.  Figures from the Central Statistics Office (CSO, 
                                                 
10
 This was also noted by Smith (2009). 
11
 Beds in public hospitals may be designated as public beds or private beds, or in a small number of 
instances be non-designated.  Examples of non-designated beds would be those in Intensive Care 
Units or Coronary Care Units. 
12
 The Health Service Executive is the body responsible for the provision of public healthcare 
services in Ireland.  It was established in 2005 to replace the previous system of regional health 
boards.  For further details, see O’Morain (2007). 
13
 Data on discharges from public hospitals (for example ESRI 2006, 2008a, 2008b) show that private 
patients account for more than 25% of discharges, although this might reflect more intensive use of 
private beds than public beds – an issue that is examined in Chapter 6. 
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2008b) show that 60% of the hospital inpatient stays of those aged 18 and over with 
private health insurance were in public hospitals, with the remaining 40% in private 
hospitals.
14
  By comparison, 92% of such stays of those with medical cards and 97% 
of stays of those with neither private health insurance nor a medical card were in 
public hospitals.  Insurers have a financial incentive to have their members treated in 
private beds in public hospitals rather than in private hospitals.  This is due to the 
fact that insurers are not currently charged the full economic cost of private beds in 
public hospitals.  However, the government is committed to moving to a situation 
where insurers do pay the full economic cost of such beds and therefore the charges 
for these beds have been increased in recent years, most recently by 20% following 
the Budget announced in October 2008 (Department of Finance, 2008).
15
 
 
The State also subsidises private health insurance in other ways.  The main such 
subsidy is the availability of tax relief on premiums.  This was available from the 
outset of the market, but while it was previously available at the marginal rate of tax, 
this was changed over two tax years (1995/96 and 1996/97) to the standard income 
tax rate (currently 20%).
16
  Since April 2001 this tax relief has been deducted at 
                                                 
14
 Recently published figures suggest that 45% of private patient throughput in public hospitals was 
not subject to bed charges as the patients were accommodated in public beds, while a further 5% was 
not charged for because the patients were accommodated in non-designated beds, leaving only 50% 
of private patient throughput subject to bed charges as a result of staying in private beds (Comptroller 
and Auditor General, 2009).  However, the report also notes that private accommodation in public 
hospitals was used to accommodate 83,541 bed-days for public patients.  An example of private beds 
being used to accommodate public patients would be private rooms being used as isolation units to 
prevent the spread of hospital-acquired infections. 
15
 O’Brien & Shanahan (2009) note that a steering group has been set up, comprising officials from 
the Departments of Finance and Health & Children, along with representatives of the Health Service 
Executive, to assess the economic cost of providing private beds in public hospitals.  This steering 
group is expected to report in December 2009. 
16
 Thomson, Foubister & Mossialos (2009) note that tax relief on private health insurance premiums 
has been reduced or abolished in a number of older EU Member States in recent years, although 
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source.  The provision of this tax relief was estimated to have cost €321m in 2008.  
(Source: Unpublished correspondence from Revenue Commissioners.) 
 
A Government White Paper on Private Health Insurance, published in 1999 
(Department of Health and Children, 1999) noted that two earlier reports
17
 had 
recommended the abolition of tax relief on private health insurance premiums, but 
suggested that the equity and effectiveness concerns behind these calls were 
addressed by reducing the rate of tax relief from the marginal rate to the standard 
rate.  The White Paper also noted the argument that some incentive to purchase 
private health insurance could be justified “on the basis that those who opt for 
private cover effectively forgo a statutory entitlement while continuing to contribute 
to the funding of the public health service through taxation.”  (Department of Health 
and Children, 1999: 24). 
 
A more recent report from the Commission on Taxation (2009) acknowledges that 
tax relief on premiums helps to attract and retain people in the health insurance 
market, and that in the absence of private health insurance the State would have to 
provide treatment for greater numbers of people under the public system.  However, 
the report cautions that “there is a sizeable deadweight element as many individuals 
would pay these premiums in the absence of the tax relief.”  (Commission on 
Taxation, 2009: 258-259).  Overall, the Commission recommends the continuation 
                                                                                                                                         
according to Vrangbaek (2009), tax rules encouraging private health insurance take-up were 
introduced in Denmark in 2002. 
17
 These reports were those of the Commission on Taxation (1982) and the Commission on Health 
Funding (1989). 
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of tax relief on health insurance premiums but on a more limited basis.  Specifically, 
it recommends a flat-rate tax relief per person irrespective of the amount of coverage 
purchased.  This would differ from the current pro-rata system, under which those 
who pay more for their health insurance receive more relief in absolute monetary 
terms. 
 
Another way in which the State subsidises the private health insurance market is 
indirectly, via the provision of education and training for medical professionals.  
Since much of the treatment of privately insured individuals takes place in public 
hospitals, and since most hospital consultants work in both public and private 
practice
18
, the training of these medical professionals, which is subsidised by the 
State, also benefits private patients. 
 
In its White Paper in 1999 (Department of Health and Children, 1999), the then 
government reiterated its commitment to maintaining State support for the private 
health insurance market “in view of the alternative it provides to publicly-funded 
care and in recognition of the importance of community rating/open enrolment.” 
(Department of Health and Children, 1999: 23).  It went on to state that it considered 
the continuance of State facilitation of private healthcare to be appropriate, on the 
basis that it encourages people to take responsibility for meeting the cost of their 
                                                 
18
 The Competition Authority (Competition Authority, 2005) notes that there are approximately 1,800 
public consultant posts in Ireland, of which 1,500 are filled, and that 90% of public consultants are 
also engaged in private practice.  It further notes that there are only approximately 170-200 
consultants who work exclusively in the private sector. 
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own healthcare, thus reducing the demands on the public system, and that the 
facilities and services are available in the private sector to take the strain. 
 
However, studies undertaken in the UK (Emmerson, Frayne & Goodman, 2001) and 
Canada (Stabile, 2001) suggest that subsidisation of private health insurance by the 
State does not represent good value for money, as the costs of the subsidies 
outweigh the benefits in terms of the savings from lower utilisation of the public 
healthcare service.  Palangkaraya, Yong, Webster & Dawkins (2009) also conclude 
that reforms in the Australian private health insurance market had income 
distributive effects that favoured high-income households, leading to a subsidy of 
approximately AUS$887m per annum to households who might have purchased 
health insurance even in the absence of such a subsidy.  Mossialos & Dixon (2002) 
also suggest that subsidies to private sources of healthcare funding, such as private 
health insurance, are regressive.  A more mixed assessment comes from Frech III & 
Hopkins (2004), who found that a 30% rebate given to private health insurance 
subscribers in Australia since 1997 could not be justified on the basis of freeing up 
public resources, but that additional justification could come from the provision of 
choice to consumers and a reduction in waiting times for those left relying on the 
public hospital system. 
 
Meanwhile, a model presented by Wright (2006) suggests that an insurance premium 
subsidy increases the prices charged by private hospitals and doctors, without a 
significant net effect on the number of consumers insured, and that relatively 
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wealthy consumers are the ones who benefit from higher quality treatment in private 
hospitals (which would include shorter waiting lists or private rooms), as they are 
the ones who choose to purchase insurance and receive treatment in private hospitals 
rather than be treated for free in public hospitals.  He also finds that the private 
sector does not provide a safety valve for the public sector, but rather responds to 
reduced public hospital quality by reducing its own quality while increasing private 
hospital profit and doctor income.  He concludes that if policy-makers wish to 
increase the numbers privately insured then it might be better to reduce monopoly 
power in the private sector rather than introducing premiums subsidies or reducing 
public hospital quality. 
 
2.1.3 The Market for Private Health Insurance in Ireland 
 
The growth of private health insurance in Ireland has been remarkable, particularly 
in light of the universal entitlement to access the public hospital system.  In 1957, 
when the Voluntary Health Insurance Board was established (see Section 2.2), the 
top 15% of earners in the country were not entitled to free access to the public 
hospital system.  However, in 1979 eligibility for free access to public hospital 
accommodation was extended to the entire population, while universal eligibility for 
free treatment by public hospital consultants followed in 1991. 
 
Despite this however, private health insurance coverage has far exceeded the 15% 
initially envisaged, as can be seen in Figure 2.1.  As mentioned in Section 2.1.1, 
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coverage of private health insurance in Ireland reached 51.6% at the end of 2008 
(Source: HIA, 2009).
19
  The OECD (2004) found that Ireland, with an estimated 
take-up of PHI of almost 44 percent in 2000, and Australia, with almost 45 percent 
take-up in the same year, were the largest duplicate health insurance markets in the 
OECD.  Duplicate insurance in this instance refers to the situation where private 
insurers operate in parallel to the public healthcare system. 
 
Figure 2.1 Percentage of Irish Population Covered by Private Health 
Insurance, 1980-2008 
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Source: 1980-1999: Department of Health and Children (1999), Appendix IV; 2000: 
NESF (2002), Table 2.3; 2001-2008: HIA (2009), Appendix A 
Note: Figures for 1980-2000 relate to end-February, figures for 2001-2007 relate to 
end-December. 
 
 
The role of the private health insurance market in Ireland has changed over time.  
Initially, it was envisaged that the system would play a substitutive role for those not 
entitled to free access to the public hospital system.  However, enrolment was not 
                                                 
19
 However, Donnellan (2009) states that the HIA confirmed that numbers insured fell by 
approximately 13,000 in the first quarter of 2009, the first such fall since it began to collect quarterly 
figures in 2001.  O’Brien (2009) meanwhile notes that the number of people covered by private 
health insurance in Ireland had fallen by 21,000 in the first half of 2009. 
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limited to those ineligible for free hospital treatment.  For some, private health 
insurance offered the option of better accommodation or choice of consultant, while 
it gave the option of treatment in private hospitals to many subscribers, irrespective 
of their entitlements to public hospital treatment.  Therefore, private health insurance 
in its early days in Ireland also played a supplementary role.  Since entitlements to 
the public healthcare system were extended, the substitutive role has been 
eliminated, and private health insurance now plays primarily a supplementary role, 
with elements of a complementary system.
20
 
 
Hospital plans (which account for the vast majority of coverage in Ireland) provide 
access to semi-private
21
 or private rooms in public hospitals and access to private 
hospitals (in a semi-private or private room) depending on the level of cover 
provided by the plan.  There is also a perception (backed up by some evidence, 
which will be discussed in Section 2.1.4) of shorter waiting periods for those with 
private health insurance.  Most hospital plans provide limited cover for ancillary 
(non-hospital) services, such as visits to general practitioners (GPs), 
physiotherapists, etc., which must be paid for out-of-pocket by those without 
medical cards.
22
  However, in recent years, an increasing number of hospital plans 
                                                 
20
 Substitutive health insurance substitutes for the statutory healthcare system, complementary health 
insurance provides complementary cover for services not covered, or not fully covered, by the 
statutory system, while supplementary health insurance enhances consumer choice and/or provides 
faster access to healthcare services.  For a fuller discussion of this categorisation, see Mossialos & 
Thomson (2002b, 2004, 2009). 
21
 A semi-private room may contain up to five beds. 
22
 These plans usually make a contribution towards the cost of visiting a GP, physiotherapist, etc., 
although they do not generally cover the full cost.  Furthermore, these contributions are subject to an 
excess for ancillary treatment, which must be met by allowable expenses, rather than actual expenses, 
before contributions are made by the insurer.  For example, if a plan has an excess for ancillary cover 
of €300, and provides a contribution of €20 per visit to a GP, while a GP visit costs, say, €50, then an 
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with significant ancillary cover have been introduced.
23
  Some ancillary plans have 
also been introduced, some of which may be purchased on a stand-alone basis, 
others of which can also be combined with hospital plans.  The ancillary plans 
would primarily be complementary, while the hospital plans (the ones with limited 
ancillary cover) would primarily be supplementary.  The combined hospital and 
ancillary plans would be both complementary and supplementary. 
 
2.1.4 Consumer Attitudes Towards Private Health Insurance in Ireland 
 
Given the universal access entitlements to the public hospital system, the question 
must be asked as to why so many Irish consumers choose to voluntarily take out 
private health insurance.  Surveys of consumers undertaken by The Health Insurance 
Authority – the independent statutory regulatory body for the private health 
insurance industry in Ireland – provide some answers to this question.  Among the 
questions asked as part of the quantitative surveys, a number of statements were read 
out and respondents were asked to rate their level of agreement with those 
statements.  Figure 2.2 shows the level of agreement with certain statements among 
those surveyed who had private health insurance. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                         
insured person on such a plan would need to make 15 visits to a GP – not six – before the excess 
would be reached. 
23
 These plans tend to make contributions towards the cost of visits to a GP, physiotherapist, etc., 
although they do not generally cover the full cost.  However, the excess on ancillary expenditure for 
such plans is typically €1.  Some of the ancillary or combined plans will only cover limited numbers 
of visits to various types of practitioners. 
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Figure 2.2 Consumer Attitudes to Private Health Insurance in Ireland 
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From this Figure, it can be seen that the vast majority of those with private health 
insurance view it as a necessity rather than a luxury.  This might be strongly linked 
to the disagreement with the statement that there is no need for private health 
insurance in Ireland as public services are adequate.  Interestingly, significant 
numbers of those without private health insurance also disagreed with this statement, 
suggesting a widespread lack of confidence in the public hospital system in Ireland.  
Insured respondents in the 2003 and 2005 surveys also indicated strongly that 
private health insurance provides peace of mind.  In all three surveys, a majority of 
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those insured agreed that having private health insurance means always getting a 
better level of healthcare service and being able to skip the queues for treatment.
24
 
 
These findings are similar to those of an earlier study, undertaken by the Economic 
and Social Research Institute and reported in Harmon & Nolan (2001) and Nolan & 
Wiley (2000).  The ESRI survey shows that the two most important reasons cited for 
having private health insurance were “fear of large medical or hospital bills”, with 
88.5% of respondents citing this as being very important, and “being sure of getting 
into hospital quickly when you need treatment” (86.4%).  These reinforce the idea of 
private health insurance providing peace of mind and being seen as allowing people 
to skip long waiting lists for public treatment. 
 
Earlier research by Vhi Healthcare, referred to in the 1999 government White Paper 
on Private Health Insurance, also reinforce these findings.  According to this 
research, the most commonly cited reasons for having private health insurance were 
“protection against large hospital/medical bills; peace of mind about healthcare 
needs; faster access to hospital beds/avoidance of waiting lists; option of 
private/semi-private accommodation.” (Department of Health and Children, 1999: 
8). 
 
Although it is to be expected that those consumers who have private health 
insurance would view it as important, it is interesting to note that this view also 
                                                 
24
 For further details of these findings, and further discussion of consumer attitudes and behaviour in 
relation to private health insurance, see Turner (2006). 
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appears to be shared to a degree by non-consumers (those who never had private 
health insurance and those who previously had it but no longer had it when 
surveyed).  Over half (54%) of non-consumers sampled in the 2003 survey (HIA, 
2003a) agreed that private health insurance is a necessity rather than a luxury.  
Although this proportion was lower in the 2005 survey (HIA, 2005a), with 43% of 
non-consumers agreeing with this statement, fewer non-consumers (32%) disagreed, 
with the remainder neither agreeing nor disagreeing or stating that they did not 
know.  Similarly, in 2008 (HIA, 2008c), more non-consumers agreed (41%) than 
disagreed (35%), with the remainder neither agreeing nor disagreeing or stating that 
they did not know. 
 
This would suggest that a significant number of non-consumers would like to have 
private health insurance.  Indeed, 42% of non-consumers sampled in the 2003 survey 
said that they were likely to get private health insurance at some stage in the future, 
while 34% of those in the 2005 survey said they were likely to get it, as did 27% in 
the 2008 survey.  The reduction in this proportion over time might, in part, be due to 
continued premium increases in the intervening period. 
 
Indeed, affordability appears to be the major factor behind non-consumers not 
having private health insurance.  In both the 2003 and 2005 surveys, the most quoted 
reason for not having private health insurance among those who have never had it 
was that it was too expensive or that the person could not afford it (42% of those 
who have never had cover cited this as their main reason for not having private 
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health insurance in the 2003 survey, while 38% cited it as the main reason in the 
2005 survey).  In the 2008 survey, possession of a medical card was the most 
commonly cited reason for not having private health insurance (33% cited this as the 
main reason for not having it), followed closely by it being expensive or that the 
person could not afford it, at 32%. 
 
Cost factors were also the most commonly cited reason for previous consumers 
(those who previously had private health insurance but no longer had it when 
surveyed) in all three surveys allowing their coverage to lapse.  Furthermore, when 
non-consumers (those who never had private health insurance and those who 
previously had it but no longer had it when surveyed) were asked what would 
encourage them to take out health insurance, having more money was the most 
commonly cited factor in all three surveys.  A reduction in premiums was the second 
most commonly cited factor in the 2003 and 2005 surveys and the third most 
commonly cited factor in the 2008 survey. 
 
This mirrors the finding in an earlier study, undertaken by the Economic and Social 
Research Institute and reported in Nolan & Wiley (2000), which showed that 23% of 
non-consumers would be very likely to take out private health insurance in response 
to a 10% fall in the price of insurance (a total of 52% said that they would be very or 
quite likely to take out insurance after such a price fall). 
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A major reason for the attractiveness of private health insurance to both consumers 
and non-consumers is a lack of confidence in the public health system.  When asked 
whether they agreed or disagreed with the statement “There is no need for private 
health insurance in Ireland, public services are adequate”, 82% of consumers and 
58% of non-consumers in the 2003 survey disagreed.  In the 2005 survey, 
disagreement with this statement was registered by 90% of consumers and 51% of 
non-consumers.  In the 2008 survey, agreement the level of disagreement remained 
at 90% among consumers but had reduced to 43% among non-consumers, although 
fewer non-consumers agreed with the statement (33%) than disagreed.  Eight percent 
of consumers and 24% of non-consumers agreed with this statement in the 2003 
survey, while only 3% of consumers agreed with it in 2005 and 2008 and 21% of 
non-consumers agreed in 2005. 
 
This suggests that, although the level of dissatisfaction with the public health service 
in Ireland remains very high among those with private health insurance, the level of 
dissatisfaction among those without private health insurance seems to be reducing 
somewhat, although their attitudes appear to remain ambivalent at best.
25
 
 
Evidence for why the public health service is not seen as adequate comes from 
figures compiled by the Central Statistics Office (CSO).  Its Quarterly National 
Household Survey module on health, carried out in 2001 (CSO, 2002), shows that 
just over a quarter (25.9%) of the adult (over-18) population had a medical card at 
                                                 
25
 A recently released report from the Health Consumer Powerhouse (2009) suggests that the Irish 
health system appears to suffer from a problem of perception, with responses to a patient organisation 
survey being considerably more negative than results from official figures. 
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that point in time, while 46.3% had private health insurance only, a further 2.1% had 
both
26
 and 25.6% had neither.
27
  Distinct trends emerge between those with and 
without private health insurance, particularly in relation to waiting periods.
28
 
 
In the sample as a whole, 1.6% of people were on inpatient waiting lists when the 
survey was carried out.
29, 30
  However, when broken down by medical cover, the 
figures range from 3.2% of those with medical cards only to 1.0% of those with 
private health insurance only.  The figures were 2.3% for those with both a medical 
card and private health insurance and 1.0% for those with neither form of cover. 
 
                                                 
26
 Of those who responded to the consumer surveys carried out on behalf of The Health Insurance 
Authority, 5% in the 2003 survey reported that they had both private health insurance and a medical 
card, while 3% in the 2005 survey said they had both, as did 4.7% in the 2008 survey.  These figures 
translate into 16%, 12% and 13.7%, respectively, of medical card holders sampled who had private 
health insurance (see HIA, 2003a, 2005a, 2008c).  This is further evidence that the public system is 
not considered adequate, as medical card holders have free access to public hospital accommodation 
and consultants. 
27
 A similar survey relating to the third quarter of 2007 (CSO, 2008b) shows that 24% of respondents 
had a medical card only, 44% had private health insurance only, 5% had both and 27% had neither.  
The CSO noted that the increase in the proportion of respondents with both forms of cover was 
largely driven by the 70+ age-group, who would have qualified for a medical card from 2001 
onwards (see Section 2.1.2).  Specifically, the proportion of those with both forms of cover in the 70+ 
age-group increased from 10% in 2001 to 33% in 2007, while the level of medical card coverage for 
this age-group rose from 79% in 2001 to 95% in 2007.  However, the figures also show that the 
proportion of people aged 65-69 with both forms of cover increased from 5% in 2001 to 10% in 2007. 
28
 Distinct differences are also evident between those with and without a medical card, with the 
former being significantly more likely to have a GP consultation or other health appointment in the 
two weeks prior to the survey being administered, and having one or more listed medical conditions.  
Those with medical cards also tended to rate their self-assessed health status lower than those without 
a medical card.  However, it should be noted that the age profile of those with medical cards was 
older than those without. 
29
 Private health insurance in Ireland is primarily focused on providing cover for hospital treatment, 
i.e. inpatient and day case treatment, rather than outpatient treatment.  This is confirmed by 
consumers’ perceptions of the most important element of cover. 
30
 A survey of health systems in Europe (Health Consumer Powerhouse, 2008a) noted that severe 
waiting list problems in Ireland seem to be improving, but the associated press release (Health 
Consumer Powerhouse, 2008b) suggested that waiting times should be cut further, particularly for 
specialist appointments.  The index ranked Ireland 11
th
 out of 31 countries, up from 16
th
 in 2007.  It 
should be noted that the report ranked Ireland 15
th
, but the revised press release ranked Ireland 11
th
 – 
it would appear that an error was made in the tally of marks assigned to Ireland in the report.  The 
2009 report (Health Consumer Powerhouse, 2009) ranked Ireland 13
th
 out of 33 countries. 
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However, while the likelihood of being on a waiting list showed a distinct trend 
between those with and without a medical card, the length of time people were 
waiting showed a distinct trend between those with and without private health 
insurance. 
 
Just over a quarter of those with medical cards only who were on waiting lists for 
inpatient treatment had been waiting over a year for treatment (see Figure 2.3).  By 
contrast, only 12.7% of those with private health insurance only had been waiting 
that long.  Of those with neither form of cover, 38.5% had been waiting over a year, 
while the sample size in the group with both, who had been waiting for over a year, 
was too small for estimation by the CSO. 
 
Figure 2.3 Inpatient Waiting Lists by Type of Medical Cover, Q3 2001 
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At the other end of the scale, just over 60% of those with private health insurance 
only and nearly 72% of those with both private health insurance and a medical card 
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had been waiting less than three months, while only 36.3% of those with medical 
cards only and just under 31% of those with neither form of cover had been waiting 
less than three months for treatment.  It would appear from these figures that those 
with private health insurance cover (on its own or with a medical card) tend not to be 
waiting as long for treatment as those without private health insurance cover (those 
with a medical card only or neither form of cover). 
 
A similar pattern emerges in relation to waiting lists for day care procedures or 
investigations.  Nationally, 1.3% of people were on such waiting lists when the CSO 
survey was carried out.  Of those with medical cards only, 2.3% were on a day care 
procedure or investigation waiting list, while only 0.8% of those with private health 
insurance only were on such a list.  The corresponding figure for those with both a 
medical card and private health insurance was 1.8%, while the figure for those with 
neither form of cover was 1.0%.  The breakdown of waiting times for each of these 
categories is shown in Figure 2.4. 
 
Again, it can be seen that those with private health insurance tend to be waiting for 
less time than those without it.  A little over half of those with a medical card only or 
with neither form of cover had been waiting less than three months for day care 
procedure or investigation, compared with over 80% of those with private health 
insurance only or those with both.  One in ten of those with a medical card only, and 
a slightly higher proportion of those with neither form of cover, were waiting over a 
year for such treatment, compared with just 2.6% of those with private health 
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insurance only (again, the sample size of those with both forms of cover, who had 
been waiting over a year, was too small for estimation by the CSO). 
 
Figure 2.4 Day Care Procedure/Investigation Waiting Lists by Type of 
Medical Cover, Q3 2001 
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As O’Morain (2007) notes, a common waiting list for public and private patients 
was called for by the Commission on Health Funding (1989), but has not been 
implemented.
31
  This is despite the fact that, in the most recent health strategy 
(Department of Health and Children, 2001), the government acknowledged that the 
public-private mix in hospitals is a contributory factor to long waiting lists for public 
patients.  The strategy document notes “Waiting times for public patients for some 
non-emergency (elective) treatment are unacceptably long.  While this is due 
primarily to the problems of capacity discussed above, the current mix between 
public and private practice is a contributory factor.”  (Department of Health and 
Children, 2001: 100). 
                                                 
31
 Colombo & Tapay (2004) also suggest that having a single waiting list for public and private 
patients could help to limit inequalities in access. 
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As part of the policy response to this, as proposed in the health strategy, the National 
Treatment Purchase Fund (NTPF) was established in 2002.  This provides a facility 
for public patients who have been waiting longer than three months for an operation 
or procedure in a public hospital to be treated at the State’s expense in a private 
hospital in Ireland or the UK.  Over 135,000 patients have been treated under the 
NTPF up to the end of 2008.  According to the NTPF, the median waiting times for 
all procedures in Ireland in December 2008 was 2.6 months (NTPF, 2009), down 
from 3.4 months at the end of 2007 (NTPF, 2008).  These figures also show that, as 
at December 2008, 13,863 patients were waiting for surgical treatment for more than 
three months, of whom 1,576 (or just over 11%) were waiting for 12 months or 
longer.  According to NTPF (2008), in December 2007, there were 17,747 patients 
awaiting surgical procedures for more than three months, of whom 4,637 (or just 
over 26%) were waiting for 12 months or more.  According to NTPF (2009), the 
NTPF treated 36,269 patients in 2008, including nearly 21,000 inpatient procedures, 
over 12,000 outpatient consultations and over 3,000 MRI scans (increases of 5%, 
17% and 35% compared with 2007).  These figures suggest that the National 
Treatment Purchase Fund is having a positive impact on waiting times for public 
patients. 
 
The Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General – the body which oversees the 
administration of public funds – recently reported that procedures purchased from 
private hospitals by the NTPF generally cost less than the equivalent procedures 
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carried out in the public hospital system, which suggests that the NTPF also provides 
value for money for the taxpayer (Comptroller and Auditor General, 2009). 
 
In terms of the characteristics of those who purchase private health insurance, not 
surprisingly there is a significant differential between social classes, while some age 
effects can also be seen.  Table 2.4 shows that significant majorities of those in 
higher social classes A, B and C1 (upper middle class, middle class, and lower 
middle class, respectively) are covered by private health insurance, while those in 
the lower social classes of C2, D and E (skilled working class, other working class, 
and casual workers and those dependent on welfare, respectively) are less likely to 
have it.  Those in the farming class have take-up rates broadly similar to the overall 
average. 
 
Table 2.4 Private Health Insurance Coverage by Social Class 
 
Social 
Class 
AB C1 C2 DE Farming Overall 
2003 70% 31% 39% 47% 
2005 85% 75% 46% 18% 55% 52% 
2008 89% 65% 42% 18% 49% 49% 
 
Source: HIA (2003a, 2005a, 2008c) 
 
 
Figure 2.5 meanwhile, shows the coverage of private health insurance by age-group.  
It can be seen from this Figure that those in the younger and older age-groups tend to 
have lower coverage rates than those in the middle-age groups.
32
  Figures based on 
cluster analysis reported in the 2008 survey (HIA, 2008c) show that the three broad 
                                                 
32
 CSO (2008b) shows a similar pattern, with the highest level of private health insurance take-up 
recorded among those aged 35-64. 
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segments of the market are Young Singles (30%), Couples (44%) and Retirees 
(26%). 
 
Figure 2.5 Private Health Insurance Coverage by Age 
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Figures compiled by the Central Statistics Office (CSO, 2008b) show that those with 
private health insurance also tend to perceive their health status in a more positive 
light.  Of those aged 18 and over surveyed, 52% of those with private health 
insurance perceived their health status as Very Good, 40% perceived it as Good, 7% 
perceived it as Fair and only 1% perceived it as Poor.  By comparison, only 27% of 
those with medical cards considered themselves to be in very good health, 43% in 
good health, 25% in fair health and 5% in poor health.  The corresponding figures 
for those with neither form of medical cover were 56%, 38%, 5% and 1% 
respectively.  (These figures are presented in Table 6.9.)  This last group comprises 
those who effectively self-insure for medical treatment, or rely on the public health 
care system. 
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2.1.5 Equity and Private Health Insurance in Ireland 
 
Although a full discussion of the equity of private health insurance in Ireland is 
beyond the scope of this study, it would nevertheless be appropriate to briefly 
outline some of the issues that have been raised in relation to this issue, as some of 
them relate to the role that private health insurance plays in the Irish healthcare 
system. 
 
The issue of the inequity of what has been described as a two-tier health system in 
Ireland is one that has received much examination.  This two-tier system in Ireland 
developed over a period of decades and has been institutionalised, as noted by Wren 
(2003). 
 
Much of the basis for concern is the close and complex interaction between the 
public and private healthcare delivery mechanisms in Ireland.  In this regard, Nolan 
(2005) notes that, in terms of the delivery of healthcare services in Ireland, some 
services are publicly funded and delivered, some are publicly funded but privately 
delivered, some are privately funded and delivered and others are privately funded 
but publicly delivered. 
 
One of the main interactions between the private and public systems, as noted 
earlier, is that many privately insured patients receive treatment in beds designated 
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for use by private patients in public hospitals
33
 and, as seen in Section 2.1.4, 
evidence suggests that privately insured patients tend to have shorter waiting times 
on average than public patients.  This system of bed designation is one that 
successive governments have not only permitted but encouraged. 
 
For example, in the Programme for Economic and Social Progress (Department of 
the Taoiseach, 1991), which was one of a series of agreements between the social 
partners, including the government, employers and unions, the then government 
recognised the important role that voluntary health insurance played in the health 
system.  The Programme envisaged that, over time, private patients admitted to 
public hospitals for non-emergency treatment would be accommodated only in semi-
private or private beds and not in wards.  However, the document notes “In 
gradually implementing the new system the Government will be sensitive to the 
need to ensure that the public hospital system caters adequately for the requirements 
of private patients and that the important role and contribution of voluntary health 
insurance is not diminished in any way.” (Department of the Taoiseach, 1991: 28). 
 
Concerns have also been raised that, due to differential methods of payment between 
public and private patients, hospital consultants have incentives to prioritise the 
treatment of the latter group, leaving non-consultant hospital doctors to treat their 
                                                 
33
 As noted by NESF (2002), attitudes towards equity might be different where private patients are 
treated in private hospitals and are seen as paying their own way. 
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public patients.  Consultants are generally paid a salary for their public work and are 
paid on a fee-for-service basis for their private work.
34
 
 
Wren (2003) estimates that some consultants earned an average of €130,000 from 
private practice in 2002, and €280,000 between their public and private practices 
combined.  She also notes that, while anecdotal evidence suggests that consultants 
prefer to spend time with their private practice, leaving non-consultant hospital 
doctors to treat many of their public patients, a Value for Money Audit of the Irish 
Health System, commissioned by the Department of Health and Children and 
published in 2001 (Deloitte & Touche, 2001), found no systematic evidence of such 
practices, although it did acknowledge that a lack of information hindered the 
making of informed judgments on the issue. 
 
The concern over consultants’ treatment of public versus private patients has been 
reflected in the negotiations between the Health Service Executive and hospital 
consultants to draw up a new consultant contract.  The agreement reached between 
the HSE and the Irish Hospital Consultants Association (the body representing the 
majority of hospital consultants in Ireland) means that new consultants (and any 
consultants who choose to transfer from their existing contracts to the new contracts) 
must agree to carry out their private practice on public hospital campuses and, 
except in limited cases, limit their private practice to 20% of their workload.
35
  Three 
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 For further discussion on this and its effects on equity, see Nolan (2005). 
35
 The previous contracts, which still apply to existing consultants who do not choose to switch to the 
new contracts, allow most consultants to carry out private practice, in some cases only on a public 
hospital campus, but in other cases off-site private practice is also permitted. 
 55 
new types of contracts will be available – the first (and highest paid) will be for 
consultants who agree to carry out only public work, the second for those who agree 
to limit their private work to 20% of their workload, and the third (and lowest paid) 
for consultants appointed in exceptional circumstances who are permitted to carry 
out private work outside the public hospital campus (see Department of Health and 
Children, 2008a for further details).  A recent report from the Comptroller and 
Auditor General (2009) states that 37% of consultants who have accepted the new 
contract are on the first category of contract, i.e. they are not permitted to engage in 
private practice. 
 
It is interesting to note that similar issues have arisen in England in recent years.  
Prior to October 2003, consultants working for the NHS were permitted to engage in 
private practice, provided that private income for full-time consultants did not 
exceed 10% of their NHS income.  Part-time consultants were permitted to engage 
in unlimited private practice.  However, concerns were raised by the House of 
Commons Health Select Committee, including about potential conflicts of interest 
arising from private practice.  Under new contracts, from October 2003, new 
consultants, and any consultants on the old contracts who opt to take the new 
contracts, are permitted to engage in private practice with no limit on the amount of 
income they can earn from such practice.  However, undertaking private practice at 
the expense of NHS work may affect pay progression. 
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Morris et al (2008) show that the mean total income across all consultants in 
England in 2003/4 was £110,773, comprising mean NHS income of £76,628 and 
mean private income of £34,144.  The ratio of mean private income to mean NHS 
income was 0.45.  For those on part-time contracts, this ratio was 0.71, while for 
those on full-time contracts it was 0.26 – far in excess of the 10% permitted under 
the old contract.  Those on maximum part-time contracts (who receive ten elevenths 
of a full-time salary) had a ratio of 0.79.  They also note that approximately 60% of 
consultants undertook private practice alongside their NHS work.  They also find 
that there was a positive correlation between waiting lists and private income across 
specialties.  However, they argue that the causality is uncertain.  It could be that 
private practice is undertaken at the expense of NHS work or that long waiting lists 
for certain specialties encourage more people to buy private health insurance. 
 
The counter-argument to claims of inequitable access to healthcare on the basis of 
ability to pay for private health insurance is that those who are privately insured are 
also paying for the public system via taxation but are opting not to use it, and are 
therefore effectively paying twice and are also freeing up capacity in the public 
system for use by those who rely solely on it. 
 
However, Smith (2009) notes that equity in healthcare can be measured in a number 
of different ways (such as rights, capacity to benefit, health status, access to health 
care or health) and that the outcomes can differ depending on which of these is 
pursued.  Using a flow of funds analysis, she examines equity in the financing of the 
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Irish healthcare system.  She notes that, overall the system is moderately 
progressive, but that progressivity and equity do not necessarily coincide.  Her 
findings indicate that there is cross-subsidisation of lower income groups by higher 
income groups at the overall system level, but that this masks different patterns for 
different types of provider/function and for different resource flows. 
 
She finds that, in terms of equity, there are uneven patterns of resource flows that are 
not evident in summary measures.  Some of these patterns involve cross-subsidies 
from rich to poor, but others involve cross-subsidies in the opposite direction.  Some 
of these unusual effects are due to restrictions in eligibility for public resources.  She 
suggests that, although some of these are relatively small resource flows (for 
example, the NTPF accounts for less than 1% of total public expenditure on health), 
they are symptomatic of wider problems in the system.  She concludes that, when it 
comes to equity in the Irish healthcare system, the devil is very much in the detail. 
 
Figures from the consumer surveys commissioned by The Health Insurance 
Authority (HIA, 2003a, 2005a, 2008c) show that approximately six in ten of those 
covered by private health insurance have made at least one claim on their policy, 
either for themselves or for someone else covered by their policy.  If these patients 
did not have the option of private health insurance, then it is clear that they would 
place additional strain on an already stretched public healthcare system.  However, 
the fact that many of these claimants would have been treated in private beds in 
public hospitals and by consultants who also work in the public healthcare system, 
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might limit the degree to which private health insurance relieves pressure on the 
public healthcare system in Ireland. 
 
Palangkaraya et al (2009) suggest, in the context of the Australian health system, 
that encouraging greater take-up of private health insurance might not reduce 
utilisation in public hospitals, as private treatment of patients will compete with 
public treatment for limited medical resources (such as specialists), thus reducing the 
amount of such resources that would be available for public patients.  They also note 
that another argument put forward for encouraging private health insurance, that of 
increased consumer choice, is limited by the universality principle underlying the 
Australian health system, which is intended to ensure equity of access to all citizens, 
whether privately insured or not.  A similar universality principle applies in the Irish 
health system. 
 
The Department of Health and Children, in its White Paper (Department of Health 
and Children, 1999), summarised the main arguments for and against the existing 
public-private mix of hospital services. 
 
The main advantages, as outlined in the White Paper, include that it helps to attract 
and retain high quality medical staff into the public healthcare system; it promotes 
efficient use of consultants’ time by having public and private patients on the same 
site; it encourages active linkages between the two systems vis-à-vis dissemination 
of medical knowledge and best practice; it allows patients who are admitted to 
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public hospitals on an emergency basis to avail of private healthcare (since private 
hospitals tend not to have Accident & Emergency facilities); and it provides an 
additional revenue stream for the public hospital system. 
 
The principal disadvantages, as outlined in the White Paper, include that the lack of 
full economic charging for private beds in public hospitals may give rise to some 
distortion and leads to reduced revenue to the State compared with a system of full 
economic charging; it provides an incentive for consultants to spend more time with 
private patients, because of the different payment methods for consultants (fee-for-
service for treating private patients versus salary for treating public patients); and the 
growth of private health insurance poses a potential threat to access for public 
patients. 
 
Plans have been proposed on a number of occasions to implement some form of 
universal health insurance in Ireland, which is favoured by a number of opposition 
political parties.  For example, two reports commissioned by The Adelaide Hospital 
Society have investigated options for a social health insurance system to replace the 
current tax-financed public health system (Thomas, Normand & Smith, 2006, 
2008).
36
  More recently, Fine Gael, the main opposition party in the Irish parliament, 
unveiled plans for the introduction of universal health insurance as part of significant 
                                                 
36
 However, Wagstaff (2009) finds that countries that have switched from tax financing to social 
health insurance financing of their healthcare systems increase health spending per capita by 3-4% 
without significant impact on what he calls amenable mortality, except for breast cancer, on which 
social health insurance systems perform worse than tax financed system.  Meanwhile, Billauer (2009) 
argues that healthcare is not suitable for provision on the basis of universal insurance. 
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reforms of the health service (see www.faircare.ie).
37
  The Labour Party, the second 
largest opposition party in the Irish parliament, has also discussed proposals for 
universal health insurance in Ireland (Labour Party, 2001).  Both the Fine Gael and 
Labour Party proposals also included free GP care for all, which is not currently a 
feature of the Irish health system. 
 
However, in the 1999 White Paper (Department of Health and Children, 1999), the 
then government noted that universal social health insurance had been suggested but 
it decided against implementing such a change.  Among the reasons cited for this 
were that the existing system was considered adequate to meet future needs, subject 
to the implementation of some reforms; it felt that concerns over equity of access 
could be dealt with in terms of targeted initiatives and general improvements in the 
public healthcare system; the level of consensus required for such a change was not 
evident; many of the European systems with social health insurance were facing 
similar challenges to Ireland; it felt that the new system would be administratively 
more complex and costly; and the cost of overhauling the existing system would be 
considerable. 
 
Recent government policies have been aimed at a greater separation of public and 
private hospital treatment.  In particular the policy of hospital co-location, favoured 
by the current government, aims to have private patients treated in private hospitals 
built on the campuses of public hospitals.  The argument put forward in favour of 
                                                 
37
 However, Burke (2009) argues that the Fine Gael proposals lack much of the detail required to 
assess the feasibility of their implementation. 
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this is that it will allow beds in public hospitals that are currently designated private 
to be re-designated as public beds.  Tax incentives for the development of private 
hospitals were also available in recent years. 
 
At the launch of the co-location initiative in 2005, the Minister for Health and 
Children noted that the public-private mix had proved difficult to manage and that 
resource and cost sharing is not as clear as it should be, but that the new initiative 
would bring greater clarity by separating the management and financing of a 
substantial proportion of private beds (Department of Health and Children, 2005b).  
However, this initiative has proved controversial and planning objections have been 
raised to a number of the co-located developments.  Furthermore, in the 
supplementary budget delivered in April 2009 (details available at 
http://budget.gov.ie/), it was announced that tax incentives for private hospitals 
would be discontinued, with transitional arrangements made for those projects that 
had reached a certain stage of development. 
 
2.2 Legislative Background 
 
The private health insurance market in Ireland, in its current form, was established 
with the passing of the Voluntary Health Insurance Act, 1957 (the 1957 Act).  Prior 
to this, a number of small-scale attempts at establishing a private health insurance 
market had been made but without much success (see O’Morain, 2007 for further 
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details).  The 1957 Act established the Voluntary Health Insurance Board (VHI), 
which now trades as Vhi Healthcare. 
 
In 1992, the European Third Non-Life Insurance Directive
38
 was passed.  Among 
other provisions, this Directive required EU Member States to open their non-life 
insurance markets to competition.  This Directive was reflected in the Health 
Insurance Act, 1994 (the 1994 Act) in Ireland.  This Act, and associated regulations 
brought forward in 1996, gave legislative foundation to a number of principles that 
VHI had been operating on a de facto basis.  In particular, the 1994 Act enshrined in 
legislation what have become known as the three ‘pillars’ of the Irish private health 
insurance market – community rating, open enrolment and lifetime cover. 
 
Community rating in the Irish context means that insurers are not permitted to vary 
premiums or benefits between individuals on the same health insurance contract, 
subject to some exceptions.  Firstly, premiums payable by a person under 18 years of 
age may be waived or reduced.  If reduced, the premium payable by an under-18 
year old may not exceed 50% of the premium payable by an adult under a similar 
contract effected by the same insurer.  Secondly, premiums may be reduced for a 
full-time student, dependent on the policyholder, between the ages of 18 and 23, 
provided that the premium payable by such a student is not more than 50% of the 
premium payable by an adult under a similar contract.  Members of group schemes 
may also have their premiums reduced by up to 10% relative to the full adult 
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 Council Directive 92/49/EEC of 18 June 1992 
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premium.
39
  However, within each of these categories, the premiums payable must 
be the same for all persons falling under those categories. 
 
The current system of community rating in operation in the Irish market is known as 
single-rate community rating.  This means that a person’s age at entry does not 
affect the premium that they pay.  However, a change has been proposed, involving 
a move to lifetime community rating, similar to the change introduced in the 
Australian private health insurance market in 2000.  Lifetime community rating 
involves consumers who delay taking out private health insurance until older ages 
paying late entry loadings to reflect the fact that they had not contributed to the 
community rate at an earlier age.  This policy is discussed in greater detail in 
Chapter 5. 
 
Open enrolment means that insurers must accept any applicant,
40,41
 although insurers 
may impose waiting periods, which are age-related.
42
  Three types of waiting periods 
                                                 
39
 There is another provision which states that a person who is a member of a restricted membership 
undertaking and is in receipt of a pension may have his/her premium reduced, but this does not apply 
to the ‘open’ insurers.  It should also be noted that there is no formal definition in the legislation of a 
group scheme.  In practice, group schemes are operated or facilitated by, inter alia, employers, trade 
unions, credit unions, alumni associations and by insurers for those who join online.  A significant 
majority of insured persons in the market in Ireland are members of a group scheme, as noted by HIA 
(2007). 
40
 Unless the person has committed fraud that caused, or could have caused, financial loss to an 
insurer. 
41
 The original regulations, brought forward in 1996, specified that this applied only to those aged 
under-65 when first applying for health insurance, or applying after a break in cover of 13 weeks or 
more, but this stipulation was removed in revised regulations in 2005, meaning that those aged 65 and 
over may not now be refused cover (except in the limited circumstances outlined in the preceding 
footnote). 
42
 The Health Insurance Authority (HIA, 2008d) notes that it has, following requests, provided advice 
to the Department of Health and Children in relation to the compatibility of these age-related waiting 
periods with equality legislation and the proposal for such age-related waiting periods to be removed 
as part of any move to lifetime community rating. 
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are permitted – an initial waiting period (for a first-time applicant or an applicant 
who has had a break in cover of 13 weeks or more), one for pre-existing conditions 
and one for upgrades in cover.  The maximum permitted waiting periods in each of 
these categories are outlined in Table 2.5.  Even during the initial waiting period 
however, insured persons are eligible for minimum payments for health services 
provided as a result of accident or injury.  During the waiting period for an upgrade 
in cover, insured persons will still be covered at the lower level of cover, subject to 
any initial or pre-existing condition waiting periods that they may be serving.  
Lifetime cover means that insurers may not refuse to renew cover for any insured 
person.
43
  In the context of lifetime cover, it should be noted that private health 
insurance contracts in Ireland are generally annual contracts. 
 
Table 2.5 Maximum Permitted Waiting Periods 
 
Age Under-55 55-59 60-64 65+ 
Initial 26 weeks* 52 weeks 104 weeks 
Pre-existing 
Condition 
5 years 7 years 10 years 
Upgrade in 
Cover 
2 years 5 years 
 
* However, maternity benefits are not covered for the first 52 weeks. 
 
 
In addition to these three ‘pillars’, regulations were brought forward in 1996 
specifying a set of minimum benefits that any eligible health insurance contract must 
provide.  These minimum benefit regulations were designed “to ensure that 
individuals do not significantly under-insure due to lack of proper understanding of 
the restrictions which, in the absence of a specified minimum entitlement, could 
                                                 
43
 Unless the person has committed fraud or the insurer ceases to carry on health insurance business 
in the State. 
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apply to some types of policies.” (Department of Health and Children, 1999: 54).  
However, monetary amounts specified in these regulations were not inflation-linked 
and are now significantly out-of-date, given the rate of medical inflation.  In practice 
however, cover provided by all insurers is significantly greater than the minimum 
required under these regulations.  A commitment was made in the 1999 White Paper 
(Department of Health and Children, 1999) to amend the minimum benefit 
regulations, and following a consultation process on the issue, The Health Insurance 
Authority recommended to the Department of Health and Children that these 
regulations should remove the references to monetary amounts wherever feasible 
(see HIA, 2003c, 2005b, 2007). 
 
Regulations were also brought forward in 1996 specifying a risk equalisation 
scheme to operate between insurers.  The aim of risk equalisation is to “equitably 
neutralise differences in insurers’ claim costs that arise due to variations in the 
health status of their members.” (HIA, 2009: 9)  This aim is achieved by means of 
transfers of money from insurers with relatively low-risk membership profiles to a 
risk equalisation fund, from which money is received by insurers with relatively 
high-risk membership profiles.  These regulations were revoked in 1999 during a 
period of consultation on the future of private health insurance, which led to the 
publication of the White Paper in 1999 (Department of Health and Children, 1999). 
 
Following on from this White Paper, the Health Insurance (Amendment) Act, 2001 
was passed.  Among other provisions, this Act allowed for the Minister for Health 
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and Children to introduce regulations specifying a new risk equalisation scheme.  
These were later introduced in 2003. 
 
The 2001 Act also made provisions for the establishment of The Health Insurance 
Authority (HIA), an independent statutory body to regulate the private health 
insurance market in Ireland, which was established on 1 February 2001.  The HIA is 
responsible for regulating the conduct of health insurance business in Ireland, 
although its role is primarily one of monitoring and advising the Minister for Health 
and Children.  It does not have widespread powers to impose sanctions on insurers 
in the event of non-compliance with legislation.  However, proposals were put 
forward to give the HIA more powers (HIA, 2007; Competition Authority, 2007; 
Private Health Insurance Advisory Group, 2007
44
), and the Health Insurance 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 2009 made changes in this regard.  The HIA is 
funded by a levy on private health insurers, currently set at 0.14% of premium 
income. 
 
2.3 Competition in the Market 
 
For 40 years from its establishment in 1957, Vhi Healthcare had a monopoly 
position in the market for private health insurance in Ireland.  The 1957 Act 
provided that no other health insurer could enter the market without the approval of 
the Minister for Health.  O’Morain (2007) notes that Private Patients Plan applied to 
                                                 
44
 The Private Health Insurance Advisory Group (2007) also recommended that certain existing 
powers of the Financial Regulator be applied to health insurers. 
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enter the Irish market in 1988 but that this application was rejected by the 
Department of Health and Children. 
 
There were a number of restricted membership undertakings in existence in 1957 
and a number of others have been established since then, but membership of these 
undertakings is restricted to certain, mostly vocational groups, and they therefore do 
not compete to any great extent with the insurers that are subject to open enrolment.  
At the end of 2008, there were 8 restricted membership undertakings operating in 
Ireland (HIA, 2009), down from 10 at the end of 2007 (HIA, 2008d).
45
  The largest 
of these are operated by, or on behalf of, An Garda Síochána (the Irish police force), 
the country’s prison officers, and employees of the State-owned Electricity Supply 
Board (ESB). 
 
After the passing of the Health Insurance Act, 1994, the first entrant into the market 
was the British United Provident Association, which set up BUPA Ireland in 1996.  
BUPA Ireland began selling plans in the Irish market in January 1997.  VIVAS 
Health was established in 2004 and was the third provider in the market.  Following 
an unsuccessful challenge against the Risk Equalisation Scheme, 2003 in the Irish 
High Court, BUPA Ireland announced its withdrawal from the market in December 
2006.  BUPA Ireland’s business was subsequently acquired by Quinn Insurance 
Limited, which already sold other forms of non-life insurance in Ireland, and was re-
branded Quinn Healthcare in April 2007.  In early 2008, Hibernian Insurance 
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 Section 12 of the Health Insurance (Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill, 2008 provides that, from the 
date of commencement of that Section, there will be a prohibition on the establishment of any new 
restricted membership undertakings. 
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Limited, part of the AVIVA group, which already sold both life and non-life 
insurance in Ireland, acquired a majority stake in VIVAS Health.  In July 2008 
VIVAS Health was re-branded Hibernian Health, and was later re-branded 
Hibernian AVIVA Health.
46
 
 
At the time of writing, Vhi Healthcare, Quinn Healthcare and Hibernian AVIVA 
Health are the only three insurers operating in the unrestricted market for private 
health insurance in Ireland.  Recent figures suggest that Vhi Healthcare has a 70% 
market share, Quinn Healthcare a 20% share and VIVAS Health 6%, with the 
remaining 4% accounted for by the restricted membership undertakings (see HIA, 
2008c). 
 
Under the 1957 Act, Vhi Healthcare was not mandated to make profits, merely to 
break even in any given year.  However, it has made profits over the years, and these 
have helped to build up its solvency reserves.  BUPA Ireland was part of the British 
United Provident Association, which is a non-profit organisation.  However, it too 
made profits in the Irish market.  VIVAS Health was the first for-profit insurer to 
operate in the market for private health insurance in Ireland.  Both Quinn Healthcare 
and Hibernian AVIVA Health are for-profit insurers. 
 
                                                 
46
 In this thesis, this insurer is variously referred to as VIVAS Health, Hibernian Health and 
Hibernian AVIVA Health, depending on the time period under discussion.  Similarly, BUPA Ireland 
and Quinn Healthcare are used at various points to describe that insurer, also depending on the time 
period under discussion. 
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The relatively low number of insurers in the Irish private health insurance market 
has been an issue of concern in recent years.  The HIA commissioned a report on 
competition and risk equalisation in the Irish market, which was carried out by the 
York Health Economics Consortium and published in 2003 (YHEC, 2003). 
 
One of its findings was that the prospect of risk equalisation and the status of Vhi 
Healthcare as a State-backed dominant player, combined with uncertainty at the time 
over its future status, were among the main factors contributing to the low level of 
existing competition and limited scope for future competition.  The report suggested 
that, even if risk equalisation payments were implemented, the Irish market would 
still likely attract some new entrants, but fewer than if payments were not 
implemented. 
 
The report also concluded that, in the absence of risk equalisation, the benefits to 
consumers of new entrants might be limited, as “lower prices and higher profits for 
insurers could be achieved for some but older people with health insurance, less 
inclined to move between insurers, would lose from the absence of full risk 
equalisation.”  (YHEC, 2003: 97). 
 
The reference to older people being less likely to move between insurers is borne out 
by the results of three surveys of consumers carried out on behalf of the HIA (HIA, 
2003a, 2005a, 2008c).  These show that, by late 2002 (when the field-work for the 
study published in 2003 was carried out), only 6% of respondents who had health 
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insurance had ever switched health insurer.  The 2005 survey found that this had 
increased to 10%, and the 2008 survey showed that, by late 2007 (when the field-
work for the 2008 report was carried out) this figure had levelled off at 10% - nearly 
11 years after the introduction of competition into the market.
47
 
 
The surveys also showed that fewer than one in seven of those who have not 
switched have seriously considered switching.  Figures from the 2003 and 2005 
reports also showed that older people were less likely to have switched or to have 
considered switching than other age groups. 
 
These findings suggest that competition among insurers is primarily for first-time 
purchasers of health insurance, who tend to be younger than the average age of 
existing consumers in the market.
48
  This phenomenon would work to the 
disadvantage of Vhi Healthcare, as the longest-established insurer in the market, and 
is consistent with the idea of adverse retention, put forward by Altman, Cutler & 
Zeckhauser (1998), which is the tendency for people who do not switch plans to 
magnify cost differentials between plans.  One of the factors that Altman et al (1998) 
suggest will affect the extent of adverse retention is the length of time for which the 
plans have been offered – the suggestion being that if people do not switch plans to 
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 By comparison, Buchmueller & Feldstein (1996) found that 3-6% of enrolees in plans that were 
effectively free to University of California employees switched plans between 1993 and 1994 (i.e. a 
single switching opportunity), despite the fact that no cost savings were to be made.  The authors also 
noted that this was consistent with “normal” switching rates for other large health benefit programs 
with multiple options.  It could be argued that there is less choice in the Irish market, due to the low 
number of insurers, but given that the Buchmueller & Feldstein findings relate to switching when no 
cost savings were to be made, this would suggest that price, a major basis of competition, was not a 
deciding factor in this rate of switching. 
48
 For example, HIA (2005a) shows that the mean age at which consumers take out private health 
insurance in Ireland is 30, compared with a mean age of insured consumers of 44. 
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any great extent then adverse retention will drive up the costs of older plans relative 
to newer ones. 
 
In addition to adverse retention, an issue of relevance to competition in the market is 
risk selection (also known as cream skimming or cherry picking), whereby insurers 
attempt to attract low-risk lives in order to reduce claim costs and increase profits.  
Community rating, which operates in the Irish market, accentuates incentives for 
insurers to engage in risk selection, and while open enrolment and lifetime cover 
reduce the opportunities for cherry picking, they do not eliminate them, as risk 
selection may occur in subtle forms, such as marketing or plan design, as noted by 
YHEC (2003).  These issues are discussed in more detail in Chapter 4. 
 
Further to BUPA Ireland’s withdrawal from the market, the Minister for Health and 
Children requested the HIA and The Competition Authority to report on competition 
in the market.  Both reports (HIA, 2007; Competition Authority, 2007) 
recommended, among other measures, the normalisation of Vhi Healthcare’s 
regulatory position (discussed further in Section 2.5), an increase in the powers 
available to the HIA, measures designed to facilitate switching by consumers and an 
updating of the minimum benefit regulations.  A third report was commissioned by 
the Minister around the same time (Private Health Insurance Advisory Group, 2007), 
and many of its recommendations were similar.  This latter report led to a number of 
policy changes by the government, including the discounting of risk equalisation 
payments by 20% (although a stay on such payments was in place at the time and the 
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Risk Equalisation Scheme, 2003 was set aside by the Supreme Court without 
payments ever having been made under the scheme). 
 
One result of the increased number of insurers operating in the market has been a 
rise in the number of private health insurance plans available to consumers.  HIA 
(2008d) notes that in 1996, Vhi Healthcare offered five health insurance products.  
By 2003 the number of products being offered by the open membership insurers 
(BUPA Ireland and Vhi Healthcare at that time) had risen to 18.  By the time the 
report (HIA, 2008d) was compiled, it noted that there were in excess of 100 products 
being offered by the open membership insurers (Quinn Healthcare, Vhi Healthcare 
and VIVAS Health at that time).  HIA (2009) states that there were over 60 products 
and over 100 product variations available in the market at the end of 2008. 
 
The large number of products available in the market could potentially lead to 
confusion among consumers.  Thomson & Mossialos (2007) conclude that if 
consumers find it difficult to compare plans in terms of price and quality then 
product differentiation could restrict competition.  Maynard & Dixon (2002) also 
note that the benefits of competition might be eroded if people experience difficulty 
in comparing plans available in the market.  They note that this is one of the 
arguments in favour of a standardised benefits package, but that insurers are often 
reluctant to comply.  Evidence of difficulty in comparing plans from European 
markets was noted by Mossialos & Thomson (2002b). 
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Evidence from the surveys of consumers carried out on behalf of the HIA suggests 
that significant numbers of people do not find it straightforward to compare plans.  
When asked their level of agreement or disagreement with the statement “There is 
adequate information to enable me to compare plans on offer from different private 
health insurers”, 31% of respondents to the 2008 survey (HIA, 2008c) agreed or 
strongly agreed, while 29% disagreed or strongly disagreed (15% neither agreed nor 
disagreed, while 25% responded that they did not know, although it should be noted 
that this statement was read out to those with and without private health insurance.  
In the 2005 survey (HIA, 2005a), these figures were 35%, 23%, 18% and 25%, 
respectively.  In the 2003 survey (HIA, 2003a), 54% of respondents (including 77% 
of those with private health insurance) stated that they were satisfied or very 
satisfied with the quality of information that helps them to compare plans on offer by 
health insurers, while 18% said they were dissatisfied and 27% said they did not 
know.  Meanwhile, in the same survey, 57% of respondents (including 78% of those 
with private health insurance) stated that they were satisfied or very satisfied with 
the accessibility of such information, while 17% said they were dissatisfied with this 
and 27% said they did not know. 
 
These findings suggest that people are finding it increasingly difficult to compare 
plans, and it is interesting to note that this coincides with the sharp increase in the 
number of plans available in the market.  Despite this however, majorities of 
respondents to all three surveys indicated that they would like to see more providers 
competing in the market for private health insurance in Ireland. 
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The HIA has also noted that special offers have been marketed in the private health 
insurance arena in recent times, such as discounts on other insurance products to 
those who purchase private health insurance from certain insurers or discounts for 
people who purchase private health insurance on specified dates.  It noted that the 
latter activity, while of benefit to consumers by contributing to competition and 
innovation in the market, may undermine community rating “if special terms are 
marketed and structured in such a way that only a subgroup of the population are 
aware of the terms and are in a position to avail of them.”  (HIA, 2008d: 14). 
 
The difficulty in comparing plans across the market is cited by respondents to the 
HIA’s consumer surveys (HIA, 2003a, 2005a, 2008c) as one of the reasons why 
some consumers have not switched providers, although the reason most commonly 
cited in all three surveys for not switching was satisfaction with current provider, 
with an increasing number of non-switching consumers citing this in more recent 
surveys.  The most commonly cited reason for switching was cost savings. 
 
The recent entry of general insurers into the market for private health insurance, and 
the anticipated normalisation of Vhi Healthcare as an authorised non-life insurer (see 
Section 2.5), may lead to bundling of private health insurance with other forms of 
insurance.  For example, the Quinn Group has offered free household insurance to 
the value of €200 and free travel insurance to customers who have motor and health 
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insurance with the Quinn Group.
49
  Hibernian AVIVA Health has also run a ‘match 
more, make more’ promotion, offering cash back to customers who have multiple 
policies with the group, including health and motor insurance.
50
 
 
There is currently some degree of product bundling between private health insurance 
and travel insurance, with Vhi Healthcare’s travel insurance plan paying for medical 
care while abroad only after the limit on the overseas cover element of the insured 
person’s private health insurance plan has been exceeded.  As the market for private 
health insurance is possibly close to saturation (although HIA, 2008c shows that 
27% of those who do not already have private health insurance intend to take it out 
at some point in the future), diversification into other insurance – and non-insurance 
– offerings would appear to be a possibility for competition in the market in the 
future. 
 
2.4 Risk Equalisation as a Source of Controversy 
 
One of the main sources of controversy in the Irish private health insurance market 
since deregulation in the 1990s has been risk equalisation.  Although a risk 
equalisation scheme was in place when it entered the market, BUPA Ireland was 
always opposed to the scheme on the basis that it would, in its view, be forced to 
subsidise the State-backed dominant insurer.  Monetary transfers under the 1996 
                                                 
49
 See http://www.quinn-healthcare.com/press_and_media/pressrelease280508.htm.  
50
 See http://www.hibernianavivahealth.ie/whats-new/press-releases/2009/press-release-27.xml.  
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scheme were never made and the regulations governing the scheme were revoked in 
1999 as part of a review of the market. 
 
The Health Insurance (Amendment) Act, 2001 made provision for another risk 
equalisation scheme and this was introduced as the Risk Equalisation Scheme, 2003.  
This scheme made provision for monetary transfers to take place between insurers 
and a risk equalisation fund, to be administered by the HIA.  Under the 2003 
Scheme, insurers would submit details of claims by age and gender to the HIA, 
which would indicate the claim costs that each insurer incurred given its existing 
risk profile.  The HIA would then calculate the market average risk profile and apply 
this risk profile to each insurer’s data, to simulate what each insurer would have paid 
in claims if they each had the market average risk profile.  The difference between 
what each insurer paid in claim costs and what they would have paid if they had the 
market average risk profile would be what the insurer would pay into, or receive 
from, the risk equalisation fund.  Claim costs would be equalised up to a given level, 
known as equalised benefits, which broadly equated to the level of cover provided 
by the most popular plans in the market. 
 
This was unlike the Australian system of reinsurance (as the risk adjustment 
mechanism was known there), under which only the claim costs of the elderly (those 
aged 65 and over) and chronically ill (those who spend more than 35 days a year in 
hospital) were equalised, although according to Industry Commission (1997), this 
covered over 48% of total claim costs by the late 1990s.  It also differed from the 
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Australian system of reinsurance, in that the latter only redistributed a set proportion 
(79%) of the claim costs of the two groups covered by reinsurance (see, for example, 
PHIAC, 2006), whereas under the Irish scheme all the costs of the equalised benefits 
would be redistributed.  In 2007, the Australian risk adjustment mechanism was 
amended.  It is now known as risk equalisation and equalises a proportion of the cost 
of hospital benefits for people aged 55 and over (on a sliding scale from 15% to 
82%, increasing with age) and 82% of the value of high-cost claims, i.e. those over 
AUS$50,000 (see PHIAC, 2007, 2008b). 
 
Under the 2003 scheme in Ireland, the HIA had a role in advising the Minister for 
Health and Children on whether or not to commence risk equalisation payments.  
Specifically, if a measure called the Market Equalisation Percentage (which is equal 
to the amount of monetary transfers under risk equalisation expressed as a 
percentage of the claims paid in the market subject to risk equalisation) were below 
2%, no transfers would be made.  If the Market Equalisation Percentage (MEP) were 
between 2% and 10%, the HIA would be required to make a recommendation to the 
Minister on whether or not payments should be triggered, while if it were above 
10% then the Minister would commence payments, unless, having consulted with 
the HIA, the Minister felt that the commencement of risk equalisation payments 
would not be in the best overall interests of health insurance consumers.  (See HIA, 
2003b, 2008b for further details.) 
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For each of the six-monthly periods from 1 July – 31 December 2003 to 1 January – 
30 June 2005, the MEP was found to lie between 2% and 10% (see HIA, 2005c).  
For the first two periods, the HIA recommended that payments should not be 
commenced.  For the third of these periods, the HIA recommended that payments 
should be commenced, but having reviewed representations from the insurers, as 
required under legislation, the Minister decided not to commence payments.
51
  She 
did this on the basis that the introduction of risk equalisation payments would be 
premature in advance of a Government decision regarding the commercial status of 
Vhi Healthcare (see Department of Health and Children, 2005a).  For the fourth of 
these periods, the HIA again recommended that payments should be commenced and 
this time the Minister decided to commence payments from 1 January 2006.  She 
noted that the government had, at that stage, approved legislation in relation to the 
commercial status of Vhi Healthcare (see Department of Health and Children, 
2005c). 
 
Once payments under the scheme were triggered, BUPA Ireland challenged the 
scheme through the Irish courts.  It had already made a complaint to the European 
Commission that the scheme constituted illegal State aid, but the Commission ruled 
in 2003 that it did not.  BUPA Ireland took the Commission to the European Court 
                                                 
51
 Under the Risk Equalisation Scheme, 2003, the HIA was obliged to notify insurers of its intended 
decision in relation to the triggering of payments, and insurers had 21 days to make representations 
thereon to the HIA, which the HIA was then obliged to consider before making its final 
recommendation.  If it recommended the triggering of payments, and if the Minister was minded to 
follow this recommendation, then the Minister in turn was obliged to notify insurers of his/her 
decision and consider any representations from insurers before making a final decision.  (See HIA, 
2003b, 2008b). 
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of First Instance, but in 2008 this Court dismissed BUPA Ireland’s challenge to the 
Commission’s decision.52 
 
In a High Court ruling in November 2006, BUPA Ireland’s challenge was dismissed, 
but BUPA Ireland appealed this to the Supreme Court.  Following the High Court 
judgment, BUPA Ireland announced in December 2006 that it was withdrawing 
from the market and its business was taken over and re-branded as Quinn Healthcare 
in April 2007.  In July 2008, the Supreme Court overturned the High Court decision 
and set aside the Risk Equalisation Scheme, 2003.  Its decision was taken on the 
basis of the definition of community rating in the 1994 Act, as amended (see Section 
3.2.2 for further details). 
 
A stay on payments under the Risk Equalisation Scheme, 2003 had been put in place 
subject to the outcome of the legal challenge.  By early 2008, before the Supreme 
Court set aside the scheme, BUPA Ireland would have been liable to pay over €33m 
into the risk equalisation fund, and Quinn Healthcare would have been liable to pay 
just over €1m, while Vhi Healthcare was set to have received over €32m from the 
fund, with over €2m being due to the ESB Staff Medical Benefit Fund, the only one 
                                                 
52
 The Court’s judgment contended that private health insurance constituted a service of general 
economic interest (SGEI), and suggested that national governments of Member States had wide 
discretion in determining what constituted an SGEI.  As noted by Thomson & Mossialos (2008), this 
gives national governments considerable scope to regulate private health insurance on the basis that it 
serves the general good, particularly if private health insurance covers a significant proportion of the 
population.  Sauter (2008) meanwhile argues that the Court’s judgment in this case applied the 
Altmark criteria, which are used to determine whether State aid is involved in the context of public 
service compensation, extremely flexibly and that it virtually ignored the issue of competition. 
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of the restricted membership undertakings participating in the scheme.
53,54
  VIVAS 
Health was not, at that time, liable for payments under the scheme, as the scheme 
included a three-year exemption from making risk equalisation payments for new 
insurers in the market. 
 
Following the setting aside of the Risk Equalisation Scheme, 2003 by the Supreme 
Court, in November 2008 the Minister for Health and Children announced interim 
measures, to be put in place for three years, while work is carried out on a new risk 
equalisation scheme.  According to the Minister, the Government was of the opinion 
that, in the absence of some method of supporting the cost of health insurance for 
older consumers, such consumers could face significant increases in prices or 
reductions in benefits.  She went on to state “If that happened, the chances we could 
ever re-establish a community rated market would have been severely diminished.”  
(Department of Health and Children, 2008c). 
 
The interim measures, which were approved by the European Commission in June 
2009 (see European Commission, 2009a), comprise two elements.  The first is a 
community rating levy on health insurers for each person they insure.  The levy is 
set at €160 for each adult and €53 for each child aged under-18.  The second element 
is increased tax relief for those aged 50 and over, on a sliding scale.  All insured 
persons will continue to benefit from the 20% tax relief at source (mentioned in 
                                                 
53
 These figures relate to the periods January – June 2006, July – December 2006 and January – June 
2007.  For details see HIA (2008a). 
54
 When the Risk Equalisation Scheme, 2003 was brought forward, the restricted membership 
undertakings were given an opportunity to opt out of the scheme.  ESB Staff Medical Provident Fund 
was the only one which did not avail of this option. 
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section 2.1.2), but those aged 50 and over will get additional tax relief, as outlined in 
Table 2.6.  The measures are designed to be revenue neutral. 
 
Table 2.6 Additional Tax Relief Available Under Interim Measures 
 
Age 50-59 60-69 70-79 80+ 
Additional tax relief €200 €500 €950 €1,175 
 
Source: Department of Health and Children (2008c) 
 
 
Since tax relief on health insurance premiums is deductible at source, consumers pay 
the net premiums (net of the tax relief), and the insurers then claim back the tax 
relief for all of their members from the Revenue Commissioners.  The additional tax 
relief will therefore be claimed back by the insurer.  This means that insurers with 
higher proportions of older consumers will benefit more from the additional tax 
relief.
55
  It should be noted that the interim scheme may be thought of as a form of 
risk adjusted premium subsidies, as outlined in Van de Ven, Van Vliet, Schut & Van 
Barneveld (2000), which are further discussed in Section 5.3 and that therefore a 
form of risk adjustment is currently in place in Ireland despite the fact that no risk 
equalisation scheme is currently in place. 
 
The combination of the interim measures is likely to mean that Vhi Healthcare, with 
a higher proportion of older members, will receive more money in additional tax 
relief than it has to pay in the community rating levy, while Quinn Healthcare and 
Hibernian AVIVA Health, with lower proportions of older members, will have to 
                                                 
55
 The Commission on Taxation (2009) notes that these measures are designed to be in place for a 
limited time period and acknowledges that it is appropriate that they be implemented on a temporary 
basis. 
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pay more money in the community rating levy than they will receive in additional 
tax relief.  Indeed, approximate figures provided by the Department of Health and 
Children to accompany the announcement of the interim measures (Department of 
Health and Children, 2008d) suggest that just over 32% of Vhi Healthcare members 
are aged 50 or over, compared with just over 16% of Quinn Healthcare members and 
13% of Hibernian Health members (see Table 2.7). 
 
Table 2.7 Approximate Share of Customers by Age Group 
 
 Under-50 50-59 60-69 70-79 80+ 
VHI 1,000,000 207,000 151,000 85,000 32,000 
Quinn 370,000 46,000 21,000 4,000 900 
Hibernian 84,000 9,000 3,000 500 100 
 
Source: Department of Health and Children (2008d) 
 
 
Subsequently, on 28
 
November 2008, Vhi Healthcare announced it was increasing 
its premiums by an average of 23% from 1 January 2009, while on the same day 
Quinn Healthcare announced an average increase of 16%, also to take effect from 1 
January 2009 (see Quinn Healthcare, 2008; VHI, 2008b).  Vhi Healthcare stated in 
its press release that it was not passing on the cost of the community rating levy, 
while Quinn Healthcare stated in its press release that the community rating levy 
meant that it had to increase premiums by eight percentage points more than would 
otherwise have been the case.  Quinn Healthcare said that it had planned to increase 
premiums by an average of 8% but that the community rating levy amounted to 12% 
of premiums.  However, it said that it would not pass on the full cost of the levy, 
hence the additional eight percentage points of an increase in its premiums. 
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In December 2008, Hibernian Health stated its intention to challenge the new levy 
once the legislation is published.  It also stated that it would pass on the cost of the 
levy to consumers from 18 January 2009, but that if its challenge were successful it 
would refund the levy to those consumers who paid it (see Hibernian Health, 2008).  
This challenge has not yet, at the time of writing, come before the courts. 
 
Also in December 2008, the Health Insurance (Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill, 2008 
was published.  This Bill, which was enacted as the Health Insurance (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Act, 2009, includes provisions to enact the community rating levy and 
additional tax relief for consumers aged 50 and over.  It also amends the definition 
of community rating to mandate that the net premium (which is defined as the 
premium payable less any tax relief due to the individual) charged to each insured 
person must be the same as for any other insured person on the same contract 
(subject to the exceptions discussed in Section 2.2). 
 
2.5 Other Controversial Aspects of the Market 
 
In addition to the regulation of health insurance business by the HIA, health insurers 
in Ireland must comply with prudential regulatory requirements.
56
  However, this 
has been another source of controversy in recent years, due to a different prudential 
                                                 
56
 In July 2009, the report of a body charged with finding ways of reducing public expenditure 
recommended that The Health Insurance Authority be merged with the Financial Regulator (Special 
Group on Public Service Numbers and Expenditure Programmes, 2009).  This is despite the fact that 
the HIA is funded by a levy on insurers and not by the Exchequer.  The Private Health Insurance 
Advisory Group (2007) previously recommended that private health insurers be regulated by the 
Financial Regulator in all respects, leaving the HIA with an administrative role in relation to risk 
equalisation and an advisory role to the Minister. 
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regulatory regime being applied to Vhi Healthcare from that applying to its 
competitors.  Under the 1957 Act, Vhi Healthcare was not subject to the Insurance 
Acts in Ireland.  In particular, this means that it was not required to maintain the 
same level of solvency reserves as its competitors.  In practice, this level of reserves 
equates to approximately 40% of premium income.  However, other requirements 
were made of Vhi Healthcare that were not applicable to its competitors, chief 
among which was the obligation on Vhi Healthcare to seek Ministerial approval for 
price increases on its health insurance plans or for new plans that it wanted to 
launch.
57
 
 
Immediately prior to BUPA Ireland’s withdrawal from the market, all three insurers 
had different prudential regulatory accountability.  Vhi Healthcare, as a statutory 
body, reported to the Minister for Health and Children, BUPA Ireland, as a tied 
agent of BUPA Insurance Limited, was regulated by the Financial Services 
Authority in the UK, while VIVAS Health was regulated by the Financial Regulator 
in Ireland.  However, since the recent takeover activity in the market, things have 
become somewhat more straightforward, as both Quinn Healthcare and Hibernian 
AVIVA Health are regulated by the Financial Regulator. 
 
Following a number of complaints, particularly from VIVAS Health, the European 
Commission deemed that Vhi Healthcare’s derogation from solvency requirements 
should be removed, and legislation was drafted to normalise Vhi Healthcare’s status.  
It should be noted that such a move had been proposed in 1999 (Department of 
                                                 
57
 In practice it was rare for the Minister not to approve price increases. 
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Health and Children, 1999), but had not been carried out, although it had been 
recommended in three reports in early 2007 (Competition Authority, 2007; HIA, 
2007; Private Health Insurance Advisory Group, 2007). 
 
The Voluntary Health Insurance (Amendment) Act, 2008 (the 2008 Act) made 
provision for Vhi Healthcare to be regulated by the Financial Regulator from 1 
January 2009.  However, this was later pushed back to 31 March 2009 and again to 1 
September 2009.  The European Commission has lodged court proceedings against 
Ireland for the ongoing delay in removing Vhi Healthcare’s derogation (see 
European Commission, 2009b).  However, as reported in the Irish media (Oliver, 
2009), Vhi Healthcare is struggling to meet this solvency requirement and might 
require further equity in order to achieve the required level of reserves.  The 
deadline for meeting the solvency requirement has now been further put back to 31 
December 2009.  Any intervention by the government in order to assist Vhi 
Healthcare in meeting the solvency requirements would likely raise State aid issues 
at European level.  The idea of the government assisting Vhi Healthcare in meeting 
solvency requirements was mooted as far back as 1999 in the White Paper 
(Department of Health and Children, 1999).  In its Annual Report for the year 
ending 31 December 2008, Vhi Healthcare noted that its solvency ratio at the end of 
2008 was 27.7%, down from 35.3% (see VHI, 2009).
58
 
 
                                                 
58
 It should be noted that Vhi Healthcare changed its accounting period in 2008 from year ending end-
February to year ending end-December.  Therefore, VHI (2009) covers the period 1 March 2008 – 31 
December 2008, whereas VHI (2008a) covers the period 1 March 2007 – 29 February 2008, even 
though both are titled Annual Report and Accounts, 2008. 
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Another provision of the 2008 Act is that Vhi Healthcare should set up subsidiary 
companies to undertake non-health insurance business.  This was another source of 
controversy relating to Vhi Healthcare’s statutory status.  Under amendments to the 
1957 Act, Vhi Healthcare was able to diversify into other business areas with the 
permission of the Minister for Health and Children.  However, for its competitors to 
do so, they would be required to set up subsidiary companies.  In recent years, Vhi 
Healthcare has begun selling travel insurance and dental insurance, as well as setting 
up an on-line health shop and minor injury clinics. 
 
In addition to the controversy surrounding the prudential regulation of Vhi 
Healthcare, there has been much controversy since deregulation in relation to Vhi 
Healthcare’s continued dominance in the market.  Having been in a monopoly 
position for 40 years, it has retained the majority of consumers in the market.  
However, the three surveys of consumers carried out on behalf of the HIA have 
shown that this dominance has been reduced, with Vhi Healthcare’s market share 
being reduced from 82% in the 2003 survey (HIA, 2003a) to 76% in the 2005 survey 
(HIA, 2005a) to 70% in the 2008 survey (HIA, 2008c).  It should be noted that the 
survey figures relate to the share of the overall market, including the restricted 
membership undertakings.  Vhi Healthcare’s share of the open market for private 
health insurance would therefore be slightly higher in each case. 
 
Vhi Healthcare’s competitors have argued that this dominance, combined with its 
State ownership, distorts competition in favour of Vhi Healthcare.  YHEC (2003) 
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also noted that Vhi Healthcare’s dominance in the market was cited as one 
contributory factor to the low level of competition in the market and suggested that 
the prospect of buying some of Vhi Healthcare, if it were to be split up, might be an 
attractive one to a potential new entrant. 
 
The idea of splitting Vhi Healthcare into a number of smaller companies has been 
raised on a number of occasions, including during the parliamentary debates on the 
Voluntary Health Insurance (Amendment) Bill, 2007, which later became the 
Voluntary Health Insurance (Amendment) Act, 2008.  However, any move to split 
Vhi Healthcare into a number of smaller companies would have to take into account 
the effect on consumer choice, particularly in light of the fact that 70% of consumers 
choose to remain with Vhi Healthcare in its current form. 
 
2.6 Summary 
 
The market for private health insurance in Ireland, in its current form, dates back to 
1957.  Although it was put in place to provide a scheme for a relatively small 
proportion of the population, who were not at that time entitled to free access to 
public hospital services, the popularity of private health insurance has increased 
significantly in the last 50 years, despite the introduction of universal access 
entitlements to the public hospital system at no – or very little – cost.  Its role has 
also changed over that period, from a primarily substitutive role, with some element 
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of a supplementary role, to a primarily supplementary role, with an element of a 
complementary role. 
 
Over 50% of the Irish population is now covered by private health insurance, paying 
combined premiums of over €1.65bn in 2008.  However, take-up rates of private 
health insurance in Ireland vary widely depending on social class, with higher take-
up rates among those in higher social classes.  This, and the fact that private patients 
appear to have shorter waiting times for treatment, which is often delivered in public 
hospitals and by consultants who also work in the public system, has raised concerns 
over the equity of the Irish healthcare system as it currently stands.  Private health 
insurance also appears to have greater importance in the Irish health system than its 
contribution to overall health financing in Ireland – which is primarily financed 
through general taxation – would suggest. 
 
The market for private health insurance in Ireland is heavily regulated, and the 
regulation largely reflects the behaviour of the State-owned monopoly provider prior 
to the deregulation of the market in the 1990s.  Community rating, open enrolment, 
lifetime cover and a prescribed set of minimum benefits are among the main 
regulatory features of the market.  Since deregulation, two other insurers have 
entered the market, although both of these have been taken over by companies that 
already sold other forms of non-life insurance in Ireland. 
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The continued presence of the former monopoly as the dominant player in the 
market (it still has approximately 70% market share – partly due to a very low rate 
of switching among private health insurance consumers in Ireland), and its 
differential prudential regulation, compared with its competitors, have been two of 
the main sources of controversy in the market. 
 
The other main source of controversy has been risk equalisation.  This is a scheme 
designed to support community rating, by requiring insurers with relatively 
favourable risk profiles to contribute to a fund, from which payments would be made 
to insurers with relatively unfavourable risk profiles.  Although on the statute books 
from 1996 to 1999 and again from 2003 to 2008, no risk equalisation payments have 
ever been made between private health insurers in Ireland, and the 2003 scheme was 
set aside by a judgment of the Supreme Court in 2008.  Since then, interim measures 
have been introduced to underpin community rating, while work is carried out on a 
new risk equalisation scheme. 
 
It is in this context that the current study has been carried out.  This study will add a 
quantitative dimension to a debate about community rating and risk equalisation that 
has, to date, largely been based on qualitative arguments. 
 
The next Chapter sets out a formulaic model of a community rated health insurance 
market, first under monopoly conditions (such as existed in Ireland until BUPA 
Ireland entered the market), and then after the introduction of multiple insurers (a 
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situation similar to that which has pertained in Ireland since 1997).  Using certain 
assumptions, the model examines whether community rating can continue to operate 
in the presence of multiple insurers, each of which operates community rating 
among its own insured community.  The Supreme Court ruling on the Risk 
Equalisation Scheme, 2003 is then examined in the context of the model.  
 
 
 91 
CHAPTER 3 
COMMUNITY RATING IN THE ABSENCE OF RISK EQUALISATION 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, community rating forms one of the fundamental ‘pillars’ 
of the Irish private health insurance market, alongside open enrolment and lifetime 
cover.  A system of risk equalisation was also introduced to support community 
rating.  However, as discussed in Chapter 2, this proved to be highly controversial 
and, despite being on the statute books from 1996 to 1999 and again from 2003 to 
2008, when it was set aside by the Supreme Court, no payments have yet been made 
under risk equalisation schemes in Ireland. 
 
BUPA Ireland, which stood to pay a considerable sum of money into any risk 
equalisation fund, argued that community rating was a legal requirement in the Irish 
private health insurance market, and that therefore it operated as required by law.  
They argued on this basis that risk equalisation was not necessary in order for 
community rating to operate.  However, Vhi Healthcare consistently argued that risk 
equalisation was essential to underpin community rating. 
 
Other authors have argued that some form of risk adjustment is required to ensure 
stability in a community rated market (this is discussed in more detail in Chapter 4).  
For example, the Society of Actuaries in Ireland referred to risk equalisation as a 
“logical concomitant to a voluntary health insurance system based on community 
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rating open enrolment and lifetime cover.” (Society of Actuaries in Ireland, 2002: 
para 13.1). 
 
This chapter briefly reviews some of the issues relating to community rating in the 
Irish private health insurance market.  A formulaic model of community rating is 
then developed, with a view to assessing whether community rating could continue 
to function in a market with multiple insurers.  The results of this model are then 
used to draw conclusions about the implications for community rating of the 
Supreme Court decision to set aside the Risk Equalisation Scheme, 2003. 
 
3.2 Community Rating in the Irish Context 
 
3.2.1 The Form of Community Rating in Ireland 
 
Community rating in Ireland pre-dates the legislative imperative for such a rating 
system.  Prior to the opening of the private health insurance market in Ireland to 
competition, Vhi Healthcare operated community rating on a de facto basis.  When 
the market was deregulated in the mid-1990s, community rating was put on a 
legislative footing. 
 
The legislative definition of community rating in Ireland is contained in the Health 
Insurance Act, 1994.  It specifies that insurers are not permitted to vary premiums or 
benefits by reference to a person’s age, gender, or current or prospective state of 
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health.  However, it does permit some exceptions, notably for children aged under-
18, full-time dependent students aged 18-23, and members of a group scheme.  
However, premiums may not be varied among insured persons falling into these 
categories (see Section 2.2 for further details). 
 
The system of community rating that operates in Ireland is known as single-rate 
community rating.  This means that a person’s age at entry into the market for 
private health insurance is not taken into account when setting the premium for that 
person.  Therefore, it is possible for a person to only take out private health 
insurance when he/she is older, and therefore more in need of it, while avoiding 
paying into the community rate in his/her younger years.  The only defence that 
health insurers in Ireland currently have against this type of behaviour is the set of 
age-related maximum waiting periods that they may impose on consumers who take 
out insurance for the first time or after a break in cover of 13 weeks or more (see 
Table 2.5). 
 
Surveys of consumers, carried out on behalf of The Health Insurance Authority 
(HIA 2003a, 2005a) show that, for the most part, people tend to take out private 
health insurance at relatively young ages, and relatively few wait until older ages to 
take out private health insurance for the first time (see Table 5.4). 
 
Although such behaviour is not prevalent, the risk remains that, if large numbers 
were to delay taking out private health insurance until they needed it, this would 
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reduce the numbers of younger people in the market, which would lead to increases 
in average claim costs, which in turn would lead to increases in the community rated 
premium, which may lead higher numbers of younger people to put off taking out 
private health insurance (or, indeed, to younger people withdrawing from the market 
on the basis that it is not economically worthwhile to remain in the market), which 
would, in turn, lead to further increases in average claim costs, leading to what is 
known as an adverse selection death spiral (a concept that is discussed further in 
Chapter 4). 
 
For this reason, the Advisory Group on the Risk Equalisation Scheme (Advisory 
Group to the Minister for Health on the Risk Equalisation Scheme, 1998) 
recommended a change from single-rate community rating to lifetime community 
rating.  Lifetime community rating operates on the basis of late entry loadings being 
applied to those who wait until older ages before taking out health insurance for the 
first time, and a similar change was implemented in Australia in 2000.  Such a 
change was included in Irish government policy in 1999 (Department of Health and 
Children, 1999) but has not yet been implemented.  This is discussed further in 
Chapter 5. 
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3.2.2 Legal Issues Surrounding the Definition of Community Rating in Irish 
Legislation 
 
Recent court cases in Ireland relating to risk equalisation have highlighted the 
importance of the definition of community rating in Irish legislation.  After risk 
equalisation payments were triggered by the Minister for Health and Children from 1 
January 2006, BUPA Ireland took out an injunction against the Risk Equalisation 
Scheme, 2003.  One of the bases for the injunction was that the promulgation of the 
scheme was ultra vires (beyond the powers of) the Minister, as community rating 
was operating in the market as prescribed by the Health Insurance Act, 1994, as 
amended.
59
 
 
Section 7 of the 1994 Act, as amended, specifies that insurers may not vary 
premiums or benefits among people on the same health insurance contract.  It goes 
on to state “A health insurance contract that complies with [the conditions outlined 
in an earlier paragraph within that Section] shall be known as a community rated 
health insurance contract and ‘community rating’ shall be construed accordingly.”  
(Sections 7 and 12 of the Health Insurance Act, 1994, as amended, are reproduced in 
Appendix A.) 
  
The Risk Equalisation Scheme, 2003 was brought forward under the terms 
of Section 12 of the 1994 Act, as amended.  This Section noted that, in forming its 
                                                 
59
 This discussion relates to the definitions of the Act, as amended, at the time when the Supreme 
Court decision was taken.  It should be noted that the Health Insurance (Miscellaneous Provisions) 
Act, 2009 further amended the definition of community rating (see Footnote 120). 
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decision on whether to recommend to the Minister for Health and Children to trigger 
payments, The Health Insurance Authority must have regard to “the best overall 
interests of health insurance consumers” and it went on to note that this “includes a 
reference to the need to maintain the application of community rating across the 
market for health insurance and to facilitate competition between undertakings.” 
(Emphasis added.) 
 
BUPA Ireland argued that the only valid definition of community rating is the 
Section 7 one, which defines community rating within plans, and that therefore the 
Section 12 definition was essentially invalid, which would invalidate the entire risk 
equalisation scheme. 
 
The case was heard by the High Court in 2006 and its judgment was delivered in 
November of that year.  In that judgment, Mr Justice Liam McKechnie noted that the 
definition of community rating was central to the case.  However, he ruled that the 
Section 12 definition was reasonable, and that therefore the Risk Equalisation 
Scheme, 2003 was not invalid as a result.  BUPA Ireland appealed this decision to 
the Supreme Court, and its judgment was delivered in July 2008. 
 
The Supreme Court agreed that the definition of community rating was central to the 
case, but decided that the Section 12 definition could not be construed so differently 
from the Section 7 definition.  The Chief Justice, in the judgment, suggested that, if 
the Oireachtas (parliament) had wanted such a different interpretation to be given to 
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the Section 12 definition that it would have made that clear.  Therefore, it was the 
Supreme Court’s view that Section 12 could only be interpreted as referring to the 
maintenance of community rated plans across the market.  On this basis, the Court 
ruled that the Risk Equalisation Scheme, 2003, as adopted by the Minister, “was 
founded on an erroneous interpretation of subsection 10(iii) in s. 12.  That is to say 
the scheme was introduced on the basis that community rating meant community 
rating across the entire insured population and not as defined in the Act.”  The Court 
therefore determined that the 2003 scheme, since it was founded on an erroneous 
interpretation of community rating, was ultra vires (beyond the powers of) the 
Minister, and therefore should be set aside.  It should be noted however, that the 
Supreme Court judgment did not question the need for risk equalisation in a 
community rated health insurance market with open enrolment and lifetime cover. 
 
3.3 Community Rating: A Numerical Example 
 
The basic principle behind community rating is that high-risk insured lives pay the 
same as low-risk insured lives.  If there is only one insurer in the market, practicing 
community rating among its members, then inherently community rating applies 
across the market.  However, if two insurers are operating in the market, each 
operating community rating among their own members, then community rating will 
only apply across the market if each insurer has the same proportion of high risk and 
low risks as the market average. 
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To demonstrate this, let us first take a numerical example.  The findings of this 
example can then be generalised into a model form. 
 
Firstly, a number of assumptions are made, as follows: 
 
Assumption 1. There are 1,000,000 insured lives in the market. 
Assumption 2. In the overall market, 25% of people are high-risk and 75% of people 
are low-risk. 
Assumption 3. Premium per member = expected claim cost per member (in other 
words, for the sake of simplicity, we ignore the investment income, 
administrative loading and profit loading elements of a fair premium 
– see Harrington & Niehaus, 2003 for a discussion of the elements of 
a fair insurance premium). 
Assumption 4. Claim costs for high-risk lives are €200 per person, while claim costs 
for low-risk lives are €100 per person. 
 
If there were only one insurer in the market, insuring all of the insured lives and 
operating community rating, then the community-rated premium would be the 
expected claim cost per insured person. 
 
From the above assumptions, we can calculate this as 
 
[(€200 x 250,000/1,000,000) + (€100 x 750,000/1,000,000)] = €125 
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Now let us expand this example to include two insurers, A and B, each operating 
community rating among its own members.  In addition to the above assumptions, 
let us also assume 
 
Assumption 5. Insurer A has a 75% share of the market (i.e. 750,000 lives) and 
Insurer B has the remaining 25% share (i.e. 250,000 lives). 
 
Now, let us first assume that each insurer has the same proportions of high-risk and 
low-risk lives as the market average.  Thus, 
 
Assumption 6. Insurer A has 187,500 high-risk and 562,500 low-risk lives (25% and 
75%, respectively, of 750,000).  Insurer B has 62,500 high-risk and 
187,500 low-risk lives (25% and 75%, respectively, of 250,000). 
 
Insurer A’s premium per person (which is equal to expected claim cost per person) is 
 
[(€200 x (187,500/750,000) + (€100 x 562,500/750,000)] = €125 
 
Insurer B’s premium per person (which is equal to expected claim cost per person) is 
 
[(€200 x 62,500/250,000) + (€100 x 187,500/250,000)] = €125 
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It can therefore be seen that if each insurer has the same proportions of high-risk and 
low-risk lives as the market average and each practices community rating within its 
own membership base, then community rating still applies across the market. 
 
We can also see that high-risk lives and low-risk lives across the market will, on 
average, be paying the same premium, as all insured lives are paying €125 in 
premium payments. 
 
However, let us now assume that Insurer A has a higher proportion of high-risk lives 
than the market average, and consequently a lower proportion of low-risk lives than 
the market average.  This means that Insurer B must have a lower proportion of 
high-risk lives and a higher proportion of low-risk lives than the market average. 
 
Specifically, let us assume 
 
Assumption 7. Insurer A has 90% of the high-risk lives.  This means that Insurer A 
has 225,000 high-risk lives.  Consequently, given assumption 5, this 
means that Insurer A has 525,000 low-risk lives (or 70% of the low-
risk lives). 
Assumption 8. Assumptions 5 and 7 imply that Insurer B has 10% of the high-risk 
lives, or 25,000, and 225,000 low-risk lives (or 30% of the low-risk 
lives). 
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Insurer A’s premium per person is now 
 
[€200 x (225,000/750,000)] + [€100 x (525,000/750,000)] = €130 
 
Insurer B’s premium per person is now 
 
[€200 x (25,000/250,000)] + [€100 x (225,000/250,000)] = €110 
 
From these results we can now calculate the average premiums paid by high-risk and 
low-risk lives. 
 
High-risk lives: 
 
There are 225,000 high-risk lives with Insurer A, each paying €130. 
There are 25,000 high-risk lives with Insurer B, each paying €110. 
The average premium paid by high-risk lives is therefore 
 
[€130 x (225,000/250,000)] + [€110 x (25,000/250,000)] = €128. 
 
Low-risk lives: 
 
There are 525,000 low-risk lives with Insurer A, each paying €130. 
There are 225,000 low-risk lives with Insurer B, each paying €110. 
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The average premium paid by low-risk lives is therefore 
 
[€130 x (525,000/750,000)] + [€110 x (225,000/750,000)] = €124. 
 
Clearly, high-risk lives are, on average, paying more than low-risk lives, thus 
meaning that community rating no longer applies across the market.  However, it 
should be noted that the total amount of premium paid in the market is the same 
under this scenario as it would be if both insurers had the same proportions of high-
risk and low-risk lives as the market average, which in turn is the same as if there 
were only one insurer in the market, using the above assumptions. 
 
To confirm this, note that, under the assumption of one insurer, total premium paid 
in the market would be 
 
1,000,000 x €125 = €125,000,000. 
 
If there were two insurers in the market, each operating community rating among its 
members, and if each had the same proportions of high-risk and low-risk lives as the 
market average, as per Assumptions 5 and 6, then the total premium paid in the 
market would be 
 
(750,000 x €125) + (250,000 x €125) = €125,000,000. 
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If there were two insurers in the market, each operating community rating among its 
members, and if each had different proportions of high-risk and low-risk lives, as per 
Assumptions 7 and 8, then the total premium paid in the market would be 
 
(750,000 x €130) + (250,000 x €110) = €125,000,000. 
 
Thus, if one insurer has a higher proportion of high-risk lives and a lower proportion 
of low-risk lives than the market average (and consequently the other insurer has a 
lower proportion of high-risk lives and a higher proportion of low-risk lives than the 
market average), but both insurers operate community rating within their own 
insured groups, then the overall level of premiums paid in the market remains the 
same but the payment of this level of premiums falls disproportionately on the high-
risk lives. 
 
3.4 A Formulaic Model of Community Rating 
 
The above example can now be generalised into a formulaic model. 
 
3.4.1 Two-Insurer Model 
 
Firstly, let us restate Assumptions 1-6 in general form: 
 
Assumption 1. There are at total of T insured lives in the market. 
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Assumption 2. In the overall market, there are HT high-risk lives and LT low-risk 
lives.  Therefore, the proportions of high-risk and low-risk lives in the 
market are HT/T and LT/T, respectively.  Note that HT + LT = T. 
Assumption 3. Premium per member = expected claim cost per member (in other 
words, for the sake of simplicity, we ignore the investment income, 
administrative loading and profit loading elements of a fair premium). 
Assumption 4. Claim costs for high-risk lives are CH per person, while claim costs 
for low-risk lives are CL per person, where CH > CL. 
Assumption 5. Insurer A has TA members, while Insurer B has TB members, giving 
these insurers market shares of TA/T and TB/T, respectively.  Note 
that TA + TB = T. 
Assumption 6. Insurer A has HA high-risk and LA low-risk lives, while Insurer B has 
HB high-risk and LB low-risk lives.  Note that HA + LA = TA and HB + 
LB = TB.  Note also that HA + HB = HT and LA + LB = LT. 
 
Now, we can see that Insurer A’s premium (which we denote CA and which equals 
expected claim cost per member) is 
 
A
A
L
A
A
HA
T
L
C
T
H
CC ..   (Equation 3.1) 
 
Meanwhile, Insurer B’s premium (which we denote CB and which equals expected 
claim cost per member) is 
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B
B
L
B
B
HB
T
L
C
T
H
CC ..   (Equation 3.2) 
 
We can also see from this that, on average, high-risk insured lives will pay what 
could be termed the high-risk premium (HRP), which can be calculated as 
 
T
B
B
T
A
A
H
H
C
H
H
CHRP ..   (Equation 3.3) 
 
Meanwhile low-risk insured lives will, on average, pay what could be termed the 
low-risk premium (LRP), which can be calculated as 
 
T
B
B
T
A
A
L
L
C
L
L
CLRP ..   (Equation 3.4) 
 
If each insurer has the same proportion of high-risk and low-risk lives as the market 
average, then HA/TA = HB/TB (= HT/T) and LA/TA = LB/TB (= LT/T), and it can be 
seen from Equations 3.1 and 3.2 that CA = CB. 
 
Feeding this back into Equations 3.3 and 3.4, and remembering from Assumption 6 
that HA + HB = HT and that LA + LB = LT we can see that 
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And 
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Thus, it can be seen that HRP = LRP and that therefore, high-risk lives and low-risk 
lives pay the same premium, thus ensuring that community rating operates across the 
market as well as within each insurer’s insured group. 
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Let us now assume that Insurer A has a higher proportion of high-risk lives than the 
market average (and thus a lower proportion of low-risk lives than the market 
average).  Thus, Insurer B has a lower proportion of high-risk lives and a higher 
proportion of low-risk lives than the market average.  We can now restate 
Assumptions 7 and 8 in general form as 
 
Assumption 7. Insurer A has HA/HT of the high-risk lives and LA/LT of the low-risk 
lives. 
Assumption 8. Assumption 7 implies that Insurer B has HB/HT of the high-risk lives 
and LB/LT of the low-risk lives. 
 
To examine the effects of this on CA and CB, we need to revisit Equations 3.1 and 
3.2. 
 
Before doing so however, it should be noted that if both insurers have the same 
proportion of high-risk and low-risk lives as the market average, then the proportion 
of high-risk lives accounted for by each insurer would equal the proportion of low-
risk lives accounted for by that insurer.  Put another way, 
 
If HA/TA = HB/TB (= HT/T) and LA/TA = LB/TB (= LT/T) then HA/HT = LA/LT (= 
TA/T) and HB/HT = LB/LT (= TB/T). 
 
 108 
To prove this, let us take the example of the high-risk lives with Insurer A.  This can 
be calculated as the total number of insured lives in the market, multiplied by the 
proportion of the market insured with Insurer A, multiplied by the proportion of 
high-risk lives within Insurer A’s insured community.  In other words, 
 
A
AA
A
T
H
T
T
TH ..  
 
Similarly, 
 
B
BB
B
T
H
T
T
TH ..  
A
AA
A
T
L
T
T
TL ..  
B
BB
B
T
L
T
T
TL ..  
 
Now, we can see that, if HA/TA = HB/TB = HT/T and LA/TA = LB/TB = LT/T then 
 
T
H
T
H
T
T
T
T
T
H
T
H
T
T
TH TTA
AA
ATA
A  ....  
T
H
T
H
T
T
T
T
T
H
T
H
T
T
TH TTB
BB
BTB
B  ....  
T
L
T
L
T
T
T
T
T
L
T
L
T
T
TL TTA
AA
ATA
A  ....  
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L
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T
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BB
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B  ....  
 
Furthermore, if HA/TA = HB/TB = HT/T and LA/TA = LB/TB = LT/T then 
 
T
T
T
H
T
T
H
T
H
H
T
H
T
T
TH ATA
TT
ATA
A  ....  (Equation 3.5) 
T
T
T
L
T
T
L
T
L
L
T
L
T
T
TL ATA
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A  ....   (Equation 3.6) 
T
T
T
H
T
T
H
T
H
H
T
H
T
T
TH BTB
TT
BTB
B  ....  (Equation 3.7) 
T
T
T
L
T
T
L
T
L
L
T
L
T
T
TL BTB
TT
BTB
B  ....   (Equation 3.8) 
 
Thus, we can see that, if HA/TA = HB/TB (= HT/T) and LA/TA = LB/TA (= LT/T) then 
HA/HT = LA/LT (= TA/T) and HB/HT = LB/LT (= TB/T). 
 
Now, from Equations 3.1 and 3.2, remember that 
 
A
A
L
A
A
HA
T
L
C
T
H
CC ..   and 
B
B
L
B
B
HB
T
L
C
T
H
CC ..   
 
Now, as we saw above, if both insurers have the same proportions of high-risk and 
low-risk lives as the market average (i.e. HA/TA = HB/TB = HT/T and LA/TA = LB/TB 
= LT/T), then CA = CB.  However, we are now assuming that Insurer A has a higher 
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proportion of high-risk lives than the market average, and thus a lower proportion of 
low-risk lives than the market average, while Insurer B has a lower proportion of 
high-risk lives and a higher proportion of low-risk lives than the market average. 
 
Thus, HA/TA > HT/T > HB/TB and LA/TA < LT/T < LB/TB.  From Equations 3.5, 3.6, 
3.7 and 3.8, we can see that this also implies that HA/HT > TA/T > LA/LT and that 
HB/HT < TB/T < LB/LT. 
 
 It should be borne in mind at this stage that, since HA + LA = TA, then HA/TA + 
LA/TA = 1, or to put it another way, LA/TA = (1 – HA/TA).  In other words, HA/TA and 
LA/TA can be thought of as weights. 
 
Using these observations, it can now be seen that, if Insurer A has a higher 
proportion of high-risk lives than the market average, then that increases the weight 
HA/TA, and consequently reduces the weight LA/TA.  At the same time, the weight 
HB/TB is reduced and the weight LB/TB is increased. 
 
Thus, we can see that, when calculating CA, since the weight on the higher number 
(CH) has risen and the weight on the lower number (CL) has been reduced, then CA, 
the average premium paid by those with Insurer A, must rise (relative to the situation 
where both insurers have the same risk profile as the market average).  Similarly, 
when calculating CB, the weight on the higher number (CH) has fallen and the weight 
 111 
on the lower number (CL) has risen, therefore the overall figure CB, the average 
premium charged to those insured with Insurer B, must fall.  Therefore, CA > CB. 
 
We can now examine the effect on the high-risk premium (HRP) and the low-risk 
premium (LRP).  Remember from Equations 3.3 and 3.4 that 
 
T
B
B
T
A
A
H
H
C
H
H
CHRP ..   and 
T
B
B
T
A
A
L
L
C
L
L
CLRP ..   
 
It should be borne in mind at this stage that, since HA + HB = HT, then HA/HT + 
HB/HT = 1, or to put it another way, HA/HT = (1 – HB/HT).  In other words, HA/HT 
and HB/HT can also be thought of as weights. 
 
Since Insurer A has a higher proportion of high-risk lives than in the situation where 
both insurers have equal proportions, then we can now see that the weight HA/HT has 
risen while the weight HB/HT has fallen.  Similarly, the weight LA/LT has fallen and 
the weight LB/LT has risen. 
 
Thus, for the high-risk premium, we now have a higher weight attached to a higher 
number (since we have established that now CA > CB) and a lower weight attached 
to a lower number.  Therefore, HRP must rise.  Likewise, for the low-risk premium, 
we now have a lower weight attached to a higher number and a higher weight 
attached to a lower number.  Therefore, LRP must fall. 
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Since HRP has risen and LRP has fallen, relative to a situation where both were 
equal, we can now conclude that HRP > LRP.  In other words, on average, high-risk 
lives pay higher premiums than low-risk lives.  This is in breach of the community 
rating principle. 
 
Thus we can see that, if both insurers have similar proportions of high-risk and low-
risk lives to the market average, then under the assumptions we set out above, the 
premiums charged by both insurers will be equal and the average premiums paid by 
high-risk lives and low-risk lives will also be equal.  However, if one insurer has a 
higher proportion of high-risk lives, and thus a lower proportion of low-risk lives 
than the market average (which inherently means that the other insurer has a lower 
proportion of high-risk lives and a higher proportion of low-risk lives than the 
market average), then the premiums charged by the insurer with the higher 
proportion of high-risk lives will be higher than the premium charged by the other 
insurer, and the average premium paid by high-risk lives will be higher than the 
average premium paid by low-risk lives, thus meaning that community rating breaks 
down. 
 
3.4.2 Determinants of the Magnitude of Imbalance Between High-Risk and Low-
Risk Premiums 
 
It can be seen from the above that the difference between the average premium paid 
by high-risk lives (HRP) and the average premium paid by low-risk lives (LRP) can 
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be no greater – and in most cases will be less – than the difference between the 
premiums charged by Insurer A and Insurer B.  Specifically, it should be noted that, 
from Equations 3.3 and 3.4 that 
 
T
B
B
T
A
A
H
H
C
H
H
CHRP ..   and 
T
B
B
T
A
A
L
L
C
L
L
CLRP ..   
 
We have already established that, since HA + HB = HT, then HA/HT and HB/HT can be 
thought of as weights.  Similarly, since LA + LB = LT, then LA/LT and LB/LT can also 
be thought of as weights.  Thus it can be seen that both HRP and LRP are simply 
weighted averages of CA and CB, with the weights being HA/HT and HB/HT, and 
LA/LT and LB/LT, respectively, for HRP and LRP. 
 
In the extreme case, where Insurer A has all of the high-risk lives in the market (and 
therefore none of the low-risk lives) and Insurer B has all of the low-risk lives in the 
market (and therefore none of the high-risk lives), then HRP = CA and LRP = CB, 
thus HRP – LRP = CA – CB.  However, if both insurers have a mixture of high-risk 
and low-risk lives then HRP – LRP < CA – CB. 
 
Therefore, two factors that will determine the magnitude of the deviation from 
community rating, in other words the magnitude of the difference between the 
average premiums paid by high-risk and low-risk lives, are the difference in 
premiums between Insurer A and Insurer B, and the relative weights attached to 
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those premiums, the latter of which are the proportions of the high-risk and low-risk 
lives in the market that are with Insurer A and Insurer B. 
 
We saw from Equations 3.5, 3.6, 3.7 and 3.8 above that, if HA/TA > HT/T > HB/TB 
and LA/TA < LT/T < LB/TB, then HA/HT > TA/T > LA/LT and that HB/HT < TB/T < 
LB/LT.  The greater HA/HT – LA/LT is, the greater will be the relative weight put on 
CA (which is higher than CB) in the calculation of HRP compared with the 
calculation of LRP.  Likewise, the greater HB/HT – LB/LT, the smaller will be the 
relative weight put on CB (which is lower than CA) in the calculation of HRP 
compared with the calculation of LRP.  Thus, the greater the difference between 
HA/HT – LA/LT and between HB/HT – LB/LT, the greater will be the difference 
between HRP – LRP. 
 
We can also see that the greater HA/HT – LA/LT is, the greater will be HB/HT – LB/LT.  
To see this, note that 
 
HB/HT – LB/LT = (1 – HA/HT) – (1 – LA/LT) 
= 1 – HA/HT – 1 + LA/LT 
= – HA/HT + LA/LT 
= – (HA/HT – LA/LT) 
 
Therefore, if Insurer A has a greater proportion of the high-risk group than Insurer 
B, the increase in weight attached to CA will be equal to the reduction in the weight 
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attached to CB, compared with a situation where Insurer A has the same proportion 
of the high-risk lives in the market as it does of the low-risk lives in the market. 
 
The difference between CA – CB will, in turn, be affected by the difference between 
the average claim costs for high-risk lives and the average claim costs for low-risk 
lives (i.e. CH – CL) and by the relative weights attached to those claim costs, which 
we can see from Equations 3.1 and 3.2 are the relative weights of high-risk and low-
risk lives within each insurer’s insured population. 
 
The greater the difference between CH – CL, the greater will be the difference 
between CA – CB.  In practice, the former could be significant.  Berk, Monheit & 
Hagan (1988) and Berk & Monheit (1992, 2001) find significant difference in 
expenditure between the sickest and healthiest individuals.  Their 2001 paper ranks 
healthcare expenditures and finds that those in the bottom 50% by expenditure spent 
an annual average of $122 per person in medical costs, compared with an average of 
$56,459 per person for those in the top 1%. 
 
Likewise, the greater the difference between HA/TA – HB/TB (and thus the greater the 
difference between LA/TA – LB/TB), the greater will be the difference between the 
relative weights attached to CH and CL in the calculations of CA and CB.  It should be 
noted that LA/TA – LB/TB = – (HA/TA – HB/TB), and thus an increase in the absolute 
magnitude of one leads to a corresponding increase in the absolute magnitude of the 
other.  Therefore, if Insurer A has a higher proportion of high-risk lives than Insurer 
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B, the increase in the weight attached to CH is equal to the reduction in the weight 
attached to CL, compared with a situation where both have the same proportions of 
high-risk and low-risk lives as the market average. 
 
3.4.3 General Form Model 
 
We have dealt above with a situation where there are two insurers operating in a 
market.  We can now generalise to a situation with n insurers and see that unless all 
insurers have the same proportions of high-risk and low-risk insured lives as the 
market average then community rating will not operate across the market. 
 
Firstly, note that the premiums charged by the various insurers will be as follows
60
: 
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Note also that the high-risk premium and the low-risk premium will be as follows: 
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And 
 
                                                 
60
 It should be noted that the subscripts designating the insurers changes from A and B (as used in 
previous sections) to 1…n to account for the possibility of a greater number of insurers in the market. 
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1    (Equation 3.11) 
 
Now, let us first assume that each insurer has the same proportion of high-risk and 
low-risk lives as the market average.  In this instance, H1/T1 = H2/T2 = … = Hn/Tn = 
HT/T and L1/T1 = L2/T2 = … = Ln/Tn = LT/T.  From Equation 3.9, we can see that, if 
this is the case, then C1 = C2 = … = Cn, in other words, each insurer’s premium will 
be the same.  We can also see that, under these conditions, using the same logic as in 
Equations 3.5, 3.6, 3.7 and 3.8, H1/HT = L1/LT, H2/HT = L2/LT, …, Hn/HT = Ln/LT.  
Thus, we can see that 
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Therefore, if each insurer has the same proportions of high-risk and low-risk lives as 
the market average, then the premiums of each insurer are equal and the high-risk 
premium and the low-risk premium are equal.  Thus, all insured persons pay the 
same, ensuring that community rating operates across the market. 
 
However, let us now assume that one insurer (Insurer j) has a higher proportion of 
high-risk lives (and therefore a lower proportion of low-risk lives) than the market 
average.  This inherently means that another insurer (Insurer k) must have a lower 
proportion of high-risk lives (and therefore a high proportion of low-risk lives) than 
the market average.  In terms of our calculations, what this means is that Hj/Tj > 
HT/T and thus Lj/Tj < LT/T.  Correspondingly, Hk/Tk < HT/T and thus Lk/Tk > LT/T. 
 
From our analysis above, remembering that Hj/Tj and Lj/Tj are the weights attached 
to CH and CL in the calculation of Cj, while Hk/Tk and Lk/Tk are the weights attached 
to CH and CL in the calculation of Ck, we can see that Cj will rise and Ck will fall, 
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relative to the situation where all insurers have the same proportions of high-risk and 
low-risk lives as the market average, thus Cj > Ck. 
 
We can also see that, if Hj/Tj > HT/T > Hk/Tk and Lj/Tj < LT/T < Lk/Tk, then Hj/HT > 
Hk/HT and Lj/LT < Lk/LT.  Thus, a higher weight will be attached to Cj and a lower 
weight will be attached to Ck in the calculation of HRP, while a lower weight will be 
attached to Cj and a higher weight will be attached to Ck in the calculation of LRP.  
Thus, since HRP attaches a higher weight to a higher number and a lower weight to 
a lower number, while LRP attaches a lower weight to a higher number and a higher 
weight to a lower number, then HRP > LRP, meaning that community rating no 
longer applies across the market. 
 
It can easily be seen that, if more than one insurer has a higher proportion of high-
risk lives than the market average and/or if more than one insurer has a lower 
proportion of high-risk lives than the market average, the premiums of the former 
insurers will be higher than the premiums of the latter insurers, and higher weights 
will be attached to the higher premiums in the calculation of the high-risk premium, 
while higher weights will be attached to the lower premiums in the calculation of the 
low-risk premium, meaning that the high-risk premium will inevitably be higher 
than the low-risk premium, thus meaning that community rating does not apply 
across the market. 
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It is clear from the model presented above that, in the absence of some form of risk 
adjustment mechanism, community rating will break down in a market with multiple 
insurers if these insurers have differing risk profiles.  A risk adjustment mechanism, 
by effecting monetary transfers from insurers with relatively low risk profiles to 
insurers with relatively high risk profiles, would mitigate the effect of the differing 
risk profiles on the respective insurers’ premiums.  Specifically, it would likely 
result in higher premiums for the insurer with the relatively low risk profile and 
would likely allow the insurer with the relatively high risk profile to reduce its 
premiums, all other things being equal.  This would reduce, or – in the case of a 
perfect risk adjustment mechanism – eliminate, the differences in the average 
premiums paid by high-risk lives and low-risk lives. 
 
3.5 Application of the Model to the Irish Market 
 
The above model can be applied to the Irish market in the context of the Supreme 
Court ruling on the Risk Equalisation Scheme, 2003.  This ruling allows for 
community rated health insurance plans but not for community rating across the 
market for health insurance. 
 
This is similar to the situation outlined in the model, with the slight difference that, 
instead of a number of insurers operating community rating within their insured 
populations, the Irish case takes the form of a number of health insurance plans, each 
of which operates on a community rated basis, but without risk equalisation.  There 
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may be some (formal or informal) risk adjustment between plans offered by the 
same insurer but risk equalisation is not operating between insurers. 
 
Extending the above model to this situation then, it can be seen that, in the absence 
of some form of risk adjustment (such as the Risk Equalisation Scheme, 2003, which 
has been set aside by the Supreme Court), although each health insurance plan in the 
market is community rated, community rating will not operate across the market.  
Instead, the model would suggest that high-risk insured lives will end up paying, on 
average, higher premiums than low-risk insured lives for the same level of cover. 
 
In the absence of some form of risk adjustment, the only way that community rating 
could operate across the market for health insurance in Ireland is if each health 
insurance plan available in the market had exactly the same risk profile as the market 
average.  Theoretically, this is possible but highly unlikely as it would require a 
coincidence of monumental proportions in order to hold.  In practice, it has already 
been confirmed that insurers operating in the market have different risk profiles. 
 
Under the Risk Equalisation Scheme, 2003, The Health Insurance Authority had a 
role in advising the Minister for Health and Children on whether or not to commence 
risk equalisation payments.  Specifically, if a measure called the Market 
Equalisation Percentage (which is equal to the amount of monetary transfers under 
risk equalisation expressed as a percentage of the claims paid in the market subject 
to risk equalisation) were below 2%, no transfers would be made.  If the Market 
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Equalisation Percentage (MEP) were between 2% and 10%, the HIA would be 
required to make a recommendation to the Minister on whether or not payments 
should be triggered, while if it were above 10% then the Minister would commence 
payments, unless, having consulted with the HIA the Minister felt that the 
commencement of risk equalisation payments would not be in the best overall 
interests of health insurance consumers.  (See HIA, 2003b, 2008b for further 
details.) 
 
For each of the six-monthly periods from 1 July – 31 December 2003 to 1 January – 
30 June 2005, the MEP was found to lie between 2% and 10% (see HIA, 2005c).  
This means that there must have been a difference in risk profiles between insurers, 
and thus between plans, as each insurer offers a similar, though not identical, suite of 
plans.  If each plan had the same risk profile as the market average, then each insurer 
would, by definition, have the same risk profile as the market average, and the MEP 
would be equal to zero. 
 
Since this was not the case, it can be concluded that risk profile differences were 
evident and that therefore community rating was not operating across the market for 
health insurance in Ireland, since no risk equalisation payments have ever been 
made, either under the Risk Equalisation Scheme, 1996 or under the Risk 
Equalisation Scheme, 2003, to adjust for differences in risk profiles between 
insurers.  If risk equalisation had been in operation then, as mentioned in Section 
2.4, it would have meant that each insurer would have paid a combination of claims 
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and net risk equalisation payments (which would have been positive for an insurer 
with a relatively low risk profile and negative for an insurer with a relatively high 
risk profile) that would have equated to the claims they would have paid out if they 
had the market average risk profile. 
 
3.5.1 Limitations of the Model 
 
It should be noted that some of the simplifying assumptions made in the formulation 
of this model have implications for the applicability of the model in a real-world 
setting. 
 
Firstly, Assumption 3 held that premiums were based entirely on expected claim 
costs.  In reality, premiums for each insurer will reflect not just expected claim costs, 
but will also factor in investment income, administrative expenses and profit 
loadings (see Harrington & Niehaus, 2003).  In practice, these are almost certain to 
differ between insurers.  According to Financial Regulator (2007), BUPA Ireland’s 
management expenses in 2006 represented approximately 6.8% of earned premium.  
According to re-stated accounts contained in VHI (2008a), Vhi Healthcare’s 
operating expenses in the financial year ending February 2007 represented just under 
8.2% of earned premium. 
 
If each insurer had precisely the same proportions of high-risk and low-risk lives as 
the market average, then H1/T1 = H2/T2 = … = Hn/Tn = HT/T and L1/T1 = L2/T2 = … 
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= Ln/Tn = LT/T, and we have seen above that if this is the case then H1/HT = L1/LT, 
H2/HT = L2/LT, …, Hn/HT = Ln/LT.  Thus, we can see from Equations 3.10 and 3.11 
that the weights attached to each insurer’s premiums would be the same in the 
calculation of HRP as they would in the calculation of LRP.  In other words, even 
though premiums might differ between insurers, due to differences in investment 
income, administrative expenses or profit loading, the high-risk premium would still 
be equal to the low-risk premium, and thus community rating would operate across 
the market. 
 
However, if at least one insurer has a higher than average proportion of high-risk 
lives and at least one other insurer has a lower than average proportion of high-risk 
lives, then the only way that the high-risk premium would equal the low-risk 
premium is if the premiums of those insurers with above-average proportions of 
high-risk lives were actually lower than the premiums of those insurers with below-
average proportions of high-risk lives, due to better investment of premium income, 
lower administrative costs,  lower profit loadings or a combination of all three, and 
the differences in premiums and proportions were such that they exactly cancel each 
other out.  This situation is highly unlikely and would only be coincidental if it were 
to transpire at all. 
 
Secondly, Assumption 4 implies that CH and CL are the same across insurers.  Again, 
this is not necessarily the case in practice.  Claim costs for high-risk and/or low-risk 
lives might differ between insurers for reasons such as, inter alia, differing payment 
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agreements between insurers and healthcare providers (for example, one insurer 
might be able to negotiate a better price for healthcare services) or different disease 
management practices between healthcare providers (for example, one hospital 
might encourage patients to convalesce at home with follow-up outpatient visits, 
whereas another might encourage patients to stay in hospital for longer). 
 
The effects of CH and CL differing between insurers would be the same as the effects 
of differing investment income, administrative expenses or profit loadings, as above.  
Differing values of CH and CL by insurer would lead to different values for C1, C2, 
…, Cn.  To see this, we can re-write Equation 3.9 as 
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If we assume that each insurer in the market has the same proportions of high-risk 
and low-risk members as each other insurer, then from Equations 3.10 and 3.11 we 
can see that 
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 126 
T
n
n
TT L
L
C
L
L
C
L
L
CLRP ...... 22
1
1   
 
If each insurer has the same risk profile as each other insurer, then H1/T1 = H2/T2 = 
… = Hn/Tn = HT/T and L1/T1 = L2/T2 = … = Ln/Tn = LT/T.  We have already 
established, using Equations 3.5, 3.6, 3.7 and 3.8, that, if this is the case then H1/HT 
= L1/LT, H2/HT = L2/LT, …, Hn/HT = Ln/LT.  Combining this with the revised 
equations for HRP and LRP above, we can see that the weights attached to C1, C2, 
… , Cn are the same in the calculations of both HRP and LRP, so that the values for 
HRP and LRP will be equal and thus community rating would still hold across the 
market. 
 
If one or more insurers have higher than average proportions of high-risk lives and 
other insurer(s) have lower than average proportions of high-risk lives, then the only 
way in which community rating would still operate across the market is if the 
differences in claim costs exactly balanced the differences in risk profiles, which 
would be highly unlikely and would only occur by chance. 
 
Thirdly, the model assumes that there are two discrete risk types, high-risk lives and 
low-risk lives.  Again, in practice, there are as many risk types as there are insured 
persons, although insurers tend to group insured persons with similar characteristics 
into risk classes, so the practical number of risk classes will be less than the number 
of insured persons but likely greater than two.  In general however, some risk classes 
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will still have higher expected claim costs than others, and can thus be thought of as 
broadly high-risk or low-risk. 
 
In terms of the effect on the model, one could envisage a situation where one insurer 
has higher proportions of some high-risk classes but lower proportions of other high-
risk classes, and higher proportions of some low-risk classes but lower proportions 
of other low-risk classes than the market average.  These may, to some extent, 
cancel each other out, leading to similar risk profiles between insurers. 
 
However, due to other factors, such as plan coverage, provider coverage, length of 
time in the market, or switching behaviour, it is more likely that insurers that attract 
higher proportions of one high-risk class would also attract higher proportions of 
other high-risk classes, while insurers that attract higher proportions of one low-risk 
class would also attract higher proportions of other low-risk classes.  Again, it would 
be unlikely, and only coincidental, for the relaxation of the assumption of two risk 
types to exactly negate the effect of differing proportions of different risk types on 
the maintenance of community rating across the market.  It is far more likely that 
any differential risk profiles between different insurers would lead to a breakdown of 
community rating across the market. 
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3.6 Discussion and Conclusions 
 
Community rating within plans in the Irish context could be described as quite a 
pure form of community rating.  However, it is not, to continue with such 
terminology, 100% pure, as it does allow for exceptions to the community rating 
rules, such as for children aged under-18, dependent full-time students aged 18-23 
and members of group schemes. 
 
A pure form of community rating across the market for health insurance cannot 
operate in the absence of some form of risk adjustment mechanism, as shown by the 
model in this chapter.  However, the ‘impurities’ in community rating in Ireland 
mean that perhaps an ‘impure’ form of risk equalisation might suffice in the Irish 
context. 
 
An example of a less-than-pure form of risk equalisation is that operating in The 
Health Insurance Plan of California (The HIPC), as described by Shewry, Hunt, 
Ramey & Bertko (1996).  Within The HIPC a risk assessment value (RAV) is 
calculated for each health plan, based on its enrolee mix compared with the overall 
enrolee mix of The HIPC.  The RAV of The HIPC as a whole is always 1.0.  Risk 
adjustment is implemented when at least one health plan has an RAV that is at least 
5% above or below that of The HIPC (i.e. below 0.95 or above 1.05) and adjusts 
until the RAV of the outlier plan returns to within the 5% threshold of the RAV of 
The HIPC.  This suggests that some degree of risk profile difference is acceptable in 
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The HIPC, and this might be something that the Irish government might wish to 
consider in designing a new risk equalisation scheme for the Irish market. 
 
Whether or not pure community rating across the market is required, or even 
desirable, in Ireland is a decision for the legislature, although Oireachtas 
(parliamentary) debates suggest that there is broad political support for the idea of 
community rating across the market.  This has been reinforced in parliamentary 
debates that have taken place since the Supreme Court ruling on the Risk 
Equalisation Scheme, 2003, which highlights the need to have a precise definition in 
legislation of the type of community rating that is desired in the market.  In the 
immediate aftermath of the Supreme Court judgment setting aside the Risk 
Equalisation Scheme, 2003, the Minister for Health and Children called for a period 
of reflection, although in November 2008, the Minister announced a number of 
interim measures to stabilise the market while work is carried out on another risk 
equalisation scheme (see Section 2.4).  However, perhaps some reflection in relation 
to the type of community rating that is desired in the Irish private health insurance 
market might be useful at this juncture, particularly as this might have implications 
for the design of any new risk equalisation scheme. 
 
In the meantime however, following the Supreme Court judgment, it is clear that 
community rating is not operating across the market for private health insurance in 
Ireland.  Instead, it is only mandated to operate within plans, thus leading to a 
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situation that could be described as ‘communities rating’ rather than community 
rating – each plan being a distinct community. 
 
Therefore, while high-risk consumers are paying the same as low-risk consumers for 
the same plan, on average high-risk consumers may be paying more than low-risk 
consumers for similar levels of cover.  The Supreme Court judgment also increases 
the possibility of risk segmentation, which would be detrimental to community 
rating in the Irish market.  This problem was alluded to by the Minister for Health 
and Children when introducing the interim measures discussed above. 
 
This in itself raises another issue.  Given the number of plans available in the 
market, with differing levels of cover, is it feasible to operate community rating 
across the market for health insurance?  In response to a consultation paper by The 
Health Insurance Authority on lifetime community rating (HIA, 2002b), it was 
suggested by BUPA Ireland (BUPA Ireland, 2002) that the market might benefit 
from having one standardised, community-rated plan, providing minimum benefits, 
to be offered by all insurers as the cheapest plan available. 
 
BUPA Ireland’s suggestion that a standardised plan should be the lowest-priced plan 
in the market has some merit, as if it were not the cheapest plan in the market then 
insurers could design other plans that were more attractive to low-risk lives and set 
the premiums of such plans at a lower level than the premium of the standardised 
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plan, potentially cream-skimming healthy lives away from the standardised 
community rated plan. 
 
Another option would be to have a series of standardised plans at various cover 
levels, regulated by an independent body – perhaps The Health Insurance Authority 
– at standardised prices.  However, this could be considered over-regulation of the 
market, which might make the market unattractive to potential new entrants, 
particularly if non-standardised plans were prohibited, although this is unlikely. 
 
Such a standardised plan might however form the basis for a future solution to the 
problem of trying to effectively operate community rating across the market in the 
presence of multiple insurers offering multiple plans.  However, this highlights a 
possible tension between achieving true community rating in the market and 
fostering consumer choice. 
 
Another possible solution might be to have an element of plan premiums reflecting a 
community rate across the market for a standardised level of benefits and an element 
reflecting the community rate of that plan for all benefits above those standardised 
benefits (as well as a premium loading to reflect administrative expenses and a profit 
loading, as per Harrington & Niehaus, 2003).  In other words, the premium would be 
expressed as 
 
Premium = CRmarket + CRplan + Premium Loading 
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The element of premium comprising the community rate for the market could 
perhaps be tied to the anticipated revised minimum benefit regulations.  In this way 
this element of the premium would reflect a community rate for the benefits to 
which everyone with qualifying health insurance plans would be entitled.  The 
element of premium reflecting the community rate of the plan would be based on the 
risk profile of that particular plan, which might have subtle differences from other 
plans providing broadly similar levels of cover based on the level of hospital 
accommodation.  It should be noted at this point that the Private Health Insurance 
Advisory Group (2007) made a similar recommendation – that community rating 
should only be applied to the level of benefits deemed adequate for the majority of 
the insured population, and not to benefits in excess of this level. 
 
This potential solution raises a number of questions, however.  The first is by whom 
the element of premiums reflecting the community rate for the market would be set.  
It is possible that an independent body could set this, although it might not have 
detailed knowledge of payments provided for the standardised benefits.  A possible 
way around this problem might be to have a panel consisting of actuaries from each 
of the insurers in the market plus one or more independent representatives, although 
this might lead to difficulties surrounding commercial sensitivity regarding payment 
rates.  A possible middle-ground solution might be for an independent body with 
actuarial expertise to be given details of payment rates for the standard benefits – 
 133 
most likely on a statutory basis – and then calculate the market community rate for 
those benefits. 
 
The second question arising from this type of solution relates to whether it would 
facilitate – or even give incentives for – some form of risk selection or market 
segmentation.  This could possibly be the case, as part of the premium would reflect 
the community rate of the plan membership, which in turn would reflect the risk 
profile of the plan.  However, although risk selection might still be possible under 
this type of solution, the degree to which this would be effective would be reduced, 
as part of the premium would reflect the community rate of the market for the 
standardised level of benefits.  This would reduce the potential degree of variation in 
plan premiums based on the benefits above this level. 
 
Nevertheless, despite the ‘impurities’ in the system of community rating in Ireland, 
the conclusions of the model remain valid, including that differences in risk profiles 
between insurers, or indeed between plans, will, in the absence of some risk 
adjustment mechanism, lead to high-risk consumers paying more, on average, than 
low-risk consumers.  Two possible reasons for differing risk profiles between 
insurers are adverse selection and risk selection, and these are examined in more 
detail in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4 
EVIDENCE OF SELECTION IN THE IRISH PRIVATE HEALTH 
INSURANCE MARKET 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter 3 examined whether or not community rating can operate across the market 
for health insurance in the presence of multiple insurers.  The formulaic model 
presented in Chapter 3 suggests that this is not possible if insurers have different risk 
profiles from the market average.  However, the presence of some risk adjustment 
mechanism would mitigate this effect. 
 
Differences in risk profile between insurers are highly likely in practice.  Two 
possible reasons for this would be adverse selection and risk selection.  These are 
two forms of market failure that can arise in insurance markets.  Risk selection 
involves insurers trying to select favourable risks to reduce their cost base and 
thereby maximise profits, while adverse selection involves consumers selecting 
more or less comprehensive coverage based on their own health status, which may 
accentuate cost differentials between more and less comprehensive plans. 
 
This Chapter examines whether there is evidence of either form of selection in the 
Irish private health insurance market.  If either or both selection effects are present 
in the market then it would increase the need for some form of risk adjustment 
mechanism, such as the risk equalisation scheme that was proposed for the Irish 
market but set aside by the Supreme Court in 2008. 
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4.2 A Review of the Issues Surrounding Selection 
 
Much of the literature in the area of competition in the provision of health insurance 
highlights the issues of risk selection (also known as cream skimming) and adverse 
selection, which may be present in the health insurance market. 
 
4.2.1 Risk Selection 
 
In insurance markets, there exist individuals who represent relatively low risks to 
insurers and individuals who represent relatively high risks to insurers.  In the case 
of health insurance, these are relatively healthy and less healthy individuals, 
respectively. 
 
The expected value of claims for medical expenses would be lower for a relatively 
healthy individual than for a relatively unhealthy individual.  Although a large 
number of factors will affect the likelihood of claiming for medical expenses, one of 
the key determinants is age.  Studies have shown that average health expenditure 
rises with age. 
 
For example, Berk et al (1988) and Berk & Monheit (1992, 2001), using data from 
the US, show that healthcare expenditure is highly concentrated among the highest-
spending patients.  For example, in 1996 the top 1% of the US population, ranked by 
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medical expenditure, accounted for 27% of expenditure, and 46.3% of these people 
were elderly (aged 65 or over).  By contrast, the bottom 50% of the population, 
ranked by medical expenditure, accounted for only 3% of expenditure.  Their 
findings suggest that the concentration is reasonably consistent across time. 
 
Meanwhile, Russo, Wier & Elixhauser (2009) find that hospital costs and utilisation 
rise with age.  Specifically, those aged 45-54 had average length of hospital stays of 
4.8 days in 2007, compared with 5.2 for those aged 55-64 and 5.4 days for those 
aged 65-74.  Average hospital costs were $10,400 for those aged 45-54, compared 
with $11,900 for both the 55-64 and 65-74 age groups.  Furthermore, they found that 
the hospitalisation rate per 1,000 population rose from 101.7 in the 45-54 age group 
to 145.9 in the 55-64 age group and further to 253.4 among those aged 65-74. 
 
In Ireland, figures from the Central Statistics Office (CSO, 2007a) show that 13.3% 
of the population in 2006 was aged 65 and over, but ESRI (2008b) shows that this 
age bracket accounted for 30.6% of acute public hospital discharges and 46.1% of 
total bed-days that year 
 
Therefore, age is a readily available indicator of expected medical expenses and thus 
of the risk that an individual would represent to a health insurer.  Gender can also be 
an indicator of likely health expenditures, particularly when combined with age.  For 
example, analysis of figures provided to the author by the Economic and Social 
Research Institute shows that females of child-bearing age are significantly more 
 137 
likely to have episodes of hospitalisation than males of similar ages, while this 
relativity is not as marked in other age brackets.  
 
However, Newhouse (1982, 1994, 1996) suggests that age and gender, while 
inexpensive to collect, only explain a small proportion of the variance in health 
costs, with prior utilisation being the main predictor.  This point was also noted by 
Van de Ven, Van Vliet, Van Barneveld & Lamers (1994).  Nicholson, Bundorf, 
Stein & Polsky (2004) find that even a simple risk adjustment mechanism based on 
age and gender would not prevent the risk selection experienced by Health 
Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) compared with non-HMOs, because the 
selection is based on other factors that are more difficult to observe, such as health 
status and preference for medical care.  Van de Ven et al (2000) suggest that poor 
risk-adjusters, such as age and gender sometimes supplemented by an indicator of 
disability, still leave ample room for insurers to make profits from cream skimming.  
This point was also made by Van de Ven & Ellis (2000), who argue that, because 
there is no perfect risk adjustment mechanism there will always be selection 
incentives, but that the better (more accurate) the risk adjustment mechanism the less 
a trade-off exists between the goals of efficiency and fairness. 
 
As the payment of claims for medical expenses represents the majority of a health 
insurer’s costs, this means that insurers have a strong incentive to select lower-risk 
consumers, if possible, in order to maximise profits.  This is particularly true in a 
community rated market, in which insurers receive the same premium for high-risk 
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consumers as for low-risk consumers, despite higher expected claim costs for the 
former than for the latter.  However, it may also hold true in a risk rated market, 
where insurers are free to charge premiums based on expected claims.  In such 
markets, the factors that insurers may take into account and their relative accuracy in 
predicting future health expenditures will determine the degree to which risk 
selection is incentivised.  However, since there is no perfect predictor of future 
health spending, an incentive will likely remain for risk selection. 
 
Although community rating is often accompanied by open enrolment, whereby 
insurers are obliged to accept all applicants, irrespective of risk, there are subtle 
ways in which insurers may still attempt to engage in risk selection.  These would 
include marketing and plan design.  A number of authors have noted this possibility, 
including Field (1985), Kifmann (2002), Light (1998) Mossialos & Thomson 
(2002a, 2002b), Newhouse (1994), Shewry et al (1996) and Thomson & Mossialos 
(2007).  As an example of subtle risk selection by plan design, additional benefits 
designed around sports injuries or maternity benefits would, ceteris paribus, appeal 
more to younger consumers, as these consumers would be more likely to make 
claims for such benefits.  Meanwhile, benefits for heart conditions or cancer would, 
ceteris paribus, appeal more to older consumers, as they would be more likely to 
make claims for these benefits. 
 
Another possible form of subtle risk selection might be for insurers to contract with 
healthcare providers that are unsuitable for high-risk consumers (Parkin & McLeod, 
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2001), but there is no evidence of this being an issue in the Irish market.  This might 
be due to the fact that, as noted by Colombo & Tapay (2004), insurers in Ireland 
have little incentive to engage in selective contracting with providers as one of the 
main drivers of demand for private health insurance is the additional choice that it 
provides to consumers. 
 
Thomson & Mossialos (2007) note that product differentiation (of which plan design 
could be one example) could restrict competition if consumers find it difficult to 
compare price and quality across a wide range of products.  In this regard, both The 
Health Insurance Authority (HIA, 2007) and The Competition Authority 
(Competition Authority, 2007) found evidence that consumers find it difficult to 
compare health insurance products in Ireland and that this contributes to the low 
level of switching in the market. 
 
Hsiao (1995) suggests that open enrolment and community rating are only 
moderately effective in combating risk selection, although he also suggests that risk-
adjusted premiums for individuals would be technically unfeasible.  Sauter (2008) 
also notes that, in the absence of risk equalisation, other public interest policies, such 
as community rating and open enrolment, are unlikely to work given the possibilities 
of risk selection based on the subtle methods described above. 
 
In a report by the York Health Economics Consortium (YHEC), commissioned by 
the HIA in 2003, the authors note that, although open enrolment means that risk 
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selection is technically illegal, there remain a number of ways in which insurers 
could attempt to cream-skim healthier lives.  These include “targeted 
marketing,…structuring insurance plans to appeal most to the healthiest…and 
offering lower premiums in return for using service providers who follow strict 
protocols or other utilisation management techniques.” (YHEC, 2003: 50-51)  They 
further note that, while price competition on the basis of efficiency, quality and 
innovation is desirable, price competition on the basis of a lower risk profile 
(achieved deliberately or accidentally
61
) is socially undesirable.  This latter point is 
echoed by a number of other authors, such as McCarthy, Davies, Gaisford & 
Hoffmeyer (1995), Mossialos & Thomson (2002a), Newhouse (1982, 1998) and 
Shewry et al (1996). 
 
In the context of the discussion on subtle forms of risk selection, it is interesting to 
note that, as part of the 2008 consumer survey commissioned by the HIA, in addition 
to the quantitative survey of consumers, a survey of employers was undertaken, as 
well as in-depth interviews with a small number of Human Resource Executives.  
One of the outcomes of this was that there was some evidence that younger 
employees viewed the hospital elements of cover as less relevant to them, but that 
“some insurers were perceived as offering more relevant products to the needs of 
younger people and marketing of cover for lifestyle based services such as GP visits, 
tooth whitening, laser eye surgery and physiotherapy.”  (HIA, 2008c: 98). 
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 It may be possible for insurers to attract favourable risks without actively targeting lower-risk 
consumers, although the net result is the same. 
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The Health Insurance Authority undertook a consultation process on risk 
equalisation in the Irish private health insurance market in 2002.  It published a 
consultation paper, which was circulated to stakeholders and interested parties (HIA, 
2002a) and took account of the responses to this in the formulation of a policy paper 
on the subject (HIA, 2002c).  In its policy paper (HIA, 2002c), the HIA noted two 
potential difficulties that could arise when risk profiles differ significantly between 
insurers in the market.  These are price following and predatory pricing. 
 
Price following describes a situation whereby an insurer with a significantly lower 
risk profile would be in a position to charge a significantly lower premium than 
another insurer with a significantly higher risk profile, reflecting the relative levels 
of claim costs between the insurers.  However, the insurer with the lower risk profile 
might instead choose to set its premiums slightly below those of the insurer with the 
higher risk profile.  HIA (2002c) notes that this would be a sensible strategy for the 
low-risk insurer, as this would attract a significant proportion of new consumers in 
the market and some of the better risks from the other insurers, without attracting too 
many higher risks from the other insurers.
62
 
 
This last observation was made on the assumption that high-risk consumers would 
be less likely to switch insurer than low-risk consumers.  This was borne out by the 
consumer surveys commissioned by the HIA (HIA, 2003a, 2005a, 2008c), which 
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 Mercer Human Resource Consulting (2005) echoed this view, noting in the Irish context that the 
community rated model without risk equalisation had led to a situation where “a new entrant’s 
commercial interest (profitability) is best served by, in the main, shadow pricing and shadow 
servicing the market.” (Mercer Human Resource Consulting, 2005: 5-6) 
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suggest that younger consumers (who would tend to be lower risk) tend to be more 
likely to switch insurer than older consumers (who would tend to be higher risk).  If 
this were to happen then the claim costs of the insurers with the higher risk profiles 
would rise further as they would either lose, or not attract sufficient numbers of, 
low-risk consumers. 
 
The HIA noted that, if the price following strategy were followed then all consumers 
in the market would pay a premium close to that required to cover the claims of the 
insurers with the highest risk profiles, and if the risk profiles of the latter insurers 
were to continue to worsen then the premiums for all consumers would continue to 
rise. 
 
Analysis carried out by the HIA in October 2005 (HIA, 2005c) suggested that price 
following may have been occurring in the Irish private health insurance market.  In 
particular, the report noted that, between the time BUPA Ireland began selling plans 
in the Irish market (January 1997) and early 2005, both BUPA Ireland and Vhi 
Healthcare had implemented eight price increases, with both sets of increases 
totalling 98%.
63
 
 
Earlier analysis by the York Health Economics Consortium (YHEC, 2003) also 
found a high degree of correlation between the premiums of BUPA Ireland and Vhi 
Healthcare and concluded that the two insurers were “not participating in a price 
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 It also noted that Vhi Healthcare had implemented a further price increase in September 2005, but 
that BUPA Ireland tended to increase prices six months after Vhi Healthcare did, so the 98% figure is 
based on comparable price increase cycles. 
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war” (YHEC, 2003:33).  It suggested that an alternative interpretation of the price 
patterns of the two insurers was the presence of Stackelberg competition, whereby 
Vhi Healthcare set premiums and BUPA Ireland followed by charging similar but 
slightly lower premiums.  Sauter (2008) also notes that the European Commission, 
in making its decision on BUPA Ireland’s complaint that risk equalisation 
constituted illegal State aid, had taken into consideration evidence suggesting that 
BUPA Ireland had adopted a strategy of active risk selection combined with a 
strategy of price following. 
 
A report by the Society of Actuaries in Ireland (2002) also notes little evidence of 
price competition in the Irish private health insurance market.  The report also 
suggests that there exists a market incentive for BUPA Ireland to be a price follower.  
It argues that, in the absence of risk equalisation, it would make little sense for 
BUPA Ireland to set its prices at a level that would attract significant numbers of 
Vhi Healthcare’s high-risk members.  The report notes that this price following 
effect would reinforce the natural inertia of consumers. 
 
A number of authors have suggested that incentives for insurers to engage in risk 
selection mean that a fully competitive market for health insurance is not possible.  
For example, Arrow (1963) suggests that the equalisation of premiums between 
those with a low propensity to illness and those with a high propensity (such as 
would occur under community rating) “could not in fact be carried through if the 
market were genuinely competitive.  Under those circumstances, insurance plans 
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could arise which charged lower premiums to preferred risks and draw them off, 
leaving the plan which does not discriminate among risks with only an adverse 
selection of them.” (Arrow, 1963: 964). 
 
Enthoven (1993) states the issue more bluntly: “A free market does not and cannot 
work in health insurance and health care.  If not corrected by a careful design, this 
market is plagued by problems of free riders, biased risk selection, segmentation, 
and other sources of market failure.” (Enthoven, 1993: 44).  His proposals for 
managed competition in the health insurance market involve sponsors acting as 
intermediaries between consumers and health insurers.
64
  One of the functions of 
such sponsors is to manage risk selection and thus “create powerful incentives for 
health plans to succeed by improving quality and patient satisfaction, not by 
selecting good risks and avoiding bad ones.” (Enthoven, 1993: 33). 
 
The idea of managed competition was one of the central features of proposals for 
reform of the US healthcare system proposed by the so-called Jackson Hole Group 
of experts (Ellwood, Enthoven & Etheredge, 1992), which formed the basis of 
healthcare reforms attempted (ultimately unsuccessfully) by the Clinton 
administration in the 1990s.  One of the suggestions put forward by the Jackson 
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 Enthoven describes managed competition thus:  “A sponsor (either an employer, a governmental 
entity, or a purchasing cooperative), acting on behalf of a large group of subscribers, structures and 
adjusts the market to overcome attempts by insurers to avoid price competition.  The sponsor 
establishes rules of equity, selects participating plans, manages the enrolment process, creates price-
elastic demand, and manages risk selection.”  (Enthoven, 1993:25)  For further details on these 
proposals for managed competition, see Enthoven (1988) and Ellwood et al (1992).  In the context of 
the application of managed competition, Van de Ven et al (1994) state “cream skimming truly is the 
Achilles’ heel of a wide range of market-oriented strategies in health care…” (Van de Ven et al, 
1994: 134) 
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Hole Group was to ensure that “competition can take place on the basis of health 
services cost, quality, and patient satisfaction rather than on risk selection and 
market segmentation.”  (Ellwood et al, 1992: 153) 
 
Attitudes towards risk segmentation have changed over time, from it being viewed 
as efficient in the 1960s and 1970s to a more negative view in the late 1980s and 
1990s.  Feldman & Dowd (2000) conclude “There appears to be a growing 
consensus that risk segmentation is undesirable, that “risk adjusted” payments to 
health plans are necessary either to forestall risk segmentation or to offset its effects, 
and even that competitive approaches to allocating health care resources may not be 
viable without such adjustments.” (Feldman & Dowd, 2000: 499). 
 
In a similar vein, Nolan (2005) notes “While asymmetric information, uncertainty 
and externalities are the most readily identifiable indicators of market failure in the 
health sector, health care markets also suffer from imperfect competition in the sense 
that many of the conditions for perfectly competitive markets are absent or 
deficient.” (Nolan, 2005: 7)  As examples of such conditions being absent or 
deficient, she notes that hospital services are subject to economies of scale, 
producers can influence levels of demand and/or price, and consumers are not 
perfectly informed. 
 
The impact of risk selection on the opportunities for a competitive market in health 
insurance is a common theme in the literature.  Light (1998) notes “Unless careful 
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safeguards are put in places, however, competition between health insurers obeys the 
inverse coverage law: the more people need insurance, the less coverage they will 
get and the more they will pay for what they get.”  (Light, 1998: 745).  He also notes 
that subtle techniques used to cream skim preferred risks, along with other 
(unspecified) reasons mean that “competition in health insurance that benefits – 
rather than harms – society by lowering costs and improving services is difficult to 
attain.”  (Light, 1998: 745) 
 
Regarding the reasons for the competitive incentives for risk selection, Rogal & 
Gauthier (1998) note that plans gain more by competing on the basis of risk 
selection than by competing on the basis of cost efficiency and quality.  Dunn (1998) 
notes that a common reason for the implementation of four risk adjustment schemes 
in the US was the reduction or removal of incentives to select preferred risks.  
Eggleston (2000) suggests that competition can exacerbate selection incentives in 
markets for healthcare and health insurance.  Van de Ven (1990) also notes that one 
of the reasons reforms were carried out in the Dutch health insurance system was the 
incentive for insurers to engage in risk selection rather than improve health care 
efficiency.  Mossialos & Thomson (2002b) suggest that insurers in the EU tend to 
compete on the basis of risk selection.  Colombo & Tapay (2004) suggest that the 
implementation of risk equalisation in Ireland would “improve fair competition 
across insurers by reducing the appeal of competition based on risk selection.”  
(Colombo & Tapay, 2004: 4). 
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However, Pupp (1981) suggests that, in a competitive market, without government 
regulation of prices (such as community rating), cream-skimming will tend to ensure 
that price equals marginal cost for all customers and that it should therefore be 
encouraged, as it ensures that non-discriminatory prices will be charged.  He argues 
that community rating inherently leads to cross-subsidisation between certain groups 
and that this can, to some extent, shield those with unhealthy lifestyles (such as 
smoking) from the social costs of these lifestyles. 
 
Switching is an important factor in both risk selection and adverse selection, as 
evidence suggests that those who switch tend to be younger.  This means that, if a 
gap opens up between the premiums of one insurer and the premiums of another, 
then those more likely to switch between insurers to avail of the lower prices would 
tend to be younger, who are also more likely to be healthier, which would accentuate 
differentials between the insurers’ average claims costs and thereby premiums, 
which could then lead to further switching, and so on, in extreme cases leading to a 
‘death spiral’.  This possibility was referred to by Industry Commission (1997) 
among others. 
 
This is a particularly relevant point in the context of the Irish private health 
insurance market, and ties in with the concept of adverse retention, which is 
discussed in the next section.  Because Vhi Healthcare had such a long period of 
monopoly presence in the market, many of its older customers have built up a long-
standing relationship with the insurer and might be less willing to switch to another 
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insurer.  Younger consumers, by contrast, would be less likely to have built up such 
a relationship and might therefore be expected to be more likely to switch. 
 
Consumer inertia might therefore work to the advantage of new entrants (such as 
BUPA Ireland/Quinn Healthcare and VIVAS Health/Hibernian AVIVA Health) and 
to the detriment of incumbents (in this case Vhi Healthcare).  This was alluded to by 
the Society of Actuaries (2002), who argue that this consumer inertia is more likely 
to be a positive rather than a negative for a new entrant to a health insurance market, 
as a new insurer would not want to attract the high-risk customers of the incumbent 
insurers.  They also argue that, in the absence of risk equalisation, it would not make 
commercial sense for BUPA Ireland to set its prices in such a way as to attract Vhi 
Healthcare’s higher risk members. 
 
There is some evidence from other health insurance markets that corroborates the 
idea that switching patterns can accentuate differences in risk profiles.  For example, 
Nicholson et al (2004) find that those who switched from non-HMOs to HMOs
65
 in 
60 US communities in the 1990s used 11% fewer medical services in the year prior 
to switching than those who didn’t switch from non-HMOs, and that those switchers 
maintained relatively low use once enrolled in the HMO.  Meanwhile, those who 
switched in the opposite direction (i.e. from HMOs into non-HMOs) used 18% more 
medical services in the year prior to switching than those who didn’t switch from 
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 HMOs (health maintenance organizations) operate on the basis of managed care, and are therefore 
more restrictive (less generous) than traditional indemnity insurance policies. 
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HMOs.  The authors estimate that the effect of these people switching is to reduce 
HMOs’ aggregate medical expenditure by 2% per annum. 
 
The idea of switching, or a lack thereof, having an impact on competition has been 
put forward by a number of authors, including Dudley (1982) and Waterson, (2001).  
The argument in this case is that if consumers are reluctant to switch then this 
reduces the effectiveness of competition, and that it might be the case that regulation 
to encourage competition, which traditionally targets firms rather than consumers, 
might therefore be less effective at achieving its aims.  However, while Dudley 
(1982) argues that consumer inertia would help incumbents to deter entry and 
increase profitability, in the case of health insurance the incumbent would more 
likely suffer if it were left with a less profitable customer base, i.e. a higher 
proportion of high-risk insured lives. 
 
As mentioned in Section 2.3, the level of switching in the Irish private health 
insurance market, at 10% in total by late 2007 (HIA, 2008c) is relatively low.  This 
can be put into perspective by examining the Dutch health insurance market, 
although care should be taken in comparing the two, as the Dutch market underwent 
significant reform in 2006.  Mosca & Schut-Welkzijn (2008) find that between 1 
January 2006 and 1 March 2006, when consumers had the option of staying with 
their existing health insurer or switching to a new one, 26% of consumers in a 
sample of 2,172 insured persons switched insurer, and that those who were more 
likely to switch were younger consumers, more educated people, those in good or 
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excellent health and those on higher incomes, while those who had contact with their 
health insurer in the previous 12 months were less likely to switch. 
 
Van de Ven & Schut (2009) suggest that the switching rate in the Netherlands in 
2006 was 18%, although they note that since 2007 switching rates have dropped to 
around 4%.  Although the 2006 rate reflects significant reforms in the Dutch health 
insurance system, a stabilisation of switching at around 4% per annum would still be 
significantly higher than the rate of switching found in the Irish market by the HIA 
surveys (HIA, 2003a, 2005a, 2008c).  The findings of Buchmueller & Feldstein 
(1996) that 3-6% of consumers switched plans in the University of California in a 
single year, despite the absence of cost savings, would also suggest that the Irish 
switching rate is relatively low. 
 
Risk equalisation in the Irish private health insurance market was introduced to 
support community rating by discouraging risk selection.  The literature suggests 
that risk adjustment (of which risk equalisation is a form) can combat risk selection 
and/or adverse selection, which might also be an issue for the Irish market. 
 
A number of authors have highlighted the importance of risk adjustment in this 
regard.  One such author is Newhouse (1998), who suggests that the need for risk 
adjustment stems from community rating, which gives insurers incentives to risk 
select (a suggestion also put forward in the Irish context by Nolan, 2005).   
However, Pauly (1984) argues that, under the circumstances outlined by Newhouse 
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(1982), the problem is not cream-skimming (risk selection) but rather adverse 
selection.  He also argues that cream-skimming will only occur because of 
regulation (in the form of community rating).
66
  In this regard, he suggests that 
efficiency may only be achieved by sacrificing equity, although he questions 
whether the notion of high-risk individuals paying more for insurance than low-risk 
individuals is inequitable.  In an earlier paper (Pauly, 1970), he suggests that 
community rating leads to a welfare loss relative to experience rating. 
 
The idea of regulatory regimes that place restrictions on the pricing of insurance 
policies – of which community rating would be one – inducing risk selection and 
adverse selection has also been put forward by, among others, Mossialos & 
Thomson (2002a) and Maynard & Dixon (2002), the latter of whom also note that, 
in the absence of appropriate regulation, market segmentation, cream skimming and 
the exclusion of vulnerable groups could undermine social objectives.  Van de Ven 
& Ellis (2000) also note that, while community rating gives insurers less opportunity 
to engage in risk selection, it increases the incentives for such behaviour, an idea 
also put forward by Dowd & Feldman (1985). 
 
It should be noted at this point that risk selection and adverse selection are not 
entirely separate.  Indeed, there can be significant interaction between the two forms 
of selection, as pointed out by McCarthy et al (1995), who suggest that risk selection 
can be used by insurers as a defence against adverse selection by consumers, which 
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 Hartedny (1994) also argues that community rating and guaranteed issue distort the market for 
health insurance and can contribute to making insurance less affordable for younger people. 
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could threaten their financial solvency.  Van de Ven & Ellis (2000) suggest that 
insurers could use adverse selection as a tool for engaging in risk selection, by 
designing plans in such a way as to encourage high-risk consumers and low-risk 
consumers to self-select into different plans.  Meanwhile, Shewry et al (1996) note, 
in the context of The Health Insurance Plan of California, that “individual choice is 
likely to exacerbate any nonrandom risk segmentation that is occurring.” (Shewry et 
al, 1996: 172). 
 
The role of the regulatory system is also examined in the case of the Swiss and 
Dutch (pre-reform in 2006) private health insurance systems (Van Kleef, Beck, Van 
de Ven & Van Vliet, 2008).  In both systems, community rating, open enrolment and 
risk equalisation are operated, and insured persons have the option of a deductible 
(in return for a lower premium, or a premium rebate as it is described).  Van Kleef et 
al (2008) find that, in the absence of risk equalisation, insurers are forced to 
incorporate differences in expenditure between low-risk and high-risk groups into 
the premium rebate given to consumers who opt for a deductible.  With risk 
equalisation, the effect of self-selection on the premium rebate will be smaller, as 
these differences are adjusted for via the equalisation payments.  However, the paper 
notes that it is unlikely that the Swiss and (pre-reform) Dutch systems fully adjust 
for self-selection. 
 
While these results arise from an examination of the markets in Switzerland and the 
Netherlands, they are also relevant for Ireland, where risk equalisation was – and 
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may again be in the future – in place in a market characterised by community rating 
and open enrolment and where some health insurance plans offer consumers the 
option of having deductibles (or excesses, as they are more commonly known in 
Ireland). 
 
Irish policy-makers appear to have accepted that some form of risk adjustment is 
essential in the Irish private health insurance market, given its three ‘pillars’ of 
community rating, open enrolment and lifetime cover.  The fact that risk equalisation 
has not been successfully implemented casts some doubt on the stability of the 
market in these circumstances, as acknowledged by Nolan (2006). 
 
The government’s view that risk equalisation is essential to underpin community 
rating stems partly from the conclusions of the report of the Advisory Group set up 
by the then Minister for Health to report on the risk equalisation scheme (Advisory 
Group to the Minister for Health on the Risk Equalisation Scheme, 1998).  This 
report also examined the options of a retrospective and prospective system, and 
concluded that a retrospective system, which formed the basis of both the 1996 
scheme and the 2003 scheme in Ireland, was the most practical method.  This was in 
contrast to the Society of Actuaries in Ireland (2002), which recommended the use 
of a prospective system of risk equalisation. 
 
In an international context, it would appear that risk equalisation often accompanies 
community rating and open enrolment.  Parkin & McLeod (2001) find examples of 
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17 countries (including Ireland) where risk equalisation takes place (although some 
of their examples refer to public healthcare systems, such as the National Health 
Service in the UK) and only one country – South Africa – where community rating 
operates in the absence of risk equalisation.  It should be noted however, that risk 
equalisation was not on the statute books in Ireland at that time, although a new risk 
equalisation scheme had been proposed at the time.  It is also worth noting that work 
is currently under way on a proposed risk equalisation scheme in South Africa. 
 
From a review of literature in the area, it would appear that there is a general, though 
not unanimous, view that risk selection is undesirable, as it distorts the market and 
prevents a competitive outcome.  Risk selection may not always be obvious, and 
there are subtle ways in which insurers can overcome legal impediments to risk 
selection, such as community rating and open enrolment.  Indeed, while these two 
regulatory practices are designed to reduce the opportunity for risk selection, they 
are seen in many cases as increasing the incentive for such behaviour.  In the 
regulatory context, it would also appear that the regulation of firms in the market 
might not be sufficient to eliminate selection effects, as consumer inertia and 
switching patterns play an important role.  There is also a significant body of 
literature advocating some form of risk adjustment mechanism in order to combat 
risk selection. 
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4.2.2 Adverse Selection 
 
While risk selection entails insurers trying to attract low-risk individuals and avoid 
high-risk individuals, adverse selection refers to the situation whereby higher-risk 
consumers prefer more comprehensive insurance cover, and are willing to pay more 
for it, while lower-risk consumers tend to opt for less expensive, less comprehensive 
cover.  This can widen cost differentials between plans offering the two types of 
cover. 
 
Adverse selection can arise when there is an information asymmetry between 
insurers and consumers, with the latter having greater knowledge about their health 
status than the former.  In a seminal paper on information asymmetry and its effects 
on the market mechanism, Akerlof (1970) shows how information asymmetry can 
reduce the size and quality of markets or, in extreme cases, cause market collapse.  
He then shows how these principles can be applied in the market for health 
insurance, where, as the price rises, the average health status of the insured 
population decreases, as only the sickest or those at high risk of falling ill would be 
willing to pay higher prices for insurance.  In the extreme case, this could lead to no 
insurance being sold at all. 
 
In many markets, health checks are not required before a health insurance contract is 
issued.  This leaves insurers with only broad indicators of the health status of actual 
or potential enrolees, the main ones being age and gender.  This allows insurers to 
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place enrolees in broad categories of risk status, but in community rated markets 
even this may not be reflected in the premiums that an insurer can charge.  Dionne & 
Laserre (1985) suggest that, under adverse selection in insurance markets, an insured 
person has no incentive to reveal his/her true risk, which is costly for an insurer to 
observe.
67
 
 
Rothschild & Stiglitz (1976), in a seminal paper, note that in the presence of 
imperfect information, a competitive equilibrium may not exist, and even if it does, 
it may have unusual properties.  They show that, in order for equilibrium to occur, 
high-risk and low-risk consumers must purchase separate insurance contracts.  
Equilibrium may not exist if the costs to low-risk individuals of pooling with high-
risk individuals are low or if the costs of separating are high.  Furthermore, even if 
equilibrium does exist, the negative externality imposed by high-risk individuals on 
low-risk individuals means such equilibrium may not be Pareto-efficient. 
 
This idea of a separating equilibrium has implications for the idea of community 
rating, as such a rating regime requires low-risk consumers to pool their risks with 
high-risk consumers in order to keep insurance affordable for the latter group. 
 
Altman et al (1998) introduce the concept of adverse retention alongside adverse 
selection.  Adverse retention is the tendency for people who do not switch plans to 
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 They also suggest that, with multi-period contracts, an insurer can detect cheating and can induce 
an insured person to reveal his/her true risk in the first period.  However, this is of limited use in a 
community rated market, as the insurer would not be in a position to adjust premiums to reflect the 
true risk of an insured person. 
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magnify cost differentials between plans, especially as costs are non-linear with age.  
One of the factors that the authors suggest will affect the extent of adverse retention 
is the length of time for which the plans have been offered.  The last factor suggests 
that if people do not switch plans to any great extent then adverse retention will 
drive up the costs of older plans relative to newer ones. 
 
Newhouse (1994) also takes up this point, noting that new insurers tend to appeal 
more to people who do not already have insurance or those more likely to switch, 
both categories of which would tend to be relatively healthy.  Price & Mays (1985) 
also note that one possible factor that could give rise to adverse selection is if one 
plan is older and thus has an older mix of enrolees.  Industry Commission (1997) 
notes that, in practice, risk equalisation means that claims costs of older established 
funds with a higher proportion of elderly members are shared by newer funds, which 
suggests that the latter tended to have relatively lower risk profiles.  The idea of 
adverse retention is particularly relevant to the Irish case, given that Vhi Healthcare 
was operating in the Irish private health insurance market for 40 years before its first 
competitor. 
 
A recurring theme in the literature on adverse selection is the potential for a ‘death 
spiral’ to manifest itself.  This refers to the situation whereby an insurer with a 
higher risk profile (a higher proportion of high-risk insured lives and/or a lower 
proportion of low-risk insured lives) must raise premiums in order to cover the 
higher risk (and thereby higher claim costs), which increases the differential between 
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its premiums and those of another insurer with a lower risk profile.  As the 
difference in premiums widens, those most likely to switch from the more expensive 
insurer are lower-risk lives, who would prefer lower cost cover.
68
  This would 
further accentuate the difference in risk profiles, which would result in a further 
widening of the premium differential, and so on.  In the extreme case, if not 
corrected, this could lead to the insurer with the higher risk profile being forced to 
withdraw from the market. 
 
The possibility of a death spiral occurring in the Irish private health insurance 
market has been raised in the debate on risk equalisation in recent years.  YHEC 
(2003) acknowledged the theoretical possibility that a death spiral could occur in the 
Irish private health insurance market.  The Society of Actuaries in Ireland (2002) 
also argued that the private health insurance market in Ireland was potentially 
unstable at that time, irrespective of risk equalisation, as a significant proportion of 
the population was taking out private health insurance, despite being entitled to 
public hospital care.  They note that the market might appear to have been stable 
since 1994, due to the increase in overall take-up, which might reflect deteriorating 
perceptions of the public system and growth in numbers employed. 
 
                                                 
68
 This has been found to be the case in practice.  For example, Buchmueller (2006) cites research that 
suggests a greater degree of price-sensitivity on the part of younger consumers than older consumers, 
which contributes to adverse selection against plans favoured by the latter group.  Ellis (1985) finds 
that demographic factors explain some of the choice between (less generous) HMO and (more 
generous) non-HMO plans, and within non-HMO plans.  However, prior expenditure patterns 
significantly improve the explanation of non-HMO plan choice, as well as future expenditure.  In 
particular, expenditure on categories of treatment that are better predictors of future expenditure in 
those categories (e.g. prescription drugs) are better predictors of health plan choice than expenditure 
on categories that are not as highly serially correlated (such as inpatient care). 
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This argument has also been made by advocates of risk equalisation, including Vhi 
Healthcare, who have suggested that instability in the market due to adverse 
selection and/or risk selection has been masked by the overall increase in private 
health insurance take-up as household incomes rose, driven by Ireland’s economic 
growth in the late 1990s and early part of this decade.  Sommerville (1998) suggests 
that growth in membership, combined with the fact that new members tend to be 
younger than average, protected Vhi Healthcare from the full impact of an ageing 
membership on claim costs up to the mid-1990s, but speculated that the advent of 
competition might reduce this insulating effect.   
 
Opponents of risk equalisation, such as BUPA Ireland, have argued however that an 
adverse selection death spiral is not a realistic proposition in the Irish market, citing 
as evidence the fact that Vhi Healthcare’s membership has grown since the market 
was deregulated. 
 
However, as reported by Donnellan (2009), Vhi Healthcare’s membership has begun 
to fall as the recession in Ireland has led to discontinuation of coverage and 
switching to lower cost insurers.  In this context, it is worth noting that the Society 
of Actuaries in Ireland (2002) suggested that, in the event of a market contraction of, 
say, 5% a year for three or four years, in the absence of risk equalisation, the effect 
on an insurer with a poorer risk profile could be disproportionate to the reduction in 
the size of the market and that a death spiral could happen quite quickly. 
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Although an adverse selection death spiral is a theoretical risk, insurers tend not to 
be forced out of markets due to death spirals.  However, a number of empirical 
studies, such as Altman et al (1998), Cutler & Zeckhauser (1997) and Cutler & 
Reber (1998), show how adverse selection can lead to a death spiral at plan level, 
where more comprehensive plans had to be withdrawn after consumers were given a 
choice between them and less comprehensive plans, or after changes in the way 
these plans were subsidised. 
 
Buchmueller (2006) notes two examples of health insurance reforms which resulted 
in overall reductions in health insurance costs to the University of California and 
Harvard, but at the expense of adverse selection death spirals for the more expensive 
plans.  Monheit, Cantor, Koller & Fox (2004) also find that enrolment patterns in 
New Jersey’s Individual Health Coverage Program (IHCP) from 1994-2001 are 
consistent with an adverse selection death spiral.  However, they note that the 
causality is difficult to identify, partly due to a number of complicating factors.  
These include pricing incentives inherent in the IHCP regulatory structure, 
institutional changes in New Jersey’s regulated health insurance products, and 
improved economic circumstances (which meant that more people could get 
employer-sponsored health insurance coverage). 
 
Adverse selection has also been found in other markets, such as Australia (Barrett & 
Conlon, 2001) and Switzerland (Gardiol, Geoffard & Grandchamp, 2005).  Luft, 
Trauner & Maerki (1985) also found evidence of adverse selection in the California 
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Public Employees’ Retirement System (CALPers), while Dowd & Feldman (1985) 
and Dowd, Feldman, Cassou & Finch (1991) find evidence of adverse selection in 
the Twin Cities health plan market in Minnesota. 
 
Not all empirical studies find evidence of adverse selection, however.
69
  A private 
health insurance market that has been the subject of much discussion regarding a 
death spiral was that of New York in the 1990s.  In the early 1990s, Empire Blue 
Cross/Blue Shield was effectively the insurer of last resort in the New York market, 
and was obliged to offer plans on the basis of open enrolment, while its competitors 
were not subject to open enrolment requirements.  Largely as a result of financial 
difficulties experienced by Empire Blue Cross/Blue Shield, the New York Health 
Care Reform Act, 1993 was passed, which mandated that private health insurance be 
sold on the basis of community rating, open enrolment and lifetime cover.  A risk 
adjustment scheme was also introduced.  Buchmueller & DiNardo (2002), 
Buchmueller (2006) and Hall (1998) all argue that the introduction of community 
rating in New York did not result in an adverse selection death spiral, although it did 
lead to a reduction in the overall amount of insurance purchased in the market and, 
as Hall (1998) finds, it also led to the withdrawal of a number of plans. 
 
Newhouse (1984) and Thomasson (2002) also find mixed evidence of adverse 
selection effects and the causation of death spirals.  A number of simulations of 
insurance markets however, including Browne (1992), Feldman & Dowd (1982) and 
                                                 
69
 Berki & Ashcraft (1980), having reviewed the literature in relation to HMOs and non-HMOs, state 
that the evidence on adverse selection is mixed, although on balance it does tend to indicate the 
presence of adverse selection. 
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Marquis (1992), found that adverse selection will manifest itself in markets with 
low-risk and high-risk consumers. 
 
In the Irish context, Somerville (1998) argues that the evidence suggests that 
intergenerational adverse selection had not occurred in Ireland to any great extent up 
to the mid-1990s.  However, he speculates that if adverse selection becomes 
dominant, then some high-risk groups might be excluded from insurance, despite the 
presence of community rating. He notes that the maximum age for admission to 
insurance is some defence against this, but that the high maximum means that it is a 
weak defence.
70
 
 
Another market with community rating, similar to Ireland, is Australia.  Brown III & 
Connelly (2005b) and Connelly & Brown III (2006) suggest that the move from 
single rate community rating to lifetime community rating in Australia, while it 
raised the overall membership numbers and improved the overall risk profile of the 
insured population, did not fully address the adverse selection issue in Australia.  
They suggest that an adverse selection death spiral has recommenced in Australia 
since the introduction of lifetime community rating.   
 
This suggests that adverse selection is perhaps an inherent phenomenon in health 
insurance markets.  One possible explanation for this is offered by Chernew, Cutler 
                                                 
70
 At that time, the maximum age for admission to health insurance (or, strictly speaking, the 
maximum age at which insurers were obliged to accept applicants) was 65, but this maximum was 
removed in 2005.  This would presumably, following Sommerville’s argument, further weaken the 
defence against adverse selection. 
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& Keenan (2005), who suggest that it is possible that rising premiums might 
increase the incentives for low-risk lives to separate from high-risk lives in the risk 
pool, which would be consistent with the idea of a separating equilibrium as put 
forward by Rothschild & Stiglitz (1976).  This adverse selection behaviour, 
according to Chernew et al (2005) could potentially lead to the market unravelling.  
In this context, it is worth noting that rising premiums have been experienced in 
many markets, including the US (about which Chernew et al, 2005 were writing) 
and also Ireland.  Meanwhile, Dowd & Feldman (1985) argue that biased selection is 
not necessarily a short-term phenomenon that will be corrected as the population in 
less generous plans ages.  Furthermore, Farley & Monheit (1985) suggest that the 
presence of multiple health insurance options would exacerbate selection effects.  
This has relevance in the context of the growing number of plans available in the 
Irish private health insurance market, as mentioned in Section 2.3. 
 
However, some authors have questioned whether adverse selection is in fact a 
problem.  Ginsburg (1985) argues that biased selection goes together with rational 
choice, and that, as insured persons gain a greater understanding of their options, 
adverse selection is likely to increase over time. 
 
Pauly (1985) argues that adverse selection would not be a problem if community 
rating and easy switching between policies can be avoided.  He questions whether 
adverse selection really leads to any inefficiency in the market, and suggests that 
inefficiency, in the form of low-risk consumers under-insuring, actually arises from 
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the information asymmetry between insurers and consumers.  YHEC (2003) also 
suggested that the potential for adverse selection to destabilise the market is greater 
under community rating, while Buchmueller (2006) also suggests that community 
rating contributed to the death spirals experienced in the University of California and 
Harvard. 
 
Feldman (1987) also notes that community rating is seen as a solution to the problem 
of adverse selection, but he questions whether adverse selection disequilibrium 
actually exists.  He also notes that an absence of risk rating is likely to lead to three 
sources of market failure – moral hazard, a cross-subsidisation of high-risk lives by 
low-risk lives, and less than optimal spending on health promotion. 
 
Van de Ven et al (2000) point out that premium rate restrictions – of which 
community rating would be a form – can lead to selection effects and they note that 
“in order to eliminate the adverse effects of the selection induced by the rate 
restrictions, these restrictions have to be supplemented with an adequate risk-
adjustment mechanism.”  In this context, they find it “remarkable to read so many 
reports and proposals with respect to premium rate restrictions without any reference 
to a risk-adjustment mechanism.”  However, they note that “in most of the risk-
adjustment literature it is not well recognized that the selection problems are caused 
by the premium rate restrictions.”  (Van de Ven at al, 2000: 337, emphasis in 
original). 
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The idea that community rating creates incentives for adverse selection, particularly 
in the Australian context, is also noted by Industry Commission (1997), which notes 
the importance of risk adjustment (or reinsurance as it was then known in Australia) 
as a stabiliser of community rating, concluding that “in the absence of reinsurance, it 
is the existence of the community rating regulation which would most negate the 
principle of community rating.”  (Industry Commission, 1997: 441-442) 
 
A review of the literature on adverse selection finds that it results from information 
asymmetry favouring consumers over insurers and can lead to a reduction in the 
amount of insurance sold in the market.  It can also interact with the phenomenon of 
adverse retention, which would act to put older insurance plans at a disadvantage 
relative to newer ones.  In extreme cases, it can lead to a ‘death spiral’, whereby risk 
profile differences lead to an insurer with an unfavourable risk profile withdrawing 
from the market.  However, the available evidence suggests that this has not 
happened at an insurer level, although it has occurred at a plan level.  Evidence from 
Ireland and Australia suggest mixed experiences with adverse selection.  It has been 
argued that community rating increases the incentive for adverse selection, and that 
as a result further regulatory intervention – possibly in the form of a risk adjustment 
mechanism – may be needed to counteract the effect of community rating on the 
market.  However, some authors have questioned whether adverse selection is in fact 
a problem. 
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4.3 Adverse Selection and Risk Selection in the Irish Context 
 
The Irish private health insurance market lends itself to an examination of whether 
adverse selection and/or risk selection are evident.  This is due to the structure of the 
market and the nature of the products sold in the market. 
 
Most health insurance plans available in the market – those which cover hospital 
treatment – are structured in similar ways (although some now integrate significant 
non-hospital cover), largely as a result of the minimum benefit regulations.  These 
specify prescribed minimum benefits that any qualifying health insurance plan in 
Ireland must provide.  The broad categories of benefits covered include hospital 
charges (for inpatient and day-patient services), hospital treatment for listed 
procedures and out-patient benefits.  The structure of the prescribed minimum 
benefits has been described by Centura Health Administration Ltd. (later VIVAS 
Health) as stifling innovation, and in their view the regulations mean that 
“Competitors and potential competitors are forced to imitate the products of the 
single dominant insurer.”  (Centura Health Administration Ltd., 2004: 3). 
 
The majority of plans available in the Irish private health insurance market (those 
that provide hospital-based benefits or a combination of hospital-based and ancillary 
benefits) can therefore be examined on the basis of hospital treatment and hospital 
accommodation.  In the 2003 and 2005 consumer surveys carried out on behalf of 
the HIA (HIA, 2003a, 2005a), approximately three-quarters of insured respondents 
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said that hospital treatment was the most valued element of their cover, with hospital 
accommodation a distant second (11% of respondents to both surveys cited this as 
the most important element).
71
  In the 2008 survey (HIA, 2008c), respondents with 
health insurance were asked to rank the elements of their cover in order of 
importance.  The highest rank was given to receiving hospital treatment as a private 
patient under a consultant.  Receiving out-patient treatment as a private patient was 
ranked second highest, while the quality of hospital accommodation was ranked 
third.
72
 
 
If an insurer has a fully participating agreement with a particular hospital consultant, 
in which case the consultant accepts the insurer’s payment as full payment for 
services delivered and there is no balance billing of the patient, then a customer of 
that insurer is covered for treatment by that consultant irrespective of which level of 
hospital plan they are on. Each of the three insurers has fully participating 
agreements with the vast majority of consultants.  The three insurers also cover 
broadly similar numbers of hospitals.  In particular, they each cover the major acute 
hospitals in Ireland. 
 
Therefore the main differentiating factor between plans is the level of hospital 
accommodation covered.  Each of the three insurers in the market offers a number of 
                                                 
71
 Similar issues were found in research carried out by the Economic and Social Research Institute, 
and reported in Harmon & Nolan (2001) and Nolan & Wiley (2000).  This research showed that the 
two most important factors leading Irish consumers to purchase private health insurance were fear of 
large medical bills and being sure of getting into hospital quickly when treatment is needed, with 
88.5% and 86.4% of respondents, respectively, citing these as very important.  By comparison, only 
27.8% cited being able to have a private or semi-private room in hospital as being very important. 
72
 A partial refund of GP fees was ranked fourth, while receiving maternity care as a private patient 
was ranked fifth. 
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plans covering different levels of hospital accommodation, from a semi-private room 
in a public hospital to a private room in a high-tech hospital (see Section 4.3.1).  
Plans covering a similar level of hospital accommodation (for example, a private 
room in a public hospital and a semi-private room in a private hospital) are therefore 
broadly comparable, as they would also provide cover for similar numbers of 
hospitals and consultants.  Although there would be some differences (particularly in 
non-hospital cover) between plans providing similar levels of cover for hospital 
accommodation, these differences would likely not be sufficient to attract large 
numbers of consumers to one plan over another, as the two main categories of 
hospital treatment and hospital accommodation would be similar. 
 
4.3.1 Statistical Analysis 
 
An initial review of the data on risk profiles in Ireland, using the consumer surveys 
commissioned by the HIA and published in 2003 and 2005 (HIA, 2003a, 2005a), 
provides some interesting results.
73
  The first survey consisted of a nationally 
representative sample of 1,001 consumers, of whom 47% were covered by private 
health insurance.  The second involved an initial, nationally representative, sample 
of 1,002 consumers, of whom 52% were covered, as well as a booster sample of 
                                                 
73
 The analysis in this Chapter is based on risk profiles found in surveys carried out on behalf of the 
HIA.  Data relating to risk profiles were requested from the three insurers operating in the Irish 
market but these requests were refused on the grounds of commercial sensitivity. 
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consumers who had switched insurer.  The results presented in this chapter include 
this booster sample.
74
 
 
The HIA produces comparisons of plans across insurers (available at 
http://www.hia.ie/sec4_consumer_information) in order to assist consumers in 
making more informed decisions about which plan to purchase.  Using these 
comparisons, it is possible to equate plans with broadly similar levels of cover.  As 
noted above, there are some differences in cover between similar plans, but broad 
comparisons can be made in terms of hospital accommodation in particular.  Table 
4.1 shows a comparison of BUPA, VHI and VIVAS plans that were offered at the 
time of one or both of the HIA surveys
75
, ranked by the highest level of hospital 
accommodation that would be fully covered under the plan.
76
 
 
If adverse selection were present in the market, it would be expected that plans 
which provide a lower level of cover, in terms of hospital accommodation, would 
attract a higher proportion of low-risk consumers, while plans providing more 
comprehensive cover (e.g. private rooms, access to the high-tech hospitals
77
, etc.) 
would attract a higher proportion of high-risk consumers, who would be more likely 
                                                 
74
 The raw data from the 2008 survey (HIA, 2008c) was requested but the data received did not 
include most of the socio-demographic variables.  Therefore, the detailed analysis in this chapter 
could not be carried out on the 2008 data set. 
75
 Other plans have been launched since then but these have not been included in the table.  Some of 
the plans listed in this table have since been closed to new subscribers. 
76
 Higher levels of hospital cover would be partially, but not fully, covered. 
77
 The Blackrock Clinic, the Mater Private and the Beacon Hospital in Dublin are considered high-
tech hospitals, which specialise in acute care of serious and complex conditions.  Some plans also 
only provide limited cover for the Galway Clinic. 
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to be hospitalised, or may have a higher probability of requiring treatment in one of 
the high-tech hospitals. 
 
Table 4.1 Comparison of Health Insurance Plans by Hospital 
Accommodation Provided 
 
Cover 
Level 
Hospital 
Accommodation 
BUPA Plan VHI Plan VIVAS Plan 
1 Semi-private room in a 
public hospital 
Essential Plan A/A 
Option 
Me, I and We 
Plans Level 1 
2 Private room in a public 
hospital 
 First Plan, 
Family Plan 
 
3 Private room in a public 
hospital or semi-private 
room in a private 
hospital (excluding 
high-tech hospitals) 
Essential Plus 
(with/without 
excess) 
Plan B/B 
Option/B 
Excess, First 
Plan Plus, 
Family Plan 
Plus, 
Company 
Plan, 
Company 
Plan Plus 
Me, I and We 
Plans Level 2, 
Teachers Plan, 
Nurses Plan 
4 Private room in a public 
hospital or private room 
in a private hospital 
(excluding high-tech 
hospitals) 
Health 
Manager 
Starter,
78
 
Health 
Manager 
Plan C/C 
Option, 
Forward Plan 
I and We 
Plans Level 3, 
Teachers Plan 
Plus, Nurses 
Plan Plus 
5 As Level 4 or semi-
private room in a high-
tech hospital 
 Plan D/D 
Option 
I and We 
Plans Level 4 
6 As Level 4 or private 
room in a high-tech 
hospital 
Essential 
Gold,
79
 Health 
Manager Gold 
Plan E/E 
Option 
I and We 
Plans Level 5 
 
Note: Plans in italics also provide significant cover for ancillary (non-hospital) 
services 
 
 
Table 4.2 shows a comparison of plans in terms of the average age of respondents to 
the 2003 survey who said they were covered by that plan.  Also included is a 
                                                 
78
 A limited number of private hospitals are covered by this plan. 
79
 Essential Gold was closed to new subscribers in 2004.  However, respondents were found in both 
surveys who had this plan. 
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comparison of the claims experience of respondents on the plans.  The number of 
respondents covered by each plan is also included.  In some cases a small number of 
respondents were covered by particular plans, so care should be taken in interpreting 
the findings for these plans. 
 
Table 4.2 Average Age and Claims Experience by Plan, 2003 
 
Plan Cover 
Level 
Average 
Age 
% of 
respondents 
on plan who 
had made a 
claim 
Average no. 
of claims 
per claimant 
on the plan 
No. of 
respondents 
on the plan 
Essential 1 34 25.0% 2.50 8 
Essential Plus 3 38 48.6% 2.75 35 
Essential Gold 6 47 0.0% 0.00 1 
Don’t know 
which BUPA 
plan 
N/A 40 19.0% 2.50 21 
Plan A/A Option 1 44 66.7% 3.33 21 
Plan B/B Option 3 43 60.9% 3.98 276 
Plan C/C Option 4 45 59.1% 4.00 22 
Plan D/D Option 5 58 100.0% 6.20 11 
Plan E/E Option 6 51 80.0% 4.50 5 
Plan P, Other 
VHI, Don’t 
know which 
VHI Plan 
N/A 35 29.4% 2.87 51 
Other Insurers N/A 42 48.0% 5.33 25 
Overall  42 54.6% 3.91 476 
 
 
Broadly speaking, the average age of respondents with more comprehensive plans 
was higher than that of respondents with plans providing less comprehensive cover.  
This suggests that younger consumers are more likely to take out less comprehensive 
plans than older consumers.  This would be consistent with adverse selection on the 
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part of consumers.  Furthermore, there is some evidence that the likelihood of 
claiming is higher among consumers who are covered by more comprehensive plans. 
 
It also appears that the average number of claims made per claimant is higher on the 
more comprehensive plans than on the less comprehensive ones.  However, when 
the number of claims per year insured is examined, there is no clear trend evident, 
suggesting that at least part of the reason why those on more comprehensive plans 
have claimed more often is the fact that they have been insured for longer.  The 
differential claims frequency between less and more comprehensive plans might 
indicate moral hazard rather than adverse selection, although it is unlikely that 
significant numbers of people would increase utilisation solely on the basis of better 
accommodation in hospital, which might not be forthcoming in any case, depending 
on room availability.  Overall however, the table suggests at least a possibility that 
adverse selection might be present in the market. 
 
A comparison of broadly similar plans between BUPA and VHI suggests that there 
may also be a certain degree of risk selection in the market.  Consumers on VHI 
plans (red font) tend to have a higher average age than those on comparable BUPA 
plans (blue font).  Furthermore, the proportion of respondents on the VHI plans who 
made claims is higher than that for the comparable BUPA plans, as is the average 
number of claims made per claimant, although again this is less clear when the 
number of claims per year insured is examined. 
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It would appear from the evidence above that risk selection may be present in the 
market, with BUPA having a more favourable risk profile than VHI.  However, it 
should be noted that average age is not necessarily an accurate measure of the 
average risk posed by subscribers to different plans; rather the distribution of 
members by age would be more accurate. 
 
Table 4.3 Average Age and Claims Experience by Plan, 2005 
 
Plan Cover 
Level 
Average 
Age 
% of 
respondents 
on plan who 
had made a 
claim 
Average no. 
of claims 
per claimant 
on the plan 
No. of 
respondents 
on the plan 
Essential 1 40 42.9% 2.83 15 
Essential Plus 3 44 55.9% 3.14 59 
Essential Gold 6 49 60.0% 4.00 5 
Health Manager 
Starter 
4 38 57.1% 2.75 7 
Health Manager 4 41 66.7% 1.60 9 
Health Manager 
Gold 
6 45 100.0% 1.50 2 
Don’t know 
which BUPA 
plan 
N/A 42 33.3% 2.17 19 
Plan A/A Option 1 44 63.3% 4.33 30 
Plan B/B 
Option/B Excess 
3 46 70.8% 3.79 260 
Plan C/C Option 4 50 70.4% 5.85 28 
Plan D/D Option 5 51 88.9% 2.83 19 
Plan E/E Option 6 46 100.0% 3.00 6 
Plan P, Other 
VHI, Don’t 
know which 
VHI plan 
N/A 38 59.3% 4.21 66 
Other Insurers N/A 40 65.6% 6.56 33 
Overall  44 65.8% 3.86 561 
 
 
The results from the 2005 data are presented in Table 4.3 and show similar trends, 
although less pronounced in the case of risk selection by age.  The results for the 
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VIVAS respondents are excluded from this table, as there was only one respondent 
found in each of three different VIVAS plans. 
 
4.3.2 Econometric Results 
 
Having examined the data, as discussed above, the next step was to model the data 
econometrically to ascertain whether the same trends were evident.   
 
4.3.2.1 Adverse Selection 
 
In order to test for adverse selection, it was decided to use the level of cover as the 
dependent variable, with plans ranked by reference to the level of hospital 
accommodation provided, since this is one of the main differentiating factors 
between plans, as noted earlier.
80
  Table 4.1 above shows the ranking on this basis.  
Given the qualitative and ordered nature of the dependent variable, an ordered logit 
model was used.
81
 
 
                                                 
80
 It could be argued that this analysis only tests for one form of adverse selection, being that which 
takes place once a decision has been made to insure.  Adverse selection might also take the form of 
higher risks deciding to insure against medical expenses, while low risks decide not to insure.  This 
could be described as adverse selection ‘against’ the market, while the adverse selection being tested 
for here involves adverse selection ‘within’ the market.  It could further be argued that there is a 
three-stage choice evident.  The first stage is the decision on whether or not to insure.  The second 
stage, conditional on the outcome of the first stage being to insure, is the decision on what level of 
cover to take out, which is what is being tested for in this Section.  The third stage then, conditional 
on deciding to insure and deciding on the level of cover, is the decision on which insurer to choose, 
which is analogous to the risk selection analysis in Section 4.3.2.2. 
81
 For an accessible discussion of ordered logit models, see DeMaris (1995) and Maddala (1983).  For 
a review of models involving selection, particularly related to health insurance, see Maddala (1985). 
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Two main measures of the risk posed by an insured person to an insurer are an 
age/gender combination and some measure of utilisation.  Therefore, for each data 
set (2003 and 2005), these risk variables were grouped together.  The age/gender 
variables were the age of the insured person (AGE), a dummy variable 
(DUMMALE) set to 1 if they were male and 0 if they were female, and an 
interaction variable (AGEMALE), which is the product of the person’s age and the 
gender dummy.  The measures of utilisation available from the data are a dummy for 
whether any claims had been made on the respondent’s policy, either for themselves 
or another named person (DUMCLAIMED), and the number of claims made 
(NUMCLAIMS).  The length of time covered under the policy (YEARSCOVERED) 
was also included to account for the possibility that the number of claims made, and 
the likelihood of claiming, would increase with length of time covered. 
 
It is possible that, as income rises, people can better afford more comprehensive 
cover, which could have an impact on their choice.  In addition to the risk variables 
therefore, it was decided to include variables to try to account for income.  The 
choice of these variables was restricted by the data set, as income level was not 
explicitly measured.  However, level of education achieved (EDUCATIONLEVEL) 
and social class (SOCIALCLASS) were used as proxy variables for income.  It 
could be reasonably expected that, ceteris paribus, a more educated person 
(reflected in a higher value for EDUCATIONLEVEL) would command a higher 
income than a less educated person
82
, while a person in the higher social classes, 
such as AB (reflected in a lower value for SOCIALCLASS) would also have a 
                                                 
82
 Evidence for this effect was found by, for example, Cheeseman Day & Newburger (2002). 
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higher income than someone in a lower social class.  However, social classes F50+ 
and F50- (farmers with large and small land holdings, respectively) might contain a 
broader range of income than the other social classes. 
 
Finally, a number of other, miscellaneous variables were added to the regressions.  A 
dummy for whether the respondent had a medical card (DUMMEDICALCARD) 
was included to test whether the possession of such a card, and therefore the 
entitlement to free access to the public healthcare system, would lead the card holder 
to opt for a lower level of cover.  An alternative explanation for a negative 
coefficient on this variable would be that many medical card holders qualify for such 
cards on the basis of having a low income and might therefore choose a lower level 
of cover on the basis of affordability (although, from 2001 to 2008, which 
incorporates the two surveys from which the data were taken, anyone over the age of 
70 also qualified, irrespective of income). 
 
Two variables were included to test for the significance of life-stage in the decision 
on the level of cover to opt for.  The first was a dummy variable for being married 
(DUMMARRIED), set to 1 if the person was married or living as married and 0 if 
they were single or widowed/divorced/separated.  The second was the number of 
children on the plan (CHILDRENONPLAN).  If these variables are significant and 
have positive coefficients, then it would indicate that those with a spouse/partner or 
those with children tend to opt for a higher level of cover than single people with no 
dependents.  Again, this behaviour would be consistent with adverse selection, as 
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those with dependents would bear higher risk if they became ill than those without, 
while the number of children on a plan would also increase the risk that such a 
policy unit would represent to an insurer, due to the increased likelihood of a claim 
being made on that policy. 
 
Another variable included was an indicator of the price sensitivity of the consumer 
(PREMIUMDISCONT).  Respondents to the HIA surveys who had health insurance 
were asked whether they would discontinue their cover if premiums were to rise on 
an annual basis by 10%, 20%, 30% and so on in increments of 10 percentage points, 
up to 100%.  This variable reflects the level of annual premium increases that would 
be required for the respondent to discontinue cover.  A positive coefficient on this 
variable would indicate that more price-sensitive consumers tend to opt for lower 
levels of cover, while less price sensitive consumers opt for more comprehensive 
cover. 
 
In the 2005 survey, respondents were asked whether they had various other types of 
health-related insurance products (cash plan, critical illness policy, permanent health 
insurance or any other health-related insurance product).  A dummy variable 
(DUMANYOTHERINS) was included in the regression using the 2005 data, set to 1 
if a respondent had any of these types of insurance and 0 if they had none.  Those 
who have such other products in addition to private health insurance might be 
considered more risk-averse.  Therefore, a positive coefficient on this variable would 
indicate that more risk-averse individuals tend to opt for higher levels of cover, 
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possibly because they may have information about their own state of health that 
would indicate a higher risk to insurers.  This might therefore be indicative of the 
presence of adverse selection. 
 
For each data set (2003 and 2005), three regressions were run.  The first included the 
age/gender and utilisation variables only.  The second added the income proxy 
variables, while the third also included the ‘other’ or miscellaneous variables 
described above.  The regressions run were therefore of the form 
 
iii xy 
'*    (Equation 4.1) 
iiii zxy 
''*   (Equation 4.2) 
iiiii mzxy 
'''*  (Equation 4.3) 
 
Where 
yi* is a vector of the dependent variable, i.e. the ordered maximum level of hospital 
accommodation fully covered by the plan, as set out in Table 4.1 
xi is a matrix of age/gender and utilisation variables 
zi is a matrix of income proxy variables 
mi is a matrix of the other, miscellaneous variables 
Β, Φ and Ψ are vectors of coefficients 
εi is a vector of error terms 
 
It should be noted that the observed yi is determined from yi* using the rule 
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The probabilities of observing each value of y are given by 
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Where F is the cumulative distribution function of ε. 
 
Table 4.4 shows the results of the ordered logit regression using the data from the 
2003 consumer survey.  The fact that age is significant and has a positive coefficient 
suggests that younger people tend to take out less generous cover, while older people 
tend to take out more comprehensive cover, which is consistent with the presence of 
adverse selection.  However, the gender variable and the age/gender interaction 
variable are both insignificant, indicating that there is no gender effect evident in the 
choice of cover level.  In terms of the utilisation variables, both the dummy variable 
indicating whether a claim was made on the respondent’s policy and the number of 
claims made were insignificant in all three regressions using the 2003 data, as was 
the length of time covered, indicating that there is no evident pattern of cover 
selection based on claims history. 
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Table 4.4 Results from Ordered Logit Model with 2003 Data Using Level of 
Cover as Dependent Variable 
 
Variable Age/Gender and 
Utilisation Only 
 
Equation 4.1 
Plus Income 
Proxy 
 
Equation 4.2 
Plus Income 
Proxy and Other 
Variables 
Equation 4.3 
AGE 0.033843* 
(0.015520) 
0.040020* 
(0.017089) 
0.037228* 
(0.017911) 
DUMMALE 0.482342 
(0.945231) 
0.524796 
(0.937878) 
0.542693 
(0.921881) 
AGEMALE -0.004378 
(0.022227) 
-0.005798 
(0.022023) 
-0.004756 
(0.021914) 
DUMCLAIMED 0.066600 
(0.337783) 
0.109845 
(0.331664) 
-0.015721 
(0.347901) 
NUMCLAIMS 0.036129 
(0.046402) 
0.036626 
(0.044436) 
0.045642 
(0.043153) 
YEARSCOVERED -0.005464 
(0.017115) 
-0.007550 
(0.017113) 
-0.005448 
(0.016720) 
EDUCATIONLEVEL  0.121986 
(0.128790) 
0.142765 
(0.126375) 
SOCIALCLASS  -0.017106 
(0.096425) 
0.029780 
(0.091377) 
DUMMEDICALCARD   -1.031148** 
(0.608068) 
DUMMARRIED   0.618275 
(0.380433) 
CHILDRENONPLAN   -0.133065 
(0.103918) 
PREMIUMDISCONT   Not Used 
LR Index (Pseudo-R
2
) 0.026014 0.028604 0.044845 
Included Observations 348 348 348 
 
* = Significant at 5% level; ** = Significant at 10% level 
Note: Standard errors reported in parentheses are the QML (Huber/White) standard 
errors 
 
 
When the income proxy variables were added to the regression, the results did not 
change significantly.  Age remained the only significant variable and there was no 
meaningful change in the pseudo-R
2.  However, when the ‘other’ variables were 
added in, they did have an effect on the results.  Age remained significant and 
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retained its positive coefficient, but the pseudo-R
2
 increased from less than 0.03 to 
almost 0.045. 
 
The negative sign on the medical card dummy suggests that those with medical 
cards are less likely to take out the most comprehensive level of cover and more 
likely to take out the most basic level of cover, which is consistent with a priori 
expectations.  The life-stage variables were both insignificant.  The price sensitivity 
variable (PREMIUMDISCONT) was excluded from the regression, as when it was 
included it was highly insignificant, reduced the number of included observations by 
47 and led to the regression becoming insignificant. 
 
One of the reasons that those who are less likely to claim would tend to take out less 
generous insurance coverage would be to save money.  However, since the premium 
is heavily dependent on the level of cover (the simple correlation coefficient 
between level of cover and premium is 0.86), adding this into the above regression 
would have been deterministic.  It was therefore excluded on this basis. 
 
The relatively low level of explanatory power of the model could reflect the fact that 
coverage for hospital treatment does not vary significantly between insurers or plans, 
as mentioned earlier, the main differentiating factor instead being the level of cover 
for hospital accommodation.
83
  This would be consistent with Ellis’s (1985) finding 
that minimising differences across plans of features that cause self-selection can 
                                                 
83
 Explanatory power for this type of regression also tends to be lower than for many OLS regression, 
due to the discrete nature of the dependent variable. 
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reduce such self-selection.  As mentioned earlier, to a large extent the choice of plan 
is not made on the basis of cover for treatment, but rather for the ‘hotel’ aspects of 
plans (i.e. the type of room), which may be less likely to induce adverse selection.  
This is also consistent with Ginsburg’s (1985) suggestion that limiting the benefit 
structures of competing plans will limit adverse selection, since the benefit structures 
of plans available in the Irish market do not differ significantly in terms of the level 
of cover for hospital treatment, as mentioned earlier. 
 
The results of similar regressions for the 2005 survey data can be seen in Table 4.5.  
When using this data set, plans with significant ancillary (non-hospital) cover were 
excluded from the regressions, in order to ensure that this factor did not mask any 
adverse selection effects that may be present.
84
  It should be noted however, that this 
means there were no plans at cover level 2 included in the regressions. 
 
These results are somewhat different from those using the 2003 data.  In these 
regressions, age is insignificant, while the number of years covered is significant and 
positive.  This suggests that, although age is not a determining factor in the choice of 
cover level, length of time insured is.  The simple correlation coefficient between 
these two variables is 0.53.  The coefficients on the gender dummy and the 
age/gender interaction variable are insignificant for the most part, although the 
interaction variable is significant at the 10% level in the regression including 
age/gender, utilisation and income proxy variables.  The coefficient on the dummy 
variable for having claimed is insignificant in all three regressions, while the 
                                                 
84
 No respondents were found in the 2003 survey who were on plans with significant ancillary cover. 
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coefficient on the number of claims is significant but negative in the last of the three 
regressions.  This suggests that those who made more claims are less likely to take 
out the most comprehensive cover and more likely to take out the most basic cover, 
which is contrary to a priori expectations. 
 
Of the two income proxy variables, social class is insignificant in both versions of 
the regression in which it is included, while education level is significant and 
positive in both, which would be consistent with the hypothesis that those who can 
afford more comprehensive cover are more likely to take it out.  Of the ‘other’ 
variables, only the price sensitivity variable is significant, and its positive coefficient 
suggests that more price sensitive consumers opt for less comprehensive cover, 
while less price sensitive consumers (perhaps because they are better able to afford 
cover or because they are knowingly higher-risk consumers) tend to take out more 
comprehensive cover.  This would be consistent with a priori expectations. 
 
Again, premium is excluded from the model due to the deterministic nature of the 
relationship between premium and the level of cover provided.  Also, the 
explanatory power of the regression is again relatively low, suggesting that other 
factors, not captured in the explanatory variables available here, heavily influence 
the decision on what level of cover to opt for.  However, the inclusion of the ‘other’ 
variables does increase the predictive power of the regression somewhat. 
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Table 4.5 Results from Ordered Logit Model with 2005 Data Using Level of 
Cover as Dependent Variable 
 
Variable Age/Gender and 
Utilisation Only 
 
Equation 4.1 
Plus Income 
Proxy 
 
Equation 4.2 
Plus Income 
Proxy and Other 
Variables 
Equation 4.3 
AGE -0.009032 
(0.011195) 
0.003484 
(0.010976) 
0.016258 
(0.015293) 
DUMMALE -1.194911 
(0.830935) 
-1.388522 
(0.858106) 
-1.146637 
(0.947942) 
AGEMALE 0.027048 
(0.018209) 
0.030300** 
(0.018410) 
0.023235 
(0.020717) 
DUMCLAIMED 0.421304 
(0.324159) 
0.338574 
(0.327309) 
0.264767 
(0.360892) 
NUMCLAIMS -0.062656 
(0.052751) 
-0.052844 
(0.049879) 
-0.095809* 
(0.046891) 
YEARSCOVERED 0.041128* 
(0.008602) 
0.035137* 
(0.009027) 
0.029714* 
(0.011615) 
EDUCATIONLEVEL  0.401855* 
(0.106652) 
0.367751* 
(0.115841) 
SOCIALCLASS  -0.012163 
(0.109863) 
-0.090092 
(0.116403) 
DUMMEDICALCARD   -0.568029 
(0.564514) 
DUMMARRIED   -0.099803 
(0.342495) 
CHILDRENONPLAN   0.210008 
(0.141837) 
PREMIUMDISCONT   0.013292* 
(0.005235) 
DUMANYOTHERINS   0.428871 
(0.283050) 
LR Index (Pseudo-R
2
) 0.039240 0.064082 0.082429 
Included Observations 345 345 309 
 
* = Significant at 5% level; ** = Significant at 10% level 
Note: Standard errors reported in parentheses are the QML (Huber/White) standard 
errors 
 
 
The results of the regressions reported in Tables 4.4 and 4.5 indicate some evidence 
of adverse selection, with older consumers or those who have been insured for 
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longer having a higher likelihood of subscribing to more comprehensive plans, while 
younger consumers or those who have been insured for a shorter period of time have 
a greater likelihood of subscribing to cheaper, less comprehensive plans.  There does 
not appear to be evidence of adverse selection on the basis of claims history, but the 
variables measuring this – a dummy for having claimed and the number of claims 
that have been made on a policy – are perhaps not the most accurate indicators of 
utilisation, as they do not take into account the intensity of claims made.  
 
Although the explanatory power of these regressions is quite low, it is important to 
point out that if the explanatory power of the regressions were high then this might 
suggest that adverse selection is so strong that a death spiral could be imminent or in 
progress.  Therefore a low explanatory power could indicate that the market is not 
critically unstable.  This might be of some comfort to policy-makers, although it 
should not invite complacency. 
 
It should also be noted that the phenomenon of older, higher-risk consumers being 
more likely to be found in more comprehensive plans may also be partly due to risk 
segmentation on the part of insurers.  This was highlighted by the Industry 
Commission report in Australia (Industry Commission, 1997), which noted that 
premiums facing older people could be affected if insurers were to use plan features 
to appeal to consumers in particular age and health status categories. 
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It is difficult to empirically model this type of behaviour by insurers, but some 
inferences may be drawn from analysis of membership trends in recent years.  
VIVAS Health was the first insurer to market plans on the basis of life-stage.  When 
it launched its first plans in 2004, they were named the Me Plan, I Plan and We Plan, 
targeted at younger, first-time insurance buyers, individuals looking for more 
comprehensive cover, and couples and families, respectively.  Shortly after these 
plans were launched, also in 2004, Vhi Healthcare launched its Lifestage Choices 
plans, alongside its more traditional suite of plans, Plans A to E.  The Lifestage 
Choices plans comprise the First Plan (and First Plan Plus), designed for those 
starting out in the health insurance market, the Family Plan (and Family Plan Plus), 
designed for those with children or planning a family, and the Forward Plan, which 
offers a wider choice of hospital cover. 
 
These plans have proved very popular with consumers.  For example, VHI (2007) 
notes that, by the end of February 2007, the Lifestage Choices plans had attracted 
almost 200,000 members.  Meanwhile, in May 2009, when Hibernian AVIVA 
Health launched a new suite of plans, it noted that it already insured over 200,000 
members (Hibernian AVIVA Health, 2009).  It is likely that most of these would 
have been insured on their Me, I and We Plans.  This, coupled with the likely 
continued growth in membership of Vhi Healthcare’s Lifestage Choices plans since 
2007, means that it is likely that over 20% of consumers in the market are currently 
insured on lifestage-based plans.  Unfortunately however, it is not possible to 
analyse the age profiles of members in the various plans, as too few respondents to 
 187 
HIA (2005a) were found on the Lifestage Choices plans and the VIVAS Health 
plans to give any robust estimates of the age profiles of members of those plans. 
 
In the years since the Lifestage Choices plans were launched, premium increases by 
Vhi Healthcare for the Lifestage Choices plans have, for the most part, tended to be 
equal to or below the average price increases by the company, as for the most part 
have premium increases for the lower and standard levels of cover on the traditional 
hospital plans (Plans A, A Option, B and B Option), while premium increases for the 
more comprehensive plans (Plans D, D Option, E and E Option) have been above 
the average increases.
85
  This might or might not be indicative of some element of 
risk segmentation, but the data are perhaps too limited to draw any firm conclusions 
in this regard. 
 
4.3.2.2 Risk Selection 
 
Binary logit models were used to test for risk selection, using the dummy variable 
for being insured with VHI as the dependent variable (set to 1 if the respondent was 
insured with VHI and 0 if the respondent was insured by another health insurer).  
The level of cover was restricted to level 3, which is the level of hospital cover 
provided by the most popular plans, such as BUPA’s Essential Plus schemes (with 
and without excess) and VHI’s Plan B schemes (including Plan B Option and Plan B 
                                                 
85
 Sources: Figures for price increases effective 1 September 2005, 2006 and 2007 are detailed in Vhi 
Healthcare press releases, dated 04 July 2005, 23 June 2006 and 20 July 2007 respectively.  Available 
at www.vhi.ie/press/040705.jsp, www.vhi.ie/press/230606.jsp and www.vhi.ie/press/200707.jsp 
respectively - all accessed on 23 September 2008.  Figures for price increases effective 1 January 
2009 are detailed in VHI (2008b). 
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Excess).  By restricting the level of cover to this level, adverse selection effects are 
removed from the analysis, so any significant difference in the age or claims profiles 
of insurers could be interpreted as signalling the presence of risk selection.  Similar 
regressions for the most basic and the most comprehensive levels of cover (levels 1 
and 6, respectively) were not reliable as there were too few observations. 
 
Again, the regressions contained variables related to socio-demographic indicators 
and the insured’s characteristics.  As with the adverse selection models, three 
regressions were run for each data set (2003 and 2005) – the first using age/gender 
and utilisation variables only, the second adding in income proxy variables and the 
third adding the ‘other’ variables. The regressions run were of the form 
 
 
UXY     (Equation 4.4) 
UZXY    (Equation 4.5) 
UMZXY    (Equation 4.6) 
 
Where 
Y is a vector of the dependent variable, i.e. the dummy variable for membership of 
VHI 
Α is a vector of constant terms 
X is a matrix of age/gender and utilisation variables 
Z is a matrix of income proxy variables 
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M is a matrix of the other, miscellaneous variables 
Β, Φ and Ψ are vectors of coefficients 
U is a vector of error terms 
 
It should be noted that, in the risk selection regressions, another age variable, 
AGESQUARED, was included, to take account of the non-linearity that was 
discovered in the age-related propensity to take out insurance with VHI versus 
BUPA.
86
  The income proxy variables were included to take account of the fact that 
VHI premiums are higher than BUPA premiums for plans providing similar levels of 
cover.  (This is confirmed by the fact that, if premium was included in the risk 
selection regressions using the 2003 data set, it was a perfect predictor of the choice 
of insurer, while using the 2005 data set premium was a significant predictor of this 
choice, albeit not perfect as Plan B Excess – which was not offered in 2003 – was 
cheaper than Essential Plus without an excess.) 
 
The results of the model using the 2003 data can be seen in Table 4.6.  The results 
indicate that age is a significant indicator of the likelihood of being a member of 
VHI, but the significance of Age
2
 as well as Age suggests that the relationship is 
non-linear.  The combined effect of Age and Age
2
 is that younger people are less 
likely to be with VHI, while older people are more likely to be with that insurer.  A 
                                                 
86
 When AGESQUARED was included in the adverse selection regressions, it was found to be 
insignificant, suggesting that there was not a non-linear effect of age on the choice of cover level, and 
it was therefore omitted from the adverse selection regressions on this basis.  Furthermore, 
AGECUBED was added in to the risk selection regressions and found to be insignificant, so that 
variable was omitted on the basis that it appears to be a quadratic relationship between age and choice 
of insurer. 
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J-curve type of effect is seen in this regard.  However, the number of claims, when 
included alongside the number of years covered, is insignificant, although being 
covered for a greater number of years increases the likelihood of being insured with 
VHI.  The simple correlation coefficient between number of claims and number of 
years covered is 0.38, which would suggest that it is not multicollinearity which is 
causing the insignificance of the former.  The explanatory power of the regression 
indicates that other factors have a large impact on VHI membership. 
 
The addition of the income proxy variables and the ‘other’ variables show that all of 
these are insignificant.  It is not entirely surprising that the income proxy variables 
are insignificant however, as the difference in premium between the standard level 
plans of BUPA and VHI would not likely be sufficient to render affordability a 
major issue for a large number of people.  The results do suggest that, based on the 
data from the 2003 survey, VHI’s standard plans had a less favourable age profile, 
although not necessarily a worse claims profile, than comparable plans offered by 
BUPA. 
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Table 4.6 Results from Binary Logit Model with 2003 Data Using the 
Dummy for Membership of VHI as Dependent Variable and Restricting 
Observations to Those with Cover Level = 3 
 
Variable Age/Gender and 
Utilisation Only 
 
Equation 4.4 
Plus Income 
Proxy 
 
Equation 4.5 
Plus Income 
Proxy and Other 
Variables 
Equation 4.6 
CONSTANT 6.803912* 
(2.470593) 
8.432390* 
(2.373525) 
8.087252* 
(2.991323) 
AGE -0.332617* 
(0.118459) 
-0.365736* 
(0.112689) 
-0.355776* 
(0.148377) 
AGESQUARED 0.004024* 
(0.001320) 
0.004274* 
(0.001267) 
0.004077* 
(0.001628) 
DUMMALE 0.937113 
(1.486372) 
1.070990 
(1.519455) 
1.756130 
(1.690095) 
AGEMALE -0.007495 
(0.037927) 
-0.009993 
(0.038160) 
-0.020856 
(0.040704) 
DUMCLAIMED 0.235316 
(0.517698) 
0.204527 
(0.527475) 
0.392086 
(0.607422) 
NUMCLAIMS -0.005179 
(0.134865) 
-0.012179 
(0.135018) 
-0.004824 
(0.178899) 
YEARSCOVERED 0.104888* 
(0.040960) 
0.112917* 
(0.041896) 
0.119249* 
(0.047145) 
EDUCATIONLEVEL  -0.243546 
(0.183645) 
-0.304946 
(0.211030) 
SOCIALCLASS  -0.031134 
(0.151530) 
-0.036811 
(0.160072) 
DUMMARRIED   -0.050294 
(0.630846) 
CHILDRENONPLAN   -0.024396 
(0.184009) 
PREMIUMDISCONT   0.009266 
(0.014157) 
McFadden R
2
 0.134561 0.143706 0.164497 
Included Observations 290 290 250 
 
* = Significant at 5% level 
Note: Standard errors reported in parentheses are the QML (Huber/White) standard 
errors 
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Table 4.7 Results from Binary Logit Model with 2005 Data Using the 
Dummy for Membership of VHI as Dependent Variable and Restricting 
Observations to Those with Cover Level = 3 
 
Variable Age/Gender and 
Utilisation Only 
 
Equation 4.4 
Plus Income 
Proxy 
 
Equation 4.5 
Plus Income 
Proxy and Other 
Variables 
Equation 4.6 
CONSTANT 5.401491* 
(1.851940) 
7.363297* 
(2.158127) 
7.230462* 
(2.291054) 
AGE -0.233057* 
(0.087998) 
-0.272189* 
(0.095280) 
-0.190993** 
(0.105070) 
AGESQUARED 0.002530* 
(0.000948) 
0.002811* 
(0.001015) 
0.001673 
(0.001098) 
DUMMALE 1.444910 
(1.261829) 
1.579168 
(1.296941) 
0.888470 
(1.325318) 
AGEMALE -0.028578 
(0.027575) 
-0.029564 
(0.028275) 
-0.012911 
(0.028901) 
DUMCLAIMED 0.205748 
(0.539897) 
0.359139 
(0.515686) 
0.695993 
(0.519424) 
NUMCLAIMS 0.080232 
(0.141067) 
0.053868 
(0.124619) 
0.059833 
(0.125660) 
YEARSCOVERED 0.038783** 
(0.022188) 
0.044504* 
(0.022382) 
0.039292 
(0.024682) 
EDUCATIONLEVEL  -0.327576* 
(0.139695) 
-0.392033* 
(0.148845) 
SOCIALCLASS  -0.007370 
(0.131337) 
-0.025784 
(0.132084) 
DUMMARRIED   -0.349543 
(0.458997) 
CHILDRENONPLAN   -0.347543* 
(0.159829) 
PREMIUMDISCONT   0.008937 
(0.006187) 
DUMANYOTHERINS   -0.006815 
(0.376090) 
McFadden R
2
 0.057121 0.078060 0.105954 
Included Observations 265 265 239 
 
* = Significant at 5% level; ** = Significant at 10% level 
Note: Standard errors reported in parentheses are the QML (Huber/White) standard 
errors 
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Table 4.7 shows the results from similar models run using the 2005 data.  As the 
number of VIVAS members in the sample was so small, it was decided to exclude 
those respondents from the regressions.  This also allows for more direct 
comparisons between the results of the two data sets, vis-à-vis any selection effects 
between BUPA and VHI. 
 
Respondents who had plans which provide significant ancillary cover were also 
excluded, as this may affect the choice of plan/insurer but the numbers were so low 
(only four respondents at this level of cover) that the dummy variable for significant 
ancillary cover proved insignificant when included as an explanatory variable. 
 
The same variables appear in these regressions, although the significance of Age, 
Age
2
 and the number of years covered are all reduced slightly, compared with the 
regressions using the 2003 data, with the last two of these being insignificant in the 
regression including the ‘other’ variables.  The correlation coefficient between 
number of claims and number of years covered using this data set is 0.27, again 
suggesting that multicollinearity is not the culprit in rendering the former 
insignificant in all three regressions and the latter insignificant in the regression 
including the ‘other’ variables. 
 
Again, the results suggest that VHI had a less favourable age profile on its standard 
plans than BUPA had on its corresponding plans, although not necessarily a less 
favourable claims profile.  The explanatory power of the regressions using the 2005 
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data is lower than of that using the 2003 data, indicating that other factors account 
for more of the likelihood of being a VHI member. 
 
The inclusion of the income proxy variables shows that the more educated a person, 
the less likely they are to be with VHI.  If the affordability issue were to come into 
play, then it would be expected that this variable would have a positive, rather than a 
negative coefficient.
87
  The inclusion of the ‘other’ variables reduces the significance 
of Age and makes Age
2
 and the number of years covered insignificant, while the 
number of children on the plan is the only one of the ‘other’ variables that is 
significant.  The negative coefficient on this variable indicates that those with more 
children are more likely to have chosen a BUPA plan.  Adding premium or the 
dummy variable for being a switcher significantly improved the explanatory power 
of the regression but these are somewhat deterministic, and their inclusion in the 
model is not warranted by theory. 
 
The results of the regressions detailed in Tables 4.6 and 4.7 indicate some evidence 
of risk selection in the Irish private health insurance market.  These regressions 
compared the characteristics of consumers with plans giving similar levels of cover 
offered by BUPA Ireland and Vhi Healthcare.  The results show that, for a similar 
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 One possible explanation for the negative sign on the education level variable comes from Park & 
Kang (2008).  They examine whether education induces individuals to have a healthier lifestyle, 
using data from South Korea.  Their results suggest that an increase in education induces people to 
exercise more and to get regular health checkups, although they note that the effects of education are 
mainly through its effects on job characteristics and that unobserved determinants of health 
behaviours are correlated between these two indicators.  When BUPA Ireland launched its 
HealthManager suite of plans, it became the first health insurer in the Irish market to provide 
significant cover for ancillary health services, such as GP visits.  If the behaviour noted by Park & 
Kang (2008) were repeated in Ireland then this may have induced those with higher education, if they 
were more interested in getting regular checkups, to join BUPA Ireland. 
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level of cover, younger consumers are more likely to be covered by BUPA Ireland 
while older consumers are more likely to be with Vhi Healthcare.  As with the 
adverse selection results, claims history does not appear to be a significant factor in 
the choice of insurer, but again this could be due to the broad nature of the variables 
used to measure claims history – a dummy variable for having claimed and a simple 
number of claims made on the policy, with no indication of the intensity of the 
claims. 
 
4.3.2.3 Accounting for Adverse Retention 
 
It could be argued, however, that the effect being seen in these regressions is not risk 
selection, but rather adverse retention, as outlined by Altman et al (1998), or even a 
combination of both effects.  In particular, an argument could be made that BUPA 
would not have had a chance to attract a similar membership profile as VHI due to 
the fact that it was not in the market for the same length of time.  (Recall that 
adverse retention would entail high-risk (older) consumers remaining with a longer-
established incumbent and low-risk (younger) consumers tending to gravitate 
towards a new entrant insurer, thereby magnifying cost differentials between the 
insurers.)  The counter-argument to this would be that any VHI member could have 
switched to BUPA, although as discussed earlier, switching is not common in the 
Irish market. 
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Nevertheless, to try to account for the possibility that the results in Tables 4.6 and 
4.7 indicate adverse retention rather than, or in addition to, risk selection, the risk 
selection regressions were re-estimated, restricting the sample to those who had been 
covered for a maximum of six years for the 2003 survey (since the sampling was 
carried out in late 2002) and eight years for the 2005 survey – in other words to 
those who had taken out their policies since BUPA entered the market. 
 
As the sample sizes were more restricted in both cases, the three-regression analysis 
used above was not as effective, and therefore the results presented in Table 4.8 
represent models of similar form to those represented by Equation 4.5, with some 
modifications.  Specifically, YEARSCOVERED was excluded from the regressions 
presented in Table 4.8, as the sample was restricted on the basis of this variable over 
a short time-span.  Furthermore, when using the 2005 data, some correlations 
between variables were higher using the restricted sample than using the wider 
sample as presented in Table 4.7.  As a result, AGEMALE was excluded because it 
was highly correlated with DUMMALE (with a correlation coefficient of 0.92 using 
the restricted sample), while NUMCLAIMS was also excluded as it was highly 
correlated with DUMCLAIMED (with a correlation coefficient of 0.70 using the 
restricted sample).  The regression using the 2003 data is significant at the 10% 
level, while that using the 2005 data is significant at the 5% (and also the 1%) level. 
 
These results show similar patterns to the full sample above, in terms of age.  Both 
Age and Age
2
 are significant using the 2003 data, while Age is significant using the 
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2005 figures, although Age
2
 is significant at the 10% level.  The only other variable 
that is significant using the 2003 data is education level, and the negative sign on 
this indicates that people with a higher educational attainment were less likely to be 
with VHI.  This suggests that those people who choose VHI do not do so because of 
being better able to afford the higher premiums charged by that insurer.  The 
positive and significant coefficient in the 2005 regression of the dummy variable for 
having claimed suggests that those who took out cover with VHI after BUPA 
entered the market were more likely to have claimed than those who took out cover 
with BUPA.  The positive and significant coefficient on the dummy for males in the 
2005 regression indicates that they are more likely to be with VHI.  Again, the level 
of education is negatively related to the likelihood of being with VHI, suggesting 
that ability to afford higher premiums does not induce people to join VHI. 
 
Table 4.8 Results from Binary Logit Models with 2003 and 2005 Data Using 
the Dummy for Membership of VHI as Dependent Variable and Restricting 
Observations to Those with Cover Level = 3 and who Were Covered Since 
BUPA Entered the Market 
 
Variable 2003 Data 2005 Data 
CONSTANT 14.70432* (4.314063) 14.31553* (4.449672) 
AGE -0.524215* (0.199395) -0.467566* (0.175852) 
AGESQUARED 0.005396* (0.002172) 0.003601** (0.001925) 
DUMMALE 1.980835 (1.773817) 2.016810* (0.864364) 
AGEMALE -0.017987 (0.044072)  
DUMCLAIMED 0.416230 (0.897227) 2.185049* (0.880196) 
NUMCLAIMS -0.031890 (0.315744)  
EDUCATIONLEVEL -0.858349* (0.289345) -0.675792* (0.344183) 
SOCIALCLASS -0.124967 (0.274329) -0.310798 (0.475513) 
McFadden R
2
 0.172235 0.319468 
Included Observations 81 67 
 
* = Significant at 5% level; ** = Significant at 10% level 
Note: Standard errors reported in parentheses are the QML (Huber/White) standard 
errors 
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These results suggest that the effects seen in Tables 4.6 and 4.7 are not just 
indicative of adverse retention, but that risk selection is also evident.  Although the 
two phenomena might interact to some degree, the results presented in Table 4.8 
take account of any possible effects of adverse retention arising from Vhi 
healthcare’s 40-year head start in the market by only focusing on consumers who 
took out private health insurance since the advent of competition in the market.  
These results still show evidence of risk selection in comparable plans offered by 
BUPA Ireland and Vhi Healthcare providing similar levels of cover.  Again the 
evidence of risk selection is based on age rather than claims history, although the 
same caveat applies regarding the degree of sophistication of the variables 
measuring claims. 
 
It can be seen from Tables 4.7 and 4.8 that, for the regressions using the 2005 data, 
the McFadden R
2
 in the regression using the more restricted sample is considerably 
higher than the McFadden R
2
 in the regression using the unrestricted sample (the 
restriction in this case being to those who had taken out private health insurance for 
the first time since the entry of BUPA Ireland to the market).  This suggests that risk 
selection is more strongly evident among the first-time buyers of private health 
insurance after the onset of competition.  However, the smaller sample size in the 
restricted sample should be taken into account when interpreting this finding. 
 
While the above evidence suggests that age is a factor in the choice of insurer by 
first-time buyers of private health insurance in Ireland since competition became a 
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feature of the market, switching is also a major factor in adverse retention.  If low-
risk (younger) consumers tend to switch to an insurer with a lower risk profile and 
high-risk (older) consumers tend to remain with an insurer with a higher risk profile, 
then this could accentuate differences in claim costs and risk profiles. 
 
The consumer surveys commissioned by the HIA (HIA, 2003a, 2005a, 2008c) 
examined switching patterns.  All three surveys showed that the majority of 
switchers had switched from Vhi Healthcare to the newer insurers.  If these 
consumers tended to be younger then it could suggest that Vhi Healthcare might be 
suffering from adverse retention. 
 
The 2003 survey (HIA, 2003a) found that 49% of those who had switched were aged 
25-34 at the time of the survey and that three quarters of switchers were aged under 
44, while nobody aged 65 or over in the sample had switched.  The average age of 
switchers found in the sample was 34.  However, the sample size of switchers (29) 
was small and therefore care should be taken in interpreting these findings.  Of those 
who had not switched, only 13% said that they had seriously considered doing so, 
but none of these was aged 65 or over. 
 
The 2005 survey (HIA, 2005a) included a booster sample of switchers, bringing the 
total number of switchers to 80, which allows for more robust estimation.  This 
survey found that almost two thirds of those who had switched were aged 25-44 
when they switched, while only one person aged 65 or over when the survey was 
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undertaken was found to have switched.  The average age of switchers when they 
switched was 39.  Again, only 13% of those who had not switched had seriously 
considered doing so, but only 6% of those aged 65 or over had contemplated 
switching. 
 
Although the 2008 survey (HIA, 2008c) did not give details of switching rates by 
age group, it did highlight the fact that a marginally higher proportion of consumers 
in the 35-54 age groups were found to have switched (14% compared with an 
average of 10%).  It also found evidence from focus groups that younger consumers 
were more willing to consider switching between insurers.  However, the focus 
group evidence also suggested that most of the switching in the market tends to be 
between cover levels with the same insurer rather than between insurers. 
 
It would therefore appear that, while Tables 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8 show evidence of risk 
selection, adverse retention is also a feature of the Irish private health insurance 
market.  This is to the detriment of Vhi Healthcare, as it would appear from the 
evidence in the HIA consumer surveys that younger consumers are more likely to 
switch and that switchers tend to switch from Vhi Healthcare to its newer 
competitors.  This would magnify any differences in risk profiles that would favour 
the newer insurers compared with Vhi Healthcare. 
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4.3.2.4 ‘Active’ versus ‘Passive’ Risk Selection 
 
It can be seen from the above discussion that risk selection and adverse retention can 
sometimes interact and it might be difficult to discern the effects of one from the 
effects of the other. 
 
At this point, it should be reiterated that risk selection can occur in a number of 
ways, some more explicit and others more subtle.  A distinction could perhaps be 
drawn between what might be termed ‘active’ risk selection and ‘passive’ risk 
selection. 
 
While the division between the two could be open to interpretation, one possible 
way of interpreting it would be that ‘active’ risk selection would entail insurers 
making conscious decisions or engaging in strategies designed to target low-risk 
consumers.  This would include engaging in what might be considered more subtle 
risk selection methods such as plan design and marketing. 
 
By comparison, ‘passive’ risk selection could be used to describe risk selection not 
attributable to insurers’ strategies in relation to their interaction with consumers, but 
rather what might be considered the natural market forces that could lead a newer 
insurer to inherently have a more favourable risk profile than an incumbent.  This 
would encompass the idea of adverse retention suggested by Altman et al (1998) and 
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the possibility of a new insurer engaging in a price following strategy, as noted by 
HIA (2002c). 
 
Under this interpretation, a new insurer entering a market – such as the Irish one – 
could naturally expect to attract a relatively low-risk profile of consumers.  This 
might make entry to such a market attractive for new insurers.  This would 
particularly be the case in the absence of some form of redistributive mechanism, 
such as a risk equalisation scheme, which would counterbalance the effects of such 
‘passive’ risk selection.  This attractiveness of a market such as the Irish one in the 
absence of risk equalisation was alluded to by YHEC (2003). 
 
If this categorisation of ‘active’ and ‘passive’ risk selection were to be used in the 
Irish case, it is unclear from the quantitative analysis presented in this Chapter which 
type of risk selection is taking place, but intuitively it is likely that elements of both 
are at play. 
 
4.4 Summary and Conclusions 
 
The Irish private health insurance market consists, primarily, of three competitors, 
BUPA Ireland (now Quinn Healthcare), Vhi Healthcare and VIVAS Health (now 
Hibernian AVIVA Health).  Features of the Irish market include community rating, 
open enrolment and lifetime cover, along with a mandated minimum level of cover 
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that must be provided.  The fact that the largest insurer had a monopoly for 40 years 
before the introduction of competition is also unusual, if not unique. 
 
The majority of products in the market are structured in a similar fashion, catering 
primarily for hospital treatment, which is what consumers value most highly.  The 
main differentiating factor between plans is the level of hospital accommodation 
provided.  This lends itself to examination of adverse selection and risk selection 
effects.  Analysis of data from two consumer surveys indicates the presence of both 
effects. 
 
In both cases, it is primarily age that provides the evidence for selection effects, 
while claims experience does not show as distinct a pattern.  This could be due to the 
fact that having claimed and the number of claims made are not the most accurate 
indicators of utilisation, as they do not take account of the intensity of claims.  The 
results suggest that older consumers are more likely to choose more comprehensive 
plans and more likely to be with VHI than with BUPA.  The latter finding is also 
consistent with the notion of adverse retention, put forward by Altman et al (1998) 
and the suggestion by Price & Mays (1985) that older plans may have an older mix 
of consumers.  The fact that VHI had a 40-year head-start over BUPA, combined 
with the relatively low levels of switching between insurers and the fact that 
switchers tend to be younger, appears to be contributing to the relatively 
unfavourable nature of VHI’s membership age profile. 
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Much of the criticism of risk equalisation in the Irish context has been on the basis 
that it is anti-competitive.  However, this is contrary to the findings of a number of 
papers, which suggest that risk adjustment would actually improve competition, as it 
would force insurers to compete on the basis of price, service or efficiency, rather 
than risk profile.  The findings of this research have implications for the debate over 
risk equalisation in Ireland, as they provide empirical evidence that both adverse 
selection and risk selection are features of the Irish private health insurance market, 
and in this context it is worth reiterating that much of the literature surrounding both 
types of selection suggests that risk adjustment mechanisms are either necessary or a 
possible solution to either or both of these problems. 
 
It has been suggested that community rating itself gives rise to problems of adverse 
selection.  However, the introduction of lifetime community rating, which entails 
late entry loadings being applied to consumers who leave it until later ages to take 
out private health insurance, might reduce the degree to which adverse selection 
occurs, which in turn might reduce the need for risk equalisation.  This is examined 
further in the next Chapter. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE EFFECT OF LIFETIME COMMUNITY RATING ON THE NEED FOR 
RISK EQUALISATION 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
As was seen in Chapter 4, one theme coming through in the literature on adverse 
selection and risk selection is the role that community rating plays in facilitating or 
incentivising these features of the market.  In particular, community rating is seen by 
some as increasing the incentives for risk selection by insurers, as they receive the 
same premium for a low-risk life as for a high-risk life under community rating, 
while it also leads to increased incentives for consumers to engage in adverse 
selection, as they pay the same premium irrespective of the risk they represent to 
insurers. 
 
Ireland currently operates a system of single rate community rating, whereby the 
same community rated premium is charged to all applicants for the same insurance 
plan, irrespective of any factor, including at what age they first took out insurance.  
It is therefore possible for people in Ireland to take out private health insurance for 
the first time only when they are more likely to need it, i.e. when they are older, 
without any penalty.  This is sometimes referred to as ‘hit-and-run’ or ‘hit-and-stay’ 
behaviour, depending on whether the consumer remains insured after receiving 
treatment and benefitting from cover. 
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However, single rate community rating is not the only version of community rating.  
Another version is lifetime community rating.  Under this system, a person’s age at 
entry to the market is taken into account when setting their premium, and a system 
of late entry loadings is implemented, which is designed to encourage people to take 
out private health insurance at a younger age, thereby contributing to the community 
rate for longer before they are likely to claim.  Australia introduced such a system in 
2000 to replace its system of single rate community rating. 
 
This Chapter reviews the fundamental role of community rating from the inception 
of the Irish private health insurance market.  The literature on community rating is 
then reviewed, with particular emphasis on issues surrounding adverse selection and 
lifetime community rating.  Drawing on data from the Private Health Insurance 
Administration Council, which produces statistics on the private health insurance 
market in Australia, the experience of changing from single rate community rating to 
lifetime community rating in Australia is then examined, particularly in the context 
of how the changeover affected the risk profile of the insured population.  
Implications of this are then drawn for the Irish market, where a change to lifetime 
community rating is anticipated in the near future. 
 
5.2 Background to Community Rating in the Irish Market 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the Irish private health insurance market in its current 
form was established with the passing of the Voluntary Health Insurance Act, 1957.  
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This Act established the Voluntary Health Insurance Board (now trading as Vhi 
Healthcare), as a statutory body.  For forty years, Vhi Healthcare (VHI) was the only 
provider of private health insurance to the general population in Ireland.  During this 
time, VHI operated a system of community rating, along with open enrolment and 
lifetime cover, on a de facto basis.
88
  It is not entirely clear how this came about. 
 
For example, in the High Court case on the Risk Equalisation Scheme, 2003, Mr. 
Justice William McKechnie, in reviewing the development of community rating, 
notes in Paragraph 94 of his judgement, “As such it seems to be accepted that it 
[VHI] operated a de facto system of community rating, open enrolment and lifetime 
cover, even though there was no statutory obligation to so do.  How precisely it 
achieved a uniformity of premium for the same bundle of benefits across its entire 
population, was never a pressing issue, as it operated on a non-profit basis and in a 
single player market.  How precisely it put into practice, what has been described as 
intergenerational solidarity, was likewise never a matter of concern.  But what 
emerges from the evidence is that its system of PMI [private medical insurance] 
incorporated a provision of community rating which had the effect of young people, 
generally low risk, subsidising to some extent older people, generally higher risk.”  
The Advisory Group to the Minister for Health on the Risk Equalisation Scheme 
(1998) also noted that it is unclear how community rating in Ireland developed, 
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 As O’Morain (2007) notes however, there were some exceptions to this in the early days of VHI.  
For example, he notes that in its first year of operation, subscribers to its Plans A, B and C paid an 
extra 15% if they were aged 60 or over.  It also reserved the right to withdraw cover for illnesses that 
arose after cover was taken out but which led to recurrent claims, although he notes that this was 
never implemented in practice.  Upper age limits were also imposed on members in the early days. 
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although it speculated that administrative convenience may have played a role in this 
regard. 
 
In 1992, the European Third Non-Life Insurance Directive
89
 was passed.  This 
required all EU Member States to facilitate the entry of non-life insurers based in 
other Member States, thereby fostering cross-border competition.  This directive was 
reflected in the Health Insurance Act, 1994 (the 1994 Act) in Ireland.  This Act gave 
legislative status to the principle of community rating in the health insurance market 
in Ireland.  It also made provisions for the Minister for Health and Children (the 
Minister) to prescribe regulations governing open enrolment, lifetime cover and a 
system of minimum benefits to be covered by health insurance contracts.  Such 
regulations were promulgated in 1996. 
 
The importance of community rating to policy-makers is evident from the fact that, 
of the three ‘pillars’ underlying the private health insurance market in Ireland – 
community rating, open enrolment and lifetime cover – community rating is the only 
one which is specified in primary legislation (i.e. the 1994 Act, as amended), while 
the others are specified in secondary legislation (i.e. the aforementioned 
regulations).  The definition of community rating was updated in the Health 
Insurance (Amendment) Act, 2001, and it is this definition which remained in force 
during the period when the Risk Equalisation Scheme, 2003 was in place.  The 
Health Insurance (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 2009 further amended this 
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 Council Directive 92/49/EEC of 18 June 1992 
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definition in light of the Supreme Court judgment on the Risk Equalisation Scheme, 
2003 (see Section 2.4). 
 
Although VHI had operated community rating on a de facto basis since 1957, the 
government of the day, in formulating the 1994 Act, and in particular in giving 
community rating such a legislative standing, clearly considered community rating 
to be a public policy objective.  This position appears to have continued beyond the 
lifetime of that government.  In the 1999 White Paper (Department of Health and 
Children, 1999), published under a different government from that which passed the 
1994 Act, it is noted, 
 
“Community rating is the corner-stone of the Irish health insurance system.  
In the absence of community rating, today’s healthy individual could become 
tomorrow’s uninsurable risk.  The very existence of community rating 
therefore represents a broad protection to the community as a whole in terms 
of individual insurance rate stability and equitable access to insurance 
cover.  It provides all insured persons with the peace of mind and certainty 
that the advent of chronic illness or sustaining serious injury will not render 
the cost of cover unaffordable.  In particular, the inter-generational 
solidarity which is at the very core of community rating in Ireland has made 
insurance accessible to those (i.e. the elderly and the chronically ill) who 
might otherwise not be able to afford the cost of cover.”  (Department of 
Health and Children, 1999: 33). 
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All qualifying health insurance contracts in Ireland are offered on the basis of 
community rating, although there was some controversy surrounding add-on plans 
that BUPA Ireland offered in early 1997, which were risk rated, although the basic 
plans onto which these were added were community rated.  After some debate 
between BUPA Ireland and the then Minister for Health and Children, these plans 
were withdrawn.
90
 
 
Community rating relies on what is termed intergenerational solidarity, whereby 
younger consumers (who generally tend to be lower-risk) effectively subsidise older 
consumers (who generally tend to be higher-risk) in the expectation – conscious or 
otherwise – that, when they get older, they in turn will be subsidised by a future 
generation of younger consumers.  This system inherently relies on a constant 
stream of younger consumers entering the market in order to subsidise older 
consumers and keep premiums relatively affordable. 
 
The version of community rating that is in operation in Ireland is known as single 
rate community rating.  This is a system whereby anyone who applies for a 
particular health insurance contract, irrespective of the age at which they apply, is 
charged the same premium as anyone else who applies for that contract.  In 1998, 
the Advisory Group to the Minister for Health on the Risk Equalisation Scheme (the 
Advisory Group) published its report (Advisory Group to the Minister for Health on 
the Risk Equalisation Scheme, 1998).  The Advisory Group had been set the task of 
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 For a fuller discussion of this incident, see Light (1998). 
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examining issues relating to the health insurance market, specifically in relation to 
risk equalisation. 
 
Among the issues that the Advisory Group examined was community rating.  The 
Advisory Group examined a number of alternative forms of community rating – 
single rate community rating, unfunded lifetime community rating, funded lifetime 
community rating and yearly community rating.  The first two of these are pay-as-
you-go systems (where the total of premiums in the market for any given year cover 
the cost of claims in the market for that year), while the latter two are not. 
 
The difference between funded and unfunded lifetime community rating, as outlined 
by the Advisory Group, is that, with funded lifetime community rating, for 
consumers of the same age, the excess of premiums over claims in their younger 
years are invested and the assets accumulated are used to pay the excess of claims 
over premiums in their older years.  Premiums for funded lifetime community rating 
are set with the objective of ensuring stability of premiums in real terms throughout 
a policyholder’s lifetime with insurance, assuming that medical inflation equals 
overall inflation.  With unfunded lifetime community rating, total premiums in the 
market in any given year are used to pay total claims in the market in that year.  
Premiums at each age for unfunded lifetime community rating are set to ensure that 
consumers pay more than they actuarially would at younger ages and less than they 
actuarially would at older ages. 
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Under a system of yearly community rating, the premium paid by a policyholder for 
a given benefit level varies with his/her attained age, reflecting the risk being borne 
for policyholders of that age by the insurer at that time.  Premiums would therefore 
rise in real terms over a policyholder’s lifetime under this system, and there would 
be no intergenerational cross-subsidy.  In contrast to this system of yearly rating, the 
other three versions of community rating examined by the Advisory Group operate 
on what the Group termed level rating (in that the premium remains stable in real 
terms throughout the life of a policyholder).  The Group argued that yearly rating is 
not appropriate for health insurance, as it would mean that insurance would be 
unaffordable for older people, many of whom would discontinue cover when they 
most need it, and recommended level rating instead. 
 
The Advisory Group noted that single rate community rating is inherently unstable, 
as it gives consumers an incentive to select against the market.  In particular, the 
Group argued that the combination of community rating, open enrolment and 
lifetime cover in the Irish market had certain elements that should be encouraged.  
These were guaranteed entry to health insurance before a certain age (which at that 
time was 65 but this maximum was later removed in 2005), guaranteed renewability 
and stability of premiums payable after entry to the market.  The Group argued that, 
while lifetime cover was consistent with these principles, open enrolment was 
inconsistent with these principles, and that it posed a risk to the stability of private 
health insurance in Ireland as it facilitated adverse selection. 
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Having examined the options, the Advisory Group recommended the introduction of 
unfunded lifetime community rating, whereby the premium is partly based on age at 
entry.  The Advisory Group noted that, ideally, if one were to start again, a system of 
funded lifetime community rating should be introduced, whereby premiums rise 
with age at entry, and, “for a group of policyholders of the same age, assets are 
accumulated by investing the excess of premiums over claims during their younger 
years with the objective of using those assets to pay the excess of claims over 
premiums during their older years.”  (Advisory Group to the Minister for Health on 
the Risk Equalisation Scheme, 1998: 18) 
 
The Institute of Actuaries in Australia (1997) provides a very clear definition of 
funded lifetime community rating.  It notes that, under such a system, for each age at 
entry to health insurance, the cost of the average insured health services purchased in 
each future year of age is estimated, and a level annual premium would be calculated 
in order to adequately cover future health costs as they arise, taking into account the 
possibility for investment income.  In this way, each age-at-entry cohort funds its 
own consumption of healthcare and does not rely on a continued stream of new 
members to maintain a stable annual premium rate.  Reserves could be accumulated 
for young age cohorts, which could then be used to supplement premium income to 
fund their care at older ages. 
 
However, in order to move to such a system, those who had contributed to the single 
rate community rating system over a number of years would be left without the 
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intergenerational solidarity on which they were relying.  The Advisory Group 
termed the cost of continuing the single rate for these consumers as the ‘unfunded 
liability’, and estimated that, assuming that premiums and claims were to rise in line 
with overall inflation, this stood at IR£3.3bn (€4.2bn) in 1998.  They also noted that, 
if their assumption in relation to inflation were not met, this figure could be 
significantly higher.  Specifically, if medical inflation were to exceed general price 
inflation by three percentage points per annum, the figure would rise to IR£8bn 
(€10.2bn), while if it were to exceed general price inflation by six percentage points 
per annum, it would rise to IR£23.6bn (€30bn).  In general, the Advisory Group 
noted that medical inflation represents a significant threat to the stability of 
community rating and they stressed the need to keep medical inflation under 
control.
91
 
 
In this context, it is worth noting that, according to CSO figures, between 1998 and 
2008, inflation in the Health category of the consumer price index exceeded the 
overall rate of inflation by nearly three percentage points per annum, while inflation 
in the Health Insurance sub-category exceeded the overall rate of inflation by over 
five percentage points per annum (see Figure 5.1 and Table 5.1).  It should also be 
noted that the number of insured persons in the market has increased significantly 
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 The Advisory Group also argued that, due to its inherent instability, compulsory community rating 
should not be extended any further than it already had been.  It also recommended that the existing 
requirement to apply community rating to ancillary (non-hospital) benefits should be removed. 
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since 1998, which would also mean that the unfunded liability would be 
significantly higher now than when the Advisory Group estimated it.
 92
 
 
Figure 5.1 Overall and Health Inflation in Ireland, 1998-2008 
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Table 5.1 Overall and Health Inflation in Ireland (%), 1998-2008 
 
Year All Items CPI Health Health Insurance 
(1998) (2.4) (5.4) (9.0) 
1999 1.6 5.5 9.2 
2000 5.6 7.1 6.8 
2001 4.9 7.6 7.5 
2002 4.6 10.1 12.0 
2003 3.6 7.7 14.9 
2004 2.1 5.9 6.8 
2005 2.5 6.3 6.5 
2006 3.9 4.4 11.8 
2007 4.9 2.9 9.1 
2008 4.1 6.0 5.8 
Avg. 1998-2008 pa 3.8 6.3 9.0 
 
Source: Central Statistics Office 
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 According to Department of Health and Children (1999), the insured population at the end of 
February 1998 was just under 1.5 million, while HIA (2009) puts the insured population at almost 2.3 
million in December 2008. 
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The Health Insurance Authority (HIA), the independent statutory regulatory body 
for the private health insurance industry in Ireland, conducted a consultation process 
on lifetime community rating in 2002.  It published a consultation paper (HIA, 
2002b), and sought views from stakeholders and interested parties.  Resulting from 
this consultation process, it made a submission to the Department of Health and 
Children later that year (HIA, 2002d).  In this submission, the Authority also 
advocated the introduction of lifetime community rating.
93
  The HIA believed that 
such a move would reduce the risk of adverse selection and contribute to greater 
stability in the market. 
 
Lifetime community rating was introduced in Australia in 2000, to replace its system 
of single rate community rating, and this introduction provides an interesting 
indicator for the Irish case.  In keeping with the Advisory Group’s assertion that 
lifetime community rating would be more stable than single rate community rating, 
the Institute of Actuaries in Australia, in a discussion paper on the move to unfunded 
lifetime community rating (Institute of Actuaries of Australia, 1997), suggested that 
such a change would reduce adverse selection by deterring ‘hit-and-run’ activity 
(where consumers would wait until they needed medical treatment before taking out 
private health insurance, and would then discontinue cover once treatment had been 
covered) and late entry to the market by consumers (also sometimes known as ‘hit-
and-stay’ activity).  The Institute also suggested that, as lifetime community rating 
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 Light (1998) also suggests that lifetime community rating would help to bolster the community 
rated system in Ireland. 
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would encourage greater numbers of insured persons into the market, it would 
provide a larger insured pool, which would provide the opportunity to reduce 
systemic increases in premiums. 
 
The central feature of lifetime community rating is late entry loadings.  This is a 
system whereby the premium paid for a given level of insurance rises with age at 
entry, but remains stable in real terms thereafter.  This system was introduced to 
replace single rate community rating in Australia in 2000 and involved anyone 
entering the market above the threshold age of 30 paying an additional 2% of the 
base premium for every year above this age at which they joined, up to a maximum 
loading of 70% for anyone aged 65 or over taking out private health insurance for 
the first time.
94
 
 
During the transition phase from single rate community rating to lifetime community 
rating in Australia, a 12-month grace period was introduced (although this was 
further extended by two weeks).  During this grace period, anyone who did not 
already have health insurance but wished to take it out could do so and be treated as 
if they had joined at or before age 30, in other words without being subject to late 
entry loadings.  Anyone aged 65 or over at the commencement of the grace period is 
exempt from late entry loadings, irrespective of when they take out private health 
                                                 
94
 The Institute of Actuaries of Australia (1997) referred to the approach that was adopted as a 
prescribed scale approach, but examined another alternative method of lifetime community rating, 
which they referred to as a market approach.  Under the market approach, premium relativities 
between those who joined at different ages would not have been set; instead, the reinsurance (risk 
equalisation) system would have been modified to ensure that contribution rates, net of reinsurance, 
would rise with age at entry in a roughly linear manner. 
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insurance.  Credit is also given for those who have previously had health insurance 
but allowed it to lapse.  Late entry loadings payable in the Australian market cease if 
the person paying them has had hospital cover for a continuous period of 10 years 
(see PHIAC, 2008a, 2008b). 
 
The introduction of lifetime community rating significantly increased the penetration 
rate of hospital-based private health insurance in Australia,
95
 and reduced the 
average age of the insured population.  However, both of these effects have begun to 
unwind.
96
  This is discussed in more detail in Section 5.4.1. 
 
Following on from the Advisory Group report (Advisory Group to the Minister for 
Health on the Risk Equalisation Scheme, 1998) and the wider consultation on the 
operation of the private health insurance market in Ireland, the then Government 
outlined its own proposals for a lifetime community rating scheme in the White 
Paper (Department of Health and Children, 1999). 
 
The government recognised the risk to intergenerational solidarity from single rate 
community rating.  In particular, the White Paper acknowledges that community 
rating inherently requires a constant flow of younger consumers into the market in 
order to keep premiums affordable for older consumers.  It also notes that if this 
flow were to be reduced then it would lead to increases in premiums, which in turn 
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 Ancillary cover is also available in Australia, separately from hospital cover. 
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 Connelly & Brown III (2006) argue that, although the introduction of lifetime community rating in 
Australia increased membership and improved the risk profile of the insured population, it has not 
solved the adverse selection problem that faced the market. 
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could lead to a further reduction in the flow of young people into the market, thereby 
effectively leading to an adverse selection death spiral.  However, it recognised that 
the age-related waiting periods act as some protection against this type of activity on 
the part of consumers. 
 
The White Paper went on to state that “the Government wish to provide an 
environment that promotes joining health insurance early” (Department of Health 
and Children, 1999: 33) and acknowledged the work of the Advisory Group and 
submissions on the subject from various interested parties. 
 
The White Paper proposed a move to a system of unfunded lifetime community 
rating.  Based on actuarial advice, the White Paper proposed a threshold age for 
initial take-up of private health insurance of 35 (compared with 30 in Australia), 
below which no late entry loadings would be applicable.  After that, late entry 
loadings would be applied in age bands, as outlined in Table 5.2.  The White Paper 
also proposed that these loadings would be reviewed at regular intervals (around 
every five years) to ensure that they are still appropriate. 
 
Table 5.2 Proposed Late Entry Premium Loadings in Ireland 
 
Age at Joining Under-35 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+ 
Maximum Premium Loading 0% 10% 25% 45% 80% 
 
Source: Department of Health and Children (1999), Table 5 
 
 
It was also proposed in the White Paper that, when late entry loadings were being 
calculated, credit would be given to people who had previously held private health 
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insurance for the duration of their previous contract(s).  In other words, if a person 
had health insurance, then discontinued cover, but decided to take it out again at a 
later date, their age at entry would be calculated as their current age less the number 
of years for which they previously had private health insurance.  This measure was 
introduced in Australia as part of its move to lifetime community rating. 
 
The White Paper also included a proposal to give insurers discretion on whether or 
not to apply late entry loadings.  It also specified that late entry loadings would not 
be subject to risk equalisation, thereby allowing insurers to retain any loadings they 
impose.  It was felt that, to include such loadings in the risk equalisation calculations 
would reduce the incentive for insurers to apply the loadings. 
 
However, the HIA argued that a banded system such as that proposed in the White 
Paper could lead to inconsistencies around the boundaries of the bands (HIA, 
2002d).  For example, a 45-year old could wait until age 54 before taking out health 
insurance and not face any additional late entry loading, while a 54-year old would 
face an additional loading of 20% of the base premium if they were to wait for 
another year before taking out insurance.  The HIA expressed a preference for a 
percentage loading for each year above the threshold age that a person waits before 
taking out private health insurance.  This would be similar to the arrangements put in 
place in Australia.  Given the fact that a number of alternative loading systems had 
been proposed as part of the consultation process, the HIA recommended that an 
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actuarial review be undertaken to determine the appropriate threshold age, level of 
loadings and maximum loading to apply.
 97
 
 
The Society of Actuaries in Ireland also strongly recommended to the Department of 
Health and Children that 10-year age bands should not be used as part of a move to 
lifetime community rating.  Instead it recommended that late entry loadings be set on 
a per annum basis, subject to a maximum loading (see Society of Actuaries in 
Ireland, 2002 for further details). 
 
The HIA (2002d) agreed with the government’s proposals to give credit for prior 
cover however, and made recommendations regarding the maintenance of records to 
enable consumers to prove their prior periods of cover.  It also proposed that, as 
consumers may experience periods of absence from insurance due to circumstances 
beyond their control (for example losing their jobs), consumers should not be subject 
to late entry loadings if they re-enter the market within a specified period of time 
(similar to the 13-week break in cover permitted before waiting lists must be re-
served), and it recommended that consideration be given to doubling this period. 
 
The HIA also noted the government’s proposal to give insurers the freedom to waive 
late entry loadings.  It broadly welcomed this proposal but cautioned that such 
waiving of loadings would need to be applied consistently.  It made a similar 
recommendation regarding the application of late entry loadings to upgrades in 
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 The Health Insurance (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 2009 makes provision for the threshold age 
to be set at 30. 
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cover.  The HIA also acknowledged the difficulties involved in dealing with 
consumers who move to Ireland from overseas, who may have previously had health 
insurance in another jurisdiction.  It proposed a grace period of six months from the 
time that these people move to Ireland, in order to match the grace period applied to 
Irish residents (it proposed that this should be of six months duration also). 
 
However, lifetime community rating has not yet, at the time of writing, been 
introduced, although the Department of Health and Children (2008b) noted that 
legislation would be forthcoming in the near future, which would “contain measures 
to incentivise people to take out health insurance earlier in life and not to leave that 
decision until they are older.”  The Health Insurance (Miscellaneous Provisions) 
Act, 2009 contains provisions to introduce such measures. 
 
5.3 Review of Literature on Community Rating and Health Insurance 
 
One issue with community rating in the Irish context is that the setting aside of the 
Risk Equalisation Scheme, 2003 by the Supreme Court in 2008 means that the 
practice of community rating in this country is community rating by plan.  
Therefore, while each plan may be community rated, that does not necessarily mean 
that health insurance consumers across the market are paying a community rate, as 
discussed in Chapter 3. 
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Consumers may also be paying different premium rates reflecting different levels of 
cover.  Even those with similar levels of cover may be paying different premium 
rates if they are with different insurers.  This may be due to differences in cost base, 
which might result from one insurer being more efficient than another or from one 
insurer having a more favourable risk profile than another, and thereby being able to 
charge a lower premium rate for a similar level of cover.  The analysis in Chapter 4 
suggests some evidence of risk selection between insurers, which would suggest that 
this latter effect is possible in practice. 
 
This situation is exacerbated by the fact that there is no standardised plan in the Irish 
health insurance market.  The idea of a standardised plan with a community rate is 
examined by Kifmann (2002), who develops a model of a competitive health 
insurance market.  He concludes: 
 
“Overall, the analysis has shown that the regulation of benefit packages is of 
crucial importance in a community rated health insurance system.  On the 
one hand, defining a basic benefit package may not be sufficient to reach the 
desired redistribution between high risk and low risk types since additional 
benefits can be used as a risk-selection device.  On the other hand, 
additional benefits can be used to make high risk types better off if contracts 
which offer additional benefits valuable for high risks are subsidized while 
contracts which only offer the basic benefit package are taxed.”  (Kifmann, 
2002: 735). 
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In this context, it is worth remembering that the Minimum Benefit Regulations in 
Ireland specify a minimum set of benefits that must be covered, but there are no 
restrictions on benefits offered above this level.  Van de Ven & Ellis (2000) argue 
that disadvantages of a minimum benefit package, compared with a standardised 
benefit package, include that the benefit package can be used to cream-skim, that it 
reduces the transparency of the plans available and that it reduces price competition 
because of market segmentation. 
 
Although all three insurers in the Irish market offer a variety of plans with differing 
levels of comprehensiveness of cover, this idea might still be of relevance, as it 
suggests that benefit levels can be used to target certain segments of the market.  In 
this regard, it is worth noting that Vhi Healthcare has, in the past, offered a wider 
range of more comprehensive plans than its competitors, although this situation has 
been addressed in recent years with Vhi Healthcare closing some of its more 
comprehensive plans to new subscribers
98
 and greater numbers of more 
comprehensive plans being offered by its competitors. 
 
Maynard & Dixon (2002) and Thomson & Mossialos (2007) also note that, in the 
absence of a standardised benefits package, consumers may be confused about their 
options, thus limiting the benefits of competition.  This is echoed by Mossialos & 
Thomson (2002b), who argue that the deregulation of the market for complementary 
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 For example, Vhi Healthcare closed its plans D Option and E Option to new subscribers on 1 
September 2007. 
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and supplementary voluntary health insurance in the EU has not yielded the 
expected benefits of increased competition, in the form of greater efficiency and 
consumer choice, but has in fact exacerbated a number of problems, particularly in 
relation to information failures.  In this context, it is worth noting that the number of 
plans available in the Irish private health insurance market has increased 
significantly since the market was deregulated in the mid-1990s, as mentioned in 
Section 2.3. 
 
Light (1998) also questioned whether the European legislation requiring the opening 
of the non-life insurance market to competition was an efficiency-improving 
solution, suggesting that perhaps provider competition, rather than insurer 
competition, was what policymakers were really seeking, despite the fact that 
provider competition may increase costs and inequities.  He also notes that “health 
care does not meet many of the requirements for neoclassical competition, so that 
high transaction costs, fragmentation, privatization, profiteering, and discrimination 
can result.”  (Light, 1998: 748) 
 
In this context, it is worth noting that one of the arguments used against risk 
equalisation in the Irish private health insurance market is that it would reduce 
competition in the market.  Both BUPA Ireland/Quinn Healthcare and VIVAS 
Health/Hibernian AVIVA Health have argued this on various occasions in recent 
years.  However, YHEC (2003) found that, while fewer competitors would enter the 
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Irish market if risk equalisation were in place than if it were not, the market would 
remain attractive to new entrants even if risk equalisation were in place. 
 
The lack of a standardised plan is not the only potential design flaw in the Irish 
private health insurance market, however.  Gollier (1992) notes the development of 
thought in the area of the optimal design of insurance contracts, and in particular the 
suggestion that the optimal insurance contract consists of full coverage above a 
deductible, and further developments to that idea, which suggest coinsurance 
(whereby an insured person pays a certain percentage of claim costs) above a 
deductible.  Manning et al (1987) also found that first-dollar health insurance leads 
to a welfare loss to society, while Cheah & Doessel (1994) argue that an optimal 
coinsurance rate can be found to minimise the welfare cost of health insurance. 
 
In this regard, it is interesting to note that, while outpatient or ancillary coverage is 
often subject to an excess (as a deductible is more widely known in Ireland), the 
hospital cover element of the majority of health insurance contracts purchased in 
Ireland does not involve an excess.
99
  Furthermore, coinsurance is not common in 
health insurance in this country, with insurers instead covering the full cost of 
treatment in most cases.  This would suggest that, based on the theoretical thinking 
in this area, most private health insurance contracts in Ireland are not efficient and 
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 An obvious exception to this is the Essential Plus plan offered by BUPA Ireland/Quinn Healthcare, 
the more popular variant of which includes an excess.  However, the majority of plans offered in the 
Irish market do not involve such an excess, although more plans are being introduced with this 
option.  By comparison, PHIAC (2008b) notes that, as at 30 June 2008, 73.7% of insured persons in 
Australia had policies that required an excess or co-payment. 
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that a greater use of excesses and coinsurance might be preferable from a welfare 
economics point of view. 
 
However, Robinson (2002) notes that deductibles and coinsurance are forms of user 
charges for health care.  He goes on to show that user charges in general reduce 
utilisation, for appropriate as well as inappropriate services.  From an equity point of 
view, he notes that cost sharing tends to have a greater impact on those with lower 
incomes, suggesting that it may not be the most equitable method of healthcare 
financing. 
 
One issue that arises repeatedly in the literature on health insurance is how 
community rating can be circumvented.  If insurers are not permitted to vary 
premiums on the basis of the risk a consumer represents to them, then they have 
stronger incentives to attract low-risk lives and deter high-risk insured persons from 
joining them, a phenomenon known as risk selection or cream skimming.  Even with 
open enrolment, insurers have opportunities to engage in subtle forms of risk 
selection, such as marketing or plan design, as discussed in Section 4.2.1.  For 
example, additional benefits designed around sports injuries or maternity benefits 
would, ceteris paribus, appeal more to younger consumers, while benefits for heart 
conditions or cancer would, ceteris paribus, appeal more to older consumers. 
 
These possibilities for the circumvention of community rating have led a number of 
authors to the conclusion that some form of risk adjustment is necessary to support 
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community rating.  One such author is Light (1998), who examined the Irish case in 
particular and concluded that community rating in Ireland could still leave room for 
competitors who practice community rating to discriminate, using subtle forms of 
risk selection. 
 
Also in the context of the Irish market, Mossialos & Thomson (2002b) suggest that 
an article by Payne (2000) indicates one subtle form of risk selection being 
practiced.  This latter article (Payne, 2000) notes criticism of BUPA Ireland for 
requiring detailed diagnostic information on psychiatric admissions before patients 
were admitted, despite this not being required for any other type of hospital 
admission and despite Vhi Healthcare not requiring such detailed information.  
BUPA Ireland replied to the criticism by saying that it wanted the information for 
financial planning reasons, as admissions could often involve long stays in hospital. 
 
Light (1998) also warns that the entire community rating system could collapse 
unless young people are encouraged to enter the market and older people are given a 
disincentive to delay taking out insurance for the first time.  He notes that lifetime 
community rating is an equitable way of achieving this goal. 
 
Critics of community rating in health insurance (such as, for example, Pauly, 
Kunreuther & Hirth, 1995; Pauly & Herring, 1999; Patel & Pauly, 2002) suggest that 
it leads to adverse selection in the market, with younger, lower-risk consumers 
opting out of the market, leaving older, higher-risk consumers accounting for a 
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higher proportion of the market.  This leads to higher premiums on average, which 
in turn leads to further adverse selection, with the risk that this behaviour could 
eventually cause a death spiral.
100
  Simon (2005) notes 
 
“Inability to price and issue policies in accordance with risk could worsen 
informational asymmetry and resulting adverse selection relative to the 
unregulated market.  Adverse selection is thought to generally reduce the 
insurance consumption of the low-risk groups, to transfer resources from the 
low-risk group to the high-risk group in cases where subsidized equilibria 
are sustained, or to result in a market failing to exist altogether.”  (Simon, 
2005: 1866). 
 
Van de Ven et al (2000) argue that a requirement for community rating in a 
competitive health insurance market creates incentives for both adverse selection 
and cream skimming (risk selection), both of which can be welfare reducing.  They 
conclude that “premium rate restrictions, which are intended to increase access to 
coverage for the high-risk individuals, induce selection, which may have unintended, 
counterproductive effects…So, premium rate restrictions involve a tradeoff between 
access to coverage and (the adverse effects of) selection.”  They go on to state that, 
“Although an open enrolment requirement reduces the insurers’ ability to select, it 
does not reduce their incentive for selection.”  (Van de Ven et al, 2000: 320, 
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 Newhouse (1984) referred to this phenomenon being caused by community rating as “regulation-
induced adverse selection.”  (Newhouse, 1984: 99). 
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emphasis in original).  They also suggest that insurers might use adverse selection as 
a tool to engage in cream skimming. 
 
As discussed in Section 4.2.2, one market that is often examined to test for the 
manifestation of an adverse selection death spiral is the New York health insurance 
market after reforms were introduced there in 1993, mandating community rating, 
open enrolment, lifetime cover and a risk adjustment mechanism. 
 
Buchmueller & DiNardo (2002) suggest that, based on the results of Rothschild & 
Stiglitz’s (1976) model, the introduction of community rating could have two 
possible effects.  One is that a market-wide adverse selection death spiral begins; the 
other is that the penetration of coverage does not fall, but that the average quantity of 
insurance purchased falls (with low-risk individuals purchasing less coverage, while 
high-risk individuals opt for more comprehensive coverage). 
 
Their results show that there was no adverse selection death spiral in New York after 
community rating was introduced.  However, there was a shift in the structure of the 
market, with a relatively greater move to health maintenance organizations (HMOs) 
in New York after the reforms than in either Connecticut or Pennsylvania at the 
time.
101
  Thus, the authors show that, while a death spiral did not materialise, the 
average quantity of insurance purchased did indeed fall. 
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 HMO (health maintenance organization) coverage is less comprehensive than traditional 
indemnity coverage. 
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Hall (1998) also finds that, while prices in the market for individual health insurance 
in New York rose post-reform due to adverse selection, these price rises did not 
trigger a death spiral.  He also suggests that, although controversial, the risk 
adjustment mechanism introduced in tandem with community rating appears to have 
served a purpose, as many more insurers might have left the market under 
community rating in the absence of this mechanism 
 
However, Adams (2007) shows, using a difference-in-difference-in-difference 
approach, that the reforms increased the relative wages of older workers in small 
firms in New York, compared with those of large firms.  His findings also suggest 
that there was a health insurance-wage trade-off undertaken by small group 
employers in New York after the reforms were implemented.  He suggests that his 
results, combined with the findings of Buchmueller & DiNardo (2002) could explain 
why there was no major impact on coverage rates in New York following the 
reforms. 
 
However, other studies, such as Altman et al (1998), Buchmueller (2006), Cutler & 
Zeckhauser (1997) and Cutler & Reber (1998) find evidence to suggest that 
community rating contributed to adverse selection death spirals, which resulted in 
plans being withdrawn in a number of markets. 
 
Other empirical work by Simon (2005) examines the effects of state health insurance 
reforms in the US, in particular the imposition of restrictions on rating and the 
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introduction of guaranteed issue (another term for open enrolment), on small-group 
health insurance markets.  He notes that most states introduced reforms during the 
1990s and rates states as ‘full reform’, ‘partial reform’ or ‘no reform’.  Using a 
difference-in-difference-in-difference approach, he finds that full reforms caused a 
5% reduction in the rate of employer-provided health insurance coverage, with 
coverage rates falling more sharply for low-risk employees but remaining broadly 
stable for high-risk employees.  Partial reforms had an insignificant effect in most 
cases. 
 
He also finds that average premiums increased post-reform, as did average employee 
contributions, but that coverage rates fell.  He concludes that, although the 
introduction of reforms spread the costs associated with health risks more evenly 
across the market, they may also have unintentionally reduced insurance coverage 
through increased premiums and employee contributions.  He goes on to note that 
“Economic theories of insurance markets warn us that preventing insurers from 
distinguishing between different risk groups may worsen the availability of 
insurance for healthier individuals but not for those who are considered medically 
expensive.”  (Simon, 2005: 1875-76).  However, he poses the question that if forcing 
insurers to treat all customers equally does not produce optimal results, then what 
measures will. 
 
An alternative to community rating that has been suggested is guaranteed 
renewability, which was first proposed by Pauly et al (1995).  This is a system 
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whereby insurers would charge consumers a sequence of premiums, which allow 
insurers to break even and are attractive to both high-risk and low-risk consumers.  
Premiums would decline over time as insurers gather more information on 
consumers, allowing them to identify low-risk consumers.  These higher premiums 
in earlier periods insure low-risk consumers against the risk of becoming high-risk, 
which is an advantage shared with community rating.  (By contrast, risk rating 
would not insure low-risk consumers against the risk of becoming high-risk at some 
point in the future.) 
 
Later work by Patel & Pauly (2002) suggests that guaranteed renewability is an 
alternative to community rating in dealing with problems of risk segmentation.  
They note that risk variation among insured persons leads to three potential 
problems – adverse selection, risk rating (which is often regarded as unfair, and 
which the authors show can expose people to risks against which they would like to 
be protected) and cream skimming.  They note that guaranteed renewability can help 
to reduce the problem of risk rating by protecting low-risk insured persons against 
the risk of becoming high-risk, since this will not affect their premium (although it 
does not protect against premiums rising with age).  It protects against adverse 
selection by encouraging low-risk consumers to take out guaranteed renewability 
policies before they become high-risk.  They note that cream skimming is more 
difficult to deal with, as it can be more subtle, but that “those who become higher 
risks have a legal right to stick with the policy, and those who remain average risks 
face a premium they should be willing to pay.”  (Patel & Pauly, 2002: 282).  They 
 234 
argue that guaranteed renewability, though not perfect, provides a more market-
based mechanism for protecting against some risk segmentation than community 
rating, but conclude that some form of regulation is probably needed to deal with the 
problem of risk segmentation. 
 
Pauly & Herring (2007) examine the individual health insurance market in the US 
and suggest that the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) 
requires all states to enforce some guaranteed renewability provisions, although the 
degree to which they do varies by state.  They show that premiums vary 
considerably less than expected expenses or actual expenses and thus conclude that 
risk pooling is evident in the market, even in the absence of rating regulation.  They 
estimate that guaranteed renewability or some other mechanism pooled 84.5-88.5% 
of the risk as a result of the random effect of chronic conditions.  They also find that 
high-risk lives are less likely (though only slightly) to have cover than low-risk lives 
in unregulated states, whereas there is no significant difference in coverage levels in 
regulated states.  However, regulation slightly reduced the overall rate of insurance 
take-up.  The authors suggest that the reason regulation has little effect is that the 
high degree of risk pooling in the unregulated markets means that there is little more 
that regulation can add.  They also suggest that, because the overall proportion of 
low-income people of all risk classes who were willing to get individual cover was 
so low, very few people were helped by regulation. 
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Guaranteed renewability is not the only alternative to community rating that has 
been suggested, however.  Van de Ven et al (2000) suggest that introducing 
restrictions on how insurers set their premium rates – community rating being one 
such restriction – is one way of addressing the apparent incompatibility between the 
equivalence principle (insurers need to break even on each insurance contract) and 
the solidarity principle (high-risk individuals receive a subsidy from low-risk 
individuals to increase their access to cover). 
 
However, as an alternative to premium rate restrictions, they suggest that risk-
adjusted premium subsidies might increase access for high-risk consumers without 
inducing the type of selection effects associated with premium rate restrictions.  
These represent explicit cross-subsidies, compared with the implicit cross-subsidies 
inherent in premium rate restrictions.  However, they note that under a system of 
such subsidies, access to coverage for high-risk individuals may be insufficient, for a 
number of reasons – insurers might not have sufficient information to accurately risk 
rate, or the subsidies may not be sufficient to reduce the costs of access for high-risk 
individuals. 
 
They then simulate three alternatives – premium rate restrictions, risk-adjusted 
subsidies and a combination of the two.  They conclude that “a sponsor in a 
competitive individual health insurance market is confronted with a tradeoff between 
access, efficiency and selection, [which] differs from the conclusion of Newhouse 
(1996) that widespread health insurance creates a tradeoff between efficiency and 
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selection.”  (Van de Ven et al, 2000: 336, emphasis in original).  They further 
suggest that the subsidy system also provides insurance against the risk of becoming 
a bad risk.  This is also a feature of community rating and guaranteed renewability. 
 
Two private health insurance markets that operate on the basis of community rating, 
and which are examined in detail in this study, are Ireland and Australia.  These 
markets are similar in many respects, a finding that will be examined in more detail 
in Chapter 6.  A number of studies have examined the effectiveness of community 
rating in Australia, although fewer such studies are available for the Irish market. 
 
Hall, De Abreu Lourenco & Viney (1999), in discussing the Australian market, note 
“The co-existence of universal public cover and community rating of private health 
insurance premiums exacerbates the adverse selection problem and makes private 
insurance unsustainable.”  (Hall et al, 1999: 659).  The idea that universal access to 
public health services reduces the incentive for low risk consumers to purchase 
health insurance under community rating, as their premiums would be higher than 
actuarially fair, was also noted in the Australian context by Industry Commission 
(1997).  Doiron, Jones & Savage (2008) also suggest that adverse selection effects 
would be stronger in the presence of a universal public healthcare system.  This has 
relevance for the Irish market, as it too operates on the basis of community rating 
alongside a universal public healthcare system. 
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Somerville (1998) argues that the take-up of health insurance in Ireland by younger 
people in a community rated market suggests some degree of altruism.  If this 
argument is correct then it could lend itself to further instability in the market, as 
such altruism might be seriously tested by the current economic recession.  This 
could further strengthen the case for some mechanism to encourage consumers to 
enter the market at younger ages. 
 
As discussed earlier, it has been argued that community rating induces or 
exacerbates adverse selection in the market for private health insurance.  However, 
as discussed in Section 5.2, proponents of lifetime community rating, including the 
Advisory Group to the Minister for Health on the Risk Equalisation Scheme (1998), 
the Department of Health and Children (1999) and the HIA (2002d), have argued 
that a move to lifetime community rating would reduce the adverse selection 
problem posed by community rating.  In this context, the Australian experience of 
introducing lifetime community rating is instructive, and has been the subject of 
some analysis. 
 
Brown III & Connelly (2005b) and Connelly & Brown III (2006) suggest that, 
although the introduction of lifetime community rating in Australia increased 
membership and improved the overall risk profile of the insured population, it has 
not solved the adverse selection problem facing the market.  They suggest that an 
adverse selection death spiral has already recommenced after the introduction of 
lifetime community rating.  They argue that the reason lifetime community rating 
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has not dealt adequately with the adverse selection issue is that the penalties are 
purely age-related and do not take into account risk differences among people of the 
same age.  They suggest that the loading scheme in Australia does not exclude 
sufficient numbers of high risks to make community rated insurance attractive for 
low risks of any age.  However, they note that lifetime community rating does lead 
to high risks taking out less than full cover, which mitigates the effects of high risks 
joining the risk pool.  They also find that the late entry loading is not a deciding 
factor in the decisions on purchasing insurance for the first time among older low-
risk consumers.  They conclude that, while the subsidisation of private insurance is 
supported by some, in order for an effective lifetime cover plan to be put in place 
community rating would need to be sacrificed, although they acknowledge that this 
might be politically difficult. 
 
The deterioration in risk profile since the introduction of lifetime community rating 
is also alluded to by Palangkaraya & Yong (2007), although they argue that it is not 
certain yet whether this is due to lifetime cover losing its effectiveness, adverse 
selection, a response to recent premium increases, a perception of a lack of value for 
money, or a combination thereof. 
 
Brown III & Connelly (2005a, 2005b) and Connelly & Brown III (2006) propose an 
alternative system, involving an age-based subsidy profile, drawing on the 
guaranteed renewability work proposed by authors such as Pauly et al (1995).  They 
suggest that this subsidy would stabilise the adverse selection problem that still faces 
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the Australian market.  They argue that this would give younger, healthier 
consumers a greater incentive to take out health insurance and would protect them 
against the risk of developing a medical condition, which would otherwise increase 
the lifetime premiums they would have to pay. 
 
In the White Paper in Ireland in 1999 (Department of Health and Children, 1999), 
the then government noted that the continued attraction of younger consumers into 
the market in order to ensure the affordability of health insurance for older 
consumers was an important reason for its support for the introduction of lifetime 
community rating in Ireland.  It noted 
 
“The future viability of community rating in a voluntary environment is 
dependent on people joining the private health insurance system at a young 
age.  The surpluses that young healthy people contribute to the system 
facilitate the insurance of older, sicker people at premium rates that would 
not otherwise be affordable.  If the flow of young healthy lives into the system 
were to taper off, then the community rate that insurers charge would be 
forced up, as it would be based on a worsening risk profile.  This could have 
a compounding effect, as high premium inflation could possibly cause young 
healthy people to question the value of their insurance and terminate their 
cover, thereby causing the community rate to increase further.”  
(Department of Health and Children, 1999:33). 
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The latter part of this statement indicates the then government’s concern over the 
possibility of an adverse selection death spiral if sufficient measures were not taken 
to ensure a continued stream of younger consumers into the market.  In this context, 
the suggestion of Brown III & Connelly (2005b) and Connelly & Brown III (2006) 
in relation to the inadequate efficacy of lifetime community rating in dealing with 
such behaviour in the Australian market is potentially of concern for the Irish 
market. 
 
This section has reviewed the literature on community rating.  It is clear from this 
review that the system in Ireland contains some flaws in its design, one of which is 
the lack of a standard plan, or a set of standard plans.  It is also clear that there is 
scope for insurers to circumvent community rating, without breaching the legislation 
governing the market.  A recurring theme in the literature is the possibility for 
adverse selection to occur under mandated community rating or for community 
rating to exacerbate adverse selection.  Other alternatives to community rating are 
suggested in the literature, including guaranteed renewability and risk-adjusted 
premium subsidies.  Analysis of both the Irish and Australian private health 
insurance markets, which have a number of similarities, highlights potential 
instability arising from the voluntary nature of private health insurance operating 
alongside public healthcare system to which the population has universal 
entitlements, and the fact that community rating relies to some extent on altruism by 
low-risk consumers.   Lifetime community rating, which was implemented in 
Australia in 2000 and is proposed in Ireland, has the potential to reduce the risk of 
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adverse selection.  However, it is also found in the literature to have flaws, and it is 
suggested that it might not be entirely successful in addressing the adverse selection 
issues posed by community rating in general. 
 
5.4 Single Rate Community Rating versus Lifetime Community Rating 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, take-up of private health insurance in Ireland is highest in 
the middle age groups, but lower among young adults and older people (aged 65 and 
over).  Given the proposals to introduce lifetime community rating in Ireland to 
replace the existing system of single rate community rating, it would be instructive 
to examine the likely impact, if any, such a move might have on the age profile of 
the market.  In particular, it would be appropriate to examine whether such a move 
would encourage a greater number of younger consumers to enter the market, which 
would reduce the impact of adverse selection and thus increase the stability of the 
market. 
 
5.4.1 Single Rate versus Lifetime Community Rating in Australia 
 
As mentioned in Section 5.2, lifetime community rating was introduced in Australia 
in 2000, replacing the system of single rate community rating that had been 
operating there previously.  Under the lifetime community rating system in 
Australia, anyone who takes out hospital-based private health insurance for the first 
time before 1 July after their 31
st
 birthday pays the base premium.  If they do not 
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have health insurance by this date, then for every year after age 30 that a person 
delays taking out health insurance for the first time, they pay a late entry loading of 
2% of the base premium.  Therefore, someone who takes out health insurance for the 
first time at age 31 pays 102% of the base premium, someone who takes it out at age 
32 pays 104% of the base premium, and so on. 
 
A maximum late entry loading of 70% of the base premium is charged to anyone 
who takes out health insurance for the first time at age 65 or over.  However, anyone 
aged 65 or over on 1 July 1999 (i.e. on the date of commencement of the grace 
period) was exempted from late entry loadings, whether they take out private health 
insurance for the first time during the grace period or at any time thereafter.  
Furthermore, any late entry loading that a person must pay will cease if the person 
has had hospital cover for a continuous period of 10 years.
102
 
 
This still represents community rating, as the same rate is charged to anyone taking 
out health insurance for the first time at a particular age, irrespective of gender, state 
of health or other risk factors.  Hence, risk is not taken into account in determining 
premiums; rather the loading is designed to reflect the fact that the insured person 
has not contributed to the community rate for as long as someone who took out 
insurance at or before the threshold age. 
 
                                                 
102
 See PHIAC (2008a) for further details on lifetime community rating – or Lifetime Health Cover, 
as it is sometimes called – in Australia. 
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During the transition to lifetime community rating in Australia, a grace period was 
implemented, during which anyone who took out private health insurance for the 
first time, irrespective of age, could do so without paying any late entry loadings.  
This grace period initially ran from 1 July 1999 to 30 June 2000, but it was later 
extended by two weeks.  This was to cater for the strong demand for private health 
insurance before the end of the grace period (Wilcox, 2001), which might have 
resulted from the majority of the promotional activities related to the policy being 
concentrated in the first and second quarters of 2000 (Frech III & Hopkins, 2004). 
 
Figure 5.2 Penetration Rate and Average Age of Insured Persons with 
Hospital Treatment Membership, Australia 
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The Private Health Insurance Administration Council publishes quarterly statistics 
on membership and benefits for the Australian private health insurance market.  The 
effect of the introduction of lifetime community rating, and the grace period 
therewith, can be clearly seen from these statistics.  Figure 5.2 shows the overall 
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penetration rate of hospital cover in Australia and the average age of the insured 
population with hospital cover.  Between June 1999 (the last data point before the 
commencement of the grace period) and September 2000 (the first data point after 
the expiry of the grace period), the overall penetration rate rose from 30.6% to 
45.8%, while the average age of insured persons with hospital cover fell from 39.9 
to 37.7.  However, both of these effects have begun to unwind, and in March 2009 
the penetration rate stood at 44.6% (this represents a slight rise from the post-
lifetime community rating low of 42.7% seen in June 2005), while the average age 
of the insured population had risen to 39.9. 
 
It can be seen from Figure 5.2 that, prior to the late 1990s, the proportion of the 
Australian population with private health insurance had been on a long-term 
downward trend.  This trend began in the 1970s when Medibank – a programme of 
universal, non-contributory health insurance was introduced.  In 1984, this was 
replaced by Medicare, which is the current system of tax-financed universal health 
insurance.  By the late 1990s, the decline in the proportion of the Australian 
population with private health insurance became a concern for policy-makers there, 
and a series of three market reforms were introduced in an attempt to address this 
decline. 
 
The first reform, introduced in July 1997, was a tax levy on high earners who did not 
take out private health insurance, combined with a means-tested partial refund on 
health insurance premiums for low-income households.  The second reform, 
introduced in 1999, involved an amendment to the first reform, with the means-
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tested subsidy component being replaced by a 30% premium rebate irrespective of 
income, for both new and existing policies.
103
  The third reform was the introduction 
of lifetime community rating. 
 
Although the majority of commentators accept that lifetime community rating was 
the most effective of the three reforms in addressing the decline in private health 
insurance coverage, Palangkaraya & Yong (2007) suggest that the short time-frame 
within which the three reforms were introduced means that some of the overall 
increase in take-up could perhaps have been due to the earlier reforms or a 
combination of all of the reforms.  They suggest that the effect of the introduction of 
lifetime community rating has been overestimated, and using regression 
discontinuity they isolate the effect of this measure.  Their results suggest that the 
introduction of lifetime community rating accounted for between 22% and 32% of 
the combined effect of the three reforms. 
 
Their results also suggest that the introduction of lifetime community rating had a 
bigger impact on take-up rates among those in higher income groups and very little 
effect on low income groups, and that it had a higher impact on take-up rates among 
high-risk individuals and very little effect on low-risk individuals. 
 
Wilcox (2001) also suggests that the 30% rebate benefitted the higher-income 
groups more than the lower income groups, due to the higher take-up rates of private 
                                                 
103
 According to PHIAC (2008b) this increases to 35% for people aged 65-69 and to 40% for people 
aged 70 and over.  The higher rebates for older people were introduced from 1 April 2005. 
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health insurance among the former than the latter.  However, in contrast to 
Palangkaraya & Yong (2007), she suggests that it was lifetime community rating 
rather than the rebate which had the greatest impact on take-up rates.  Although the 
debate about the relative impact of lifetime community rating compared with the 
other policy reforms is ongoing however, it is clear that the introduction of lifetime 
community rating had a significant effect on take-up rates of private health insurance 
in Australia. 
 
The increase in the average age of the insured population since the introduction of 
lifetime community rating should be taken in the context of the overall ageing of the 
population in Australia.  Figures from the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS, 
2008) show that the mean age of the population in June 1999 was 36.3 years.  This 
mean age rose to 36.6 by June 2000 and the estimate for June 2008 was 37.9.  By 
contrast, the average age of insured persons in June 1999, just before the 
commencement of the grace period for lifetime community rating, was 39.9 years.  
This fell to 38.1 by June 2000, and fell further to a low point of 37.7 in September 
2000, but rose since then to reach 39.8 in June 2008, and further to 39.9 by March 
2009 according to the membership statistics from PHIAC. 
 
It can therefore be seen that, between June 2000, just before the end of the grace 
period, and June 2008, the average age of the insured population rose by 1.7 years, 
compared to a rise in the overall age of the population of 1.3 years.  The increase in 
the average age of the insured population can therefore not be entirely explained by 
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the ageing of the overall population in Australia.  This is further reinforced if the 
additional reduction in the average age of the insured population between June 2000 
and September 2000 is taken into account.  The average age of the insured 
population increased by 2.1 years between September 2000 and June 2008, which is 
considerably in excess of the ageing of the overall population.  This would appear to 
support the suggestion by Brown III & Connelly (2005b) that, after an initial effect 
whereby younger Australians took out health insurance after the introduction of 
lifetime community rating, these younger Australians have since begun to drop 
insurance.  They suggest that this is evidence that adverse selection was not halted 
by lifetime community rating. 
 
If the trend in take-up around the time of the introduction of lifetime community 
rating is examined by age, it is clear why the average age was reduced so 
dramatically.  It also indicates that, rather than encouraging large numbers of older 
people to enter the market and thus avoid paying late entry loadings, the grace 
period actually encouraged a significantly sharper increase in take-up among 
younger age groups. 
 
Figure 5.3 shows the percentage growth in membership in different age categories 
between June 1999 and September 2000, in other words from just before the start of, 
until just after the end of, the grace period.  As can be seen from this figure, the 
largest impact in terms of membership numbers was in the 30-34 age bracket, with 
an increase of almost 90% in the number of people in that age group with hospital 
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cover.  In contrast, there was a relatively smaller increase in membership numbers in 
older age groups.  Growth in membership numbers was particularly low among 
those aged 65 and over, although as mentioned earlier, those who were aged 65 and 
over on the date of commencement of the grace period were exempt from late entry 
loadings.  The one exception was the 95+ age group, which saw an increase of 
28.8%, although this was from a relatively low base (in June 1999 there were only 
4,974 people aged 95 and over with hospital cover, out of an overall market size of 
just under 5.8 million), but even this growth rate was well below the overall growth 
rate of just under 52% in membership numbers over the period.
104
 
 
Figure 5.3 Growth in Numbers with Hospital Cover in Australia 
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However, since lifetime community rating was introduced, the pattern of 
membership growth has been quite different.  Between September 2000 (the first 
                                                 
104
 Wilcox (2001) suggests that the significant increase in take-up among those aged 30 and under, 
who would have been unaffected by the change to lifetime community rating, might have been partly 
due to the purchase of family coverage by adults aged over-30, which might have included cover for 
children aged under-30. 
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data point incorporating lifetime community rating and therefore the application of 
late entry loadings) and March 2009, the highest rates of growth have tended to be 
seen in older age groups, particularly from age 55 upwards.  The notable exceptions 
to this rule are the 20-24 and 25-29 age groups, which would be consistent with 
people taking out private health insurance before age 30, at which time they would 
be subject to late entry loadings.  It can be seen from Figure 5.3 that membership 
numbers have fallen in a number of age groups, particularly in the 5-9, 10-14 and 
40-44 age groups.  The overall growth in membership numbers since September 
2000 has been significantly more modest than that witnessed during the grace period 
however, as would be expected as the market stabilises to what might be considered 
a more normal level of growth. 
 
These patterns are confirmed by examining the share of the overall insured 
population by age group, as can be seen in Table 5.3.  These figures show that every 
age group from 50-54 upwards reduced its share of the overall insured population 
between June 1999 and September 2000, as did the 20-24 and 25-29 age groups 
(albeit marginally).  The 30-34 age group increased its share of the insured 
population by 1.5 percentage points over the period, from 6.0% to 7.5%.  However, 
this was largely reversed between September 2000 and March 2009.  Over this 
period, every age group from 55-59 upwards increased its share of the market, as did 
the 20-24 and 25-29 age groups.  The only age group to show a similar pattern 
between June 1999 and September 2000 and between September 2000 and March 
 250 
2009 was the 50-54 age group, the share of which in the overall market fell in both 
periods. 
 
Table 5.3 Proportion of Total Insured Population in Australia by Age 
 
Age Group Jun. 1999 Sep. 2000 Mar. 2009 Difference 
Jun 99 – 
Sep 00 
Difference 
Sep 00 – 
Mar 09 
0-4 5.6 5.8 5.8 0.2 -0.1 
5-9 6.3 6.9 5.8 0.6 -1.1 
10-14 7.0 7.5 6.1 0.5 -1.4 
15-19 6.7 7.0 6.6 0.3 -0.4 
20-24 4.1 4.0 5.3 -0.1 1.3 
25-29 4.5 4.4 5.0 -0.1 0.5 
30-34 6.0 7.5 6.4 1.5 -1.1 
35-39 7.4 8.6 7.5 1.2 -1.1 
40-44 8.1 9.0 7.3 0.9 -1.7 
45-49 8.7 9.0 8.0 0.3 -0.9 
50-54 8.8 8.7 7.9 -0.1 -0.8 
55-59 6.8 6.4 7.6 -0.5 1.2 
60-64 5.4 4.6 6.7 -0.8 2.1 
65-69 4.6 3.3 4.7 -1.3 1.3 
70-74 4.1 3.0 3.4 -1.1 0.4 
75-79 2.7 2.0 2.6 -0.7 0.6 
80-84 1.7 1.2 1.8 -0.5 0.7 
85-89 1.0 0.7 0.9 -0.3 0.2 
90-94 0.4 0.3 0.3 -0.1 0.1 
95+ 0.09 0.07 0.09 -0.01 0.02 
 
Source: PHIAC 
 
 
Figures 5.4 and 5.5 confirm this trend, showing the quarter-on-quarter and year-on-
year change in membership in three broad age categories.  The first broad age 
category incorporates the under-30 age groups, which would have been unaffected 
by the introduction of late entry loadings.
105
  The second is the 30-64 age groups, 
                                                 
105
 In this context, being unaffected means that they would not have been liable to pay any late entry 
loading.  It is possible that they were affected insofar as they would have had a greater incentive to 
take out private health insurance before their 31
st
 birthday. 
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which would have been partially affected.
106
  It should be noted that the partial effect 
would have varied from 2% for those aged 31 to 68% for those aged 69 when first 
taking out health insurance, and it is therefore a very heterogeneous group.  The 
third broad category is the 65+ age groups.  This group is quite heterogeneous, in 
that, anyone aged 65 or over on the date of commencement of the grace period (i.e. 1 
July 1999) is exempt from late entry loadings irrespective of when they take out 
private health insurance, while those who only turned 65 since that date would be 
most affected by the change from single rate to lifetime community rating, as they 
would have to pay a 70% late entry loading. 
 
Figure 5.4 Quarterly Growth Rates in Hospital Membership by Age, 
Australia 
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 Although those aged 30 would have been unaffected by late entry loadings, the age banding of the 
information published by PHIAC included 30-year olds with those aged 31-34.  It was therefore 
decided to include these in the category of those partially affected by late entry loadings. 
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The trends in growth for the under-30 and 30-64 age categories are broadly similar, 
while the trend for the 65+ age category is significantly different, displaying much 
more subdued growth around the time of the introduction of late entry loadings, 
although growth was recorded, suggesting that the introduction of lifetime 
community rating encouraged some increased take-up among older consumers. 
 
Figure 5.5 Annual Growth Rates in Hospital Membership by Age, Australia 
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Further evidence of the differential effect of the introduction of lifetime community 
rating in Australia can be seen from the take-up rates of hospital-based health 
insurance since before the change-over from single rate community rating.  Figure 
5.6 shows these take-up rates calculated based on membership figures from the 
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Private Health Insurance Administration Council and the Australian Bureau of 
Statistics.
107
 
 
 
Figure 5.6 Take-up Rates of Hospital-based Health Insurance by Age, 
Australia 
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It can be seen from these figures that, between June 1999 and June 2000, the 
penetration rate of hospital-based health insurance among the under-30 age group 
rose from 24.8% to 36.4%, an increase of 11.7 percentage points, before peaking in 
June 2001 at 38.4%.  The penetration rate among the 30-64 age group rose from 
34.6% in June 1999 to 50.2% in June 2000, an increase of 15.6 percentage points, 
before peaking in June 2001 at 52.4%.  However, the penetration rate among the 65+ 
age group rose more modestly, from 36.1% in June 1999 to 38.8% in June 2000, an 
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 These figures tally with the overall take-up rates published by PHIAC for the most part, with three 
minor exceptions.  The figures contained in the analysis in this study differ from the published 
PHIAC figures by 0.1 percentage points in June 2003, June 2005 and June 2007.  The reason for the 
divergence is not clear, but it is unlikely that this would make any significant difference to the 
analysis, and is reported here for the sake of completeness. 
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increase of just 2.7 percentage points, but has continued to rise, reaching 45.1% in 
June 2008. 
 
Figures for March 2009 (PHIAC, 2009) show that 89.5% of adults with hospital 
cover have a certified age at entry of 30 and are therefore not paying any late entry 
loading.  The certified age at entry is the age at entry for the purposes of late entry 
loadings.  Anyone who had private health insurance before the changeover from 
single rate community rating to lifetime community rating, or who joined during the 
grace period, or who were aged 65 or over on 1 July 1999 and who took out private 
health insurance since then, would have a certified age at entry of 30, provided they 
have not dropped their cover for more than 1,094 days since receiving this certified 
age at entry.  Provisions were also made for specific categories of persons, including 
Australians who were living abroad on their 31
st
 birthday or during the grace period, 
members of the Australian Defence Forces on 1 July 2000, and army veterans (see 
PHIAC, 2008a for further details). 
 
However, PHIAC (2009) also notes that the proportion of adults paying a late entry 
loading has increased every quarter since the introduction of lifetime community 
rating.  This proportion increased from 0.2% in the quarter ending 30 September 
2000 (the first quarter during which entry loadings would have applied to new 
entrants over the age of 30) to 10.5% in March 2009.   This is not surprising, as new 
entrants over the age of 30 (with the exception of those categories mentioned above) 
would be liable to pay late entry loadings. 
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Of those paying late entry loadings in March 2009, 21,666 had a certified age at 
entry of 65.  This represents almost 3% of those paying late entry loadings.  Indeed, 
the percentage of those paying late entry loadings accounted for by those with a 
certified age at entry of 65 has increased faster than the percentage accounted for by 
any other certified age at entry, from just 0.8% in September 2000 (the first quarter 
during which late entry loadings would have been payable) to 3.0% in March 2009. 
 
One factor that might have had an impact on the 65+ age category is that, under the 
legislation governing lifetime community rating, anyone born on or before 1 July 
1934 (i.e. anyone who would have been 65 or over when the grace period began), is 
exempt from lifetime community rating and is therefore entitled to take out private 
health insurance at any time and pay the same premium as someone taking out 
private health insurance for the first time at or before the age of 30, in other words 
without being subject to late entry loadings (see PHIAC, 2008a). 
 
Thus, in effect, these people would have been unaffected by the change.  While 
those aged 30 and under would also have been unaffected, they would be affected at 
a later stage (i.e. from their 31
st
 birthday onwards), unlike those who were aged 65 
and over at the beginning of the grace period. 
 
Despite the nuances of legislative provisions and the debates surrounding the 
effectiveness of lifetime community rating versus the other market reforms 
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introduced in the late 1990s, it is clear that the introduction of lifetime community 
rating had a significant impact on the Australian private health insurance market.  It 
led to an increase in the overall take-up rates of private health insurance and it 
encouraged younger consumers into the market in greater numbers.  Although there 
have been suggestions that its introduction has not halted adverse selection, it is 
clear that it had a significant impact in slowing its effects.  It is perhaps too early to 
determine definitively whether this was merely a short-term effect or whether it will 
have a longer-term impact. 
 
5.4.2 Lifetime Community Rating in the Irish Context 
 
As discussed in Section 5.2, lifetime community rating in Ireland has been discussed 
for a number of years.  The Advisory Group on the Risk Equalisation Scheme 
(Advisory Group to the Minister for Health on the Risk Equalisation Scheme, 1998) 
noted that the current system of single rate community rating may risk instability in 
the market, particularly if large numbers of people opt not to take out private health 
insurance at younger ages, preferring to wait until they are older before taking it out.  
This would undermine the inter-generational solidarity on which community rating 
is based. 
 
However, it should be noted that this does not occur to a great extent currently.  
According to the surveys of consumers carried out on behalf of the HIA, the 
majority of consumers take out health insurance before the age of 30, with relatively 
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low numbers taking it out for the first time at age 50 or over (see Table 5.4).  The 
mean age at which consumers took out health insurance for the first time was 30 in 
both surveys (2003 and 2005).  It could be argued that this indicates that the 
introduction of lifetime community rating in Ireland might be less effective than in 
Australia.  Nevertheless, as long as single rate community rating is in operation, the 
risk to inter-generational solidarity remains and, while a move to lifetime 
community rating would not entirely eliminate this risk, it would reduce it.  In this 
context, it is interesting to note that HIA (2008c) finds that a growing proportion of 
those without private health insurance appear to be delaying taking it up until they 
are older and more likely to need it. 
 
Table 5.4 Age At Which Policyholders Took Out First Policy, Ireland 
 
Age <30 30-39 40-49 50+ 
2003 Survey 59% 25% 9% 7% 
2005 Survey 54% 29% 12% 5% 
 
Source: Calculated from raw data from HIA (2003a, 2005a) 
Note: The survey questionnaire for HIA (2008c) did not ask what age people were 
when they first took out health insurance. 
 
 
Figure 5.7 shows the proportion of the adult insured population in various age 
categories in Australia before and after the changeover, and in Ireland in 2005, 
according to the HIA survey (HIA, 2005a).
108
  It should be noted that the Australian 
figures do not refer to 18-24-year olds, but rather 20-24.  All other age bands are 
comparable between the two countries. 
 
                                                 
108
 The 2005 figures (HIA, 2005a) are presented here instead of the 2008 figures (HIA, 2008c) to 
ensure consistency with the analysis carried out in section 5.5. 
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It can be seen from these figures that younger age groups accounted for a higher 
proportion of the insured population in Ireland in 2005 than they did in Australia in 
1999, even discounting the 18-24-year old category.  In particular, the 25-34 age 
group accounted for a significantly higher proportion of the insured population in 
Ireland in 2005 than it did in Australia before the change from single rate 
community rating to lifetime community rating (19% versus just over 14%).  At the 
same time, the 65+ age group accounted for a significantly lower proportion of the 
insured population in Ireland in 2005 than it did in Australia before the changeover 
(13% versus almost 20%). 
 
Figure 5.7 Age Breakdown of Insured Population, Australia and Ireland 
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Note: Irish data refer to 18-24, Australian data refer to 20-24; All other age bands 
are comparable 
Source: PHIAC; HIA (2005a) 
 
 
The move to lifetime community rating did shift the age balance in Australia 
however, with a greater proportion of 25-34-year olds in the insured population after 
the changeover, and a lower proportion of people aged 65 and over.  However, it 
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should be noted that, since September 2000, the proportion of the insured population 
in the 25-34 age group has fallen and the proportion in the 65+ age group has risen, 
to just under 15% and 18% respectively. 
 
The above figures would suggest that Ireland’s insured population is, on average, 
younger than that in Australia before the transition to lifetime community rating.  
The Australian experience would suggest that, if the introduction of lifetime 
community rating in Ireland were to induce a similar response to that in Australia, 
the average age would fall and younger age groups would account for a higher 
proportion of the insured population, thus strengthening further the intergenerational 
solidarity on which community rating is based.  This strengthening would, to some 
extent, balance the likely future ageing of the insured population resulting from the 
expected overall ageing of the Irish population (as projected in CSO, 2008a). 
 
It should also be noted that, when asked whether the introduction of late entry 
loadings would encourage them to take out private health insurance sooner rather 
than later, only 16% of those without private health insurance replied that it would, 
while 48% said it would not and 36% said they did not know (HIA, 2008c).  The 
fact that only 16% of those replied that they would take out private health insurance 
sooner rather than later compares with 29% giving that reply in 2005 (HIA, 2005a) 
and 16% in 2003 (HIA, 2003a).  This result should be seen in the context that 27% 
of those without private health insurance said that they are likely to take it out at 
some stage in the future, while 56% said that they would never take it out or are 
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unlikely to do so (HIA, 2008c).  These findings suggest that the introduction of 
lifetime community rating could have at least a modest impact on those who do not 
have private health insurance but are considering taking it out. 
 
5.5 What Does the Australian Experience Tell Us for the Irish System? 
 
The experience of the changeover from single rate community rating to lifetime 
community rating in Australia may give some indication as to the likely impact of 
the proposed change in Ireland.  It would therefore be useful to examine the effects 
of the change in Australia and try to predict what would happen in the Irish market if 
similar effects were to be seen here. 
 
5.5.1 Effect of Lifetime Community Rating on Take-up 
 
The Private Health Insurance Administration Council (PHIAC) in Australia 
produces quarterly statistics on membership of hospital plans by age group.  This 
series began in September 1997.  The Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) 
produces annual statistics on population by age, with the figures relating to June of 
each year.  The ABS also produces quarterly statistics on various economic 
indicators. 
 
The first step in the analysis was to calculate take-up rates of hospital plans by age 
group.  This was done by calculating the number of people in each age group with 
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hospital cover as a percentage of the overall population in that age group.  Since the 
population figures are only annual, figures for the intervening quarters were 
calculated by interpolation using a geometric growth rate. 
 
These take-up rates by age group were used as the dependent variable in a 
regression, with explanatory variables consisting of a mixture of quantitative 
economic indicators and dummy variables.  The regressions run were of the form 
 
UXY   (Equation 5.1) 
 
Where 
Y is a vector of the dependent variable, i.e. take-up rates by age 
Α is a vector of constant terms 
X is a matrix of explanatory variables 
Β is a vector of coefficients 
U is a vector of error terms 
 
The dependent variable was the take-up rate by age in each quarter.  The data were 
broken down into 20 age groups, most of five-year width (see Table 5.5 for a list of 
the age groups.  For each age group, data were quarterly from September 1997 to 
June 2007 (40 time periods).  The PHIAC data on membership by age begin in 
September 1997, while the most recent ABS figures for population by age were for 
June 2007.  The quarterly economic variables, from the Australian Bureau of 
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Statistics, were available up to the third quarter of 2007.  The 20 age groups and 40 
quarters of data provided 800 data observations for use in the regressions. 
 
 
Table 5.5 Age Groups Used in the Analysis 
 
Unaffected 0-4 5-9 10-14 15-19 20-24 25-29  
Partially 
Affected 
30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 
Most 
Affected 
65-69 70-74 75-79 80-84 85-89 90-94 95+ 
 
 
The dummy variables used were a dummy for the introduction of lifetime 
community rating (DUMLTCR – set to 1 from Q3 2000 onwards and 0 before that), 
a dummy for the grace period allowed before the introduction of lifetime community 
rating (DUMGRACEPERIOD – set to 1 from Q3 1999 to Q2 2000 inclusive and 0 
for all other periods). 
 
Subgroups of the sample were also distinguished, based on the degree to which the 
changeover from single rate community rating to lifetime community rating affected 
the group.  As discussed in Section 5.4.1, those aged under-30 were unaffected by 
the changeover, those aged 30-64 were partially affected (although this group 
contains a wide variety of effects, with those aged 31 being subject to a 2% late 
entry loading, while those aged 64 were subject to a 68% late entry loading)
109
 and 
those aged 65 and over were the most affected by the changeover, with all first-time 
health insurance applicants in this age group being subject to a 70% late entry 
                                                 
109
 As mentioned in an earlier footnote, although those aged 30 would have been unaffected by late 
entry loadings, the age banding of the information published by PHIAC included 30-year olds with 
those aged 31-34.  For that reason, 30-year olds were included in the category of those partially 
affected by late entry loadings. 
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loading (except for those who were aged 65 or over at the commencement of the 
grace period).  Dummy variables were created to indicate these categories, with 
those aged 0-29 indicated by a dummy variable called DUMUNAFFECTED, those 
aged 30-64 indicated by a dummy variable called DUMPARTIALAFFECT and 
those aged 65 and over indicated by a dummy variable called DUMMOSTAFFECT. 
 
The category of insured persons who were most affected by the changeover to 
lifetime community rating was used as the control group, since from the analysis in 
Section 5.4.1 it appeared that this category was affected substantially differently 
from the other two categories.   
 
Interaction variables were also created, to differentiate the effects of the introduction 
of lifetime community rating on the different categories of insured persons.  These 
were LTCRUNAFFECTED (the product of DUMLTCR and DUMUNAFFECTED), 
LTCRPARTIALAFFECT (the product of DUMLTCR and 
DUMPARTIALAFFECT) and LTCRMOSTAFFECT (the product of DUMLTCR 
and DUMMOSTAFFECT).  While DUMLTCR is a time dummy, 
DUMUNAFFECTED, DUMPARTIALAFFECT and DUMMOSTAFFECT are 
cross-section dummies.  Therefore, the interaction variables measure whether the 
effect of lifetime community rating differed between the three age-related categories 
of those unaffected, partially affected and most affected by the change in the 
community rating system. 
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The regression used was Pooled Least Squares.
110
  The results of the regression are 
presented in Table 5.6.
111
  
 
Table 5.6 Results from Pooled Regression Using Take-up Rates by Age 
1997-2007 as Dependent Variable 
 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error 
Constant 34.80307* 1.214106 
GDP Growth (y-on-y) -0.030691 0.201566 
DUMLTCR 3.149748* 0.909656 
DUMGRACEPERIOD 2.632607* 0.851039 
DUMUNAFFECTED? -9.417260* 0.977436 
DUMPARTIALAFFECT? 1.480548 0.939090 
LTCRUNAFFECTED? 8.927932* 1.168259 
LTCRPARTIALAFFECT? 11.15047* 1.122427 
Total Pool Observations: 800 R
2
: 0.577213 
 
* = Significant at 5% level; Variables followed by a ? indicate pooled variables 
 
 
The first thing to note about these results is that the economic variable, the year-on-
year GDP growth rate, is insignificant.  The same was true when alternative 
economic variables were included (such as the level of GDP, quarterly GDP growth, 
gross national income, or GDP per capita).  This suggests that economic factors do 
not have a significant impact on the level of take-up from one quarter to another.  
This could be accounted for by the fact that contracts run for longer than one quarter 
and therefore short-term changes in economic conditions are unlikely to significantly 
                                                 
110
 For a discussion on this type of model, see Baltagi (2005), Johnston (1984) or Wooldridge (2002). 
111
 It should be noted that the nature of the dependent variable – take-up rates over time – leads to 
problems of serial correlation in the error terms. The Durbin-Watson statistic for this regression is 
0.107991, which indicates the presence of first-order serial correlation.  Furthermore, when the AR(1) 
term was added to the regression, the coefficient was statistically significant at the 1% level, also 
indicating the presence of first-order serial correlation.  When higher-order AR terms were added to 
the regression, these were also statistically significant, indicating the presence of higher-order serial 
correlation.  The model as indicated in Table 5.6 was re-run using Period SUR Panel Corrected 
Standard Errors (PCSE), which showed that the coefficients on GDP growth and the dummy for 
being partially affected remained insignificant, while all other coefficients remained significant.  Thus 
there was no substantive difference in the results. 
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affect the numbers with health insurance on a quarter by quarter basis.  The dummy 
variables are the variables driving this regression,
112
 and the interpretations are 
interesting in a number of ways. 
 
Firstly, the positive and significant coefficients on DUMGRACEPERIOD and 
DUMLTCR confirm that take-up rates generally rose during the grace period in the 
run-up to the introduction of lifetime community rating, and rose even further after 
the introduction of lifetime community rating in July 2000. 
 
The second set of dummy variables show that there were differential take-up rates 
across difference age categories over the period in question.  The negative and 
significant coefficient on DUMUNAFFECTED shows that those aged under-30, 
when taken together, had lower take-up rates over the period than those in the 65+ 
age category.  This can be confirmed by reference to Figure 5.6 above.  The positive 
but insignificant coefficient on DUMPARTIALAFFECT reflects the fact that, 
although take-up rates were generally higher among those aged 30-64 than those 
aged 65+, this was not the case throughout the sample period.  Again, from Figure 
5.6 above, it can be seen that the take-up rate for the 30-64 age category was below 
that of the 65+ category in 1998 and 1999, but higher for the remainder of the 
period, although the two rates have shown some convergence in recent years. 
 
                                                 
112
 Indeed, if the economic variables are omitted entirely from the regression and just the six dummy 
variables and interaction dummy variables are left in, the R
2
 is .5772 and the regression remains 
significant, as do the dummy variables, with the exception of DUMPARTIALAFFECT?. 
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The two interaction variables are perhaps the most interesting, however.  Both 
LTCRUNAFFECTED and LTCRPARTIALAFFECT have large positive and 
significant coefficients.  This suggests that the introduction of lifetime community 
rating had a significantly greater impact on the take-up rates among both the under-
30 category and the 30-64 category than on the take-up rate among the 65+ category.  
This can be confirmed by referring to Figure 5.6 above. 
 
These results confirm what was highlighted in the analysis in Section 5.4.1.  The 
introduction of lifetime community rating had a generally positive impact on the 
take-up rates of private health insurance in Australia.  However, it had more of an 
effect on the take-up rates of private health insurance among those unaffected by the 
change (under-30) and those partially affected (aged 30-64) than it did on those who 
were most affected by the change (those aged 65 and over), i.e. the ones who faced 
the highest late entry loadings.  This could, at least in part, be due to the fact that 
those aged 65 and over at the commencement of the grace period are exempt from 
paying late entry loadings irrespective of when they take out private health insurance 
for the first time.  An alternative interpretation would be that very high late entry 
loadings (such as the 70% loading faced by those aged 65 and over) deter the take-
up of private health insurance. 
 
It should be noted that this analysis differs from that of Palangkaraya & Yong (2007) 
in a number of ways.  Firstly, their paper examined a sample, whereas this analysis 
uses population coverage.  Secondly, their sample included only single people and 
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excluded those aged under-18 and 65 or over, whereas this analysis includes all 
those with hospital based private health insurance.  Thirdly, their study sets a 
discontinuity at age 30 only and focuses on those aged just below or just above this 
cut-off, whereas this study examines three broad age categories.  Finally, 
Palangkaraya & Yong (2007) examine two discrete time periods – 1995 and 2001 – 
whereas this study includes a continuous time series capturing the pre- and post-
reform periods. 
 
The next point to examine is what impact the anticipated introduction of lifetime 
community rating, to replace single rate community rating, would have on the Irish 
private health insurance market if the trends here were to mirror those seen in 
Australia after the changeover there. 
 
5.5.2 Effect of Lifetime Community Rating on Market Profile 
 
In order to examine the possible effect of the introduction of lifetime community 
rating on the market risk profile in Ireland, the above analysis was adapted to data on 
the risk profile of the market in Ireland.  The Irish data used was from HIA (2005a).  
In order to apply the regression results to the Irish data however, a number of minor 
modifications needed to be made.  The first related to the fact that the Irish data only 
covered adults, aged 18 and over, whereas the Australian data used in the regression 
detailed in Table 5.6 included children covered in the Australian market.  The 
second resulted from the fact that nobody was found in the sample used in HIA 
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(2005a) aged 90 or over.
113
  Therefore, the regression used for the Australian data 
was re-run excluding the 0-4, 5-9, 10-14, 15-19, 90-94 and 95+ age bands.  The 
results of this regression are presented in Table 5.7
114
. 
 
Table 5.7 Results from Pooled Regression Using Take-up Rates by Age 
1997-2007 as Dependent Variable, Excluding Respondents Aged 0-19 and 90+ 
 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error 
Constant 35.29221* 1.319710 
GDP Growth (y-on-y) -0.017112 0.219757 
DUMLTCR 4.172804* 0.984172 
DUMGRACEPERIOD 2.734654* 0.927842 
DUMUNAFFECTED? -17.04388* 1.340801 
DUMPARTIALAFFECT? 0.895402 0.938365 
LTCRUNAFFECTED? 5.855656* 1.602564 
LTCRPARTIALAFFECT? 10.18092* 1.121561 
Total Pool Observations: 560 R
2
: 0.709809 
 
* = Significant at 5% level; Variables followed by a ? indicate pooled variables 
 
 
The results of this regression are similar to those obtained using the full range of 
age-bands, as presented in Table 5.6.  All of the variables are significant at the 5% 
level apart from GDP growth and DUMPARTIALAFFECT? and the regression is 
significant.  The explanatory power of the regression has increased however, from 
0.58 to 0.71. 
                                                 
113
 It should be noted that the oldest age band used in HIA (2005a) was 65+ and this was not further 
disaggregated.  However, respondents were also asked for their exact age in years and most gave this 
information and it was therefore possible to disaggregate this band of respondents into five-year age-
bands akin to the Australian ones.  However, 10 respondents in the 65+ age band did not give an 
exact age, so a narrower age-bracket could not be established for the purposes of this regression.  
Therefore these 10 respondents were excluded from this analysis. 
114
 As with the regression results presented in Table 5.6, the regression that produced the results in 
Table 5.7 suffered from serial correlation, as suggested by a Durbin-Watson statistic of 0.131142 and 
the significance of the AR(1) term and higher-order AR terms when added to the regression.  The 
model as indicated in Table 5.7 was re-run using Period SUR Panel Corrected Standard Errors 
(PCSE), which showed that the coefficients on GDP growth and the dummy for being partially 
affected remained insignificant, while all other coefficients remained significant.  Again, there was no 
substantive difference in the results using the robust standard errors. 
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One possible reason for the higher R
2
 might be that the exclusion of those aged 
under-19 would mean that children were excluded from the regression detailed in 
Table 5.7.  As children would, in most cases, not be in a position to make a decision 
on whether to take out private health insurance as a result of the introduction of 
lifetime community rating (as they would likely be named on someone else’s policy, 
who would have made the decision on their behalf) it is possible that the regression 
detailed in Table 5.7 better captures the decision process.  Another possible 
explanation is that children would have had more time left to be covered without 
being subject to a late entry loading and they – or the person making the decision on 
whether to insure them – would therefore have been less likely to react immediately 
to the introduction of such a loading by taking out private health insurance. 
 
The coefficients from this regression were then applied to the Irish data to simulate 
the effect that the introduction of lifetime community rating might have had.  It was 
decided for the simulation to use the results of HIA (2005a) in relation to take-up 
rates by age as the starting point, or in other words the last observation under single 
rate community rating.  The fieldwork for HIA (2005a) was carried out between 7
th
 
March and 15
th
 April 2005.  It was therefore decided, for the purpose of the 
simulation, to assign these results to Q1 2005. 
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Table 5.8 Actual and Predicted Take-up Rates by Age in Ireland in Q1 
2005 and Predicted Take-up Rates in Q2 2006 under Simulated Lifetime 
Community Rating 
 
Age Band Actual 
Q1 2005 
 
 
 
Y05 
Predicted 
Q1 2005 
 
 
 
y05 
Predicted 
Q2 2006 
 
 
 
y06 
Predicted 
Growth 
 
 
 
G = y06 - y05 
Actual Q1 
2005 + 
Predicted 
Growth 
 
Y05 + G 
20-24 43 18 28 10 53 
25-29 35 18 28 10 45 
30-34 52 36 50 14 66 
35-39 59 36 50 14 73 
40-44 57 36 50 14 72 
45-49 58 36 50 14 72 
50-54 64 36 50 14 79 
55-59 64 36 50 14 78 
60-64 56 36 50 14 70 
65-69 63 35 39 4 67 
70-74 32 35 39 4 36 
75-79 23 35 39 4 27 
80-84 32 35 39 4 36 
85-89 23 35 39 4 27 
 
 
It was then assumed that a 12-month grace period would be implemented (similar to 
that in Australia), covering Q2 2005 to Q1 2006 inclusive.  Therefore, in the 
simulation, Q2 2006 was the first quarter in which lifetime community rating was 
assumed to apply.  It should also be noted that for the Irish figures, GNP growth was 
used rather than GDP growth, as it is felt by many that the former is a more accurate 
measure of economic activity in Ireland than the latter (see, for example, Kennedy, 
2001).
115
  Table 5.8 gives details of the actual and predicted take-up rates by age in 
Q1 2005 (i.e. the last period under single rate community rating in the simulation) 
                                                 
115
 The results using GDP growth were almost identical, due to the small magnitude of the coefficient 
on this variable.  Specifically, the predicted take-up rates using GDP were less than 0.2 percentage 
points different from those using GNP in all cases. 
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and the predicted rates in Q2 2006 (the first period under lifetime community rating 
in the simulation).  These figures, based on the simulation results, are also plotted in 
Figure 5.8. 
 
Figure 5.8 Actual and Predicted Take-up Rates in Ireland Before and After 
a Simulated Shift to Lifetime Community Rating 
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Taking the 25-29 age group as an example, what these figures show is that the actual 
take-up rate among people in this age group in Ireland in Q1 2005 was 35%.  The 
model presented in Table 5.7 predicts that the take-up rate in that age group using 
data for Q1 2005 would have been 18%.  The model further predicts that, if a 12-
month grace period had then been introduced, followed by the introduction of 
lifetime community rating, then the predicted take-up rate in Q2 2006 would have 
been 28%, an increase of 10 percentage points compared with the predicted take-up 
rate in Q1 2005.  Applying this increase of 10 percentage points to the actual take-up 
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rate in Q1 2005 (which was 35%) would have given a take-up rate of 45% in Q2 
2006 in this age group. 
 
This simulation suggests that the proportion of younger consumers in the Irish 
private health insurance market would increase in the aftermath of the introduction 
of lifetime community rating.  This would be in keeping with the justification for 
such a move, which is to stabilise the market by encouraging greater numbers of 
consumers to take out private health insurance at a younger age. 
 
One issue of note however, is that, if the introduction of lifetime community rating 
in Ireland were to attract more young people into the market, then this could 
reinforce the difference in age profile between Vhi Healthcare and its competitors, 
Quinn Healthcare and Hibernian AVIVA Health.  It is likely that some of these 
younger first-time insurance buyers would be attracted to each of the three insurers, 
and competition for these purchasers would likely be seen from the insurers.  
However, the latter two insurers already have a younger age profile than Vhi 
Healthcare and, while the entry of larger numbers of young consumers into the 
market would likely improve the average age profile of all three insurers, it is likely 
that the impact on the age profiles of Quinn Healthcare and Hibernian AVIVA 
Health would be greater, due to the younger average age of their members and their 
smaller size. 
 
In this context, it is interesting to note that YHEC (2003) argue that any move to 
impose penalties on those who wait to take out private health insurance, such as the 
 273 
introduction of lifetime community rating, would reinforce the inherent tendency for 
newer insurers to attract lower risk, younger members.  If this were the case then it 
could have an impact on the need for risk equalisation, which is also examined in the 
next section. 
 
However, a number of issues should be taken into account when interpreting the 
findings of this simulation.  In the first instance, it is unlikely that the behaviour of 
Irish consumers would exactly replicate the behaviour of Australian consumers.  The 
Irish and Australian health systems, while similar in many ways, also have 
differences between them, such as the subsidisation of primary care and shorter 
waiting lists for hospital treatment in Australia.  These issues are explored further in 
Chapter 6. 
 
The Irish private health insurance market in 2005 also differed from the Australian 
market before the introduction of lifetime community rating.  In particular, the 
overall take-up rate in Ireland had exceeded 50% by 2005, compared with an overall 
take-up rate of just over 30% in Australia in June 1999, before the introduction of 
lifetime community there.  The increase in the overall take-up rate in Australia 
following the introduction of lifetime community rating – over 15 percentage points 
– is unlikely to be replicated in Ireland, as there would be less scope for such an 
increase in Ireland. 
 
 274 
In this context, it should be noted that, according to HIA (2008c), only 27% of those 
without private health insurance said that they were likely to get private health 
insurance, while another 18% said they did not know.  On the basis that those who 
do not currently have private health insurance make up approximately half the Irish 
population, this would suggest that 13-14% of the population are likely to take it out, 
with a further 9% uncertain.  As affordability issues have come into more focus in 
recent times, owing to significant price increases for private health insurance 
combined with an economic recession, it is unlikely that the introduction of lifetime 
community rating in Ireland would lead to an increase in take-up of the magnitude 
witnessed in Australia.  It is also worth noting in this context that the predicted take-
up rates for Q1 2005 are significantly lower than the actual take-up rates in all age 
bands up to age 69. 
 
As mentioned in Section 5.4.1, the introduction of lifetime community rating in 
Australia followed closely two other market reforms designed to address declining 
take-up rates of private health insurance.  In the absence of the introduction of 
similar policies in Ireland, it is possible that the introduction of lifetime community 
rating in this country might have less of an impact than it did in Australia.  In this 
context, it is worth recalling the discussion in Section 5.4.1 regarding the debate 
surrounding the relative impacts of lifetime community rating versus the other 
policy reforms in Australia. 
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Another issue that needs to be borne in mind when interpreting the results of this 
analysis is the nature of the regression.  The regression is driven by dummy 
variables, some of which are homogenous across a number of age bands.  Therefore, 
as can be seen from Table 5.8, the predicted increases in take-up are the same for the 
age bands in the broad categories of unaffected, partially affected and most affected.  
This effect, which is seen in the simulation, would be unrealistic in a ‘live’ situation, 
as the change in take-up rates would likely differ across age bands. 
 
In order to address this issue, the regression as presented in Table 5.7 was re-run 
including dummy variables for most of the individual five-year age bands and 
interaction dummies, consisting of the product of the dummy variables for the age 
bands and the dummy variable for the introduction of lifetime community rating 
(DUMLTCR).  The dummy variables for age bands 20-24, 60-64 and 85-89 
introduced multicollinearity of sufficient magnitude to prohibit the regression from 
being run using EViews.  The explanatory power of the model was increased by 
doing this, and the predicted change in take-up rates differed across age bands.  
However, when the results were applied to the Irish market, the difference between 
the actual and predicted figures for Q1 2005 (Y05 and y05 respectively) was still 
notable.  This is likely due to the fact that take-up rates by age are highly influenced 
by their previous values, and the lagged dependent variable was excluded from the 
model due to its deterministic nature.  The results for the model re-run including 
dummy variables for the different age bands, and the actual and predicted take-up 
rates by age are presented in Appendix B. 
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Furthermore, the details of the Irish system of lifetime community rating – 
specifically the level of late entry loadings and the ages at which the rates will apply 
– have not yet been finalised, although as mentioned in Section 5.2, the Health 
Insurance (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 2009 makes provision for the threshold 
age to be set at 30.  The above analysis assumes that the format of lifetime 
community rating in Ireland would be the same as that introduced in Australia, 
which may not be the case. 
 
In particular, an exemption from late entry loadings for those aged 65 and over at the 
commencement of the grace period, as was granted in Australia, has not been 
proposed in the Irish case.  If such an exemption were not granted, then it could 
result in a greater proportionate increase in take-up among those aged 65 and over 
than was witnessed in Australia.  This could mitigate any reduction in average age 
resulting from the changeover from single rate community rating to lifetime 
community rating in Ireland. 
 
5.5.3 Effect of Lifetime Community Rating on Risk Equalisation 
 
If lifetime community rating were to attract greater numbers of people into the 
market for private health insurance in Ireland, and in particular greater numbers of 
younger people, as was the case in Australia, then this could have implications for 
the Irish market in terms of the need for risk equalisation. 
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Firstly, if the overall size of the market were to expand, then this would increase the 
level of claims in the market, assuming that at least some of the newly insured 
persons were to claim.  However, given that most newly insured persons would be 
subject to initial waiting periods, it is likely that this would have a lagged effect on 
the level of claims in the market.  Under the Risk Equalisation Scheme, 2003, the 
claims of all insured persons on qualifying plans, up to a specified maximum of 
benefits, would have been equalised.  Therefore, if the overall level of claims in the 
market were to increase then the level of claims to be equalised under a risk 
equalisation scheme like the Risk Equalisation Scheme, 2003 would also increase.  
Thus the value of risk equalisation payments to (from) insurers with higher (lower) 
risk profiles would be of greater absolute magnitude. 
 
The second effect that might be seen if a move to lifetime community rating were to 
attract additional numbers into the insured pool, particularly younger people, is that 
the market average risk profile would likely fall.  In the Irish case, deviations from 
the market average risk profile might also widen, since, as mentioned in Section 
5.5.2, the entry of new consumers could have a relatively greater effect on the 
average risk profile of the smaller, low-risk insurers than the larger, high-risk 
insurer.  Since payments under risk equalisation would be based on the deviations 
from the market average risk profile, any increase in such deviations would result in 
an increase in risk equalisation payments. 
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In this regard, the Australian experience provides an interesting indication of what 
might be expected.  The Private Health Insurance Administration Council (PHIAC) 
in Australia produces statistics for the industry in its Operations of the Health 
Benefits Undertakings Annual Reports.  Included in these statistics are figures 
relating to the reinsurance fund.  This is the fund into which insurers with relatively 
low risk profiles made payments under the reinsurance scheme, and from which 
insurers with relatively high risk profiles received money under the scheme.  It 
would be similar to the risk equalisation fund that was envisaged in Ireland under the 
Risk Equalisation Scheme, 2003 but which was never established as a result of the 
setting aside of the scheme by the Supreme Court. 
 
Figure 5.9 shows the amount of money paid from the reinsurance fund in Australia 
from 1995 to 2007, the last year before the reinsurance arrangements were amended 
to yield the risk equalisation system that is now in place.
116
  It also shows the 
standard deviations of the payments into and out of the fund for the same years.  
These standard deviations relate to all of the contributions, with the net contributions 
to the fund being counted as negative figures and the net payments from the fund 
counting as positive figures.  It should be noted that the figures for each year relate 
to the four quarters ending June of that year.  Therefore, the 2000 figures relate to 
the four quarters to June 2000, so the 2001 figures, which relate to the four quarters 
ending June 2001, represent the first year during which lifetime community rating 
                                                 
116
 The money paid into the fund and paid from the fund did not always match in the time period 
covered by this analysis, although it did match in some years. 
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was in force, while the 2000 figures correspond to the grace period that was in force 
before the introduction of lifetime community rating. 
 
Figure 5.9 Payments from and Standard Deviation of Payments to/from the 
Reinsurance Fund in Australia, 1995-2007 
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Source: Calculated based on figures from Financial and Statistical Tables from 
Operations of the Health Benefits Undertakings Annual Reports (Various Years). 
Available at http://www.phiac.gov.au/publications/ar_previous/index.htm. Accessed 
on 07 May 2009. 
 
 
It can clearly be seen from Figure 5.9 that both the level of payments from the fund 
and the variability of contributions to/from the fund have increased significantly 
since the introduction of lifetime community rating.  The level of payments from the 
fund increased from just over AUS$119m in 2000 to nearly AUS$198m in 2007 (an 
increase of 66%), while the standard deviation of the payments to/from the fund 
increased from just under AUS$9.6m in 2000 to almost AUS$19.3m in 2007 (an 
increase of just over 100%). 
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This suggests that the introduction of lifetime community rating in Australia, and the 
consequent increase in private health insurance take-up, increased the level of 
reinsurance payments.  As mentioned earlier, if the overall size of the market 
increases, then this could cause an increase in the absolute level of reinsurance 
payments.  However, the greater proportionate increase in the standard deviation of 
payments suggests that differences in risk profiles were accentuated or maintained 
(the stabilisation of payments as a percentage of premiums, which is discussed 
below, would suggest perhaps the latter effect).  If the introduction of lifetime 
community rating had re-balanced risk profiles then the standard deviation would 
have been expected to fall, or at least not rise by as much as the level of payments 
from the fund. 
 
Two common methods of testing for changes in patterns in data series are a dummy 
variable approach and a Chow test, details of both of which can be found in Gujarati 
(1988).  In order to test whether there was a change in the patterns of payments from 
the fund and the standard deviation of contributions to/from the fund, the dummy 
variable approach was used, as the low number of observations would have made it 
difficult to run a Chow test. 
 
The dummy variable approach entails running a regression covering two periods 
which are believed to display different patterns, including a dummy variable to 
indicate one of the two periods and an interaction variable comprising the product of 
the dummy variable and an explanatory variable.  The coefficient on the dummy 
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variable is the differential intercept (i.e. the difference between the intercept of a 
regression run for the first period and the intercept of the same regression run for the 
second period), while the coefficient on the interaction variable is the differential 
slope coefficient (i.e. the difference between the slope of a regression run for the 
first period and the slope of the same regression run for the second period).  If the 
coefficient on the dummy variable is significant then it would indicate that the 
intercept would differ between the two periods, while if the coefficient on the 
interaction variable is significant then it would indicate that the slope of the 
regressions in the two periods would be different. 
 
Ordinary Least Squares regressions were run using payments made from the 
reinsurance fund and the standard deviations of payments to/from the fund as the 
dependent variables.  In both cases, the explanatory variables were the year (to 
indicate a time trend), a dummy variable – DUMLTCRGRACE – for the 
introduction of lifetime community rating and the grace period before it (set to 1 for 
2000 onwards and 0 from 1995 to 1999 inclusive) and an interaction variable 
consisting of the product of the year and the dummy variable.
117
  The two periods 
being compared are the period before the introduction of the grace period and the 
period after the introduction of the grace period.  The regressions were therefore of 
the form 
                                                 
117
 When these regressions were run with two separate dummy variables – one for the grace period 
(set to 1 in 2000 and 0 in all other years) and another for lifetime community rating (set to 1 from 
2001 onwards and 0 from 1995-2000 inclusive), both dummy variables were significant and the 
coefficients were almost identical.  A single dummy variable was therefore used, incorporating the 
grace period and the introduction of lifetime community rating, given the already low number of 
degrees of freedom. 
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uceDumltcrgraYearceDumltcrgraYearY  )(321   (Equation 5.2) 
 
Where 
Y is the dependent variable, i.e. payments from the reinsurance fund or standard 
deviation of payments to/from the reinsurance fund, 
α is a constant, 
β1, β2 and β3 are coefficients, and 
u is the error term 
 
The results of these regressions are presented in Tables 5.9 and 5.10. 
 
It can be seen from these results that, in the case of both payments from the fund and 
the standard deviation of payments to/from the fund, both the dummy variable and 
the interaction of the dummy variable and time trend are significant (indeed, in both 
regressions both of these variables are also significant at the 1% level).  This 
suggests that there was in fact a different pattern seen in both payments and standard 
deviations from the introduction of the grace period onwards, compared with that 
observed before the introduction of the grace period.  In particular, given the 
negative sign on the dummy variable and the positive sign on the interaction 
variable, the intercept would have been lower and the slope higher during and after 
the grace period compared with before the grace period if separate regressions had 
been run for the two periods.  In both cases the regressions were significant, 
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although the low number of observations (13) would suggest that some caution 
should be taken in interpreting the results. 
 
Table 5.9 Results from Regression Using Payments from the Reinsurance 
Fund as Dependent Variable 
 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error 
Constant 9060988* 3719383 
Year -4473.328* 1862.485 
DUMLTCRGRACE -29880775* 4141142 
Year x DUMLTCRGRACE 14943.25* 2072.382 
Included observations: 13  R
2
: 0.959429 
 
* = Significant at 5% level 
 
 
Table 5.10 Results from Regression Using Standard Deviation of Payments 
to/from the Reinsurance Fund as Dependent Variable 
 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error 
Constant 339490.2 335168.8 
Year -164.6045 167.8361 
DUMLTCRGRACE  -2928425* 373175.2 
Year x DUMLTCRGRACE 1463.989* 186.7508 
Included observations: 13  R
2
: 0.977711 
 
* = Significant at 5% level 
 
 
However, although the level of reinsurance payments rose in absolute terms after the 
introduction of lifetime community rating, these payments as a proportion of total 
revenue and as a proportion of total benefits paid in the market have declined since 
the introduction of lifetime community rating.  This continued a decline that was 
already established before its introduction, as can be seen in Figure 5.10.  However, 
the rate of decline appears to have slowed.  Between 1995 and 2000, the level of 
payments from the reinsurance fund as a percentage of total revenue fell from 3.51% 
to 2.18%.  Between 2000 and 2001 it fell further to 1.86%, but it has been more 
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stable since then, albeit on a slight downward trend, standing at 1.68% in the four 
quarters ending June 2007.
118
 
 
Figure 5.10 Payments from the Reinsurance Fund as a % of Total Premiums 
and Total Benefits in Australia, 1995-2007 
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Source: Calculated based on figures from Financial and Statistical Tables from 
Operations of the Health Benefits Undertakings Annual Reports (Various Years). 
Available at http://www.phiac.gov.au/publications/ar_previous/index.htm. Accessed 
on 07 May 2009. 
 
 
 
Similar analysis was undertaken of the figures contained in Figure 5.10 to that 
undertaken for the payments received from the fund and the standard deviations of 
contributions to/from the fund.  These results are presented in Tables 5.11 and 5.12.  
                                                 
118
 Interestingly, by comparison, according to HIA (2008a), the amount of payments from the risk 
equalisation fund under the Risk Equalisation Scheme, 2003 (had it not been set aside by the Supreme 
Court) would have been €20.14m in the full year 2006, compared with a premium in that year of 
€1.2362bn, according to HIA (2009).  This would therefore have represented 1.63% of revenue, very 
similar to the proportion in Australia in the year ended June 2007.  In fact, the proportion in Ireland in 
2006 would likely have been slightly higher for two reasons.  Firstly, the premium income of the 
restricted membership undertakings (all bar one of which were not participating in the Scheme) is 
included in the denominator.  Secondly, at that stage, VIVAS Health was still subject to a three-year 
exemption from making payments under the Scheme and therefore, while the denominator includes 
its premium income, the numerator does not include the contributions it would have been required to 
pay had it not been subject to the three-year exemption. 
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Again the low number of observations and the consequent low numbers of degrees 
of freedom should be borne in mind when interpreting the results. 
 
In the regression using payments from the fund as a percentage of premium 
received, all variables were also significant at the 1% level.  In the regression using 
payments from the fund as a percentage of benefits paid, both the constant and the 
year were significant at the 1% level.  However, both the dummy variable and the 
interaction variable were significant at the 10% rather than the 5% level in the latter 
regression.
119
  The negative sign on the dummy variable and the positive sign on the 
interaction variable suggest that, had separate regressions been run before and after 
the introduction of the grace period, the intercept would have been lower and the 
slope higher after the introduction of the grace period than before it.  The regressions 
were significant in both cases. 
 
Table 5.11 Results from Regression Using Payments from the Reinsurance 
Fund as a Percentage of Premium Received as Dependent Variable 
 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error 
Constant 468.1730* 74.99631 
Year -0.233000* 0.037554 
DUMLTCRGRACE -343.7329* 83.50049 
Year x DUMLTCRGRACE 0.171810* 0.041787 
Included observations: 13  R
2
: 0.968832 
 
* = Significant at 5% level 
 
 
                                                 
119
 For this regression (using payments as a percentage of benefits paid as the dependent variable), 
using separate dummy variables for the grace period and the period covered by lifetime community 
rating led to both dummy variables and the single interaction variable (between the year and the 
combined dummy) being significant at the 5% level, with the coefficients on the separate dummy 
variables being similar to each other.  The R
2
 also increased slightly, to 0.924247. 
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Table 5.12 Results from Regression Using Payments from the Reinsurance 
Fund as a Percentage of Benefits Paid as Dependent Variable 
 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error 
Constant 426.5120* 121.2937 
Year -0.212000* 0.060738 
DUMLTCRGRACE -282.6209** 135.0477 
Year x DUMLTCRGRACE 0.141286** 0.067583 
Included observations: 13  R
2
: 0.909529 
 
* = Significant at 5% level; ** = Significant at 10% level 
 
 
The above analysis suggests that, after the introduction of lifetime community rating 
in Australia, the absolute level of reinsurance payments rose, as did the variability of 
the payments across insurers.  Furthermore, the results suggest that the level of 
reinsurance payments relative to premiums and relative to benefits paid stabilised, 
having been on a downward trend prior to the introduction of lifetime community 
rating. 
 
This therefore would suggest that risk equalisation payments could account for a 
greater proportion of insurers’ premium income under lifetime community rating 
than under a single rate community rating system.  This is something that the 
Department of Health and Children might wish to consider in relation to its policies 
regarding the introduction of lifetime community rating in Ireland and its work on a 
new risk equalisation scheme for the Irish private health insurance market. 
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5.6 Concluding Remarks 
 
Community rating is one of the three ‘pillars’ on which the Irish private health 
insurance market is based, the others being open enrolment and lifetime cover.  
Community rating initially developed in the Irish private health insurance market in 
the absence of any legislative requirement.  However, by the time the market was 
deregulated in the mid-1990s, it had become an integral feature of the market and 
the then government enshrined the principle of community rating in legislation in 
order to ensure that it was maintained even after the onset of competition in the 
market. 
 
Community rating can take a number of forms.  The form currently practiced in the 
Irish private health insurance market is single rate community rating.  In this form, 
premiums do not vary depending on the age at which a consumer first takes out 
insurance.  However, this system suffers from an inherent instability, as there is an 
incentive for consumers to engage in hit-and-run or hit-and-stay activity (adverse 
selection), only taking out insurance when they become ill or are more likely to 
become ill.  The age-related waiting periods permitted under the Open Enrolment 
Regulations provide some protection against this type of behaviour. 
 
Another variant of community rating is lifetime community rating, whereby age at 
entry has an impact on premiums but risk is still not taken into account when setting 
the premium and therefore consumers who take out insurance at the same age pay 
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the same premium, irrespective of risk factors such as age, gender or health status.  
A central feature of lifetime community rating is the imposition of late entry 
loadings, whereby people who take out health insurance for the first time at an older 
age pay an age-related loading, usually with reference to the premium charged to a 
person who takes out insurance before a specified threshold age.  Such a system has 
been proposed in Ireland and is anticipated in the near future. 
 
A similar change from single rate community rating to lifetime community rating 
was implemented in Australia in 2000, following a grace period of just over 12 
months, during which anyone who took out private health insurance was not subject 
to late entry loadings.  The Australian experience is therefore instructive for Irish 
policy-makers in this regard. 
 
The introduction of lifetime community rating in Australia led to a significant 
increase in the numbers taking out private health insurance, although some 
commentators have suggested that the effect of this particular policy has been 
overestimated, as it came shortly after two other policy changes also designed to 
increase take-up.  The first of these was a combination of a levy on high-earners who 
do not take out private health insurance and a subsidy to assist those on low incomes 
to purchase it, while the second involved the replacement of the subsidy from the 
first policy change by a rebate for all those who purchase private health insurance. 
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The Australian market also experienced a sharp fall in the average age of insured 
persons during the grace period.  This resulted from the fact that during the grace 
period, while there was a modest increase in the number of older consumers taking 
out private health insurance, there was a significantly sharper increase in take-up 
among younger consumers.  However, the reduction in average age and the increase 
in overall take-up appear to have been unwinding since the introduction of lifetime 
community rating, leading some commentators to suggest that its introduction has 
not been entirely effective in combating the problem of adverse selection in the 
market.  It is too early to tell whether this is a readjustment of the market to a more 
stable level or the re-emergence of a longer-term adverse selection-induced market 
decline.  In any event, it is possible that an alteration of the late entry loadings might 
address this problem. 
 
The experience of the Australian market suggests that, if lifetime community rating 
is introduced to replace single rate community rating in Ireland, the average age of 
the insured population is likely to fall, and take-up is likely to increase.  However, a 
number of features of the Irish market suggest that these effects might be more 
muted here than in Australia.  In this regard, the introduction of lifetime community 
rating in Ireland might not be as effective in reducing adverse selection as it was in 
Australia.  Nevertheless, a reduction in the average age of the insured population 
would benefit the market overall in the form of a lower overall risk profile.  While 
this is unlikely to be sufficient to cause a reduction in premiums (as other factors 
such as rising treatment costs and improvements in technology would likely 
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outweigh the reduction in average age), it might lead to premiums not being raised 
by as much as they otherwise would be. 
 
Another result of the change from single rate community rating to lifetime 
community rating in Australia was an increase in the turnover of the reinsurance 
fund in absolute terms.  In relative terms, the turnover of the fund as a proportion of 
premiums/benefits, which had been on a downward trend, appears to have stabilised.  
This has implications for Ireland in the context of the Supreme Court decision in 
2008 to set aside the Risk Equalisation Scheme, 2003.  In particular, the Australian 
experience suggests that a change from single rate community rating to lifetime 
community rating would mean that some form of risk adjustment mechanism would 
likely involve a greater absolute level of monetary transfers under the new rating 
system, which would therefore have implications for insurers’ balance sheets. 
 
Overall, a change from single rate to lifetime community rating in the Irish private 
health insurance market might reduce the potential for adverse selection, at least in 
the short-run, although perhaps not in the long-run.  However, it would not reduce 
the need for a risk equalisation scheme.  Indeed, the evidence suggests the opposite – 
that it would actually increase the need for a risk adjustment mechanism.  This is 
something that policy-makers in Ireland should consider in advance of changing the 
community rating regime. 
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Another issue worthy of consideration by policy-makers is the alternative to 
community rating that has been proposed by a number of commentators – that of 
guaranteed renewability.  Its proponents argue that such a system would be superior 
to community rating, although the model of guaranteed renewability proposed by 
Pauly et al (1995) has not been fully implemented elsewhere.  Furthermore, given 
the significant difference between this system and the current community rating 
mechanism operating in Ireland, it should be noted that moving to guaranteed 
renewability would involve considerable effort and would need careful 
consideration. 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE EFFECT ON THE MARKET OF HAVING COMMUNITY RATING 
RATHER THAN RISK RATING 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Community rating – whereby insurers are not permitted to vary premiums by 
reference to age, gender, current or prospective state of health or any other factor 
that might affect the risk which an insured person represents to an insurer – is one of 
the three ‘pillars’ on which the Irish private health insurance market is based.  
Combined with open enrolment – whereby insurers may not refuse an applicant 
except in very limited circumstances – and lifetime cover – whereby insurers may 
not refuse to renew cover except in very limited circumstances – community rating 
ensures that health insurance remains affordable for those who need it most, i.e. the 
sick and elderly. 
 
However, community rating is not universally popular, despite having widespread 
political support in Ireland.  Some commentators believe that it is an unreasonable 
restriction on the conduct of insurance business and represents a market distortion.  
It has also been suggested that community rating increases incentives for insurers to 
engage in risk selection and for consumers to engage in adverse selection, both of 
which can have adverse implications for the market, as discussed in Chapter 4. 
 
If adverse selection and/or risk selection were to de-stabilise the market then 
community rating could break down.  If this were to happen then an alternative 
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would be risk rating, whereby a person’s premium would be determined with 
reference to the risk they represent to an insurer.  This would lead to higher 
premiums for high-risk (older and sicker) consumers, which might lead significant 
numbers of these consumers to discontinue coverage.  If risk segmentation were to 
be taken to the extreme under community rating, similar results would be seen.  If 
this were to happen then those people who discontinue cover would fall back on the 
public healthcare system, which is already under severe pressure.  It is worth 
remembering from Chapter 2 that dissatisfaction with the public system is one of the 
reasons behind the high take-up rate of private health insurance in Ireland. 
 
This Chapter reviews the literature regarding community rating versus risk rating.  It 
then compares the Irish private health insurance market with the Australian market 
(which also operates community rating, albeit a different form of community rating, 
as was discussed in Chapter 5) and the UK market (which operates risk rating), with 
a view to determining the effect on the market of having community rating rather 
than risk rating, particularly in terms of the age profile of the insured population.  
All three systems have the common link that they are voluntary private health 
insurance systems operating alongside universal free (or almost free) publicly 
provided hospital systems.  The characteristics of the three markets are compared, 
particularly with respect to the age profile of the insured population.  This analysis 
shows that community rating attracts a higher proportion of older, sicker consumers 
than risk rating. 
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The effect of community rating attracting a higher proportion of older consumers 
into the insured market than risk rating is then examined, particularly with regard to 
the utilisation of the public hospital system by public and private patients across age 
bands in Ireland.  Analysis is undertaken on data relating to discharges from public 
hospitals in Ireland.  In particular, the differences between younger and older 
patients and between public and private patients, in terms of average lengths of stay 
and treatment complexity, are examined.  Implications of the results are then drawn 
in order to assess the impact on the public hospital system of having community 
rating in the market for private health insurance and the impact that a breakdown of 
community rating would have on the public system. 
 
6.2 Community Rating versus Risk Rating 
 
As mentioned in Chapters 2 and 5, community rating developed as a feature of the 
Irish market during Vhi Healthcare’s monopoly era.  When the Health Insurance 
Act, 1994 was passed, it gave legislative status to the principle of community rating 
in preparation for the onset of a competitive market for health insurance.  
Community rating is the only one of the three ‘pillars’ of the market (the others 
being open enrolment and lifetime cover) which is set out in primary legislation (i.e. 
the 1994 Act, as amended) rather than secondary legislation (i.e. regulations made 
pursuant to the Act). 
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Successive governments have reiterated support for community rating as a feature of 
the Irish private health insurance market, as can be seen in, for example, Department 
of Health and Children (1999, 2008c). 
 
In a Dáil (lower house of the Irish parliament) debate on 30 September 2008, the 
Spokesperson on Health of Fine Gael, the main opposition party, asked the Minister 
for Health and Children about her views on the Supreme Court decision to set aside 
the Risk Equalisation Scheme, 2003 (see Section 2.4) and what action she intended 
to take in order to stabilise the health insurance market.  In the course of her 
response, the Minister noted “A primary objective of Government policy in health 
insurance is that it should be affordable for the broadest possible cross section of the 
community including older people and those who suffer ill health.”  She went on to 
state “I have yet to hear any argument made against the continuing need for 
community rating.  It is a fundamental principle of the health insurance market in 
Ireland.  Following the liberalisation of the market in 1994 every political party and 
successive Governments have supported the maintenance of community rating.”  
The Fine Gael Spokesperson on Health added “I fully support the Minister in the 
community rating principle.”120, 121 
                                                 
120
 Parliamentary Debates: Dáil Éireann (Official Report – Unrevised), Vol. 662 No. 1, para. 116. 
121
 It should be noted that, in this exchange, the Minister appears to be referring to community rating 
as an objective of government policy.  However, it could be argued that the objective is that older and 
sicker consumers are not disadvantaged by having to pay higher premiums, and that community 
rating is one possible tool by which this objective can be achieved (another possible tool being risk-
adjusted premium subsidies, as put forward by Van de Ven et al (2000) – see Sections 4.2.2 and 5.3).  
In this regard, it is interesting to note that the Health Insurance (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 2009 
states “The principal objective of the Minister and the Authority in performing their respective 
functions under this Act is to ensure, in the interests of the common good, that access to health 
insurance cover is available to consumers of health services with no differentiation made between 
them…in particular as regards the costs of health services, based in whole or in part on the respective 
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However, some see community rating as a market distortion.  Certainly, in a 
competitive market, if left to their own devices, it is likely that most, if not all, 
insurers would prefer risk rating, as this system allows insurers to set premiums with 
reference to the risk that an individual would represent to them.  This type of rating 
system is used for other forms of insurance in Ireland, such as motor or home 
insurance.  However, many commentators have argued that a competitive market in 
health insurance would lead to risk selection on the part of insurers.  This was 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 4. 
 
Harrington & Niehaus (2003) note that, in a competitive insurance market, insurers 
will engage in cost-based pricing – whereby premiums will differ across consumers 
based on their expected claim costs – if three conditions hold: insurers do not want 
to lose money, consumers prefer lower premiums for any given level of cover, and 
one or more insurers can predict differences in expected claim costs across 
consumers at low cost. 
 
Notwithstanding the non-profit nature of Vhi Healthcare, it would be reasonable to 
assume that the first two of these conditions would hold for the Irish private health 
insurance market.  The third could be at least partially fulfilled on the basis that age 
                                                                                                                                         
age range and general health status of the members of any particular generation (or part thereof)…” 
and that this Act amends the Health Insurance Act, 1994 by entering a new definition of community 
rating in the latter, as well as defining a community rated health insurance contract as being one 
which complies with Section 7(1) of the 1994 Act.  The definition of community rating in the 2009 
Act is “measures which, whether in whole or in part, apply towards the achievement of the principal 
objective…[as outlined above]…”  This definition of community rating could encompass risk-
adjusted premium subsidies, which would be an alternative tool to community rating in achieving the 
principal objective. 
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and gender, while not perfect predictors of health status, do give some broad 
indication of variations therein and are readily available to insurers. 
 
However, one factor that could lead to this principle not being fulfilled is if legal or 
regulatory provisions prohibit insurers from charging different premiums to different 
consumers.  This is the case in the Irish private health insurance market, as 
legislation dictates that community rating is mandatory.  If legislation is required to 
mandate community rating, and if community rating is a market distortion, then it is 
possible that further regulation would be needed to counter-balance the distortion 
arising from community rating. 
 
In this regard, Evans (2002) notes, “Since community rating is fundamentally 
inconsistent with maximizing profits, however, further regulation and various forms 
of subsidy or inter-insurer transfers are required to sustain it.”  (Evans, 2002: 49)  In 
an Irish context, Nolan (2005) argues that a risk equalisation scheme must be 
introduced in order to ensure the continued stability of the community rating system.   
 
Hartedny (1994) is one author who argues against the concept of community rating 
on the basis that it distorts the market for insurers.  He suggests that, by imposing 
social policy on insurance products, in the form of mandated community rating, the 
government adds significant costs to the market.  He argues that community rating 
and guaranteed issue (open enrolment) are often presented as solutions but that they 
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actually cause problems in practice, such as younger people paying more than they 
actuarially would for insurance. 
 
This last phenomenon is also highlighted by Curtis, Lewis, Haugh & Forland (1999), 
who note that age rating better correlates price with both ability to pay – since older 
workers generally earn more than younger ones – and with perceived and actual 
value.  In the context of insurance market reforms in a number of US states, 
including the introduction of rating restrictions in some states, they point out that 
there is a fear that a prohibition on age rating would lead significant numbers of 
young people to drop coverage, thus making insurance for those remaining in the 
market more expensive.  This would be consistent with the arguments relating to 
adverse selection caused by community rating, which are discussed in Chapters 4 
and 5.  Curtis et al (1999) suggest that this effect was partly behind the overall drop 
in health insurance coverage in the US in the 1990s. 
 
Community rating and risk equalisation are sometimes cited as factors which make 
entry by insurers to insurance markets less attractive.  For example, PHIAC (2008b) 
suggest that one reason for a low number of new entrants in the Australian private 
health insurance market might be “inability to charge premiums to individuals that 
are actuarially justified for risk, due to community rating principles and risk 
equalisation arrangements, portability of membership provisions [and] price 
regulation.”  (PHIAC, 2008b: 18).  YHEC (2003) also note that community rating, 
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as well as risk equalisation, has had an impact on the level of existing and future 
competition in the Irish private health insurance market. 
 
The notion that community rating is inconsistent with profit maximisation may 
explain why Private Patients Plan, which unsuccessfully applied to enter the Irish 
private health insurance market in 1988, said in 1990 that it would not enter the 
market if it were community rated (see O’Morain, 2007 for further details on this). 
 
Community rating leads to redistributive effects in insurance markets, as noted by 
Harrington & Niehaus (2003).  They point out that moving from flat rate pricing to 
cost-based pricing – of which risk rating would be a form – can lead to redistributive 
effects, behavioural changes and classification costs.  The redistributive effects 
redistribute wealth from high-risk consumers to low-risk consumers.  Under a flat 
rate pricing system such as community rating, low-risk consumers subsidise high-
risk consumers. 
 
If high-risk consumers are charged higher rates than low-risk consumers, then some 
high-risk consumers may alter their behaviour to reduce their risk and thereby 
reduce their premiums.  By reducing their individual risk, this helps to lower the 
overall level of risk in society and thus its cost. 
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However, there can also be costs involved in classifying consumers according to 
their risk, and, in extreme cases, these costs can outweigh the benefits of behavioural 
changes, with the overall effect being to add to the cost of risk in society. 
 
In this regard, Harrington & Niehaus note: “Any attempt to prevent classification by 
regulating insurance company classification processes will involve some cost.  
Regulation also will be less than completely effective, and it could have unexpected 
and unintended effects.” (Harrington & Niehaus, 2003: 140).  Broadly speaking, 
price regulation can take the form of regulation of rate changes or regulation of 
rating factors (into which category community rating would fall). 
 
However, the extent to which behavioural changes are possible in the health 
insurance arena is a matter for debate.  For example, while ill-health may be related 
to lifestyle factors such as smoking, diet and exercise, it may also be affected by 
such issues as genetics and environmental factors, which are beyond the scope of 
behavioural changes. 
 
It is unlikely that the costs of classifying health insurance consumers would be 
significant either, certainly if age and gender were used.  It might be more expensive 
to incorporate some type of prior utilisation measure, but this would also increase 
the predictability of future medical expenses, and the benefits might thus outweigh 
the costs. 
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The cross-subsidisation of some groups by other groups under a system of 
community rating can in some cases produce perverse effects however.  In some 
cases, cross-subsidisation as a result of community rating might benefit not only 
those who might be needy (the elderly or chronically ill) but also those who lead 
unhealthy lifestyles (smokers, drinkers, obese people, etc.), as argued by Pupp 
(1981). In other cases, the cross-subsidies might benefit higher-income consumers at 
the expense of lower-income ones.  For example, Hall (1998) suggests that 
community rating involves implicit subsidies from younger to older consumers who, 
ceteris paribus, would have higher incomes, but that this effect is not the intended 
purpose of community rating. 
 
The idea that community rating can benefit those on higher incomes has also been 
given weight by a number of empirical studies.  For example, Maynard & Dixon 
(2002) point out that, despite community rating of premiums, the purchasing of 
private health insurance in Australia was concentrated in the wealthiest households.  
Palangkaraya et al (2009) also find that policy reforms introduced in Australia in the 
late 1990s (discussed in Section 5.4.1) benefited those on higher incomes more than 
those on lower incomes.  They note that income, education and occupation have 
positive and statistically significant effects on the decision to purchase private health 
insurance.  Their results also suggest that more households in high-income groups 
would have purchased private health insurance even without the policy reforms, so 
they suggest that those high-income households benefited disproportionately from 
the windfall gains under the 30% rebate. 
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Australia is not the only country where the purchase of private health insurance is 
positively correlated with income.  As was seen in Section 2.1.4, the take-up rates of 
private health insurance in Ireland are significantly higher among those in higher 
social classes (who would likely have higher incomes) than lower social classes. 
 
Income and employment status have been significant variables in a number of 
models of demand for private health insurance in the UK (Propper, 1989; Wallis, 
2004 and Foubister, Thomson, Mossialos & McGuire, 2006).  Wallis (2004) also 
notes that those reporting better self-assessed health status have a higher propensity 
to have private health insurance, which he considers counter-intuitive, although as 
shown in Table 6.9, this is also the case in the Irish market.
122
 
 
As mentioned earlier in this section, community rating involves a redistribution of 
wealth from low-risk insured lives to high-risk insured lives, but it is unclear 
whether this is of benefit to society as a whole.  In a related theme, Pauly (1970) 
examines the welfare economics of community rating.  He defines and compares 
community rating and experience rating.  He develops a model to show that an 
insured person has similar expected net income whether he has insurance with a 
deductible or full insurance with a lump-sum tax of the same magnitude as the 
deductible, but that the expected utility is higher with the latter as the expected 
                                                 
122
 Doiron et al (2008) find the same effect in Australia.  However, they argue that this is due to the 
correlated effects of other factors such as risk preferences, income and other socio-economic 
variables.  Using other measures of risk they find a more conventional adverse selection effect. 
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income is had with certainty.  He then shows that with community rating, the insured 
person suffers a loss of utility. 
 
Overall, Pauly (1970) argues that the cross-subsidisation of high-risk lives by low-
risk lives is inefficient as low-risk lives under-insure and high-risk lives over-insure.  
This argument was also put forward by Feldman (1987).  Pauly & Herring (1999) 
also argue that community rating does not lead to a monetary gain relative to risk 
rating, but rather it leads to a transfer from lower-risk insured persons to higher-risk 
insured persons. 
 
Pauly (1970) notes a number of arguments that are put forward in favour of 
community rating: that it provides insurance against longer-term changes in the 
probability of medical expenses
123
; that it permits lower administrative expenses; 
and that it helps to make comprehensive coverage available affordably to all 
segments of a community.  He also introduces moral hazard and examines whether 
community rating or experience rating produces optimal consumption of medical 
services.  He notes that community rating encourages more consumption by some 
individuals and less by others. 
 
This theme is continued by Feldman (1987), who suggests that community rating 
accentuates the potential for moral hazard.  Indeed, he suggests that the absence of 
risk rating leads to three sources of market failure: moral hazard, the cross-
subsidisation of high-risk lives by low-risk lives (with low-risk lives under-insuring 
                                                 
123
 This is also a feature of guaranteed renewability, which was discussed in Section 5.3. 
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and high-risk lives over-insuring), and a reduction in the optimal level of spending 
on health promotion to zero.  He notes that community rating can be a sales-
maximising strategy for insurers and that it is often suggested as a solution to the 
problem of adverse selection, although he questions whether an adverse selection 
disequilibrium actually exists in practice.  He goes on to suggest that the existing 
subsidy system (between low-risk and high-risk lives) in the group insurance market 
in the US is inefficient, and that a Pareto-superior alternative might be to use risk 
rating and subsidise sick workers via higher wages. 
 
However, Light (1998) notes that community rating, as practiced in Ireland “is far 
superior to risk-rated private insurance and the upgrades that are found in many 
countries such as Great Britain, because it does not allow insurers to select 
procedures, disorders, or subscribers from the national service or system.”  (Light, 
1998: 746) 
 
The idea that community rating is beneficial as it helps to pool risks more widely 
than risk rating is one that has been put forward on a number of occasions.  
However, Pauly & Herring (1999) argue that risk rating also entails risk pooling.  In 
particular, they note that, in a risk rated health insurance market in the US, actual 
expenses varied considerably more than expected expenses, which in turn varied 
considerably more than premiums.  This, they suggest, is evidence of risk pooling 
even in a risk rated environment. 
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They suggest two ways in which community rating could be avoided, with similar 
outcomes.  The first is to have risk-rated insurance with (ideally lump sum) transfers 
to those high risks deemed worthy of a subsidy.  The second, following Arrow 
(1963), is to take a longer-term view of insurance, but to limit premium variation 
based on some but not all characteristics.  In general, they argue that community 
rating “is not a uniquely acceptable benchmark.”  (Pauly & Herring, 1999: 8)  As 
discussed in Section 5.3, the same authors have proposed a system of guaranteed 
renewability as an alternative to community rating. 
 
Another alternative to community rating was proposed by Hartedny (1994), who 
suggests a system of high-deductible, low-premium insurance products, with people 
putting the money they save on premiums into medical savings accounts, from 
which they could pay routine medical costs.  This would have the additional benefit 
of reducing administrative expenses due to fewer claims to be processed by insurers.  
Other insurance reforms suggested by Hartedny, in the context of the US, include 
portability of coverage and tax-funded state risk pools for the small number of high-
risk, uninsurable customers. 
 
As mentioned in Section 2.1.3, voluntary private health insurance can be classified 
as substitutive (substituting for the statutory health care system), complementary 
(providing cover for services excluded or not fully covered by the state) and 
supplementary (providing faster access and greater consumer choice).  Ireland’s 
private health insurance system is primarily supplementary, with elements of 
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complementary insurance also.  Mossialos & Thomson (2002b) note that most 
voluntary complementary or supplementary systems in the European Union operate 
on the basis of risk rated individual premiums, but that Ireland is a notable exception 
to this. 
 
Nolan (2005) argues that, since private health insurance in Ireland essentially 
provides cover for services already available under the universal entitlements to 
access the public hospital system (i.e. it would be primarily supplementary under the 
categorisation of Mossialos & Thomson), the rationale for community rating in 
particular and, to a lesser extent, open enrolment and lifetime cover, has been 
questioned. 
 
Article 54 of the European Third Non-Life Insurance Directive permits national 
governments of Member States to introduce measures designed to protect the 
common good in situations where national systems provide a partial or complete 
alternative to the publicly-provided system.  Community rating, open enrolment, 
lifetime cover, minimum benefits and risk equalisation in Ireland were all introduced 
using Article 54 as a justification.  However, as Thomson & Mossialos (2007) note, 
there is considerable uncertainty relating to applicability of Article 54.  In particular, 
there is some confusion about the definition of the “common good” and also some 
debate about the degree to which national systems provide a partial or complete 
alternative to the publicly-provided system. 
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Maynard & Dixon (2002) examine the pros and cons of risk rating, community 
rating and group rating in private health insurance.  They note that, while 
community rating is often introduced for reasons of equity or solidarity, introducing 
it in a voluntary market might lead to low risks exiting the market as premiums are 
seen by them as too expensive, leaving the market with a higher proportion of high 
risks.  In the absence of a single pool (such as under a compulsory national scheme 
of health insurance), regulators must define rules for pooling.  Without appropriate 
regulation, the authors argue, the market might suffer from market segmentation, 
cream skimming and exclusion of vulnerable groups, which would undermine 
solidarity objectives. 
 
It is clear that community rating is a broadly supported policy in the Irish legislature.  
However, from a review of the literature, it can be seen that community rating is 
seen by some as a market distortion, which goes against the approach, favoured by 
insurers, of taking risk into account when pricing insurance.  It is suggested by a 
number of authors that some form of further regulation (such as a risk adjustment 
scheme) is needed to counteract the distortion caused by community rating.  It is 
also clear that community rating leads to a redistribution of wealth from low risks to 
high risks, as the former subsidise the latter under community rating, and there is 
some debate as to whether or not this is a good thing for society or the market as a 
whole.  Other authors have questioned whether the potential benefits of community 
rating over other rating types really exist.  There is also evidence to suggest that the 
purchase of private health insurance in Ireland, Australia and the UK (the three 
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countries examined in this Chapter) is concentrated in higher income groups, and 
therefore government policies to support the purchase of private health insurance 
will disproportionately benefit these groups.  A number of alternatives to community 
rating have been proposed, including guaranteed renewability of insurance.  It can 
also be seen that Ireland is unusual in European terms in having a high degree of 
regulation of supplementary/complementary voluntary private health insurance in 
the form of community rating, open enrolment, lifetime cover and minimum 
benefits, along with risk equalisation (albeit that this last policy is currently not in 
place). 
 
6.3 A Comparison of Health Systems: Ireland, UK and Australia 
 
It would therefore be instructive to examine what impact community rating has on 
the characteristics of the market for private health insurance in Ireland, specifically 
with regard to the age profile of the insured community.  To do this, the Irish health 
insurance market is compared with another community rated health insurance 
market (Australia) and a risk rated health insurance market (the UK) to try to 
determine the differences in characteristics of the market under community rating 
versus risk rating. 
 
Australia and the UK provide a good basis for comparing and contrasting private 
health insurance markets with that of Ireland.  From a historical perspective, 
Ireland’s hospital system, as it is currently structured, has its roots in the workhouses 
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of the late 19
th
 century – a time during which Ireland was governed by the British – 
as noted by O’Morain (2007).  He also notes that Australia has had a considerable 
influence on the Irish healthcare system, citing as examples the private health 
insurance market and the introduction of a casemix system of hospital funding. 
 
The health systems of all three countries also have a number of common features.  In 
particular, all three systems feature voluntary private health insurance markets set 
against a background of universal access entitlements to the public hospital systems. 
 
Figure 6.1 Total Expenditure on Health as a % of GDP, 1970-2007: Ireland, 
UK and Australia 
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Source: OECD (2009) 
Note: The OECD indicates occasional breaks in the series so these figures should be 
used for indicative purposes 
 
 
Figure 6.1 shows health spending as a proportion of GDP in the three countries.
124
  
This shows that all three countries have increased the proportion of GDP spent on 
                                                 
124
 As noted in Section 2.1.2 and Section 5.5.2, many feel that GNP is a more accurate indicator of 
economic activity in Ireland.  If this measure were used for Ireland, health spending as a proportion of 
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health since the 1970s, as has been the case in most OECD countries.  The effect of 
severe cutbacks in health spending in Ireland in the 1980s can be clearly seen from 
these figures (see Wren, 2003 for a discussion of these cutbacks).  Since the late 
1980s, Australia has consistently spent a higher proportion of GDP on health than 
either Ireland or the UK, while Ireland has also spent a lower proportion of GDP on 
health than the UK since the mid-1990s. 
 
Figure 6.2 Total Expenditure on Health per Capita US$ PPP, 1970-2007: 
Ireland, UK and Australia 
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Figure 6.2 shows total expenditure on health per capita, allowing for exchange rate 
differentials by using purchasing power parity.  It can be seen from this figure that 
Australia has consistently spent a higher amount per capita on health than the UK 
                                                                                                                                         
GNP would be higher than health spending as a proportion of GDP.  Specifically, as noted in Section 
2.1.2, in 2007 health spending represented 7.7% of GDP but 9.1% of GNP in Ireland.  However, the 
figures produced by the OECD use GDP rather than GNP and are therefore presented here for 
consistency. 
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and Ireland, although figures for Australia for 2007 are not available.  Although 
Ireland’s spending as a percentage of GDP has remained below that of Australia and 
the UK in the 1990s and 2000s, the strong growth in GDP in Ireland in the late 
1990s and early years of this decade – the so-called “Celtic Tiger” era – has allowed 
spending per capita in Ireland to increase strongly and overtake the comparable 
figures in the UK and close the gap between Ireland and Australia. 
 
Table 6.1 Selected Indicators of Health Expenditure, 2006: Ireland, UK and 
Australia 
 
Indicator Ireland UK Australia 
General government expenditure on health 
as a % of total expenditure on health 
78.3 87.4 67.2 
Private expenditure on health as a % of total 
expenditure on health 
21.7 12.6 32.8 
Private prepaid plans as a % of private 
expenditure on health 
38.6 7.8 22.0 
Out-of-pocket payments as a % of private 
expenditure on health 
57.2 92.2 55.7 
Social security expenditure on health as a % 
of general government expenditure on 
health 
0.9 0.0 0.0 
General government expenditure on health 
as a % of total government expenditure 
17.3 16.5 17.2 
 
Source: WHO (2009b) 
 
 
Table 6.1 shows that the health systems of all three countries are primarily financed 
by government expenditure.  However, the degree to which private expenditure 
accounts for overall health spending is considerably lower in the UK than in either 
Ireland or Australia, as is the proportion of private expenditure on health accounted 
for by private insurance (private prepaid plans).  This likely reflects the fact that the 
private health insurance markets in both Ireland and Australia cover significantly 
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higher proportions of the population than in the UK (see Section 6.3).  Combining 
these two measures, it can be seen that private prepaid plans accounted for almost 
8.4% of total expenditure on health in Ireland and 7.2% in Australia in 2006, 
compared with just less than 1.0% in the UK. 
 
The low proportions of government expenditure on health accounted for by social 
security expenditure reflects the fact that all three systems are primarily tax-
financed, compared with the social insurance financing of many continental 
European health systems.  Table 6.1 also shows that health accounts for a greater 
share of overall government expenditure in Ireland and Australia than in the UK. 
 
As can be seen in Table 6.2, the number of practicing physicians per capita in 
Ireland is higher than in either Australia or the UK, although the OECD notes that a 
different methodology is used for the Irish figures.  However, Ireland has a 
significantly higher number of nurses and hospital beds per capita than either of the 
other two countries.  Ireland’s number of hospital discharges per 100,000 population 
is higher than that of the UK but significantly below that of Australia.  Combining 
this figure with the number of beds per 1,000 population, it would appear that the 
other two systems have a higher number of discharges per bed than Ireland.  Life 
expectancy figures for Ireland are broadly similar to those of the UK but lower than 
those of Australia.  It should be noted however, that this is not necessarily an 
indication of the efficacy of the health system, as environmental and lifestyle factors 
would also make a difference to this measure. 
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Table 6.2 Selected Indicators of Health Performance, 2007: Ireland, UK 
and Australia 
 
Indicator Ireland UK Australia 
Practicing physicians: density per 1,000 
population (head counts) 
3.03† 2.48 2.81* 
Practicing nurses: density per 1,000 
population (head counts)
125
 
15.50 10.02 9.66** 
Total hospital beds per 1,000 population 5.3* 3.4 3.9* 
Hospital discharge rates per 100,000 
population: all causes 
13,796 12,554 16,238* 
Life expectancy: males at birth (years) 77.3* 77.1** 79.0 
Life expectancy: females at birth (years) 82.1* 81.1** 83.7 
 
Source: OECD (2009) 
Note: † indicates a different methodology, according to the OECD 
Note: * indicates 2006 data; ** indicates 2005 data 
 
 
6.3.1 Brief Overview of the Australian and UK Systems 
 
A full examination of the Australian and UK health systems and their interaction 
with the private health insurance markets in those countries would be beyond the 
scope of this study.  However, this section presents a brief outline of the health 
systems in the two countries and should therefore be treated as such. 
 
The National Health Service (NHS) in the UK was founded in 1948.  It is primarily 
a tax-financed system, in which residents are entitled to free access to NHS 
                                                 
125
 The figure for practicing nurses per 1,000 population for Ireland has been criticised as an 
inaccurate portrayal of the true situation.  In particular, it has been pointed out that this figure makes 
no allowance for the breakdown between full-time and part-time nurses.  For example, Spiers (2006) 
suggests that, as at December 2004, there were 40,700 nurses employed in the public health system, 
but that they were filling fewer than 34,300 whole-time equivalent posts.  She also argues that certain 
categories of nurses included in the Irish figures are not included in the corresponding figures for 
other countries. 
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hospitals.  Similarly to the Irish situation, the NHS suffered from under-funding for 
years, which led to long waiting lists, although not as long as those in the Irish 
public hospital system (see Wren, 2003).  Hospital doctors are salaried in the NHS, 
similar to the public hospital consultants in Ireland.  However, consultants in the 
NHS may only engage in limited private practice, compared with Irish consultants.  
There are a very small number of private beds in public hospitals in the UK, but the 
majority of private practice carried out by NHS consultants is performed in private 
hospitals.  Wren (2003) notes that, in 1998 these private beds accounted for just 1% 
of all public beds, while in 2001 private patients accounted for just 1% of NHS 
admissions.  Grosse-Tebbe & Figueras (2005) note that private hospitals account for 
less than 5% of total acute bed capacity. 
 
This is also highlighted by Foubister et al (2006), who point out that public 
providers cannot receive private income, while private providers who deliver 
services to the NHS cannot combine private and public revenue in the same NHS-
contracted service.  However, they suggest that private provision of NHS-funded 
healthcare is likely to become a more significant feature in the coming years.  They 
also note that NHS doctors are permitted to undertake some private practice, and that 
the overlap is self-regulated, which they note can create perverse incentives for 
doctors to carry out treatment privately rather than publicly (an issue that has been 
raised in Ireland, as discussed in Section 2.1.5).  They also point out that the NHS 
consultant contract has recently been altered to provide greater incentives for doctors 
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to carry out NHS work only (also similar to the Irish case, as discussed in Section 
2.1.5). 
 
Another major difference between the UK and Irish systems is that the NHS 
provides for free access to GPs, whereas the majority of the Irish population (those 
without medical cards or GP visit cards) must pay for GP visits through out-of-
pocket expenses.
126
  Restrictions on free access to primary care in Ireland could 
accentuate demand for hospital care (if illnesses are left untreated for longer), 
leading to longer waiting times for hospital treatment, which in turn could lead to 
higher demand for private health insurance, particularly as it is perceived as 
providing faster access to treatment, as discussed in Section 2.1.4. 
 
There is some cost-sharing for prescription medicines in the UK (as there is in 
Ireland), although fees charged to patients for such medicines are nominal (Boyle, 
2008).  In recent years, the NHS has undergone major reforms, moving towards 
NHS Trusts, rather than a single, large monopoly provider of hospital care.  Waiting 
times for hospital treatment in the UK have been reduced in recent years, as a result 
of initiatives by the NHS.  As noted by Grosse-Tebbe & Figueras (2005), from 2004 
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 O’Reilly et al (2007) find evidence that user charges for GP services act as a deterrent to those 
people who must pay them.  In particular, they find that, while only 1.8% of those surveyed in 
Northern Ireland (which, as part of the UK, has free access to GP services) had an illness but had not 
consulted a GP due to cost concerns in the previous 12 months, the figures in the Republic of Ireland 
were 4.4% of patients with medical cards and 26.3% of those without.  Their findings show that those 
most likely not to consult a GP due to cost concerns were young adults and those on lower incomes.  
Layte & Nolan (2009) also conclude that GP charges act as a deterrent to those who must pay them, 
and they note that Ireland is unusual among OECD countries in terms of the relatively low proportion 
of the population entitled to free primary care services.  They also find that, of those without medical 
cards, the probability of visiting a GP is lower among those in lower income groups, and that the 
probability of visiting a GP even among the highest income group is lower than the probability of a 
medical card holder visiting a GP (controlling for health and other factors). 
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any patient waiting more than six months for surgery is entitled to obtain treatment 
from another hospital or provider, in the private sector or abroad if necessary.  This 
is similar to the National Treatment Purchase Fund initiative in Ireland. 
 
The private health insurance market in the UK also displays a significant difference 
compared with the Irish system, in that the majority of insured persons in the UK 
market have their private health insurance purchased by their employer.  However, 
Foubister et al (2006) note that around one in eight company schemes require some 
contribution from employees. 
 
A report from Laing & Buisson (2008) shows that, at the end of 2007, company-paid 
private health insurance accounted for approximately three-quarters of subscribers 
and persons covered, although it only accounted for just over half of subscription 
income earned.  The report shows that subscriptions per subscriber for company-
paid private health insurance were less than half the level of individual/employee-
paid subscriptions per subscriber, at £709 and £1,475 respectively.  The report 
argues that the difference is due to higher sales and administration costs and an older 
subscriber age profile for the individual market.  It also finds that the numbers 
insured in the individual market have been trending downwards during the 1990s 
and the 2000s, while the numbers insured in the company-paid market have 
remained reasonably stable.  It also shows that the individual market is more price 
inelastic than the company-paid market and that both price increases and cost 
increases have tended to be greater for the former than the latter.  This is also 
 317 
highlighted by Foubister et al (2006), who argue that higher prices and higher gross 
margins seen in the individual market are partly due to the fact that there is more 
competition in the company-paid market. 
 
Australia has a largely publicly-funded healthcare system, although significant 
overlaps between the public and private systems exist, as they do in Ireland.  
However, according to PHIAC (2008b), private hospital treatment constituted the 
majority of benefits paid by insurers in 2007/08 (accounting for 60.1% of total 
hospital benefits), with public hospital treatment comprising only a small minority of 
benefits paid (6.9% of total hospital benefits paid).
127
  The Commonwealth 
Government funds medical and hospital services, with significant provision and 
funding of health services by State governments.
128
 
 
Public hospital doctors are salaried, although many services delivered in public 
hospitals are provided by doctors under fee-for-service arrangements.  According to 
the Department of Health and Aged Care (now called the Department of Health and 
Ageing), specialists in public hospitals often have rights to treat private patients in 
public hospitals, although they note that in such cases specialists often contribute a 
portion of their fee income to the hospital (Department of Health and Aged Care, 
2000).  Cheah & Doessel (1994) point out that 75% of medical practitioners in 
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 The other categories were day hospital facilities (3.0%), medical benefits (15.9%) and listed 
prostheses (14.0%). 
128
 Madden (2006) notes that, since the States fund medical services in public hospitals and the 
Commonwealth is the main funder for medical services and drugs in all other settings, the States have 
an incentive for services to be shifted out of public hospitals, while the Commonwealth has the 
opposite incentive.  However, he notes that the extent of cost shifting between the Commonwealth 
and the States is a matter for conjecture. 
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Australia engage in private practice.  Australians are entitled to free hospital 
treatment as public patients, although even if they elect to be treated as private 
patients they are still heavily subsidised by the state. 
 
They are also eligible for free or subsidised non-hospital treatment by health care 
professionals such as GPs.  Prescription medicines are also subsidised by the 
Commonwealth government. 
 
The Commonwealth Government in Australia is keen to promote the involvement of 
the private sector in healthcare provision in Australia.  The government “considers 
that strong private sector involvement in health services provision and financing is 
essential to the viability of the Australian health system.”  (Department of Health 
and Aged Care, 2000: 2).  This is similar to the Irish government’s attitude towards 
private provision and financing, as set out in the White Paper on Private Health 
Insurance in 1999 (Department of Health and Children, 1999), which is discussed in 
more detail in Chapter 2. 
 
Another difference between the Australian and Irish systems is the length of wait for 
public treatment.
129
  Madden (2006) notes that the median wait for elective 
procedures was 28 days, with only 10% waiting longer than 193 days.  Waiting 
times in Ireland tend to be higher (see Section 2.1.4).  However, Madden (2006) also 
notes that health insurance accounts for 7% of resources, which is similar to the 
                                                 
129
 Doiron et al (2008) note that longer waiting times and lack of choice of provider are two of the 
main risks of being uninsured in Australia.  In this regard, it is similar to the Irish system. 
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proportion of resources accounted for by private health insurance in Ireland (see 
Section 2.1.2).  Private health insurance in Australia is primarily individual paid 
rather than company paid health insurance (Wilcox, 2001; Doiron et al, 2008).  In 
this regard, it is quite similar to the Irish market, which is predominantly individual 
paid.
130
 
 
Although there is a long history of health insurance in Australia (which can be traced 
back to Federation time, according to Palangkaraya et al, 2009), the establishment of 
Medibank in 1975 (renamed to Medicare in 1984), to provide universal healthcare 
had a major impact on the market for private health insurance.  Take-up rates for 
private health insurance declined steadily during the 1990s (see Figure 5.2), leading 
to concerns that the decline in private coverage would put undue strain on the public 
hospital system. 
 
The then government reacted to these concerns by implementing a series of reforms 
designed to encourage take-up of private health insurance again (as mentioned in 
Section 5.4.1).  The first of these was the Private Health Insurance Incentives 
Scheme, whereby those on high incomes who did not take out private health 
insurance were subject to a levy,
131
 while a means-tested subsidy was available for 
low-income earners to purchase private health insurance.  The second was a 30% 
rebate for all those who took out private health insurance, to replace the means-
                                                 
130
 Although many people in Ireland are members of employment-based group schemes, in many 
cases these merely facilitate employees in benefitting from the group scheme discount (mentioned in 
Section 2.2), while the individuals, rather than the employers, pay the premiums. 
131
 PHIAC (2008b) notes that from 1 July 2008 the threshold for this levy is AUS$70,000 for an 
individual and AUS$140,000 for a couple or family. 
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tested subsidy from the PHIIS.
132
  The third was the introduction of lifetime 
community rating (which was discussed in more detail in Chapter 5). 
 
While the regulatory environment for private health insurance in Australia is very 
similar in many respects to that in Ireland, one significant difference is that in 
Australia, the Minister for Health and Ageing must approve applications by insurers 
to increase premiums.  Prior to the passing of new legislation in 2007, the Minister 
had the discretion to disallow price increases, but the Private Health Insurance Act, 
2007 made this subtle change. 
 
6.3.2 The Private Health Insurance Markets in Ireland, Australia and the UK 
 
Australia operates community rating, while the UK has a risk-rated private health 
insurance market, although as pointed out by Foubister et al (2006), there is an 
element of group rating in the corporate paid market in the UK.  The system of 
community rating currently in operation in Australia is lifetime community rating.  
This was introduced in 2000 to replace the previous system of single rate community 
rating and was discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.  Ireland still operates a single 
rate community rating system, although it is anticipated that Ireland will move to 
lifetime community rating in the near future. 
 
                                                 
132
 According to PHIAC (2008b) this increases to 35% for people aged 65-69 and to 40% for people 
aged 70 and over. 
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A related issue to the rating system is how each market deals with pre-existing 
conditions.  Pre-existing conditions are covered in Ireland, although as discussed in 
Section 2.2, insurers are permitted to apply age-related waiting periods before 
providing cover for such conditions.  A similar system is in place in the Australian 
market, whereby pre-existing conditions are covered after a waiting period is served.  
According to PHIAC (2008a), the maximum waiting period that must be served 
before a pre-existing condition is covered is 12 months.
133
  In the UK however, pre-
existing conditions are usually not covered at all (see Foubister et al, 2006 for more 
details).  This might reduce demand for private health insurance in the UK, relative 
to markets where pre-existing conditions are covered.
134
  However, it could also 
reduce the likelihood of adverse selection on the part of consumers (a problem 
which was discussed further in Chapters 4 and 5). 
 
With only three insurers competing in the unrestricted market for private health 
insurance in Ireland, the market is heavily concentrated.  This has formed the basis 
for some of the criticism of risk equalisation in the Irish market, particularly given 
that the market leader, with the majority of the market share, is the former State 
monopoly.   However, it would be instructive to examine whether, or to what extent, 
the other markets being reviewed here are concentrated.  To do this, the markets are 
                                                 
133
 A 12-month maximum waiting period is permitted for obstetric cases.  A maximum waiting period 
of two months may be imposed for psychiatric, rehabilitative and palliative care whether or not the 
condition was pre-existing.  The maximum waiting period in all other circumstances is two months.  
Waiting periods for ancillary benefits are not regulated by the Government.  (Source: PHIAC, 2008a). 
134
 The coverage of pre-existing conditions can be a controversial area.  Evidence from the US 
suggests that significant numbers of those who applied for private health insurance in the individual 
market were denied coverage, charged higher premiums or had their pre-existing conditions excluded 
from cover (Doty, Collins, Nicholson & Rustgi, 2009; US Department of Health and Human 
Services, 2009). 
 322 
compared using the Hirschmann-Herfindal Index of market concentration.
135
  The 
index value is calculated by summing the squares of the market shares of the 
individual competitors, i.e.  
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If the value of the index is less than 0.1 then the market is unconcentrated.  If it is 
greater than 0.18 then the market is considered to be concentrated.  An index value 
of between 0.1 and 0.18 is inconclusive and further examination of the market is 
needed to determine whether or not it is concentrated. 
 
Tables 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5 show the market shares and Hirschmann-Herfindal Index 
calculations for the Irish, Australian and UK markets respectively.  The market 
shares of the insurers in each case are ranked from highest to lowest.  The market 
share figures published for the Irish market include the restricted membership 
undertakings so the figures are rebased to exclude those undertakings and only 
examine the insurers operating in the open market. 
 
It can be seen that the Irish market is highly concentrated, which is to be expected 
with only three insurers, the largest of which has over a 70% market share.  
However, the UK market is also concentrated, though not as heavily as the Irish 
market.
136
  According to Laing & Buisson (2008), the largest insurer (BUPA) had a 
                                                 
135
 See, for example, Carlton & Perloff (2005) for a discussion of this measure of market 
concentration. 
136
 Foubister et al (2006) note that market power of insurers is important in terms of relationships 
with medical providers.  Specifically, they suggest that insurers negotiate discounts with providers, 
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market share of 42% in 2007, while the top three insurers between them accounted 
for over three-quarters of the market.  Laing & Buisson (2008) also reports that, as at 
July 2008 there were 19 private health insurers operating in the UK market, of which 
eight were provident and 11 commercial.  It should be noted that Laing & Buisson 
(2008) does not provide separate figures for the ‘other insurers’ category, although 
this would not alter the finding that the UK market is concentrated. 
 
Table 6.3 Hirschmann-Herfindal Index Calculations for Ireland 
 
Insurer Market Share Rebased for 
Unrestricted Market 
Square of Market 
Share 
Vhi Healthcare 0.7 0.729167 0.531684 
Quinn Healthcare 0.2 0.208333 0.043403 
Hibernian Health 0.06 0.0625 0.003906 
Other 0.04   
Hirschmann-Herfindal Index  0.578993 
 
Source: HIA, 2008c 
 
 
The Hirschmann-Herfindal Index value for the Australian market lies in the 
inconclusive range, suggesting that the market may or may not be concentrated.  It 
should be noted that 13 of the 38 health insurers listed in the Australian market in 
2008 were restricted membership undertakings (these are marked with an asterisk in 
Table 6.4).  Excluding these undertakings and recalculating the figures for only the 
open undertakings yields a Hirschmann-Herfindal Index value of 0.152826, which is 
still in the inconclusive range.  However, it can be seen that the six largest insurers 
in the Australian market account for around three-quarters of the market, while 24 
                                                                                                                                         
which are reflected in premiums.  They also note that, while insurers usually reimburse medical 
facilities directly, specialists usually bill consumers directly and the consumers then apply to the 
insurers for reimbursement.  They also note that insurers usually do not cover specialist fees above a 
fee schedule and that balance billing applies above this level.  Balance billing is rare in the Irish 
market. 
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insurers each have less than 1% market share.  PHIAC (2008b) notes however that a 
number of smaller insurers have combined when negotiating with providers, in order 
to benefit from economies of scale. 
 
It should be noted that some private health insurers in Australia only operate in 
certain states and that not all of them compete at a national level.
137
  PHIAC (2008b) 
gives details of the market shares by total policies for each state/territory as at 30 
June 2008 (PHIAC, 2008b: 16), although it combines the figures for New South 
Wales and the Australian Capital Territory.  Based on these figures, the markets in 
most states/territories are concentrated, with the exception being New South 
Wales/Australian Capital Territory, which falls into the inconclusive range.  The 
combined market share of the top six insurers in each state ranges from 81.6% in 
Victoria to 93.8% in Tasmania, while the combined market share of the top three 
insurers ranges from 62.6% in New South Wales/Australian Capital Territory to 
86.9% in Tasmania. 
 
Table 6.4 Hirschmann-Herfindal Index Calculations for Australia 
 
Insurer Premium Revenue 
($000) 
Market Share Square of Market 
Share 
MPL 3,347,245 0.274616 0.07541395 
MBF 1,988,398 0.163133 0.02661234 
BUPAAH 1,280,407 0.105048 0.01103501 
HCF 1,081,383 0.088719 0.00787111 
HBF 792,978 0.065058 0.00423252 
NIB 758,238 0.062208 0.00386979 
AUHL 386,541 0.031713 0.00100570 
AHM 377,134 0.030941 0.00095734 
                                                 
137
 This is a decision on the part of insurers – there is no Government regulation specifying states in 
which insurers may or may not operate. 
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MBF Alli 265,455 0.021779 0.00047431 
TFH* 242,452 0.019891 0.00039567 
MU 225,130 0.018470 0.00034115 
Defence* 179,894 0.014759 0.00021783 
GMHBA 164,530 0.013498 0.00018221 
CBHS* 161,610 0.013259 0.00017580 
Westfund 83,149 0.006822 0.00004654 
H’Partners 81,207 0.006662 0.00004439 
QTUH* 70,728 0.005803 0.00003367 
H’guard 68,806 0.005645 0.00003187 
Latrobe 68,586 0.005627 0.00003166 
GUC 67,878 0.005569 0.00003101 
CUA 54,155 0.004443 0.00001974 
HIF 53,434 0.004384 0.00001922 
St. Luke’s 52,769 0.004329 0.00001874 
Lysaght 51,136 0.004195 0.00001760 
RT* 43,678 0.003583 0.00001284 
Police* 41,071 0.003370 0.00001135 
QCH 38,813 0.003184 0.00001014 
Navy* 36,096 0.002961 0.00000877 
Mildura 25,235 0.002070 0.00000429 
Phoenix* 18,613 0.001527 0.00000233 
DHF* 15,805 0.001297 0.00000168 
Druids 15,134 0.001242 0.00000154 
ACA* 14,701 0.001206 0.00000145 
HCI* 9,626 0.000790 0.00000062 
Transport* 8,458 0.000694 0.00000048 
RBHS* 6,478 0.000531 0.00000028 
NHBA 6,425 0.000527 0.00000028 
CDH 5,445 0.000447 0.00000020 
Industry Total 12,188,820 1  
Hirschmann-Herfindal Index  0.1331354 
 
Source: PHIAC (2008b) 
Note: For a key to insurer names and acronyms, see PHIAC (2008b): 36-37 
Note: Entries marked * are restricted membership undertakings 
 
 
It should be noted that the market share figures for the Irish market are based on 
membership rather than premium, whereas the figures for the Australian (national) 
and UK markets are based on premium revenue.  Comparable figures for premium 
revenue for Ireland are not readily available.  However, it should be noted that 
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calculations were also carried out on the Australian data using number of insured 
persons and the Hirschmann-Herfindal Index measured on this basis was 0.1334861 
(0.152201082 using only the open undertakings), which is very similar to that based 
on the premium revenue figures.  It is likely that a calculation for the Irish market 
based on revenue figures would also show that the market is highly concentrated. 
 
Table 6.5 Hirschmann-Herfindal Index Calculations for the UK 
 
Insurer Subscription 
Income (£m) 
Market Share Square of Market 
Share 
BUPA 1,441 0.420 0.17619 
Axa PPP Healthcare 835 0.243 0.05916 
Norwich Union 348 0.101 0.010276 
Standard Life 
Healthcare 
264 0.077 0.005914 
CIGNA 117 0.034 0.001162 
WPA 104 0.030 0.000918 
Simplyhealth Group 88 0.026 0.000657 
PruHealth 64 0.019 0.000348 
Exeter Friendly 37 0.011 0.000116 
CS Healthcare 19 0.006 0.000031 
Other Insurers 116 0.034 0.001142 
All PMI Carriers 3,433 1.000  
Hirschmann-Herfindal Index  0.255911 
 
Source: Laing & Buisson (2008) 
 
 
As can be seen from the above, there are significant similarities between the health 
systems in Ireland, Australia and the UK, although differences also exist between 
them.  This section has not been intended to provide a comprehensive comparison of 
the systems, but rather to highlight that there are grounds for comparison between 
the three countries’ health systems. 
 
6.4 Market Characteristics with Different Rating Systems 
 327 
 
A distinct comparison can be made between the community rated markets of Ireland 
and Australia and the risk rated market in the UK, in terms of the take-up of private 
health insurance.  While over 50% of the Irish population and over 40% of the 
Australian population is covered by private health insurance in Ireland, the 
comparable figure for the UK is just over 10%. 
 
Considering the similarities between the three health systems, this is a significant 
difference in take-up rates.  Although there are likely to be other factors at play, the 
fact that the UK market is risk rated is almost certainly a contributory factor. 
 
In a risk rated market, those for whom private health insurance is relatively 
affordable are low-risk, younger, healthier consumers, while premiums are less 
affordable or unaffordable for those who need it most, i.e. high-risk, older, sicker 
consumers.  Therefore, it is possible that those who can afford it do not purchase it 
because they do not need it – or at least do not perceive a need for it – while those 
who need it cannot afford to purchase it. 
 
An analysis of take-up rates by age is instructive in this regard.  Table 6.6 shows 
take-up rates of private health insurance by age for the three markets under review.  
In all three markets, take-up rates peak in middle age groups.  In Ireland, the highest 
take-up rates are found in the 35-54 range, followed by the 55-64 age group.  In 
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Australia, the highest rates are found in the 45-64 range, as is also the case in the 
UK. 
 
Table 6.6 Take-up Rates of Private Health Insurance by Age: Ireland, 
Australia and UK 
 
Ireland Nov. 2007 Australia Jun. 2007 UK 2004-05 
Age Band % with PHI Age Band % with PHI Age Band % with PHI 
  0-19 41   
18-24 39 20-24 31   
25-34 45 25-34 34   
35-44 57 35-44 45   
45-54 57 45-54 52   
55-64 50 55-64 56   
65+ 42 65+ 44   
      
18-44 48 15-44 39 16-44 13 
45-64 54 45-64 54 45-64 16 
65+ 42 65+ 44 65+ 7 
      
Total 49 Total 44 Total 13 
 
Source: HIA (2008c), Laing & Buisson (2008), Australian figures calculated based 
on data from ABS (2007) and PHIAC 
 
 
However, one clear difference is evident between a community rated market and a 
risk rated one.  In the two markets operating community rating – Ireland and 
Australia – take-up rates among those aged 65 and over are either slightly below, in 
the case of Ireland, or comparable with, in the case of Australia, the market average.  
Meanwhile, the take-up rate among the 65+ age group in the UK, where risk rating 
is practiced, is just over half of the market average.  The take-up rate in the 65+ age 
group in Ireland is 86% of the overall take-up rate, it is the same as the overall take-
up rate in Australia, but it is only 54% of the overall take-up rate in the UK. 
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The fact that community rating makes health insurance more affordable for high-risk 
consumers (who would generally be older and sicker consumers) clearly attracts a 
higher take-up rate among older age groups than a risk rated market, in which health 
insurance could be very expensive for such consumers. 
 
This point is emphasised by examining the breakdown of spending on individual 
(i.e. non-company paid) private medical insurance in the UK, which is shown in 
Table 6.7.  This table shows that, in 2006, those aged 65 and over accounted for 39% 
of total spending on individual private medical insurance.  This is despite the fact 
that the take-up rate in this age-group is slightly over half that of the average.  This 
clearly illustrates the extent to which older, high-risk consumers pay substantially 
higher premiums under a system of risk rating.  Indeed, Laing & Buisson (2008) 
notes that the relatively high proportion of spending accounted for by the 65+ age 
category reflects the high premiums paid by older people. 
 
Table 6.7 Spending on Individual PMI by Age, UK 
 
Age Band 0-29 30-49 50-64 65-74 75+ All Ages 
 % of total % of total % of total % of total % of total % of total 
1995/96 3 36 32 18 11 100 
1999/00 4 27 34 22 13 100 
2006 2 24 35 20 19 100 
 
Source: Laing & Buisson (2008), Table 12.3 
 
 
In this context, Wallis (2004) finds a higher propensity to hold private health 
insurance among those in middle age brackets than at younger ages or older ages.  
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He puts these trends down to younger people not needing insurance and older people 
facing higher premiums.   
 
Further evidence for the effect of affordability (induced by community rating) 
attracting higher take-up among older age groups than risk rating comes from the 
most recent survey of consumers commissioned by The Health Insurance Authority 
(HIA, 2008c).  Among the questions asked in this survey was why those who were 
covered by private health insurance in Ireland purchased it.  One possible answer 
was ‘I can afford it’.  This was listed as one factor by 18% and as the main factor by 
4% of those with private health insurance.  However, when examined by age band, 
22% of those aged 55-59 and 27% of those aged 60-64 listed this as one of the 
reasons they had private health insurance, with 8% and 13%, respectively, of insured 
persons in those age bands citing it as the main reason.  However, the proportion of 
those in the 65+ age band giving this as a reason was below average, at 12%, 
although the proportion citing it as the main reason was in line with the average. 
 
6.5 Impact of Community Rating on the Irish Health System 
 
Thus, one significant impact of community rating in the private health insurance 
market in Ireland is to increase the relative take-up rate among older consumers 
significantly above that of a risk-rated market.  As medical expenses for older 
consumers tend, on average, to be higher than those for younger consumers, this 
means that community rating, by attracting a relatively higher proportion of older 
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consumers, increases the average risk in the insured pool, with a consequent 
reduction in the average risk in the uninsured community. 
 
Evidence for the higher medical expenses for older people can be seen in empirical 
studies.  For example, Berk et al (1988) and Berk & Monheit (1992, 2001) show that 
the distribution of medical expenses is heavily skewed towards the very ill, and that 
a disproportionate amount of these people are aged 65 or over. 
 
Figure 6.3 Hospital Utilisation and Population by Age, 2006 
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Source: CSO (2007a); ESRI (2008b) Table 3.3 
 
 
In Ireland, figures from the Central Statistics Office (CSO) and the Economic and 
Social Research Institute (ESRI) show that the proportions of total (inpatient and day 
case) hospital discharges and total bed-days accounted for by those aged 55 and over 
are significantly higher than the proportion of the population in that age group, as 
can be clearly seen in Figure 6.3.
138
 
                                                 
138
 The proportion of the population in the 45-54 age bracket is marginally less than the proportion of 
discharges accounted for by that age bracket (12.3% versus 12.4%) but it is higher than the 
proportion of bed-days accounted for by that age bracket. 
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It can be seen from Figure 6.4 that the average length of stay (ALOS) for inpatient 
discharges increases significantly after the age of 45, compared with other age 
brackets.  It is therefore clear from Figures 6.3 and 6.4 that older people in Ireland 
have higher utilisation of hospital services than younger people.  This is consistent 
with the findings of Layte et al (2009), who note that just 10% of patients accounted 
for almost half of inpatient bed days in 2006, and that these patients were older, 
poorer, sicker and more likely to be medical card holders than other users.
139
 
 
Figure 6.4 Inpatient Average Length of Stay by Age, 2006 
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Source: ESRI (2008b) 
 
 
However, the presence of younger consumers in the market maintains the 
community rated premiums at an affordable level.  This highlights the importance of 
maintaining the stability of community rating through intergenerational solidarity, 
and is relevant in the context of the discussion of single rate community rating 
versus lifetime community rating in Chapter 5. 
                                                 
139
 This is also consistent with the findings of Russo et al (2009) for the US, as discussed in Section 
4.2.1. 
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By making private health insurance more affordable for older consumers, and 
thereby encouraging older consumers into the privately insured market, community 
rating also has an impact on the utilisation of private versus public healthcare 
services.  This has implications for the public healthcare system.  Indeed, as already 
mentioned in Section 2.1.5, one of the main arguments put forward in favour of the 
private health insurance market in Ireland is that it ensures that people do not rely 
entirely on the public hospital system.  It would therefore be instructive to examine 
differences in utilisation between private and public patients in Irish hospitals. 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, much of the hospital care provided to privately insured 
patients in Ireland is given in public hospitals.  Indeed, 20% of beds in public 
hospitals in Ireland are designated as private beds, for use by privately insured 
patients, representing approximately half of the private bed stock in the country. 
 
Data on activity in public hospitals in Ireland are collected and published using the 
Hospital In-Patient Enquiry Scheme (HIPE), which is managed by the Economic and 
Social Research Institute (ESRI) in association with the Department of Health and 
Children and the Health Service Executive.  All acute public hospitals in Ireland 
participate in the HIPE scheme.  Since 1999 the HIPE system has classified 
discharges by patient status, i.e. public or private.  However, the categorisation 
refers to whether the patient discharged saw a consultant as a public or private 
patient and does not take account of whether he/she was accommodated in a public 
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or private bed.  Furthermore, it does not distinguish how private discharges paid for 
their consultant care – i.e. whether this was through private health insurance or out-
of-pocket payments.  Nevertheless, intuitively it is likely that a significant majority 
of private discharges would have paid through private health insurance. 
 
These data on discharges are published in annual reports on Activity in Acute Public 
Hospitals in Ireland.  A request was made for additional data from the HIPE & 
NPRS
140
 Unit of the ESRI in February 2008 and this request was granted, providing 
more detailed figures on discharges by patient status (i.e. public or private) and age 
for the years 1999 (which was the first year that the HIPE system recorded patients’ 
status) to 2004 (the latest year for which data were available at the time the request 
was made) inclusive.  A subsequent request was made for updated data from the 
HIPE system in June 2009 and this was also granted, providing more detailed figures 
for 2005, 2006 and 2007. 
 
Analysis carried out using the published ESRI data and the more detailed data 
provided further to the specific requests reveals some interesting trends. 
 
It can be seen from Figure 6.5 that, since 1999, day patients have tended to account 
for a lower proportion of private discharges (day patient and inpatient) from public 
hospitals than public discharges from public hospitals, with the exception of 2001.  
The proportion of patients being discharged as day patients rather than inpatients has 
risen consistently for both public and private patients, although the increase has been 
                                                 
140
 National Perinatal Reporting System 
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greater for public patients, resulting in a widening of the gap between the series in 
recent years.  The sharp increase in the proportion of public patients being 
discharged as day patients from 2006 was partly due to an increase in activity but 
largely due to the inclusion of specific hospital activity, such as day-patient 
radiotherapy activity and day-patient dialysis activity, in the HIPE scheme from 
2006 onwards (see ESRI, 2008b for a fuller description of the technical issues 
involved). 
 
Figure 6.5 Day Patient Discharges as a % of Total Discharges by Patient 
Status, 1999-2007 
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Source: HIPE & NPRS Unit, ESRI; ESRI (2008a, 2008b) 
 
 
It is clear from Figure 6.5 that a higher proportion of private patients than public 
ones are treated on an inpatient basis rather than on a day patient basis.  Further 
analysis of the ESRI figures by broad age category (under-15, 15-44, 45-64 and 65+) 
shows that the proportion of both private and public patients discharged as day 
patients is consistently above average in only the 45-64 age category.  The 
proportion of day patients in the under-15 and 15-44 age categories are both below 
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average, while the corresponding proportion in the 65+ age category tended to be 
below average from 1999 to 2003, but has been above average since 2005.  The 
figures show that, in recent years, the proportion of patients aged 65 and over treated 
as inpatients rather than day patients has not been significantly different from the 
average.  Given the reduced costs associated with day patient treatment compared 
with inpatient treatment, this means that this age group as a whole appear to be 
benefiting from these savings as much as – and in recent years slightly more than – 
other age groups. 
 
However, further analysis of the 65+ age group shows that those aged 65-74 were 
more likely than the average to be treated as day patients, while the proportion of 
those aged 75-84 treated as day patients was significantly lower than those aged 65-
74, and this proportion was significantly lower again for the 85+ age-group.  This 
suggests that the older patients get the more likely it is that their medical needs will 
be such that they are unable to be met in a day-case setting, thus requiring more 
expensive inpatient treatment.  Figure 6.6 shows the proportion of discharges by age 
from public hospitals that were day patients between 1999 and 2007 inclusive, using 
the aggregate figures from those years. 
 
Figure 6.6 Day Patient Discharges as a % of Total Discharges by Age, 1999-
2007 (Aggregate) 
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Source: HIPE & NPRS Unit, ESRI 
 
Analysis of the figures from the ESRI also shows that private inpatients consistently 
have shorter average lengths of stay than public inpatients, as can be seen in Figure 
6.7.
141
  The average inpatient stay in a public hospital by a private patient has been 
between 0.47 and 0.93 days shorter than that of a public patient between 1999 and 
2007.  It can also be seen from Figure 6.7 that the average length of stay for private 
patients has been on a downward trend since 1999, while there is less of a clear trend 
in average length of stay for public patients. 
 
 
Figure 6.7 Average Length of Stay for Inpatients by Patient Status, 1999-
2007 
                                                 
141
 Doiron et al (2008) note similar trends in Australia, with patients having shorter lengths of stay for 
similar procedures in private hospitals compared with public hospitals.  It should be noted however, 
that the Irish figures refer to public and private patients in public hospitals. 
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Source: HIPE & NPRS Unit, ESRI; ESRI (2008a, 2008b) 
 
 
ESRI (2008b) points out however, that there is less of a difference between the 
average length of stay for public and private acute inpatients (those with a stay of up 
to, or including, 30 days), but that the public extended-stay patients (those with a 
stay of more than 30 days) were in hospital for an average of almost three days 
longer than their private counterparts (see Table 6.8). 
 
Table 6.8 Inpatient Discharges and Average Length of Stay by Patient 
Type, 2006 
 
Patient Type Public Private Total 
 Discharges ALOS Discharges ALOS Discharges ALOS 
Acute (0-30 
days) 415,045 4.8 151,335 4.6 566,380 4.8 
Extended 
(>30 days) 13,177 60.5 3,237 57.6 16,414 60 
Total 
Inpatient 428,222 6.5 154,572 5.8 582,794 6.3 
 
Source: ESRI (2008b), Table 3.9 
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These figures show that extended stay inpatients account for a small proportion of 
discharges but a significant proportion of bed-days.  Based on the average length of 
stay and the number of discharges, as reported in Table 6.8, extended stay patients in 
total accounted for just over 2.8% of inpatient discharges, but nearly 27% of bed-
days in 2006.  This is consistent with the findings of Berk et al (1988) and Berk & 
Monheit (1992, 2001) that medical expenditures are highly skewed towards those 
who are very ill. 
 
The figures in Table 6.8 also show that private patients are less likely to have 
extended stays in public hospitals than public patients.  Extended stay patients 
account for 3.1% of public inpatient discharges and nearly 29% of public inpatient 
bed-days, compared with 2.1% of private inpatient discharges and nearly 21% of 
private inpatient bed-days. 
 
In light of the figures in Table 6.8 it is interesting to recall that the reinsurance 
scheme in the Australian private health insurance market equalised the claim costs of 
those aged 65 and over and those who spent more than 35 days a year in hospital.  
As noted in Section 2.4, the Industry Commission (1997) pointed out that these two 
groups accounted for nearly half of total claim costs in Australia by the late 1990s.  
The risk equalisation system in Australia, which replaced the reinsurance system in 
2007 (see PHIAC, 2008b), equalises the cost of hospital benefits paid for people 
aged 55 and over and high cost claims (those in excess of AUS$50,000). 
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When analysed by broad age group, it can be seen that the average length of 
inpatient stay for private patients is lower than for public patients in all categories 
except for the 15-44 age group, as can be seen in Figure 6.8.  The higher average 
length of stay in this age group is likely to be related to maternity stays.  Evidence 
for this can be found by examining the figures by age and gender.  The age/gender 
categories of patient for which private patients consistently (i.e. each year between 
1999 and 2007 inclusive) have a longer average length of stay than public patients 
are females aged 15-34.  Males aged 15-19 have longer average length of stay for 
private than public in each year except 2005.  Males aged 20-24 also have a longer 
average length of stay as private patients than public patients in the years 2000 to 
2003 inclusive, while the same is true of males aged 85+ from 2002 onwards and 
females aged 85+ from 2005 onwards. 
 
Particularly interesting is the difference between the average length of stay for 
private patients and public patients aged 65 and over.  As can be seen from Figure 
6.8, between 2000 and 2005, private patients in this age group had average lengths 
of stay that were approximately 6-8% shorter than their public counterparts in that 
age group, although the gap narrowed in 2006 and 2007. 
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Figure 6.8 Percentage Difference in Average Length of Stay for Inpatients 
by Age Group, 1999-2007 
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Source: Calculated from data provided by HIPE & NPRS Unit, ESRI 
 
 
It could be the case that privately insured persons aged 65 and over are more likely 
to be in higher social classes, who tend to be in better health than those in lower 
social classes, the latter of whom are more likely to be treated as public patients.  
Figures from the Central Statistics Office (CSO, 2008b) show that self-assessed 
health status tends to decrease with age and that it is better than average for those 
with private health insurance (see Table 6.9).  Earlier figures from the Central 
Statistics Office (CSO, 2002) show similar patterns of responses regarding self-
assessed health status. 
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Table 6.9 Self-assessed Health Status in Ireland, Q3 2007 
 
% of adults perceiving own 
health as… 
Very Good Good Fair Poor 
State 47 40 11 2 
Age Group     
18-24 64 32 4 0 
25-34 61 33 5 1 
35-44 53 39 7 1 
45-54 43 43 12 2 
55-64 31 47 19 3 
65-69 27 47 22 4 
70+ 19 50 26 5 
Medical Cover     
Medical card 27 43 25 5 
PHI 52 40 7 1 
Neither 56 38 5 1 
 
Source: CSO (2008b), Table 2 
 
 
Table 6.10 shows the breakdown of medical cover by age from the same CSO 
survey.  This shows that those aged 70 and over are less likely to have private health 
insurance and significantly more likely to have a medical card.  This suggests that a 
higher proportion of these older people are likely to be treated in public hospitals as 
public patients rather than private patients.  Given the findings of Table 6.9 that 
those with medical cards on average do not perceive their health status as being as 
good as those without medical cards, this could perhaps suggest that the older people 
treated in public hospitals as public patients rather than private patients, because 
they are more likely to be medical card holders, might be in poorer health than their 
private counterparts of similar age. 
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Table 6.10 Medical Cover by Age in Ireland, Q3 2007 
 
 Medical card 
only 
Private health 
insurance only 
Both Neither 
State 24 44 5 27 
18-24 19 34 2 44 
25-34 16 44 1 38 
35-44 15 58 1 25 
45-54 18 55 2 25 
55-64 27 52 3 19 
65-69 38 41 10 11 
70+ 62 3 33 1 
 
Source: CSO (2008b), Table 1 
 
 
However, this does not take into account the complexity of treatment received by 
public and private patients.  The shorter average length of stay for private patients 
compared with public patients begs the question whether private patients receive the 
same mix of treatment as public patients or whether they receive less complex care. 
 
The HIPE & NPRS Unit of the ESRI also produces a Casemix index, in conjunction 
with the Department of Health and Children and the Health Service Executive.  
Casemix is a system that measures hospitals’ activity in terms of the complexity of 
treatment undertaken.  According to the official documentation on the system, 
casemix is “the comparison of activity & costs between hospitals, by categorising 
each hospital’s ‘mix’ of cases into Diagnoses Related Groups (DRGs) which share 
common clinical attributes and similar patterns of resource use.”  (HSE, 2008: 2).  
The Casemix index (CMI), produced by the ESRI, is described as a measure of the 
relative complexity of the patients treated by a hospital, with the overall figure for 
all treatment in all hospitals in the Casemix scheme being 1 (see 
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http://www.casemix.ie for further details).  A CMI above 1 indicates a more 
complex mix of treatment, while a CMI below 1 indicates a less complex mix of 
treatment than the average. 
 
Figure 6.9 Casemix Index by Patient Status and Age, 2007 
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Source: HIPE & NPRS Unit, ESRI 
 
 
Figures for the Casemix index by age for inpatient and day-patient discharges for 
2005, 2006 and 2007 were provided pursuant to a further data request.
142
  The 
figures for 2007 are presented in Figure 6.9, but the patterns for 2005 and 2006 are 
broadly similar.  It can be seen from these figures that the CMI for private patients in 
most age bands tends to be higher than for public patients in the same age bands.  
This applies to both day-patient and inpatient treatments.  For the total of all age 
bands, the CMI was 0.999 for private inpatient discharges compared with 0.954 for 
                                                 
142
 The Casemix system also covers emergency department and outpatient activity.  However, as the 
earlier analysis of hospital discharges related to inpatient and day-patient activity, these were the 
categories for which CMI data were requested. 
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public inpatient discharges, while for day-patients the figures were 1.177 and 0.947 
for private and public discharges, respectively. 
 
A number of interesting patterns are evident from an analysis of these CMI figures.  
Firstly, there is a clear link between age and average complexity of treatment.  For 
inpatient treatment, all age groups under-45 have below-average intensity, while all 
age groups from 45 upwards have above-average intensity, relative to the inpatient 
total.  This applies to both public and private discharges.  The patterns for day-
patient treatment are almost the opposite however, with all age groups under-55 
having above-average intensity, while all age groups from 55 upwards have below-
average intensity, relative to the total of day-patient activity.  Again this applies 
across both public and private discharges. 
 
Furthermore, there is considerably more variation in the CMI for inpatient treatment 
than for day-patient treatment, although this makes intuitive sense as day-patient 
treatment would be relatively more homogenous than inpatient treatment.  The 
highest CMI values for both private and public inpatients were in the 85+ age group, 
at 1.610 and 1.502 respectively.  This compares with the lowest CMI for private 
inpatients of 0.620 in the 20-24 age group, while the lowest CMI for public 
inpatients was in the 25-34 age group, at 0.572.  This gives rise to a spread of 0.991 
and 0.930 in the CMI values for private and public inpatients, respectively.  By 
comparison, the spreads of CMI values for private and public day-patients were 
0.232 and 0.393, respectively, with the private figures varying from 1.105 to 1.337 
and the public figures varying from 0.875 to 1.268. 
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It would appear therefore that private patients in most age groups have shorter 
average lengths of stay than their public counterparts, despite receiving a more 
complex mix of treatments in most cases.  This can be seen in figure 6.10, which 
shows the percentage difference in CMI and average length of stay for private versus 
public inpatients by age.  A positive difference indicates a more complex mix of 
treatment or a longer average length of stay for private patients. 
 
Figure 6.10 Relative Treatment Complexity and Average Length of Stay of 
Private versus Public Inpatients by Age, 2007 
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Source: HIPE & NPRS Unit, ESRI 
 
 
As can be seen from this figure, private patients had a more complex mix of 
treatments in 2007 across all age groups except 0-4 years.  The difference peaked in 
the 15-19 age group, with private patients in this age group having a CMI that was 
34.4% higher than their public counterparts.  Meanwhile, private patients aged 
under-14 and 35-74 had shorter average lengths of stay in 2007 than their public 
counterparts.  Even in the age groups where private patients had a longer average 
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length of stay than public patients, the percentage difference in treatment complexity 
was greater than the percentage difference in average length of stay.  The figures for 
2005 and 2006 show similar patterns, with the relative ALOS being lower than the 
relative CMI in all age groups. 
 
Although it cannot be distinguished from this data why this is the case, there are a 
number of possible explanations for this finding.  The first relates to the widely held 
belief (despite a lack of definitive evidence) that hospital consultants tend to treat 
their private patients themselves, often leaving non-consultant hospital doctors 
(NCHDs) to treat their public patients.  (This was discussed further in Chapter 2.)  It 
has been suggested that this means treatment of public patients often is ““consultant 
led” – not “consultant provided”” (Wren, 2003: 153).  It is possible that this might 
add to the average length of stay of public patients, compared with private patients, 
particularly if the NCHDs must liaise with the consultants regarding treatment or if 
the consultants must see the patients personally before they are discharged. 
 
Another possible explanation relates to the way in which insurers reimburse 
providers for providing treatment to their insured members.  In recent years, insurers 
have been moving away from per diem reimbursement of hospitals towards fee-for-
service reimbursement.  This might have increased the incentives for hospitals to 
treat and discharge private patients more quickly than under the previous 
reimbursement mechanism, although there is no evidence to suggest that this effect 
has materialised. 
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Whatever the reason for the more favourable average length relative to complexity 
private patients, it is clear that if significant numbers of older private patients in 
particular were to discontinue private health insurance coverage and rely on being 
treated as public patients, then this would add to the burden of treatment on the 
public system. 
 
Figure 6.11 Average Length of Stay for Inpatients by Age and Patient Status, 
2007 
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Source: HIPE & NPRS Unit, ESRI 
 
 
An examination of average length of stay (ALOS) figures by age and patient status, 
provided by the ESRI, reveals that private patients aged 55 and over consistently 
have longer inpatient average length of stay than the overall average of public 
inpatients.  Figures for 2007 can be seen in Figure 6.11 and Table 6.11, but a similar 
pattern is evident in each of the years from 1999 onwards. 
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Table 6.11 Average Length of Stay (Days) for Inpatients by Age and Patient 
Status, 2007 
 
Age Public Private 
Total 6.42 5.69 
0-4 4.26 3.68 
5-14 2.64 2.57 
15-19 3.11 3.67 
20-24 3.21 3.83 
25-34 3.33 3.35 
35-44 4.39 3.88 
45-54 6.44 5.75 
55-64 7.91 7.04 
65-74 9.38 9.14 
75-84 11.76 12.01 
85+ 13.54 14.46 
 
Source: HIPE & NPRS Unit, ESRI 
 
 
Furthermore, analysis of the Casemix index (CMI) figures, also provided by the 
ESRI, shows that private inpatients in all age categories from 45 upwards have a 
more complex mix of treatment than the average of all public inpatients, while 
private day-patients in all age bands have a more complex mix of treatment than the 
average of public day-patients, as can be seen in Figure 6.9 above. 
 
Bearing this in mind, it is worth noting that, as was displayed in Figure 2.5, the take-
up rate of private health insurance in Ireland in late 2007 (when the fieldwork for the 
2008 consumer survey was undertaken) was 57% among those aged 45-54, 50% 
among those aged 55-64 and 42% in the 65+ age group. 
 
It can therefore be seen that a relatively high proportion of older people in Ireland 
are privately insured, and from the comparisons of the Irish, Australian and UK 
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private health insurance markets in Section 6.4, it appears that at least some of this 
effect can be attributed to the application of community rating rather than risk rating 
in the market.  The analysis in this section has examined the utilisation of the public 
hospital system by those treated privately versus publicly and across age groups. 
 
This analysis shows that those aged 55 and over have average inpatient lengths of 
stay that are longer than the average for public patients, while those aged 45 and 
over have a more complex mix of treatment than the average for public patients.  
These findings have significant policy implications for the Irish hospital system. 
 
It is clear that the widespread availability of private health insurance provides 
substantial savings to the public healthcare system as, in the absence of the wide 
availability of private health insurance, such patients would be forced to rely on the 
public system, which would increase the overall average length of inpatient stay and 
complexity of treatment among public patients, therefore increasing the utilisation of 
public inpatient beds.  If these patients were to rely on the public healthcare system 
then either the public system would require additional resources or waiting lists for 
public treatment would be further lengthened. 
 
This effect is likely to become even more important in the future, due to the ageing 
nature of the Irish population.  According to projections from the Central Statistics 
Office (CSO, 2008a), those aged 65 and over are projected to account for between 
20-25% of the Irish population in 2041 (depending on assumptions about migration 
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and fertility rates), compared with 11% in 2006.  Meanwhile, those aged 55-64 are 
projected to account for between 14-15% of the population in 2041, compared with 
less than 10% in 2006.  This suggests that encouraging take-up of private health 
insurance among older people in Ireland will become increasingly important in the 
context of the public health system budget.
143
 
 
Community rating, by attracting a relatively high proportion of older, sicker 
consumers to take out or maintain private health insurance, has a significant impact 
on the public healthcare system.  In particular, it ensures that a higher proportion of 
higher-risk consumers (and therefore those who are likely to incur higher medical 
costs) are attracted out of the public healthcare system, than would be the case if the 
private health insurance market were to operate on the basis of risk rating.  Given 
that, as demonstrated in this section, these older consumers who are treated privately 
have higher utilisation than the average of public patients, this in turn increases the 
savings to the public system arising from having a community rated private health 
insurance system operating alongside it, compared with a risk rated system. 
 
6.6 Conclusions 
 
The determination of successive Irish governments to maintain the principle of 
community rating in the private health insurance market, and the broad cross-party 
support for it in the Oireachtas (parliament) make community rating one of the 
                                                 
143
 Layte et al (2009) argue that the ageing population means that the current configuration of health 
services in Ireland is unsustainable and that resources should be focused on treating patients in 
primary, continuing and community care rather than in hospitals. 
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central features of the market, and this is unlikely to change in the foreseeable 
future, notwithstanding the anticipated move from single rate community rating to 
lifetime community rating. 
 
However, if community rating were to fail, which could be an extreme (and perhaps 
unlikely) outcome in the absence of some form of risk adjustment mechanism, then 
an alternative rating system would be risk rating.  Although a catastrophic failure of 
community rating is unlikely, particularly given the political will to ensure its 
continued application, a similar effect might be seen if risk segmentation were to be 
taken to the extreme. 
 
Ireland’s private health insurance market is akin to that of Australia, which also 
operates community rating (having switched from single rate community rating to 
lifetime community rating in 2000) alongside open enrolment and lifetime cover.  
These two markets can be compared with a risk rated private health insurance 
market, such as that which operates in the UK.  All three countries operate voluntary 
private health insurance markets alongside universal entitlements to use the public 
hospital system. 
 
Although there are undoubtedly differences between the health systems in the three 
jurisdictions, what can clearly be seen is the difference that community rating makes 
in terms of the take-up of private health insurance overall, and among older 
consumers in particular.  Community rating, which is designed to ensure that 
 353 
insurance remains affordable for high-risk (older and sicker) consumers is successful 
in attracting greater proportions of older consumers to take out and/or maintain 
private health insurance than would be the case under a system of risk rating.  Thus, 
the public policy objective of having community rating is being achieved, and the 
broad political support for the measure is justified, given the stated objectives of 
having this type of rating system. 
 
This has implications for the public healthcare system in Ireland.  What can be seen 
from the data presented in this Chapter is that community rating means that 
significantly fewer older consumers rely on being treated as public patients – and 
therefore at the expense of the State – than would be the case were risk rating to be 
practiced in the market here. 
 
The analysis in this Chapter suggests that the privately insured tend to perceive their 
own health as better than those without health insurance, and that private patients 
tend to have shorter average stays in public hospitals.  However, private patients 
nonetheless receive a more complex mix of treatment than public patients.  
Furthermore, older private patients have longer average lengths of stay and receive a 
more complex mix of treatment than the average of public patients. 
 
It is therefore clear that community rating reduces the burden on the publicly funded 
healthcare system by ensuring that these older patients are treated privately.  If 
community rating were to fail, or if risk segmentation were to become prevalent, 
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then significant numbers of older, currently privately insured, patients would likely 
discontinue private insurance cover due to affordability issues and instead fall back 
on the public system for treatment.  This would increase the average length of stay 
and the average complexity of treatment in the public system, thus placing additional 
strain on a public system that already does not enjoy widespread confidence among 
the Irish population. 
 
It is true that many of these private patients are treated in public hospitals, and it 
would appear that the 80:20 split in favour of public patients in public hospitals is 
breached.  Furthermore, the State subsidises the treatment of these private patients 
through charging less than the full economic cost for private beds in public hospitals, 
as well as through tax relief of private health insurance premiums and the 
subsidisation of education and training for medical professionals, who often work in 
both the public and private healthcare systems (as was discussed in Chapter 2). 
 
However, whether the public subsidy of private health insurance in Ireland is cost-
effective, in terms of the savings made by encouraging such numbers of patients, 
including older patients, to be treated privately, is beyond the scope of this study but 
is an area for future research.  Whether or not the public subsidies of the private 
health insurance market in Ireland are cost-effective however, it is clear that such 
subsidies would be less likely to be cost-effective were risk rating to be practiced in 
the market. 
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It is also clear that the public policy objective of ensuring that private health 
insurance is affordable for those who most need it (the elderly and the sick) is only 
achievable by ensuring the continued stability of community rating.  In this context, 
the importance of having risk equalisation is increased. 
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CHAPTER 7 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUDING 
REMARKS 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
Using Ireland as an example, this study has examined the question of whether risk 
equalisation is necessary in a regulated community rated health insurance market, 
particularly where there is staggered entry of insurers. 
 
Proponents of risk adjustment mechanisms often argue that risk adjustment is 
necessary to maintain the stability of a community rated market.  Without it, they 
suggest, community rating cannot operate, either adequately or at all. 
 
Opponents of risk adjustment counter that community rating is a distortion of the 
market, and that, in a competitive market, insurers would choose to charge 
premiums based, at least in part, on the risk that consumers represent to them.  It has 
also been argued that charging a single rate to all consumers irrespective of their 
expected losses is not efficient, and some commentators have questioned whether it 
is equitable.  One thing is clear however, and that is that community rating involves 
a cross-subsidy from low-risk consumers to high-risk consumers.  In the debate 
surrounding risk equalisation in Ireland, its opponents have also argued that it is 
anti-competitive and would deter the entry of new insurers. 
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This study has empirically examined a number of issues arising from the nature of 
the Irish private health insurance market.  The degree to which community rating 
across a competitive market can be maintained in the absence of a risk adjustment 
mechanism was examined using a formulaic model.  The Irish private health 
insurance market was then tested to evaluate whether any evidence exists of either 
adverse selection or risk selection, either of which would contribute to a difference 
in risk profiles between insurers, which in turn, according to the formulaic model, 
would lead to high-risk consumers paying higher premiums on average than low-risk 
consumers, which is in breach of the community rating principle. 
 
The change from single rate community rating to lifetime community rating in the 
Australian private health insurance market was examined and implications drawn 
regarding the possible impact of a similar move in Ireland, which is imminent.  If 
community rating were to break down, or if risk segmentation were to become 
widespread, then older consumers would end up paying higher premiums than 
younger consumers.  The effect that community rating has on overall take-up and the 
age profile of the insured population was therefore examined.  Following on from 
this, analysis was undertaken on the effect that a breakdown of community rating 
might have on the Irish public healthcare system.  The results of this analysis have 
implications for the debate surrounding the need for risk equalisation in the Irish 
private health insurance market. 
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7.2 The Private Health Insurance Market in Ireland 
 
Ireland has a community rated market for voluntary private health insurance, 
operating alongside a public hospital system that is accessible to all residents, either 
at no cost – for those with medical cards – or at nominal cost for those without.  
Despite this universal access entitlement however, over half of the population is 
covered by private health insurance.  This largely reflects a lack of confidence in the 
public hospital system, in part due to long waiting times for public patients. 
 
Ireland’s health system is also unusual in the degree to which the public and private 
sectors overlap.  Many private patients are treated in public hospitals, in beds that 
are designated private, for use by privately insured patients.  Most hospital 
consultants work in both the public and private sectors, and there is much concern 
that the fact that public work is done on a salaried basis, while private work is 
carried out on a fee-for-service basis, incentivises many consultants to prioritise their 
private patients over their public patients. 
 
When the market for private health insurance in Ireland was established in 1957, the 
Voluntary Health Insurance Board (now trading as Vhi Healthcare) was founded as a 
statutory body, charged with providing the option of voluntary insurance for those 
who were not at that time entitled to free access to the public hospital system on the 
grounds of high income.  It was not mandated to make a profit, only to break even in 
any given year, and it was exempted from the provisions of the Insurance Acts. 
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Vhi Healthcare operated as a State-owned monopoly provider for 40 years before its 
first competitor, BUPA Ireland, began selling health insurance in the Irish market.  
The entry of a new insurer followed the deregulation of the non-life insurance 
markets in the European Union, stemming from the European Third Non-Life 
Insurance Directive, which was passed in 1992 and transposed into Irish legislation 
by the Health Insurance Act, 1994. 
 
The 1994 Act gave legislative backing to the principles of community rating, open 
enrolment and lifetime cover, which Vhi Healthcare already operated on a de facto 
basis.  Community rating means that all consumers are charged the same premium 
for the same plan, open enrolment means that insurers must accept all applicants, 
and lifetime cover means that insurers may not refuse to renew cover, although in all 
three cases there are minor exceptions permitted.  A set of prescribed minimum 
benefits was also brought forward in regulations, to ensure a minimum level of cover 
for those opting to insure privately. 
 
In order to support community rating, a risk equalisation scheme was also brought 
into Irish law.  This scheme, promulgated in 1996, was withdrawn in 1999 without 
payments having been made under the scheme.  After a consultation process, the 
then government released a White Paper in 1999 (Department of Health and 
Children, 1999), setting out its policies towards the market.  One such policy was 
that risk equalisation was considered necessary to underpin community rating. 
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The Health Insurance (Amendment) Act, 2001 made provision for the Minister for 
Health and Children to bring forward another risk equalisation scheme, and for the 
establishment of a statutory body to regulate the industry.  The Health Insurance 
Authority was established in February 2001, and among its statutory responsibilities 
was a significant role in the operation of the new risk equalisation scheme, which 
was brought forward in 2003. 
 
As with the previous scheme however, the 2003 scheme proved controversial, with 
the newer entrants to the market – particularly BUPA Ireland – arguing that the 
scheme would force them to subsidise the former State monopoly, which remains 
the dominant player in the market. 
 
After an unsuccessful legal challenge to the scheme in the Irish High Court in 2006, 
BUPA Ireland withdrew from the market and sold its book of business to Quinn 
Insurance, which now operates Quinn Healthcare.  However, BUPA Ireland 
appealed the High Court judgment to the Supreme Court, which overturned the High 
Court judgment in 2008, setting aside the Risk Equalisation Scheme, 2003. 
 
This left a hiatus in the market, and in late 2008 the Minister for Health and Children 
announced a series of interim measures – a community rating levy, payable by 
insurers for each person they insure, and increased tax relief at source for older 
consumers – designed to ameliorate the situation until a new risk equalisation 
 361 
scheme can be brought forward.  It is anticipated that these interim measures will be 
in place for three years. 
 
The debate surrounding the introduction of risk equalisation in Ireland has been 
intense, but for the most part has relied on qualitative arguments, with those 
supporting it arguing that it is necessary to support community rating, and those 
against it countering that it is anti-competitive.  However, very little quantitative 
evidence has been brought forward in support of either argument. 
 
It is in this context that this study was carried out.  A formulaic model of an 
insurance market under a monopoly and then a competitive situation is presented to 
examine whether community rating can be maintained in a competitive market.  
Data from a number of surveys of consumers carried out on behalf of The Health 
Insurance Authority (HIA) are used to test for the presence of adverse selection and 
risk selection in the Irish private health insurance market.  Data from the Private 
Health Insurance Administration Council (PHIAC) in Australia are used to analyse 
the effect of introducing lifetime community rating had on the Australian market.  A 
comparison is also carried out of the Irish, Australian and UK private health 
insurance markets, using data from the HIA, PHIAC and Laing & Buisson, an 
independent firm that monitors the market in the UK.  Data on discharges from 
public hospitals in Ireland, provided by the Economic and Social Research Institute, 
are used to examine the impact that a collapse of community rating might have on 
the Irish public healthcare system. 
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7.3 Summary of Findings 
 
In Chapter 3, a theoretical model is developed to examine whether community rating 
can operate in the absence of risk equalisation.  The model shows that, in a 
monopoly market with the monopoly insurer operating community rating, all insured 
persons, whether high-risk or low-risk, pay the same premium.  However, if multiple 
insurers are competing in the same market, each operating community rating within 
its own insured community, then high-risk insured lives end up paying more, on 
average, than low-risk insured lives unless each insurer has the same risk profile as 
the market average. 
 
It is this principle which lay at the heart of risk equalisation in the Irish market.  
Under the 2003 scheme, each insurer would be left in a position where, once risk 
equalisation transfers had taken place, they would have effectively paid the claims 
that they would have paid had they had the market average risk profile. 
 
This model is then applied to the situation in which the Irish market finds itself in 
the aftermath of the Supreme Court decision to set aside the Risk Equalisation 
Scheme, 2003.  The Supreme Court ruled that the only valid definition of 
community rating in the Irish legislation is that which defines community rated 
plans, while the notion of community rating across the market, on the basis of which 
the risk equalisation scheme was to operate, was not defined in legislation and was 
therefore not valid. 
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This means that community rating need only operate at a plan level and not across 
the market for private health insurance in Ireland.  In this context, the model shows 
that community rating will not operate across the market and plans with higher 
concentrations of high-risk consumers will end up costing more, with high-risk 
consumers therefore paying higher premiums on average than low-risk consumers, 
even for similar levels of cover.  Therefore, in order for community rating to operate 
across the market, some form of risk adjustment mechanism is required.  However, 
some deviation from, or modification to, community rating might be acceptable, as 
is the case in some other markets. 
 
Two possible reasons for some plans having a higher concentration of high-risk 
consumers than others are adverse selection, where consumers select higher or lower 
levels of cover based on their level of risk, and risk selection, where insurers try to 
select low-risk lives and avoid high-risk lives.  Even under a regime of community 
rating coupled with open enrolment and lifetime cover, as in the Irish market, risk 
selection is still possible in subtle ways, such as plan design and marketing.  Indeed, 
not only is the opportunity for risk selection not entirely eliminated, but the incentive 
for risk selection is increased under such a regulatory regime. 
 
A distinction may be drawn between ‘active’ and ‘passive’ risk selection.  The 
former would involve insurers actively trying to target low-risk lives and avoid high-
risk lives, either explicitly (which is not permitted in the Irish market but may be 
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permitted in other markets) or implicitly, through subtle measures such as plan 
design and marketing.  The latter, ‘passive’ risk selection, could be used to describe 
a situation where a more recent entrant to a health insurance market would 
inherently tend to attract a relatively favourable risk profile, as first-time buyers of 
health insurance would tend to be younger than the average of existing members and 
switching between insurers is uncommon, with those switching tending to be 
younger than average consumers. 
 
Data from consumer surveys carried out in Ireland on behalf of The Health 
Insurance Authority are used to test for adverse selection and risk selection in the 
Irish market.  Market figures were requested from the insurers but given the 
commercially sensitive nature of the data these requests were denied. 
 
The survey data suggest the evidence of a degree of both adverse selection and risk 
selection in the Irish private health insurance market.  Plans with more generous 
levels of cover – as measured by the level of hospital accommodation covered, since 
the level of consultant cover would not vary between plans offered by the same 
insurer – tended to be selected by older consumers, while younger consumers were 
more likely to opt for more basic plans, suggesting some degree of adverse selection 
on the part of consumers.  Meanwhile, plans with the standard (most common) level 
of cover for hospital accommodation offered by Vhi Healthcare tended to have a 
higher concentration of older consumers than plans with similar cover offered by 
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BUPA Ireland.  This suggests some degree of risk selection, although it is unclear 
whether this is ‘active’ or ‘passive’. 
 
A significant change to the rating system used in the Irish private health insurance 
market has been proposed and is anticipated in the near future.  This is a change 
from the current system of single rate community rating to lifetime community 
rating.  The main difference between these two systems is that the latter involves 
loadings payable by those consumers who leave it later in life to take out private 
health insurance for the first time, thereby avoiding paying the community rate at a 
younger age.  It has been suggested that lifetime community rating would help to 
stabilise community rating as it would discourage hit-and-run or hit-and-stay activity 
by consumers and would help to encourage a constant stream of younger, low-risk 
consumers into the market, which is vital to the maintenance of the intergenerational 
solidarity on which community rating is based. 
 
A similar change was effected in Australia in 2000, with some significant impacts on 
the market.  In particular, the overall take-up rate of private health insurance rose 
sharply during the grace period – a one-year window during which anyone who did 
not already have health insurance could take it out without being subject to the late 
entry loadings – while the average age of the insured population dropped 
significantly.  The latter effect was due to the fact that the change of rating system 
attracted younger consumers into the market in greater numbers than older 
consumers. 
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These patterns were examined econometrically to determine the extent to which the 
changeover affected different age groups.  These findings were then used to draw 
conclusions regarding the effect that a similar change might have on the Irish 
market.  Although such a change is likely to improve the overall risk profile in the 
market however, the Australian experience suggests that it would not entirely 
eliminate adverse selection.  Hence, it would not negate the need for risk 
equalisation to ensure the operation of community rating across the market, rather 
than within plans.  An examination of the risk adjustment mechanism in Australia 
also suggests that having risk equalisation in the Irish context would be more 
important after a change in the system of community rating. 
 
If community rating were to fail – possibly as a result of a lack of risk equalisation 
or extreme risk segmentation – then an alternative would be risk rating, whereby 
high-risk consumers would be charged more for insurance than low-risk consumers.  
This is the type of rating operated in health insurance markets in some other 
jurisdictions, and also in other non-life insurance markets in Ireland, such as the 
market for motor insurance.  The differences between community rating and risk 
rating were therefore examined in an attempt to assess the impact that community 
rating has on the market. 
 
For the purpose of this comparison, the Irish market, which operates single rate 
community rating, was compared with the Australian market, which operates 
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lifetime community rating, and the UK market, which operates risk rating.  All three 
countries operate systems of voluntary private health insurance, alongside universal 
access entitlements to public hospital systems. 
 
Although there are differences between the health systems in the three countries, a 
broad comparison can be made, which shows that community rating encourages a 
higher overall take-up rate in the market.  More pertinently however, community 
rating encourages substantially higher take-up rates among older, high-risk 
consumers, which makes intuitive sense, as they are not charged the actuarial 
premiums that they would pay under a system of risk rating, and therefore health 
insurance for such consumers is more affordable under community rating than under 
risk rating. 
 
Given that older consumers have, on average, significantly higher medical utilisation 
and expenses than younger consumers, this has profound implications for the public 
healthcare system in Ireland.  Since community rating attracts a higher proportion of 
high-risk consumers, these consumers therefore do not rely to the same extent on the 
public system, ceteris paribus.  This clearly leads to savings for the public 
healthcare system, which in Ireland is funded through taxation. 
 
Analysis of figures for public hospital discharges in Ireland reveals that, while 
private patients tend to have shorter average lengths of stay than their public 
counterparts in most age groups, their treatment is, on average, more complex than 
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their public counterparts.  Furthermore, older private patients have longer average 
stays in public hospitals than the average of public patients.  Therefore, if significant 
numbers of older privately insured consumers were to discontinue their private 
health insurance as a result of being charged more under risk rating – and thereby 
rely on being treated as public patients in public hospitals – then this would add to 
the average length of stay and average treatment complexity for public patients.  
Given limited resources in the public hospital system, this would almost certainly 
increase waiting times for public patients. 
 
7.4 Is Risk Equalisation Necessary in a Community Rated Market with 
Staggered Entry of Insurers? 
 
One theme that runs through the analysis in this research is that of adverse selection.  
This can take the form of consumers waiting until they are more likely to need 
health insurance before purchasing it, or it can take the form of higher-risk 
consumers choosing more comprehensive cover, while lower-risk consumers choose 
cheaper, less comprehensive cover.  This, combined with risk selection – whereby 
insurers have an incentive to attract lower-risk consumers and avoid higher-risk 
consumers, despite, or even because of, the presence of community rating, open 
enrolment and lifetime cover – can cause or accentuate differences in risk profiles 
between insurers. 
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It would also appear that some degree of ‘passive’ risk selection by new insurers in a 
market is also inherent, as new insurers tend to attract a higher proportion of their 
members from the ranks of new consumers, who tend to be younger than the average 
of existing consumers, and consumers who switch from other insurers, who also tend 
to be younger than average.  This is the flip-side of the coin from adverse retention, 
which is the phenomenon whereby higher-risk consumers tend to stay with their 
existing (often longer-established) insurers, thus accentuating differences in risk 
profiles between older and newer insurers.  Therefore, staggered entry of insurers 
into a market would also appear to contribute to a divergence in risk profiles 
between newer insurers and older incumbent insurers.  In the context of the Irish 
private health insurance market, where Vhi Healthcare was operating in the market 
for 40 years before its first competitor entered the market, this point is of particular 
significance. 
 
As the model presented in Chapter 3 shows, if differences in risk profiles emerge 
between insurers, or indeed between plans, then it leads to higher-risk consumers 
paying more, on average, for cover than lower-risk consumers, even for the same or 
similar levels of cover.  This breaches the principle of community rating.  If 
community rating across the market is required, then it is clear that some form of 
adjustment mechanism would be needed to counter-balance any differences in risk 
profiles that might emerge.  However, this is complicated somewhat in the Irish case 
by the fact that there is no standard plan in the market; rather there is a wide – and 
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increasing – variety of plans, some of which are very similar but offered by different 
insurers.  This could lead to risk segmentation in the market. 
 
Community rating represents a deviation from the normal insurance practice of 
charging premiums based on the risk that a consumer represents to an insurer – or 
more specifically taking into account expected claim costs.  This leads to an inherent 
cross-subsidy from lower-risk consumers, who pay more than they actuarially 
would, to higher-risk consumers, who pay less than they actuarially would.  In the 
case of health insurance, the distinction between lower-risk and higher-risk 
consumers can broadly – though not conclusively – be categorised by age, with 
younger consumers tending to be lower-risk, and older consumers tending to be 
higher-risk. 
 
Since community rating makes private health insurance more attractive to older 
(higher-risk) consumers than risk rating would, it creates an inherent instability in 
the market, as it requires a constant stream of younger (lower-risk) consumers to 
enter the market in order to keep premiums affordable for older (higher-risk) 
consumers.  This inherent instability is the primary reason for the recommendation 
of – and anticipated implementation of – lifetime community rating, which involves 
late entry loadings to encourage people to join the market at younger ages. 
 
However, evidence from the Australian experience of changing from single rate 
community rating to lifetime community rating suggests that, although such a move 
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might reduce the adverse selection problem, at least temporarily, it does not entirely 
eliminate it.  Hence, a move to lifetime community rating would not negate the need 
for some form of risk adjustment mechanism to ensure community rating across the 
market. 
 
It would therefore appear that some form of risk adjustment, such as risk 
equalisation, is inherently necessary in a private health insurance market such as that 
of Ireland, in which community rating, open enrolment and lifetime cover are 
mandated, and in which there has been staggered entry of insurers (albeit 
exaggerated in the Irish case by Vhi Healthcare’s legislative monopoly), in order to 
combat the threats of adverse selection and risk selection (the latter on either an 
‘active’ or a ‘passive’ basis). 
 
If community rating is allowed to break down, or if it is abandoned (which is 
unlikely given the level of political support for it), then risk rating, either explicitly 
or implicitly, would be the alternative.  This would clearly have a major impact on 
the profile of the Irish private health insurance market, in terms of age/risk.  It would 
also have a resultant impact on the public hospital sector, as large numbers of older 
(higher-risk, less healthy) consumers would be unlikely to be able to afford private 
health insurance and would therefore be forced to rely on the public system for 
hospital treatment.  Since these consumers tend to require longer hospital stays and 
more complex treatment than the average among all public patients, this would lead 
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to an increase in the average length of stay and treatment complexity among public 
hospital patients. 
 
Given the existing waiting times for treatment, which are the subject of a high level 
of dissatisfaction with the public system and lead many to take out private health 
insurance in the first place, any such transfer of older consumers to the public 
system would not only be politically unpalatable but, given the already stretched 
nature of the public system and possible cutbacks arising from the current 
deterioration of the public finances in Ireland, could lead to a further worsening of 
waiting times for public patients. 
 
7.5 Implications for Irish Government Policy 
 
The findings of this research have clear implications for Government policy towards 
the private health insurance market in Ireland.  It is clear that Government policy is 
to maintain community rating in the market, and this has broad cross-party political 
support.  This can therefore be taken as a given in the context of any policy 
discussion. 
 
It is clear from the research in this study that community rating achieves the stated 
public policy objective of ensuring that older consumers can afford private health 
insurance.  However, in light of the Supreme Court ruling on the Risk Equalisation 
Scheme, 2003, a re-evaluation of what exactly community rating means – or what 
 373 
level of community rating is desired – in the Irish private health insurance market 
would appear timely and prudent. 
 
If the Australian experience is replicated in Ireland, then the move to lifetime 
community rating, which is believed to be imminent, will likely improve the overall 
risk profile in the market, by attracting younger consumers in greater numbers.  
However, this effect has begun to unwind in Australia and may therefore be 
inherently only temporary. 
 
The fact that Ireland is currently in its first recession in a quarter of a century will 
also muddy the waters somewhat in this regard.  Since the opening of the Irish 
market to competition in the mid-1990s, the country has experienced an 
unprecedented period of economic growth and an associated increase in employment 
numbers, which has helped to swell the ranks of the insured population.  The extent 
to which this will change to reflect leaner economic circumstances remains to be 
seen, although evidence is already emerging of a modest decline in the number of 
people insured in Ireland in 2009. 
 
The findings of this research suggest that both adverse selection and risk selection 
are features of the Irish private health insurance market, and this may be of use to 
policy-makers, particularly in the context of the new risk equalisation scheme, which 
the Minister for Health and Children has indicated will be brought forward in 
approximately 2011.  Adverse selection and risk selection lead to differential risk 
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profiles between insurers and between plans with the same insurer.  Given the 
Supreme Court ruling that community rating within plans is the only valid 
definition, this means that community rating cannot operate across the market under 
the current conditions.  Therefore, any risk equalisation scheme that is brought 
forward in the future will need to address these issues. 
 
It is unlikely however, that any risk equalisation mechanism will entirely eliminate 
the incentives for insurers to select low-risk insured lives.  The Risk Equalisation 
Scheme, 2003 would have operated on the basis of measuring risk by reference to 
age and gender only.  While these factors give some indication of differential risk, 
they do not explain much of the risk differences between consumers.  Utilisation, 
while a more accurate indicator of risk differences, is more difficult – and costly – to 
collect.  A balance between accuracy and cost of indicators of risk differences 
therefore needs to be struck. 
 
7.6 Future Research Agenda 
 
This research has added a quantitative element to the debate over risk equalisation in 
the Irish private health insurance market.  However, by its nature it is a contribution 
rather than a definitive work, and a number of other questions have been raised 
during the research for this study. 
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The first, perhaps very ambitious, area for future research is to examine the welfare 
implications of community rating.  Clearly, community rating makes high-risk 
insured persons relatively better off at the expense of low-risk insured persons, 
compared with risk rating.  The degree to which society benefits from this however, 
is unclear, at least in the Irish context.  This would therefore be one area for future 
research, particularly in light of the suggestion by some commentators that 
community rating is a cause of market distortion. 
 
A related, perhaps more achievable, goal would be to determine whether the 
subsidisation of private health insurance by the Irish Government – through tax 
relief on health insurance premiums, the charging of less than the full economic cost 
of private beds in public hospitals (although this policy is being unwound) and the 
subsidisation of training of medical personnel, many of whom work in the private 
sector, by the State – represents value for money for the Irish taxpayer.  Studies in 
other countries (such as Emmerson et al, 2001 for the UK and Stabile, 2001 for 
Canada) suggest that the costs of such subsidisation outweigh the benefits in terms 
of lower utilisation of public healthcare services. 
 
However, it should be borne in mind that the UK has a risk rated private health 
insurance market, which has been shown (in Chapter 6) to be less attractive to older 
consumers, and would therefore be more likely to attract lower risks out of the 
public system, compared with a community rated system, which has been shown to 
attract greater proportions of older consumers out of the public system.  Canada’s 
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private health insurance market, meanwhile, is very different from those operating in 
Ireland or the UK, in that private health insurance in Canada is prohibited from 
covering treatments that are available in the public health system, which would 
include most hospital treatment.  It is possible therefore that the subsidisation of 
private health insurance in Ireland is more cost effective than in either the UK or 
Canada. 
 
A related area for future research would be to further investigate why the average 
length of stay for private patients tends to be shorter than that for private patients in 
similar age groups, despite having a more complex mix of treatment.  This could 
have implications for government policy regarding the public-private mix of 
treatment in public hospitals, particularly if efficiency savings can be harnessed for 
the public sector by replicating the behaviour in the private sector. 
 
Further expansion of the theme of ‘active’ versus ‘passive’ risk selection might also 
be of benefit, and if possible an analysis will be undertaken of the degree to which 
the risk selection indicated by the results of this research represents ‘active’ or 
‘passive’ risk selection. 
 
In time, once the proposed change to lifetime community rating in Ireland is 
implemented, it would be instructive to examine the impact that this has on the Irish 
market, and to compare that with the Australian experience to determine whether the 
two markets react differently to the change, and if so why. 
 377 
 
As a step on the road to building up a quantitative analysis of the Irish private health 
insurance market, this study has added to some threads of the debate relating to the 
market, and should contribute to that debate in a constructive and objective manner. 
 
 378 
REFERENCES 
 
ABS (2007): Population by Age and Sex, Australian States and Territories, June 
2007. Canberra: Australian Bureau of Statistics 
 
ABS (2008): Population by Age and Sex, Australian States and Territories, June 
2008. Canberra: Australian Bureau of Statistics 
 
Adams, S. (2007): Health Insurance Market Reform and Employee Compensation: 
The Case of Pure Community Rating in New York. Journal of Public Economics, 91 
(5-6), pp 1119-1133 
 
Advisory Group to the Minister for Health on the Risk Equalisation Scheme (1998): 
Report of the Advisory Group on the Risk Equalisation Scheme. Dublin: Department 
of Health and Children 
 
Akerlof, G. (1970): The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84 (3), pp 488-500 
 
Altman, D., Cutler, D. & Zeckhauser, R. (1998): Adverse Selection and Adverse 
Retention. The American Economic Review, 88 (2), Papers and Proceedings of the 
Hundred and Tenth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association (May 
1998), pp 122-126 
 
Arrow, K. (1963): Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care. The 
American Economic Review, 53 (5), pp 941-973 
 
Baltagi, B. (2005): Econometric Analysis of Panel Data. Third Edition. Chichester: 
John Wiley & Sons Ltd 
 
Barrett, G. & Conlon, R. (2001): Adverse Selection and the Decline in Private 
Health Insurance Coverage in Australia: 1989-1995. Discussion Paper, School of 
Economics, University of New South Wales 
 
Berk, M. & Monheit, A. (1992): The Concentration of Health Expenditures: An 
Update. Health Affairs, 11 (4), pp 145-149 
 
Berk, M. & Monheit, A. (2001): The Concentration of Health Expenditures, 
Revisited. Health Affairs, 20 (2), pp 9-18 
 
Berk, M., Monheit, A. & Hagan, M. (1988): How the U.S. Spent Its Health Care 
Dollar, 1929-1980. Health Affairs, 7 (4), pp 46-60 
 
Berki, S. & Ashcraft, M. (1980): HMO Enrollment: Who Joins What and Why: A 
Review of the Literature. Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly, 58 (4), pp 588-632 
 
 379 
Billauer, B. (2009): The Suitability of Mandated Insurance for Health Coverage: 
Why Car is Not Like Care. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1470852 
 
Boyle, S. (2008): The Health System in England. Eurohealth, 14 (1), pp 1-2 
 
Brown III, H.S. & Connelly, L. (2005a): Market Failure in Long-term Private Health 
Insurance: A Proposed Solution. Applied Economic Letters, 12 (5), pp 281-284 
 
Brown III, H.S. & Connelly, L. (2005b): Lifetime Cover in Private Insurance 
Markets. International Journal of Health Care Finance and Economics, 5 (1), pp 
75-88 
 
Browne, M. (1992): Evidence of Adverse Selection in the Individual Health 
Insurance Market. The Journal of Risk and Insurance, 59 (1), pp 13-33 
 
Buchmueller, T. (2006): Consumer Demand for Health Insurance. NBER Reporter, 
Summer 2006, pp 10-13. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau for Economic Research 
 
Buchmueller, T. & DiNardo, J. (2002): Did Community Rating Induce an Adverse 
Selection Death Spiral?  Evidence from New York, Pennsylvania and Connecticut. 
The American Economic Review, 92 (1), pp 280-294 
 
Buchmueller, T. & Feldstein, P. (1996): Consumers’ Sensitivity to Health Plan 
Premiums: Evidence from a Natural Experiment in California. Health Affairs, 15 (1), 
pp 143-151 
 
BUPA Ireland (2002): Response to HIA on Age at Entry Loadings in the Irish Health 
Insurance Market. Available at http://www.hia.ie/sec1_regulation/LCR-Submission-
BUPA-Ireland.pdf. 
 
Burke, S. (2009): Is FairCare Really the Future for Better Health Care in Ireland? 
Health Manager (June-July 2009), pp 10-13 
 
Carlton, D. & Perloff, J. (2005): Modern Industrial Organization (Fourth Edition). 
Boston: Addison-Wesley 
 
Centura Health Administration Ltd. (2004): Response to the Consultation Paper on 
Minimum Benefits. Dublin: Centura Health Administration Ltd. Available at 
http://www.hia.ie/sec1_regulation/Minimum-Benefit-Submission-Centura-Health-
Administration-Ltd.pdf 
 
Cheah, C. & Doessel, D. (1994): Welfare Cost and Health Insurance: A 
Disaggregated Approach using Duality Theory and Australian Data. Applied 
Economics, 26 (6), pp 567-574 
 
 380 
Cheeseman Day, J. & Newburger, E. (2002): The Big Payoff: Educational 
Attainment and Synthetic Estimates of Work-Life Earnings. Special Studies. 
Washington D.C.: U.S. Census Bureau 
 
Chernew, M., Cutler, D. & Keenan, P. (2005): Increasing Health Insurance Costs 
and the Decline in Insurance Coverage. Health Services Research, 40 (4), pp 1021-
1039 
 
Colombo, F. & Tapay, N. (2004) Private Health Insurance in Ireland: A Case Study. 
OECD Health Working Paper No. 10. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development 
 
Commission on Health Funding (1989): Report of the Commission on Health 
Funding. Dublin: Government Stationery Office 
 
Commission on Taxation (1982): First Report of the Commission on Taxation. 
Dublin: Government Stationery Office 
 
Commission on Taxation (2009): Commission on Taxation Report 2009. Dublin: 
Government Stationery Office 
 
Competition Authority (2005): Guidance in Respect of Collective Negotiations 
Relating to the Setting of Medical Fees. Dublin: The Competition Authority 
 
Competition Authority (2007): Competition in the Irish Private Health Insurance 
Market. Dublin: The Competition Authority 
 
Comptroller and Auditor General (2009): Accounts of the Public Services 2008: 
Comptroller and Auditor General Annual Report. Dublin: Office of the Comptroller 
and Auditor General 
 
Connelly, L. & Brown III, H.S. (2006): Lifetime Subsidies in Australian Private 
Health Insurance Markets with Community Rating. The Geneva Papers on Risk and 
Insurance, 31 (4), pp 705-719 
 
CSO (2002): Quarterly National Household Survey: Health. Third Quarter 2001. 
Dublin: Central Statistics Office 
 
CSO (2007a): Census 2006, Volume 2 – Ages and Marital Status. Dublin: Central 
Statistics Office 
 
CSO (2007b): Household Budget Survey 2004-2005 Final Results. Dublin: Central 
Statistics Office 
 
CSO (2008a): Population and Labour Force Projections: 2011-2041. Dublin: 
Central Statistics Office 
 381 
 
CSO (2008b): Health Status and Health Service Utilisation. Quarterly National 
Household Survey, Quarter 3 2007. Dublin: Central Statistics Office 
 
CSO (2009): National Income and Expenditure: Annual Results for 2008. Dublin: 
Central Statistics Office 
 
Curtis, R., Lewis, S., Haugh, K. & Forland, R. (1999): Health Insurance Reform in 
the Small-Group Market. Health Affairs, 18 (3), pp 151-160 
 
Cutler, D. & Reber, S. (1998): Paying for Health Insurance: The Trade-Off between 
Competition and Adverse Selection. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113 (2), 
pp 434-466 
 
Cutler, D. & Zeckhauser, R. (1997), Adverse Selection in Health Insurance. NBER 
Working Paper No. 6107. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau for Economic Research 
 
Deloitte & Touche (2001): Value for Money Audit of the Irish Health System. 
Deloitte & Touche in conjunction with the York Health Economics Consortium, on 
behalf of the Department of Health and Children. Dublin: Deloitte & Touche 
 
DeMaris, A. (1995): A Tutorial in Logistic Regression. Journal of Marriage and the 
Family, 57 (4), pp 956-968 
 
Department of Finance (2008): Budget 2009. Dublin: Government Stationery Office 
 
Department of Health and Aged Care (2000): The Australian Health Care System: 
An Outline. Canberra: Department of Health and Aged Care 
 
Department of Health and Children (1999): White Paper: Private Health Insurance. 
Dublin: Government Stationery Office 
 
Department of Health and Children (2001): Quality and Fairness: A Health System 
For You. Dublin: Government Stationery Office 
 
Department of Health and Children (2002): Acute Hospital Bed Capacity: A 
National Review. Dublin: Government Stationery Office 
 
Department of Health and Children (2005a): Tánaiste decides against introduction 
of risk equalisation in health insurance market at this time. Dublin: Department of 
Health and Children. Available at 
http://www.dohc.ie/press/releases/2005/20050627.html. Accessed on 04 July 2009 
 
 
 
 382 
Department of Health and Children (2005b): Tánaiste announces plan for 1,000 new 
public hospital beds over 5 years. Dublin: Department of Health and Children. 
Available at http://www.dohc.ie/press/releases/2005/20050714a.html.  Accessed on 
03 June 2009 
 
Department of Health and Children (2005c): Tánaiste announces introduction of risk 
equalisation and measures to achieve greater competition in the private health 
insurance market. Dublin: Department of Health and Children. Available at 
http://www.dohc.ie/press/releases/2005/20051223.html. Accessed on 04 July 2009 
 
Department of Health and Children (2008a): Minister Harney says IHCA acceptance 
of new contract paves the way for improved services for patients. Dublin: 
Department of Health and Children. Available at 
http://www.dohc.ie/press/releases/2008/200805016b.html.  Accessed on 04 July 
2009 
 
Department of Health and Children (2008b): Government Statement re: Medical 
Card for People Aged 70 and Over. Dublin: Department of Health and Children. 
Available at http://www.dohc.ie/press/releases/2008/20081021b.html. Accessed on 
01 November 2008 
 
Department of Health and Children (2008c): Minister announces Government 
initiative to support the cost of health insurance for older people. Dublin: 
Department of Health and Children. Available at 
http://www.dohc.ie/press/releases/2008/20081119.html. Accessed on 20 November 
2008 
 
Department of Health and Children (2008d): Health Insurance Initiative – Questions 
and Answers. Dublin: Department of Health and Children. Available at 
http://www.dohc.ie/issues/health_insurance/. Accessed on 20 November 2008 
 
Department of the Taoiseach (1991): Programme for Economic and Social 
Progress. Dublin: Government Stationery Office 
 
Dionne, G. & Laserre, P. (1985): Adverse Selection, Repeated Insurance Contracts 
and Announcement Strategy. The Review of Economic Studies, 52 (4), pp 719-723 
 
DKM Economic Consultants (2005): Entry, Risk Selection and Stability in a 
Community-Rated Health Insurance Market without Risk Equalisation. Dublin: 
DKM Economic Consultants. Available at 
http://www.vhi.ie/pdf/about/dkm_report.pdf 
 
Doiron, D., Jones, G. & Savage, E. (2008): Healthy, Wealthy and Insured? The Role 
of Self-Assessed Health in the Demand for Private Health Insurance. Health 
Economics, 17 (3), pp 317-334 
 
 383 
Donnellan, E. (2009): Co-location makes ‘no sense’ now. Irish Times, 18 August 
2009 
 
Doty, M., Collins, S., Nicholson, J. & Rustgi, S. (2009): Failure to Protect: Why the 
Individual Insurance Market is not a Viable Option for Most U.S. Families. New 
York, NY: The Commonwealth Fund 
 
Dowd, B. & Feldman, R. (1985): Biased Selection in Twin Cities Health Plans. In 
Scheffler, R. & Rossiter, L. (Eds.), Advances in Health Economics and Health 
Services Research, Vol. 6. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press 
 
Dowd, B., Feldman, R., Cassou, S. & Finch, M. (1991): Health Plan Choice and the 
Utilization of Health Care Services. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 73 (1), 
pp 85-93 
 
Dudley, W. (1982): A Consumer Inertia Model of Entry Deterrence. Working Paper 
No. 60, Research Papers in Banking and Financial Economics. Washington, DC: 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
 
Dunn, D. (1998): Applications of Health Risk Adjustment: What Can Be Learned 
From Experience To Date? Inquiry, 35 (2), pp 132-147 
 
Eggleston, K. (2000): Risk Selection and Optimal Health Insurance-Provider 
Payment Systems. The Journal of Risk and Insurance, 67 (2), pp 173-196 
 
Ellis, R. (1985): The Effect of Prior-Year Health Expenditures on Health Coverage 
Plan Choice. In Scheffler, R. & Rossiter, L. (Eds.), Advances in Health Economics 
and Health Services Research, Vol. 6. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press 
 
Ellwood, P., Enthoven, A. & Etheredge, L. (1992): The Jackson Hole Initiatives for 
a Twenty-First Century American Health Care System. Health Economics, 1 (3), pp 
149-168 
 
Emmerson, C., Frayne, C. & Goodman, A. (2001): Should Private Medical 
Insurance Be Subsidised? Health Care UK, 51 (4), pp. 49-65 
 
Enthoven, A. (1988): Managed Competition: An Agenda for Action. Health Affairs, 
7 (3), pp 25-47 
 
Enthoven, A. (1993): The History and Principles of Managed Competition. Health 
Affairs, Supplement, pp. 24-48 
 
ESRI (2006): Activity in Acute Public Hospitals in Ireland, 1992-2001. Dublin: The 
Economic and Social Research Institute 
 
 384 
ESRI (2008a): Activity in Acute Public Hospitals in Ireland: Annual Report 2005. 
Dublin: The Economic and Social Research Institute 
 
ESRI (2008b): Activity in Acute Public Hospitals in Ireland: Annual Report 2006. 
Dublin: The Economic and Social Research Institute 
 
European Commission (2009a): IP/09/961. State aid: Commission authorises Irish 
health insurance tax and levy scheme. Brussels: European Commission. Available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/961&format=HTML
&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en. Accessed on 18 June 2009 
 
European Commission (2009b): IP/09/1003. Insurance: Commission refers Ireland 
to Court of Justice over exemption of Irish Voluntary Health Insurance Board (VHI) 
from EU rules. Brussels: European Commission. Available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/1003&format=HTM
L&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en. Accessed on 29 June 2009 
 
Evans, R. (2002): Financing Healthcare: Taxation and the Alternatives. In 
Mossialos, E., Dixon, A., Figueras, J. & Kultzin, J. (Eds.), Funding Healthcare: 
Options for Europe. Maidenhead: Open University Press 
 
Farley, P. & Monheit, A. (1985): Selectivity in the Demand for Health Insurance and 
Health Care. In Scheffler, R. & Rossiter, L. (Eds.), Advances in Health Economics 
and Health Services Research, Vol. 6. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press 
 
Feldman, R. (1987): Health Insurance in the United States: Is Market Failure 
Avoidable? Journal of Risk and Insurance, 54 (2), pp 298-313 
 
Feldman, R. & Dowd, B. (1982): Simulation of a Health Insurance Market with 
Adverse Selection. Operations Research, 30 (6), pp 1027-1042 
 
Feldman, R. & Dowd, B. (2000): Risk Segmentation: Goal or Problem? Journal of 
Health Economics, 19 (4), pp 499-512 
 
Field, M. (1985): Comments on Policy Implications of Biased Selection in Health 
Insurance. In Scheffler, R. & Rossiter, L. (Eds.), Advances in Health Economics and 
Health Services Research, Vol. 6. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press 
 
Financial Regulator (2007): Insurance Statistical Review 2006. Dublin: Irish 
Financial Services Regulatory Authority 
 
Foubister, T., Thomson, S., Mossialos, E. & McGuire, A. (2006): Private Medical 
Insurance in the United Kingdom. Copenhagen: World Health Organization on 
behalf of the European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies 
 
 385 
Frech III, H.E. & Hopkins, S. (2004): Why Subsidise Private Health Insurance? The 
Australian Economic Review, 37 (3), pp 243-256 
 
Gardiol, L., Geoffard, P. & Grandchamp, C. (2005): Separating Selection and 
Incentive Effects in Health Insurance. Working Paper No. 2005-38. Paris: Paris 
Jourdan Sciences Economiques 
 
Ginsburg, P. (1985): Reflections on Biased Selection and Future Directions. In 
Scheffler, R. & Rossiter, L. (Eds.), Advances in Health Economics and Health 
Services Research, Vol. 6. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press 
 
Gollier, C. (1992): Economic Theory of Risk Exchanges: A Review. In Dionne, G. 
(Ed.), Contributions to Insurance Economics. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers 
 
Goodbody Economic Consultants (2007): Improving the Regulation of Private 
Health Insurance. Dublin: Goodbody Economic Consultants. Available at 
http://www.goodbody.ie/aboutgoodbody/reports/Improving%20the%20Regulation%
20of%20Private%20Health%20Insurance,%202007.pdf 
 
Grosse-Tebbe, S. & Figueras, J (Eds.) (2005): Snapshots of Health Systems. 
Copenhagen: World Health Organization on behalf of the European Observatory on 
Health Systems and Policies 
 
Gujarati, D. (1988): Basic Econometrics (Second Edition). New York: McGraw Hill 
 
Hall, M. (1998): An Evaluation of New York’s Health Insurance Reform Laws. 
Working Paper, Wake Forest University School of Medicine, Winston-Salem, NC 
 
Hall, J., De Abreu Lourenco, R. & Viney, R. (1999): Carrots and Sticks – The Fall 
and Fall of Private health Insurance in Australia. Health Economics, 8 (8), pp 653-
660 
 
Harmon, C. & Nolan, B. (2001): Health Insurance and Health Services Utilization in 
Ireland. Health Economics, 10 (2), pp135-145 
 
Harrington, S. & Niehaus, G. (2003): Risk Management and Insurance (2
nd
 Edition). 
New York: McGraw Hill 
 
Hartedny, J. (1994): You Can’t Buy Insurance When the House is On Fire: 
Community Rating Kills Health Insurance. Postgraduate Medicine, 95 (7), pp 75-81 
 
Health Consumer Powerhouse (2008a): Euro Health Consumer Index 2008. 
Brussels: Health Consumer Powerhouse. 
 
 386 
Health Consumer Powerhouse (2008b): Irish Healthcare System Witnesses Slight 
Improvement in European Health Consumer Ranking. Brussels: Health Consumer 
Powerhouse. Available at http://www.healthpowerhouse.com/files/2008-
EHCI/pr/Ireland%20EHCI%202008.pdf.  Accessed on 03 July 2009. 
 
Health Consumer Powerhouse (2009): Euro Health Consumer Index 2009. Brussels: 
Health Consumer Powerhouse 
 
HIA (2002a): Consultation Paper: Risk Equalisation in the Private Health 
Insurance Market in Ireland, 19 February 2002. Dublin: The Health Insurance 
Authority 
 
HIA (2002b): Consultation Paper: Lifetime Community Rating, August 2002. 
Dublin: The Health Insurance Authority 
 
HIA (2002c): Policy Paper: Risk Equalisation in the Private Health Insurance 
Market in Ireland, September 2002. Dublin: The Health Insurance Authority 
 
HIA (2002d): Submission to the Department of Health and Children: Lifetime 
Community Rating, October 2002. Dublin: The Health Insurance Authority 
 
HIA (2003a): The Private Health Insurance Market in Ireland. Report prepared by 
Amárach Consulting, March 2003. Dublin: The Health Insurance Authority 
 
HIA (2003b): Risk Equalisation: Guide to the Risk Equalisation Scheme, 2003 as 
prescribed in Statutory Instrument No. 261 of 2003. Dublin: The Health Insurance 
Authority 
 
HIA (2003c): Consultation Paper: Minimum Benefits, October 2003. Dublin: The 
Health Insurance Authority 
 
HIA (2005a): The Private Health Insurance Market in Ireland: A Market Review. 
Report prepared by Insight Statistical Consulting, September 2005. Dublin: The 
Health Insurance Authority 
 
HIA (2005b): Submission to the Department of Health and Children: Minimum 
Benefits. Dublin: The Health Insurance Authority 
 
HIA (2005c): Staff Report to the Members of The Health Insurance Authority in 
relation to its statutory functions and duties regarding risk equalisation, April 2005. 
Dublin: The Health Insurance Authority. Available at 
http://www.hia.ie/sec3_reports/RE-Report-April-2005.pdf  
 
HIA (2007): Competition in the Irish Private Health Insurance Market: A Report to 
the Minister for Health and Children. Dublin: The Health Insurance Authority 
 
 387 
HIA (2008a): Summary of amounts due under Risk Equalisation Scheme. Dublin: 
The Health Insurance Authority.  Available at 
http://www.hia.ie/sec3_reports/Payments%20due%20under%20the%20RE%20Sche
me.pdf.  Accessed on 7 August 2008 
 
HIA (2008b): Risk Equalisation: Updated Guide to the Risk Equalisation Scheme, 
2003 as prescribed in Statutory Instruments No. 261 of 2003, No. 710 of 2003, No. 
334 of 2005 and No. 220 of 2007. Dublin: The Health Insurance Authority 
 
HIA (2008c): The Private Health Insurance Market in Ireland: A Market Review. 
Report prepared by Insight Statistical Consulting, March 2008. Dublin: The Health 
Insurance Authority 
 
HIA (2008d): Annual Report and Accounts 2007. Dublin: The Health Insurance 
Authority 
 
HIA (2009): Annual Report and Accounts 2008. Dublin: The Health Insurance 
Authority 
 
Hibernian AVIVA Health (2009): 2.2m Health Insurance Customers Can Get Better 
Healthcare for Less with New Plans from Hibernian AVIVA Health. Available at 
http://www.hibernianavivahealth.ie/whats-new/press-releases/2009/press-release-
28.xml. Accessed on 17 August 2009 
 
Hibernian Health (2008): Hibernian Health to Challenge Government Health 
Insurance Levy. Available at http://www.hibernianavivahealth.ie/whats-new/press-
releases/2008/press-release-26.xml. Accessed on 19 December 2008 
 
HSE (2007): Acute Hospital Bed Capacity Review: A Preferred Health System in 
Ireland to 2020. Report prepared by PA Consulting Group. Naas: Health Service 
Executive 
 
HSE (2008): Welcome to Casemix in Ireland. Naas: Health Service Executive 
 
HSE (2009). Annual Report and Financial Statements 2008. Naas: Health Service 
Executive 
 
Hsiao, W. (1995): Abnormal Economics in the Health Sector. In Berman, P. (Ed.), 
Health Sector Reform in Developing Countries: Making Health Development 
Sustainable. Boston, MA: Harvard University Press 
 
Industry Commission (1997): Private Health Insurance: Report No. 57. Canberra: 
Australian Government Publishing Service 
 
Institute of Actuaries of Australia (1997): Unfunded Lifetime Community Rating: A 
Discussion Paper. Sydney: Institute of Actuaries of Australia 
 388 
 
Irish Insurance Federation (2007): Irish Insurance Federation Factfile 2007. Dublin: 
Irish Insurance Federation 
 
Irish Insurance Federation (2008): Irish Insurance Federation Factfile 2008. Dublin: 
Irish Insurance Federation 
 
Irish Insurance Federation (2009a): Irish Insurance Federation 2009 Annual Report. 
Dublin: Irish Insurance Federation 
 
Irish Insurance Federation (2009b): Irish Insurance Federation Factfile 2009. 
Dublin: Irish Insurance Federation 
 
Johnston, J. (1984): Econometric Methods, Third Edition. Singapore: McGraw Hill 
International Editions 
 
Kennedy, K. (2001): Reflections on the Process of Irish Economic Growth. 
Symposium on Economic Growth in Ireland: Where Has It Come From, Where Is It 
Going? Journal of the Statistical and Social Inquiry Society of Ireland, 30, pp 123-
139 
 
Kifmann, M. (2002): Community Rating in Health Insurance and Different Benefit 
Packages. Journal of Health Economics, 21 (5), pp 719-737 
 
Labour Party (2001): Our Good Health. Dublin: Labour Party 
 
Laing & Buisson (2008): Health & Care Cover: UK Market Report 2008. London: 
Laing & Buisson 
 
Layte, R. & Nolan, A. (2009): Improving Access to Primary Care in Ireland: Do GP 
Charges Matter? ESRI Research Bulletin 2009/2/1. Dublin: Economic and Social 
Research Institute 
 
Layte, R. (Ed.), Barry, M., Bennett, K., Brick, A., Morgenroth, E., Normand, C., 
O’Reilly, J., Thomas, S., Tilson, L., Wiley, M. & Wren, M-A. (2009): Projecting the 
Impact of Demographic Change on the Demand for and Delivery of Health Care in 
Ireland. Research Series Number 13. Dublin: Economic and Social Research 
Institute 
 
Light, D. (1998): Keeping Competition Fair for Health Insurance: How the Irish 
Beat Back Risk-Rated Policies. American Journal of Public Health, 88 (5), pp 745-
748 
 
 
 
 389 
Luft, H., Trauner, J. & Maerki, S. (1985): Adverse Selection in a Large, Multiple-
Option Health Benefits Program: A Case Study of the California Public Employees’ 
Retirement System. In Scheffler, R. & Rossiter, L. (Eds.), Advances in Health 
Economics and Health Services Research, Vol. 6. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press 
 
Maddala, G. (1983): Limited Dependent and Qualitative Variables in Econometrics. 
New York: Cambridge University Press 
 
Maddala, G. (1985): A Survey of the Literature on Selectivity Bias as it Pertains to 
Health Care Markets. In Scheffler, R. & Rossiter, L. (Eds.), Advances in Health 
Economics and Health Services Research, Vol. 6. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press 
 
Madden, R. (2006): Australia’s Health System: Radical Reform or Solve the 
Problems. Actuary Australia, May 2006, pp 10-11 
 
Manning, W., Newhouse, J., Duan, N., Keeler, E., Liebowitz, A. & Marquis, M. 
(1987): Health Insurance and the Demand for Medical Care: Evidence from a 
Randomized Experiment. The American Economic Review, 77 (3), pp 251-277 
 
Marquis, M.S. (1992): Adverse Selection with a Multiple Choice Among Health 
Insurance Plans: A Simulation Analysis. Journal of Health Economics, 11 (2), pp 
129-151 
 
Maynard, A. & Dixon, A. (2002): Private Health Insurance and Medical Savings 
Accounts: Theory and Experience. In Mossialos, E., Dixon, A., Figueras, J. & 
Kutzin, J. (Eds.), Funding Healthcare: Options for Europe. Maidenhead: Open 
University Press 
 
McCarthy, T., Davies, K., Gaisford, J. & Hoffmeyer, U. (1995): Risk-Adjustment 
and its Implications for Efficiency and Equity in Health Care Systems. London: 
National Economic Research Associates 
 
McDaid, D., Wiley, M., Maresso, A. & Mossialos, E. (2009): Ireland: Health System 
Review. Health Systems in Transition, 11 (4). Copenhagen: World Health 
Organization on behalf of the European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies 
 
Mercer Human Resource Consulting (2005): Letter to the Minister for Health and 
Children re: Commencement of Risk Equalisation, 27 June 2005.  Available at 
http://www.dohc.ie/publications/pdf/advice_mercer.pdf. Accessed on 22 April 2009 
 
Monheit, A., Cantor, J., Koller, M. & Fox, K. (2004): Community Rating and 
Sustainable Individual Health Insurance Markets in New Jersey. Health Affairs, 23 
(4), pp 167-175 
 
 390 
Morris, S., Elliott, B., Ma, A., McConnachie, A., Rice, N., Skatun, D. & Sutton, M. 
(2008): Analysis of Consultants’ NHS and Private Incomes in England in 2003/4. 
Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine, 101 (7), pp 372-380 
 
Mosca, I. & Schut-Welkzijn, A. (2008): Choice Determinants of the Mobility in the 
Dutch Health Insurance Market. European Journal of Health Economics, 9 (3), pp 
261-264 
 
Mossialos, E. & Dixon, A. (2002): Funding Healthcare: An Introduction. In 
Mossialos, E., Dixon, A., Figueras, J. & Kutzin, J. (Eds.), Funding Healthcare: 
Options for Europe. Maidenhead: Open University Press 
 
Mossialos, E. & Thomson, S. (2002a): Voluntary Health Insurance in the European 
Union. Report prepared for the Directorate General for Employment and Social 
Affairs of the European Commission. Brussels: European Commission 
 
Mossialos, E. & Thomson, S. (2002b): Voluntary Health Insurance in the European 
Union. In Mossialos, E., Dixon, A., Figueras, J. & Kutzin, J. (Eds.), Funding 
Healthcare: Options for Europe. Maidenhead: Open University Press 
 
Mossialos, E. & Thomson, S. (2004): Voluntary Health Insurance in the European 
Union. Copenhagen: World Health Organization on behalf of the European 
Observatory on Health Systems and Policies 
 
Mossialos, E. & Thomson, S. (2009): Private Health Insurance in the European 
Union. Final Report prepared for the European Commission, Directorate General for 
Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities. Brussels: European 
Commission 
 
NESF (2002): Equity of Access to Hospital Care. Forum Report No. 25. Dublin: 
National Economic and Social Forum 
 
Newhouse, J. (1982): Is Competition the Answer? Journal of Health Economics, 1 
(1), pp 109-116 
 
Newhouse, J. (1984): Cream Skimming, Asymmetric Information and a Competitive 
Insurance Market. Journal of Health Economics, 3 (1), pp 97-100 
 
Newhouse, J. (1994): Patients at Risk: Health Reform and Risk Adjustment. Health 
Affairs, 13 (1), pp 132-146 
 
Newhouse, J. (1996): Reimbursing Health Plans and Health Providers: Efficiency in 
Production Versus Selection. Journal of Economic Literature, 34 (3), pp 1236-1263 
 
Newhouse, J. (1998): Risk Adjustment: Where Are We Now? Inquiry, 35 (2), pp 
122-131 
 391 
 
Nicholson, S., Bundorf, K., Stein, R. & Polsky, D. (2004): The Magnitude and 
Nature of Risk Selection in Employer-Sponsored Health Plans. Health Services 
Research, 39 (6), pp 1817-1839 
 
Nolan, A. (2005): Health: Funding Access and Efficiency. In O’Hagan, J. & 
Newman, C. (Eds.), The Economy of Ireland: National and Sectoral Policy Issues. 
Dublin: Gill and Macmillan 
 
Nolan, B. (2006): The Interaction of Public and Private Health Insurance: Ireland as 
a Case Study. The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance, 31 (4), pp 633-649 
 
Nolan, B. & Wiley, M. (2000): Private Practice in Irish Public Hospitals. Dublin: 
Economic and Social Research Institute 
 
NTPF (2008): The National Treatment Purchase Fund, 2007 Annual Report. Dublin: 
The National Treatment Purchase Fund 
 
NTPF (2009): The National Treatment Purchase Fund, 2008 Annual Report. Dublin: 
The National Treatment Purchase Fund 
 
O’Brien, P. (2009): 21,000 People Cancelled Private Health Insurance. Irish 
Examiner, 29 October 2009 
 
O’Brien, P. & Shanahan, C. (2009): State Probe Set to Trigger Hike in Health 
Premiums. Irish Examiner, 24 August 2009 
 
OECD (2004): Private Health Insurance in OECD Countries. Paris: Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development 
 
OECD (2009): OECD Health Data 2009 – Frequently Requested Data. Paris: 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Available at 
http://www.oecd.org/document/16/0,3343,en_2649_34631_2085200_1_1_1_1,00.ht
ml. Accessed on 11 July 2009 
 
O’Morain, P. (2007): The Health of the Nation: The Irish Healthcare System 1957-
2007. Dublin: Gill & Macmillan 
 
O’Reilly, D., O’Dowd, T., Galway, K., Murphy, A., O’Neill, C., Shryane, E., Steele, 
K., Bury, G., Gilliland, A. & Kelly, A. (2007): Consultation Charges in Ireland 
Deter a Large Proportion of Patients from Seeing the GP: Results of a Cross-
sectional Survey. The European Journal of General Practice, 13 (4), pp 231-236 
 
Oliver, E. (2009): VHI eyes bailout as insurer fails to meet crucial solvency 
deadline. Sunday Tribune, 30 August 2009 
 
 392 
Palangkaraya, A. & Yong, J. (2007): How Effective is “Lifetime Health Cover” in 
Raising Private Health Insurance Coverage in Australia? An Assessment Using 
Regression Discontinuity. Applied Economics, 39 (11), pp 1361-1374 
 
Palangkaraya, A., Yong, J., Webster, E. & Dawkins, P. (2009): The Income 
Distributive Implications of Recent Private Health Insurance Policy Reforms in 
Australia. European Journal of Health Economics, 10 (2), pp 135-148 
 
Park, C. & Kang, C. (2008): Does Education Induce Healthy Lifestyle? Journal of 
Health Economics, 27 (6), pp 1516-1531 
 
Parkin, N. & McLeod, H. (2001): Risk Equalisation Methodologies: An 
International Perspective. CARE Monograph No. 3. Centre for Actuarial Research, 
University of Cape Town 
 
Patel, V. & Pauly, M. (2002): Guaranteed Renewability and the Problem of Risk 
Variation in Individual Health Insurance Markets. Health Affairs, Web Exclusive, 28 
August 2002, pp 280-289 
 
Pauly, M. (1970): The Welfare Economics of Community Rating. The Journal of 
Risk and Insurance, 37 (3), pp 407-418 
 
Pauly, M. (1984): Is Cream-Skimming a Problem for the Competitive Medical 
Market? Journal of Health Economics, 3 (1), pp 87-95 
 
Pauly, M. (1985): What is Adverse About Adverse Selection? In Scheffler, R. & 
Rossiter, L. (Eds.), Advances in Health Economics and Health Services Research, 
Vol. 6. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press 
 
Pauly, M. & Herring, B. (1999): Pooling Health Insurance Risks. Washington DC: 
American Enterprise Institute 
 
Pauly, M. & Herring, B. (2007): Risk Pooling and Regulation: Policy and Reality in 
Today’s Individual Health Insurance Market. Health Affairs, 26 (3), pp 770-779 
 
Pauly, M., Kunreuther, H. & Hirth, R. (1995): Guaranteed Renewability in 
Insurance. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 10 (2), pp 143-156 
 
Payne, D. (2000): Health Insurer Delays Psychiatric Admissions. British Medical 
Journal, 320, p. 1162 
 
PHIAC (2006): Operations of the Registered Health Benefits Organisations: Annual 
Report 2005-06. Canberra: Private Health Insurance Administration Council 
 
PHIAC (2007): Operations of the Private Health Insurers: Annual Report 2006-07. 
Canberra: Private Health Insurance Administration Council 
 393 
 
PHIAC (2008a): Insure?  Not Sure? Canberra: Private Health Insurance 
Administration Council 
 
PHIAC (2008b): Operations of the Private Health Insurers: Annual Report 2007-08. 
Canberra: Private Health Insurance Administration Council 
 
PHIAC (2009): Quarterly Statistics, March 2009. Canberra: Private Health 
Insurance Administration Council 
 
Price, J. & Mays, J. (1985): Selection and the Competitive Standing of Health Plans 
in a Multiple-Choice, Multiple-Insurer Market. In Scheffler, R. & Rossiter, L. 
(Eds.), Advances in Health Economics and Health Services Research, Vol. 6. 
Greenwich, CT: JAI Press 
 
Private Health Insurance Advisory Group (2007): A Business Appraisal of Private 
Medical Insurance in Ireland, A Report for the Minister for Health and Children. 
Dublin: Department of Health and Children 
 
Propper, C. (1989): An Econometric Analysis of the Demand for Private Health 
Insurance in England and Wales. Applied Economics, 21 (6), pp 777-792 
 
Pupp, R. (1981): Community Rating and Cross Subsidies in Health Insurance. 
Journal of Risk and Insurance, 48 (4), pp 610-627 
 
Quinn Healthcare (2008): New health insurance levy and increase in public hospital 
charges force Quinn-healthcare to implement larger price increases for 2009. 
Available at http://www.quinn-healthcare.com/pdf/pressreleasenov281108.pdf. 
Accessed on 28 November 2008 
 
Robinson, R. (2002): User Charges for Health Care. In Mossialos, E., Dixon, A., 
Figueras, J. & Kutzin, J. (Eds.), Funding Healthcare: Options for Europe. 
Maidenhead: Open University Press 
 
Rogal, D. & Gauthier, A. (1998): Are Health-Based Payments a Feasible Tool for 
Addressing Risk Segmentation? Inquiry, 35 (2), pp 115-121 
 
Rothschild, M. & Stiglitz, J. (1976): Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: 
An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information. The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 90 (4), pp 629-649 
 
Russo, C., Wier, L. & Elixhauser, A. (2009): Hospital Utilization among Near-
Elderly Adults, Ages 55 to 64 Years, 2007. HCUP Statistical Brief # 79. Rockville, 
MD: Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality. Available at http://www.hcup-
us.ahrg.gov/reports/statbriefs/sb79.pdf. Accessed on 25 September 2009 
 
 394 
Sauter, W. (2008): Risk Equalisation in Health Insurance and the New Standard for 
Public Service Compensation in the Context of State Aid and Services of General 
Economic Interest under EU Law. TILEC Discussion paper DP 2008-042, Tilburg 
University 
 
Shewry, S., Hunt, S., Ramey, J. & Bertko, J. (1996): Risk Adjustment: The Missing 
Piece of Market Competition. Health Affairs, 15 (1), pp 171-181 
 
Simon, K. (2005): Adverse Selection in Health Insurance Markets? Evidence from 
State Small-Group Health Insurance Reforms. Journal of Public Economics, 89 (10), 
pp 1865-1877 
 
Smith, S. (2009): Equity in Health Care: A View from the Irish Health Care System. 
An Adelaide Health Policy Brief. Dublin: Adelaide Hospital Society 
 
Society of Actuaries in Ireland (2002): Report of Working Group on Risk 
Equalisation, April 2002. Dublin: Society of Actuaries in Ireland 
 
Somerville, R. (1998): Medical Insurance, Community Rating, and Adverse 
Selection: An Overlapping Generations Perspective. Economic and Social Review, 
29 (3), pp 285-300 
 
Special Group on Public Service Numbers and Expenditure Programmes (2009): 
Report of the Special Group on Public Service Numbers and Expenditure 
Programmes. Dublin: Government Stationery Office 
 
Spiers, M. (2006): Seeing the Bigger Picture. World of Irish Nursing, 14 (1), p 18 
 
Stabile, M. (2001): Private Insurance Subsidies and Public Health Care Markets: 
Evidence from Canada. Canadian Journal of Economics, 34 (4), pp. 921-942 
 
Thomas, S., Normand, C. & Smith, S. (2006). Social Health Insurance: Options for 
Ireland. Dublin: The Adelaide Hospital Society 
 
Thomas, S., Normand, C. & Smith, S. (2008). Social Health Insurance: Further 
Options for Ireland. Dublin: The Adelaide Hospital Society 
 
Thomasson, M. (2002): Did Blue Cross and Blue Shield Suffer From Adverse 
Selection?  Evidence From The 1950s. NBER Working Paper No. 9167. Cambridge, 
MA: National Bureau of Economic Research 
 
Thomson, S. & Mossialos, E. (2007): Regulating Private Health Insurance in the 
European Union: The Implications of Single Market Legislation and Competition 
Policy. European Integration, 29 (1), pp 89-107 
 
 395 
Thomson, S. & Mossialos, E. (2008): Internal Market Rules and Regulation of 
Private Health Insurance: Threat or Opportunity? Euro Observer, 10 (3), pp 7-9 
 
Thomson, S., Foubister, T. & Mossialos, E. (2009): Financing Health Care in the 
European Union: Challenges and Policy Responses. Copenhagen: World Health 
Organization on behalf of the European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies 
 
Turner, B. (2006): How Do Irish Consumers View Private Health Insurance? Paper 
presented at the Irish Academy of Management Annual Conference, University 
College Cork, September 2006 
 
US Department of Health and Human Services (2009): Coverage Denied: How the 
Current Health Insurance System Leaves Millions Behind. Available at 
http://www.healthreform.gov/reports/denied_coverage/coveragedenied.pdf. 
Accessed on 25 August 2009 
 
Van de Ven, W. (1990): From Regulated Cartel to Regulated Competition in the 
Dutch Health Care System. European Economic Review, 34 (2-3), pp 632-645 
 
Van de Ven, W. & Ellis, R. (2000): Risk Adjustment in Competitive Health Plan 
Markets. In Culyer, A. & Newhouse, J. (Eds.), Handbook of Health Economics, 
Volume 1. Amsterdam: Elsevier 
 
Van de Ven, W. & Schut, F. (2009): Managed Competition in the Netherlands: Still 
Work-in-Progress. Health Economics, 18 (3), pp 253-255 
 
Van de Ven, W., Van Vliet, R., Schut, F. & Van Barneveld, E. (2000): Access to 
Coverage for High-Risks in a Competitive Individual Health Insurance Market: Via 
Premium Rate Restrictions or Risk-Adjusted Premium Subsidies? Journal of Health 
Economics, 19 (3), pp 311-339 
 
Van de Ven, W., van Vliet, R., van Barneveld, E. & Lamers, L. (1994): Risk-
Adjusted Capitation: Recent Experiences in the Netherlands. Health Affairs, 13 (5), 
pp 120-136 
 
Van Kleef, R., Beck, K., van de Ven, W. & van Vliet, R. (2008): Risk Equalization 
and Voluntary Deductibles: A Complex Interaction. Journal of Health Economics, 
27 (2), pp 427-443 
 
VHI (2003): Annual Report and Accounts, 2003. Dublin: Voluntary Health 
Insurance Board 
 
VHI (2007): Annual Report and Accounts, 2007. Dublin: Voluntary Health 
Insurance Board 
 
 396 
VHI (2008a): Annual Report and Accounts 2008. Dublin: Voluntary Health 
Insurance Board 
 
VHI (2008b): Vhi Healthcare announces average price increase of 23% to fund the 
costs of its customers’ high quality medical care needs. Available at 
http://www.vhi.ie/press/281108.jsp. Accessed on 28 November 2008 
 
VHI (2009): Annual Report and Accounts, 2008. Dublin: Voluntary Health 
Insurance Board 
 
Vrangbaek, K. (2009): Going Private? The Growth of Voluntary Health Insurance in 
Denmark. Eurohealth, 15 (2), pp 5-8 
 
Wagstaff, A. (2009): Social Health Insurance vs. Tax-Financed Health Systems – 
Evidence from the OECD. Policy Research Working Paper 4821. Washington DC: 
World Bank 
 
Wallis, G. (2004): The Demand for Private Medical Insurance.  Economic Trends, 
606, pp 46-56 
 
Waterson, M. (2001): The Role of Consumers in Competition and Competition 
Policy. A paper prepared for a plenary session at the EARIE meeting in Trinity 
College, Dublin, August/September 2001. 
 
WHO (2009a): National Health Accounts: Ireland.  World Health Organization.  
http://www.who.int/nha/country/irl/en/  Accessed on 03 July 2009 
 
WHO (2009b): WHO Statistical Information Service, Detailed database search. 
Available at http://www.who.int/whosis/data/Search.jsp, Accessed on 27 July 2009 
 
Wilcox, S. (2001): Promoting Private Health Insurance in Australia. Health Affairs, 
20 (3), pp 152-161 
 
Wooldridge, J. (2002): Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 
 
Wren, M-A. (2003): Unhealthy State: Anatomy of a Sick Society. Dublin: New 
Island 
 
Wright, D. (2006): Insurance and Monopoly Power in a Mixed Private/Public 
Hospital System. Economic Record, 82 (259), pp 460-468 
 
YHEC (2003): Assessment of Risk Equalisation and Competition in the Irish Health 
Insurance Market – Final Report. York: York Health Economics Consortium 
 
 397 
Relevant Legislation 
 
 
Primary Legislation (Ireland) 
 
Voluntary Health Insurance Act, 1957 (No. 1 of 1957) 
 
Health Insurance Act, 1994 (No. 16 of 1994) 
 
Voluntary Health Insurance (Amendment) Act, 1996 (No. 4 of 1996) 
 
Voluntary Health Insurance (Amendment) Act, 1998 (No. 46 of 1998) 
 
Health Insurance (Amendment) Act, 2001 (No. 17 of 2001) 
 
Health Insurance (Amendment) Act, 2003 (No. 11 of 2003) 
 
Voluntary Health Insurance (Amendment) Act, 2008 (No. 6 of 2008) 
 
Health Insurance (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 2009 (No. 24 of 2009) 
 
 
Secondary Legislation (Ireland) 
 
Health Insurance Act, 1994 (Registration) Regulations, 1996 (S.I. No. 80 of 1996) 
 
Health Insurance Act, 1994 (Open Enrolment) Regulations, 1996 (S.I. No. 81 of 
1996) 
 
Health Insurance Act, 1994 (Lifetime Cover) Regulations, 1996 (S.I. No. 82 of 
1996) 
 
Health Insurance Act, 1994 (Minimum Benefit) Regulations, 1996 (S.I. No. 83 of 
1996) 
 
Health Insurance Act, 1994 (Risk Equalisation Scheme), 1996 (S.I. No. 84 of 1996) 
 
Health Insurance Act, 1994 (Commencement) Order, 1999 (S.I. No. 28 of 1999) 
 
Health Insurance Act, 1994 (Risk Equalisation) (Revocation) Regulations, 1999 (S.I. 
No. 32 of 1999) 
 
Risk Equalisation Scheme, 2003 (S.I. No. 261 of 2003) 
 
Risk Equalisation (Amendment) Scheme, 2003 (S.I. No. 710 of 2003) 
 
 398 
Health Insurance Act, 2001 (Open Enrolment) Regulations, 2005 (S.I. No. 332 of 
2005) 
 
Health Insurance Act, 1994 (Minimum Benefit) (Amendment) Regulations, 2005 
(S.I. No. 333 of 2005) 
 
Risk Equalisation (Amendment) Scheme, 2005 (S.I. No. 334 of 2005) 
 
Health Insurance Act, 1994 (Registration) (Amendment) Regulations, 2005 (S.I. No. 
335 of 2005) 
 
Voluntary Health Insurance (Amendment) Act 2008 (Appointment of Date Pursuant 
to Subsection (5)(b) of Section 2 of the Voluntary Health Insurance (Amendment) 
Act 1996) Order, 2009 (S.I. No. 124 of 2009) 
 
Voluntary Health Insurance (Amendment) Act 2008 (Commencement) Order, 2009 
(S.I. No. 213 of 2009) 
 
Voluntary Health Insurance (Amendment) Act 2008 (Appointment of Date Pursuant 
to Subsection (5)(b) of Section 2 of the Voluntary Health Insurance (Amendment) 
Act 1996) (No. 2) Order, 2009 (S.I. No. 342 of 2009) 
 
 
European Legislation 
 
European Commission (1973): “First Council Directive 73/239/EEC of 24 July 1973 
on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the 
taking-up and pursuit of the business of direct insurance other than life assurance.” 
OJ L 228 (16.9.1973): 3-19 
 
European Commission (1988): “Second Council Directive 88/357/EEC of 22 June 
1988 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating 
to direct insurance other than life assurance and laying down provisions to facilitate 
the effective exercise of freedom to provide services and amending Directive 
73/239/EEC.” OJ L 172 (4.7.1988): 1 
 
European Commission (1992): “Council Directive 92/49/EEC of 18 June 1992 on 
the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to direct 
insurance other than life assurance (third non-life insurance Directive).” OJ L 228 
(11.8.1992): 1-23 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 399 
Court Judgments 
 
Ireland – High Court 
 
BUPA Ireland Ltd & Anor -v- Health Insurance Authority & Ors: Judgement of Mr. 
Justice William M. McKechnie, delivered on the 23
rd
 day of November, 2006. 
[2006] IEHC 431. 
 
Ireland – Supreme Court 
 
BUPA Ireland Limited & anor –v- Health Insurance Authority & ors: Judgment of 
Murray C.J. delivered on the 16
th
 day of July 2008. [2008] IESC 42. 
 
Luxembourg – European Court of First Instance 
 
British United Provident Association Ltd (BUPA), BUPA Insurance Ltd & BUPA 
Ireland Ltd –v- Commission of the European Communities. Judgment of the Court 
of First Instance (Third Chamber, Extended Composition), 12 February 2008. Case 
T-289/03 
 
 400 
APPENDIX A 
TEXT OF SECTIONS 7 AND 12 OF THE HEALTH INSURANCE ACT, 1994 
AS AMENDED BY THE HEALTH INSURANCE (AMENDMENT) ACT, 2001 
 
 
Section 7 
 
7.—(1) (a) Subject to subsection (4) and section 7A, the premium payable under any 
health insurance contract effected by a particular registered undertaking shall be the 
same as that payable under every other such contract (after due allowance has been 
made in respect of the payment of any premium by instalments) that— 
 
(i) is effected by that undertaking, 
 
(ii) is in respect of the same period as that to which the first-mentioned contract 
relates, 
 
(iii) relates to the same health services as those to which the first-mentioned contract 
relates, and 
 
(iv) provides for the same payments by the undertaking in respect of those services 
as those provided for by the first-mentioned contract. 
 
(b) A registered undertaking shall not effect a health insurance contract that 
contravenes paragraph (a). 
 
(c) A health insurance contract that complies with paragraph (a) (or which would 
comply with that paragraph but for its falling within subsection (4) or section 7A) 
shall be known as a community rated health insurance contract and ‘community 
rating’ shall be construed accordingly. 
 
(2) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1), premiums payable under 
health insurance contracts shall not be varied by reference to— 
 
(a) the age, sex or sexual orientation or the suffering or prospective suffering of a 
person from a chronic disease, illness or other medical condition or from a disease, 
illness or medical condition of a particular kind, 
 
(b) the frequency of the provision of health services to a person, or 
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(c) the amounts of payments or the number of different payments to which a person 
becomes entitled under such a contract. 
 
(3) The amounts of the payments provided by a health insurance contract in respect 
of the health services to which it relates shall not be varied by reference to the age, 
sex or sexual orientation of the person to whom those services are provided. 
 
(4) Notwithstanding subsections (1) and (2), a premium payable under a health 
insurance contract effected by a registered undertaking— 
 
(a) shall, in so far as it relates to a person under the age of 18 years, be— 
 
(i) waived, or 
 
(ii) reduced, such a premium being not more than 50 per cent of the premium in 
respect of a person other than the persons specified in this subsection under a health 
insurance contract effected by that undertaking, 
 
and 
 
(b) may be reduced in so far as it relates— 
 
(i) to a person who is of or over the age of 18 years and under the age of 23 years, is 
receiving fulltime education and is dependent on the person with whom the contract 
is effected, such a premium being not more than 50 per cent of the premium in 
respect of a person other than the persons specified in this subsection under a health 
insurance contract effected by that undertaking, 
 
(ii) to a person who is a member of a restricted membership undertaking and is in 
receipt of a pension recognised for the purposes of the undertaking, or 
 
(iii) to a person who is a member, for the purposes of health insurance, of a group of 
persons, such a premium being, if it is reduced, not less than 90 per cent of the 
premium in respect of a person other than the persons specified in this subsection 
under a health insurance contract effected by that undertaking. 
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Section 12 
 
12.—(1) The Minister may prescribe a scheme or schemes of risk equalisation 
(which or each of which shall be known as a risk equalisation scheme and is referred 
to in this Act as ‘a scheme’). 
 
(2) (a) Subject to paragraphs (b) and (c), a scheme shall apply to each registered 
undertaking and each such undertaking shall comply with the terms and conditions 
of the scheme. 
 
(b) A scheme may include a provision specifying that the scheme shall not, at any 
time on and from the service on the Minister of the notice hereafter referred to, apply 
to a restricted membership undertaking which— 
 
(i) was carrying on business in the State before the commencement of section 9 of 
the Health Insurance (Amendment) Act, 2001, and 
 
(ii) was, on 1 May 2000, a registered undertaking, 
 
if, before a date specified for the purposes of this subsection by the Minister, the 
undertaking serves a notice on the Minister stating that it does not wish any scheme 
to apply to it. 
 
(c) A scheme may include a provision specifying that the scheme shall not apply to 
so much of the activities of a registered undertaking as consist of effecting health 
insurance contracts that solely provide for the making of payments for the 
reimbursement or discharge in whole or in part of fees or charges in respect of the 
provision of relevant health services. 
 
(3) (a) A scheme shall include a provision requiring each registered undertaking to 
make returns (each of which is referred to in this Act as a ‘return’) to the Authority 
in relation to such matters concerning its health insurance business as may be 
prescribed. 
 
(b) The provision referred to in paragraph (a) shall require a return to be made— 
 
(i) in the case of the first return, in respect of such period as may be prescribed, 
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(ii) in the case of the second or any subsequent return, in respect of each period of— 
 
(I) 3 months, or 
 
(II) such greater duration as may be prescribed, 
 
and to be so made not later than such number of days after the end of the period to 
which it relates as may be prescribed. 
 
(4) (a) A scheme shall include a provision requiring— 
 
(i) the making of payments by registered undertakings to the Authority of such 
amounts as may be determined by the Authority in such manner and by reference to 
such matters as may be specified in the scheme (including the nature and distribution 
of insured risks amongst the undertakings), 
 
(ii) the making of payments by the Authority of such amounts as may be determined 
by the Authority to such registered undertakings as may be so determined in such 
manner and by reference to such matters as may be specified in the scheme 
(including the nature and distribution of insured risks amongst the undertakings). 
 
(b) The provision referred to in paragraph (a) shall provide that the requirements of 
the provision shall not have effect until such day as the Minister determines and 
appoints for that purpose in accordance with the provision of the scheme referred to 
in paragraph (c). 
 
(c) A scheme shall include a provision— 
 
(i) requiring the Authority to— 
 
(I) evaluate and analyse each return made to it (and such an evaluation and analysis 
shall be made by reference to the matters that are specified in the scheme for the 
purposes of the provision referred to in paragraph (a)), 
 
(II) prepare and furnish to the Minister, at such intervals as may be prescribed, a 
report in relation to— 
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(A) such an evaluation and analysis in so far as it relates to returns made to it in a 
prescribed period, and 
 
(B) matters concerning the carrying on of health insurance business and 
developments in relation to health insurance generally that the Authority considers 
ought to be included in the report as a result of that evaluation and analysis, 
 
(III) if it appears to the Authority from such an evaluation and analysis that 
conditions specified in the scheme related to the nature and distribution of insured 
risks amongst the registered undertakings are fulfilled, include in that report a 
recommendation by it that the Minister ought or ought not (as it considers 
appropriate having regard to the best overall interests of health insurance consumers) 
to exercise the power hereafter mentioned in this subsection, 
 
(ii) providing that the Minister shall consider any such report made to him or her 
under the provision and— 
 
(I) if the report includes a recommendation by the Authority that the Minister ought 
to exercise the power referred to in this subparagraph, may, or 
 
(II) if it appears to the Minister that conditions specified in the scheme related to the 
nature and distribution of insured risks amongst the registered undertakings are 
fulfilled, shall (unless it appears to the Minister, having consulted with the Authority 
in relation to the best overall interests of health insurance consumers, that there are 
good reasons for not doing so), determine that the requirements of the provision 
referred to in paragraph (a) shall have effect on and from a specified day and appoint 
a day for that purpose accordingly. 
 
(5) The provision of a scheme referred to in subsection (4)(c) shall require the 
Authority, if it appears to the Authority that a recommendation of the kind referred 
to in that provision is required to be included in a report under that provision, to— 
 
(a) give notice to each registered undertaking of the fact that it proposes to include 
such a recommendation in the report, the nature of that proposed recommendation 
and the reasons therefor, 
 
(b) invite, by means of that notice, the undertaking to make, within 21 days from the 
date of the service of the notice on the undertaking, representations to the Authority 
in relation to the nature of the recommendation that, in the undertaking's opinion, 
ought to be included in the report, and 
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(c) take into account any such representations made to it within that period before 
finally deciding what the nature of the said recommendation ought to be. 
 
(6) The provision of a scheme referred to in subsection (4)(c) shall require the 
Minister, if he or she proposes to make a determination of the kind referred to in 
subparagraph (ii) of that subsection, to— 
 
(a) give notice to each registered undertaking of the fact that he or she proposes to 
make such a determination (and the day proposed to be appointed under that 
provision accordingly) and the reasons for that proposed determination, 
 
(b) invite, by means of that notice, the undertaking to make, within 21 days from the 
date of the service of the notice on the undertaking, representations to the Minister 
as to why, in the undertaking's opinion, the said determination ought not to be made, 
and 
 
(c) shall take into account any such representations made to him or her within that 
period before finally deciding whether to make the said determination. 
 
(7) A scheme may provide— 
 
(a) that a registered undertaking which has made a return shall, on request being 
made of it to do so by the Authority, furnish to the Authority such information or 
documents in its possession or capable of being procured by it and forming the basis 
of that return as is or are specified in the request and that the undertaking shall 
comply with such a request not later than 7 days from the date the request is made, 
 
(b) that a report referred to in subsection (4)(c)(i)(II) shall be in such form, and 
contain such particulars in relation to the evaluation and analysis concerned, as the 
Minister determines. 
 
(8) A scheme may provide that a registered undertaking which has made 
representations under the provision of the scheme referred to in subparagraph (i) or 
(ii) of subsection (4)(c) to the Authority or, as the case may be, the Minister shall, on 
request being made of it to do so by the Authority or the Minister, as appropriate, 
furnish to the Authority or the Minister such information or documents in its 
possession or capable of being procured by it and forming the basis of those 
representations as is or are specified in the request and that the undertaking shall 
comply with such a request not later than 7 days from the date the request is made. 
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(9) A scheme may provide— 
 
(a) for the establishment and maintenance by the Authority of a fund into which all 
moneys paid to the Authority under the scheme shall be paid and out of which all 
moneys paid by the Authority under the scheme shall be paid, and 
 
(b) for the keeping by the Authority of specified accounts in relation to the scheme 
and the furnishing of copies of those accounts, as audited by the Comptroller and 
Auditor General, and copies of the reports of the Comptroller and Auditor General 
thereon to the Minister at specified times. 
 
(10) (a) A reference in this section to— 
 
(i) a health insurance consumer is a reference to a person, other than the registered 
undertaking, who is party to, or named in, a health insurance contract or likely to be 
interested in being such a party or being so named, 
 
(ii) insured risks among registered undertakings is a reference to the risks that have 
been respectively insured by the undertakings under health insurance contracts, and 
 
(iii) the best overall interests of health insurance consumers includes a reference to 
the need to maintain the application of community rating across the market for 
health insurance and to facilitate competition between undertakings. 
 
(b) The conditions specified in a scheme for the purposes of the provision of the 
scheme referred to in subsection (4)(c)(i)(III) may be different from the conditions 
specified in the scheme for the purposes of the provision of the scheme referred to in 
subsection (4)(c)(ii)(II). 
 
(c) The nature and distribution of insured risks amongst registered undertakings to 
which conditions as aforesaid relate may be expressed in the scheme concerned by 
reference to the amounts that would fall to be paid to or by a particular registered 
undertaking or undertakings under the provision of the scheme referred to in 
subsection (4)(a) if the requirements of that provision had effect at the time of the 
making of the evaluation and analysis to which the report concerned referred to in 
subsection (4)(c)(i)(II) relates. 
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12A.—(1) The contents of returns shall, in so far as they can be related to individual 
undertakings, be disclosed only where necessary for the functions of the Authority 
or the Minister. 
 
(2) Subject to subsection (1), the Authority may, where it considers it appropriate to 
do so, disclose aggregate data derived from returns (other than returns made to the 
Authority during the period lastly referred to in section 12B(1) by an undertaking 
that has served a notice under and in accordance with that section). 
 
(3) The Minister may engage a person whom he or she considers to be competent 
and qualified to do so to advise him or her and to consult with him or her in relation 
to the functions of the Minister under a scheme. 
 
(4) A payment due by a registered undertaking to the Authority under a scheme may 
be recovered by the Authority from the undertaking as a simple contract debt in any 
court of competent jurisdiction. 
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APPENDIX B 
SIMULATION OF THE INTRODUCTION OF LIFETIME COMMUNITY 
RATING IN IRELAND INCORPORATING AGE-BAND DUMMY 
VARIABLES AND INTERACTION VARIABLES 
 
 
The regression as presented in Table 5.7 was re-run with the addition of dummy 
variables for most of the five-year age bands and interaction dummies, consisting of 
the product of the age band dummy variables and the dummy variable for the 
introduction of lifetime community rating (DUMLTCR).  This was done in order to 
overcome the situation in the simulation whereby the predicted growth rates 
resulting from the introduction of lifetime community rating were the same across 
the broad categories of those unaffected, partially affected and most affected by the 
change.  The results are presented in Table B1. 
 
It should be noted that, as with the previous model, as presented in Table 5.7, serial 
correlation was found to be present in the model as presented here.  The standard 
errors presented in Table B1 are therefore the Period weights (PCSE) standard 
errors. 
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Table B1 Results from Pooled Regression Using Take-up Rates by Age 
1997-2007 as Dependent Variable, Excluding Respondents Aged 0-19 and 90+ 
and Incorporating Age Band Dummy Variables 
 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error 
Constant 34.57966* 0.919993 
GDP Growth (y-on-y) -0.017112 0.078042 
DUMLTCR -0.805527 0.926183 
DUMGRACEPERIOD 2.734654* 0.676385 
DUMUNAFFECTED? -16.20848* 1.219172 
DUMPARTIALAFFECT? 5.911653* 1.219172 
LTCRUNAFFECTED? 12.52492* 1.332385 
LTCRPARTIALAFFECT? 13.09081* 1.332385 
DUM25-29? -0.245707 1.219172 
DUM30-34? -15.04334* 1.219172 
DUM35-39? -11.12867* 1.219172 
DUM40-44? -6.705476* 1.219172 
DUM45-49? -1.840696 1.219172 
DUM50-54? 2.065307** 1.219172 
DUM55-59? 2.526937* 1.219172 
DUM65-69? 4.239522* 1.219172 
DUM70-74? 2.751272* 1.219172 
DUM75-79? -2.171175** 1.219172 
DUM80-84? -1.256885 1.219172 
LTCR25-29? -3.381870* 1.332385 
LTCR30-34? 2.481698** 1.332385 
LTCR35-39? 3.559229* 1.332385 
LTCR40-44? 2.526191** 1.332385 
LTCR45-49? 2.264738** 1.332385 
LTCR50-54? 1.732918 1.332385 
LTCR55-59? 1.914354 1.332385 
LTCR65-69? 8.747802* 1.332385 
LTCR70-74? 6.786796* 1.332385 
LTCR75-79? 8.067971* 1.332385 
LTCR80-84? 1.289083 1.332385 
Total Pool Observations: 560 R
2
: 0.950217 
 
* = Significant at 5% level; ** = Significant at 10% level; Variables followed by a ? 
indicate pooled variables 
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Table B2 presents the actual and predicted take-up rates of private health insurance 
in Ireland before and after a simulated change to lifetime community rating.  This 
table is similar to Table 5.8, but using the results from the regression presented in 
Table B1. 
 
Table B2 Actual and Predicted Take-up Rates by Age in Ireland in Q1 
2005 and Predicted Take-up Rates in Q2 2006 under Simulated Lifetime 
Community Rating using Age Band Dummy Variables and Interaction 
Dummies 
 
Age Band Actual 
Q1 2005 
 
 
 
Y05 
Predicted 
Q1 2005 
 
 
 
y05 
Predicted 
Q2 2006 
 
 
 
y06 
Predicted 
Growth 
 
 
 
G = y06 - y05 
Actual Q1 
2005 + 
Predicted 
Growth 
 
Y05 + G 
20-24 43 19 31 12 54 
25-29 35 19 27 8 43 
30-34 52 26 41 15 66 
35-39 59 30 46 16 75 
40-44 57 35 50 15 72 
45-49 58 40 54 15 72 
50-54 64 43 57 14 79 
55-59 64 44 58 14 78 
60-64 56 41 54 12 68 
65-69 63 40 48 8 71 
70-74 32 38 44 6 38 
75-79 23 33 41 7 30 
80-84 32 34 35 0 32 
85-89 23 35 35 -1 22 
 
